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If we can measure the success of a political concept by the frequency with 
which it is used in speeches and texts, then ‘citizenship’ has been hugely 
successful. A quick search on Google Scholar shows 1.87 million academic 
texts where the English version of the concept comes up. The use of the 
concept in all English language texts registered by Google peaked first 
around 1920, declined then continuously until the early 1980s, and has since 
risen steeply to a new record frequency around the turn of the millennium.
Since so many authors talk about citizenship the content associated with 
the concept is likely to become less precise. Citizenship is indeed used today 
in many contexts where it would have seemed oddly out of place in the past. 
Big companies advertise their ‘corporate citizenship’, users of internet- 
based social networks are addressed as cyber citizens and political philoso-
phers and activists campaign for animal citizenship. The present volume 
sticks to the core meaning of citizenship since the times of the Athenian and 
Roman republics as a status of equal membership in a political community. 
Since the French and American Revolutions, citizenship has become most 
closely associated with nationality: a legal status that attributes responsibil-
ity for individuals to states and a bundle of rights and obligations assigned 
to individuals by states. The broad new literatures on citizenship of minori-
ties or on citizenship as a practice of contestation in social movements gen-
erally assume national citizenship as a stable background. They discuss 
inequalities and exclusions among those who share the same legal status and 
rights of national citizenship. This is an important agenda, but it needs to be 
broadened by examining how the presumptively stable background of 
national citizenship itself is gradually shifting.
This question drives the four debates collected in the present volume. 
The first of these raises a question that is not entirely new in historical 
 perspective, but that has gained new salience in contexts of globalisation, 
mobility and rising global inequalities of income and wealth: Should citi-
zenship be for sale? And does the sale of passports to investors change the 
very nature of citizenship by turning it from a stable legal bond into a mar-
ketable commodity?
The second debate examines another phenomenon that had been com-
mon in ancient and medieval republics: banishing citizens from the polity as 
punishment for law-breaking or as a precautionary removal of those who 
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have become a threat. These practices have witnessed a recent comeback in 
liberal democracies that deprive terrorist suspects of their nationality in 
order to make them deportable or to prevent them from returning. How con-
cerned should we be about this trend given the small numbers of affected 
individuals and the severity of the threat they pose? Does it signal an erosion 
of the idea that liberal states may control admission to citizenship but should 
not have the power to deprive citizens of their nationality – abdicating 
thereby also their responsibility to protect or to punish them?
The third and fourth debates look more explicitly towards the future and 
consider how changing social norms and new technologies may affect the 
substance and salience of national citizenship. National citizenship is always 
acquired by birth and all states use a principle of ius sanguinis. In the large 
majority of countries, citizenship is bestowed upon those born to citizen 
parents independently of their country of birth. Ius soli, i.e. citizenship 
acquired by birth in the territory is the dominant principle only in the 
Americas, but even there second generations born abroad are citizens by 
descent. The debate on the future of ius sanguinis asks how this most basic 
and widespread rule for citizenship attribution is going to be affected by new 
patterns of family relations and new reproductive technologies. Will bio-
logical descent continue to count for more than social relations of children 
to their caregivers? And will these changes provide opportunities for aban-
doning ius sanguinis altogether and replacing it with territorial citizenship 
based on birth and residence in a country?
The fourth and last debate challenges this possible conclusion by point-
ing to another major transformation of contemporary societies: the digital 
revolution that offers also new opportunities for global citizenship. Can 
blockchain technology provide every human being with a single global legal 
persona and will it permit the creation of political communities without ter-
ritory? Would such developments complement or replace the existing func-
tions of citizenship in territorial states? Or will the latter instead capture new 
digital technologies in order to enhance their control over society?
The debates collected in this volume follow certain rules. The texts are 
not freestanding submissions to a blog or edited volume. Each author was 
invited to respond not only to the introductory kick-off essay but also to the 
comments previously published online. Authors were invited based on their 
expertise and stances on the topic, with the aim of representing a broad spec-
trum of reasonable views. This unusual format avoids repetition and simu-
lates a conversation among people who disagree with each other but are 
ready to listen and address each other’s arguments.
Preface
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The outcome provides those who lack the time to plough through thick 
piles of journal articles and books with a concise overview of debates that 
are not purely academic, since they are conducted in a non-technical lan-
guage and reflect concerns that are widely discussed among policy makers 
and engaged citizens. Together with its companion volume ‘Debating 
European Citizenship’ this book will hopefully also be used widely for 
teaching students what citizenship is about and what challenges it currently 
faces.
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Part I: Should Citizenship Be for Sale?
Abstract
On 12 November 2013 the Maltese Parliament decided to offer Maltese and 
European citizenship at the price of € 650,000, but implementation of the 
law was postponed due to strong domestic and international critiques. On 23 
December, the Maltese government announced significant amendments, 
including a higher total amount of € 1,150,000, part of which has to be 
invested in real estate and government bonds. Several other European states 
have adopted ‘golden passport’ programmes. Should citizenship be for sale? 
In November 2013 EUDO CITIZENSHIP invited Ayelet Shachar of the 
University of Toronto Law School to open a debate on these controversial 
policies. Twelve authors have contributed short commentaries, most of 
which refer to the initial law adopted by the Maltese Parliament. An execu-
tive summary by Rainer Bauböck provides an overview over the main ques-
tions raised in our Forum.
The contributions to this Forum on ‘citizenship for sale’ were published 
and disseminated to Members of the European Parliament shortly before a 
plenary debate on 15 January 2014 in the European Parliament. After hear-
ing a statement by EU Commissioner Viviane Reding, the EP passed a reso-
lution condemning the Maltese policy.
Keywords
Citizenship acquisition · Investor citizenship programmes · European 
 citizenship · Commodification · Malta
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Summary: Global, European and National  
Questions About the Price of Citizenship
Rainer Bauböck
The Forum Debate ‘Should citizenship be for Sale?’ collected comments 
representing a wide range of views and some highly original arguments. 
They can be summarised by distinguishing global, European and national 
perspectives.
 (1) Global questions
From a global perspective, several authors argue that citizenship has become 
primarily a resource for mobility. Globalisation has already deeply under-
mined national citizenship as a bond between individuals and states and the 
sale of passports is just a symptom of an irreversible commodification of 
citizenship (Spiro). The primary value of citizenship lies in the mobility 
rights attached to passports. The high price put by the Maltese Parliament on 
Maltese passports reflects the instrumental value of free movement rights 
attached to EU citizenship for the wealthy and mobile global elites.
Some authors defend the sale of citizenship by pointing out that it is less 
arbitrary and more transparent than other ways of acquiring citizenship (e.g. 
Kochenov), while others suggest that giving the ultra-rich privileged access 
to ‘global mobility corridors’ (Barbulescu) raises concerns about fairness 
and justice (e.g. Owen). Instead of offering their citizenship for money, 
democratic states could bestow it on persons who are threatened by persecu-
tion or who fight for democratic values as a means of protection or exit 
option (Paskalev).
 (2) European questions
Several comments emphasize that selling EU passports amounts to free- 
riding on the shared EU assets of free internal movement and external visa- 
waiver agreements created jointly by all Member States (e.g. Magni-Berton). 
Investor-citizenship programmes are, however, not the only instance. Many 
EU countries offer privileged access to EU citizenship to large populations 
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outside the EU territory on grounds of distant ancestry or co-ethnic identity, 
obliging thereby all other Member States to admit immigrants from third 
countries to their territories and labour markets as EU citizens (Shaw).
Since EU citizenship is derived from Member State nationality and 
determining the latter remains an exclusive competence of Member States, 
EU law does not provide much leverage against either the sale of EU pass-
ports or other policies of creating new EU citizens without genuine links to 
any EU country. Several authors raise, however, the question whether the 
principle of proportionality established by the Court of Justice of the EU if 
withdrawal of Member State nationality leads to a loss of EU citizenship 
could also be applied to national rules regulating the acquisition of citizen-
ship (Shaw, Shachar, Swoboda).
Independently of the issue of legality these authors suggest that the 
European Parliament is the institution that is best suited for addressing the 
issue. Instead of asking for intervention against particular Member States, 
they call for a broader debate on shared principles that ought to guide 
Member State policies in matters of citizenship.
 (3) National questions
Most authors in our Forum defend a conception of citizenship as member-
ship in a democratic community. From this perspective, selling membership 
seems odious in the same way that selling the franchise in elections is 
(Shachar, Bauböck). Citizenship is considered as the kind of good that 
money should not be able to buy (Ochoa).
Magni-Berton argues, however, that monetary investment can be a way 
of contributing to the common good of a political community and should 
therefore not be summarily dismissed as a legitimate reason for acquiring 
citizenship. In his view, the high price indicates the real problem, which is 
artificial scarcity created through exclusionary rules for access to national 
citizenship.
Authors disagree on whether citizenship acquisition based on purchase 
or investment is more arbitrary than the common rules of ius sanguinis, ius 
soli or residence-based naturalisation. Some consider all of these member-
ship mechanisms as essentially arbitrary or discriminatory (e.g. Armstrong, 
Kochenov), whereas Bauböck defends them as supporting equal member-
ship in intergenerational communities.
From a global justice perspective, ‘golden residence programmes’ that 
provide investors with privileged access to permanent residence status seem 
R. Bauböck
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to be just as unfair towards the poor as ‘golden passport programmes’. From 
a democratic citizenship perspective, however, the former are less problem-
atic since they maintain a condition of residence and thus a ‘genuine link 
test’ for access to citizenship (e.g. Dzankic, Shachar, Owen).
Other authors acknowledge that states have legitimate interests in ‘invit-
ing the rich, the beautiful and the smart’ (Kochenov) and that investor citi-
zenship is not essentially different from the widespread practice of offering 
citizenship to prominent sportsmen and –women (Owen). Chris Armstrong 
observes that some states offer citizenship to foreigners who have served in 
their army or have otherwise provided exceptional service to the country. If 
investors really help to save a country from financial breakdown, offering 
them citizenship may be justified on grounds of emergency relief. Other 
authors are, however, sceptical that those who are only interested in addi-
tional mobility rights can be made to invest their wealth permanently and 
productively (Dzankic).
Apart from the lack of a ‘genuine link’ criterion, a global market for citi-
zenship status is also seen as corrupting democracy by breaking down the 
wall that separates the spheres of money and power. Several contributions 
argue that there is a broader trend towards relinking citizenship acquisition 
to social class, which manifests itself, on the one hand, in offering citizen-
ship to the rich and, on the other hand, in income and knowledge tests for 
ordinary naturalisations of foreign residents (Shachar, Barbulescu, Dzankic, 
Bauböck, Owen, Swoboda).
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Dangerous Liaisons: Money and Citizenship
Ayelet Shachar
Vogue predictions that citizenship is diminishing in relevance or perhaps 
even vanishing outright, popular among jetsetters who already possess full 
membership status in affluent democracies, have failed to reach many appli-
cants still knocking on the doors of well-off polities. One can excuse the 
world’s destitute, those who are willing to risk their lives in search of the 
promised lands of migration in Europe or America, for not yet having heard 
the prophecies about citizenship’s decline. But the same is not true for the 
well-heeled who are increasingly active in the market for citizenship: the 
ultra-rich from the rest of the world. They are willing to dish out hundreds 
of thousands of dollars to gain a freshly-minted passport in their new ‘home 
country.’ That this demand exists is not fully surprising given that this is a 
world of regulated mobility and unequal opportunity, and a world where not 
all passports are treated equally at border crossings. Rapid processes of mar-
ket expansionism have now reached what for many is the most sacrosanct 
non-market good: membership in a political community. More puzzling is 
the willingness of governments – our public trustees and legal guardians of 
citizenship – to engage in processes that come very close to, and in some 
cases cannot be described as anything but, the sale and barter of membership 
goods in exchange for a hefty bank wire transfer or large stack of cash.
Everybody knows that immigration is among the most contentious pol-
icy issues of our times, and recent years have witnessed a ‘restrictive turn’1 
with respect to ordinary immigration and naturalisation applicants, such as 
those who enter on the basis of a family reunification claim or for humani-
tarian reasons. The situation is different, however, for the world’s moneyed 
elite, who can sidestep many of the standard requirements for settlement by 
‘buying’ their way into the political community. The public act of 
 naturalisation – of turning a non-member into a citizen – has always borne 
an air of legal magic, with the result that it is the ‘most densely regulated and 
1 Joppke, C. (2007), ‘Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for 
Immigrants in Western Europe’, West European Politics 30 (1): 1-22; Orgad, 
L. (2010), ‘Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Reflections on Migration and Access 
to Citizenship in Europe’, American Journal of Comparative Law 58: 53-106.
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most politicized aspect of citizenship laws’2. At stake is the regulation of the 
most important and sensitive decision that any political community faces: 
how to define who belongs, or ought to belong, within its circle of members. 
Not everyone knows, however, that governments are now proactively facili-
tating faster and smoother access to citizenship for those who can pay. 
Revealing insights about the current state of citizenship can be gained, I will 
argue in this short essay, by examining who is given this red-carpet treat-
ment, and on what basis.
Consider the following examples. Affluent foreign investors were offered 
citizenship in Cyprus as ‘compensation’ for their Cypriot bank account 
deposit losses. In 2012, Portugal introduced a ‘golden residence permit’ to 
attract real estate and other investments by well-to-do individuals seeking a 
foothold in the EU. Spain recently adopted a similar plan. On 12 November 
2013, Malta approved amendments to its Citizenship Act that put in place a 
new individual investor legal category that will allow high-net-worth appli-
cants to gain a ‘golden passport’ in return for € 650,000; this sum was later 
increased to 1.15 million, opening a gilded backdoor to European citizen-
ship. Under these cash-for-passport programmes, many of the requirements 
that ordinarily apply to those seeking naturalisation, such as language com-
petency, extended residency periods or renunciation of another citizenship, 
are waived as part of an active competition, if not an outright bidding war, 
to attract the ultra-rich. Portugal, for example, offers a fast track for quali-
fied applicants that entitles them to a 5 year permanent residence permit, 
visa-free travel in Schengen countries, the right to bring in their immediate 
family members, and ultimately the right to acquire Portuguese citizenship 
and with it the benefits of EU citizenship. This package comes with a hefty 
price tag: a capital transfer investment of € 1 million, a real estate property 
purchase at a value of € 500,000, or the creation of local jobs. The invest-
ment needs to remain active in Portugal for the programme’s duration. Alas, 
the individual who gains the golden permit bears no similar obligation. 
Simply spending 7 days in Portugal during the first year and fourteen days 
in the subsequent years is enough to fulfil the programme’s requirements. So 
much for the conclusion of the International Court of Justice in the 1955 
Nottebohm decision that ‘real and effective ties’ between the individual and 
the state are expected to undergird the grant of citizenship.
2 Bauböck, R. & S. Wallace Goodman (2010), ‘Naturalisation’, EUDO 




In Malta, recipients of the golden passport will be vetted in accordance 
with a discretionary ministerial act that puts in place little transparency and 
accountability. Government officials have made clear that applicants can 
expect an expedited treatment, meaning that they will not have to ‘stand in 
the queue’ like everyone else. In addition, the names of golden passport 
recipients would remain confidential, making it close to impossible ever to 
know to whom the polity has sold a precious part of its soul. This last provi-
sion has raised the ire of the opposition. Their concern is that concealing the 
identity of those who gain membership by literally purchasing citizenship 
makes it so that ‘Maltese [a]re now being denied the right to know who is 
Maltese’3. The secrecy provision was eventually withdrawn in the eleventh 
hour, but the basic structure of the programme remains intact: privileged and 
fast-track naturalisation, allowing ‘any Tom, Dick and Harry … [to] buy a 
Maltese passport without ever setting foot on Maltese soil.’ A recent survey4 
shows that the vast majority of the population opposes the sale of citizenship 
in principle, and rejects this scheme in particular, detached as it is from any 
residence or other requirements that would establish ties with the passport- 
granting country and society.
Beyond Europe, those seeking a new passport can look to St. Kitts and 
Nevis, where economic citizenship can be purchased for as low as $ 250,000 
(for a lump sum) or $ 400,000 (if monies are directed to a real estate proj-
ect), and issued within months. They might also consider Antigua and 
Barbuda, which is the latest in a growing list of countries to roll out a 
citizenship- by-investment programme or the Commonwealth of Dominica. 
Whereas ordinarily the law requires significant residence periods for those 
seeking naturalisation in these island nations (fourteen years in St Kitts and 
Nevis, seven years in the Commonwealth of Dominica and in Antigua and 
Barbuda, respectively), the residency requirement is reduced to merely 
seven days – a short vacation under the tropical sun – or even waived alto-
gether for those who purchase their fast-tracked passport.
The citizenship-by-investment programmes that I have just described 
fall into the category of what we might call unfettered cash-for-passport 
exchanges. No ‘nexi’ between the country and the passport recipient are 
3 ‘Updated. Mario de Marco: “Opposition will not support prostitution of 
Malta’s identity, citizenship”’, Malta Today, 9 November 2013, available at 
https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/31325/opposition-proposes-
change-of-name-to-individual-donor-programme-20131109#.Ws3jxHK-nZs
4 ‘Contentious citizenship scheme approved’, Malta Today, 12 November 2013, 
available at https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/31402/contentious-
citizenship-scheme-approved-20131112#.Ws3i9XK-nZs
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required; only the investment monies must ‘reside’ in the country for a fixed 
term. This is to be distinguished from more traditional programmes, them-
selves the subject of perennial critique, under which migrant millionaires (to 
borrow David Ley’s apt term) can receive an admission visa through a des-
ignated business-investment stream, but would then have to more or less 
comply with standard residency and naturalisation requirements5. Such pro-
grammes are found in, among other places, Australia, New Zealand, Hong 
Kong, the United Kingdom and the United States. Both kinds of programme 
raise serious ethical quandaries, but the unfettered cash-for-passport pro-
grammes are more extreme and blatant than the traditional investment pro-
grammes. They contribute to some of the most disturbing developments in 
21st-century citizenship, including the emergence of new forms of inequality 
and stratification. Instead of retreating to the background as some theorists 
had forecasted, states are proactively creating and exacerbating inequalities 
through their selective and managed migration policies, setting up easy-pass 
citizenship for some while making membership more restrictive and diffi-
cult to achieve for others. This new world order reveals tectonic pressures 
and introduces urgent dilemmas about the proper scale, scope and relations 
of justice and mobility, citizenship and (selective) openness. These develop-
ments also bear a profound impact on immigration law and policy on the 
ground, since they entail processes through which the boundary between 
state and market is constantly being tested, eroded, and blurred.
It is these intricate and underexplored interactions between state and 
market that are at the heart of my inquiry into emerging selective migration 
regimes and transactional visions of citizenship6. Legally, the sovereign pre-
rogative to issue a valid and internationally recognised passport is reserved 
in our international system to states alone. Governments and only govern-
ments – not markets – can secure and allocate the precious legal good of 
membership in the political community. But what happens when the logic of 
capital and markets infiltrates this classic statist expression of sovereignty? 
The proliferation of what I have called unfettered cash-for-passport pro-
grammes is a dramatic example of this pattern at work and it invites our 
5 Dzankic, J. (2012), ‘The Pros and Cons of Ius Pecuniae: Investor Citizenship 
in Comparative Perspective’, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory Working Paper 2012/14, Florence: European 
University Institute, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/21476
6 Shachar, A. (2006), ‘The Global Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and 
Competitive Immigration Regimes’, NYU Law Review 81 (2006): 148-206; 
Shachar, A. (forthcoming), Olympic Citizenship: Migration and the Global 
Race for Talent. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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critical scrutiny, especially since governments that use these programmes 
often do so in the name of advancing their country’s national interest while 
paradoxically setting up dangerous connections between money and access 
to citizenship, possibly to the detriment of the basic egalitarian and partici-
patory thrust of political membership as we currently know it. These devel-
opments raise core ethical and legal questions. Why are states putting 
citizenship up for sale? And what precisely is wrong with easy-pass naturali-
sation along the lines of the cash-for-passport programmes? Is it the queue 
jumping? The attaching of a price tag to citizenship? The erosion of some-
thing foundational about political membership itself? Or, perhaps, all of the 
above?
Surely, zealous free-marketeers will enthusiastically defend such pro-
grammes as freeing us from the shackles of culture, nation and tradition and 
moving citizenship forward to a new and more competitive global age of 
transactional contracting in which, as Nobel Prize laureate Gary Becker 
once put it, a price mechanism substitutes for the complicated criteria that 
now determine legal entry7. As much as Becker would like to deny it, though, 
these programmes have something of a ‘whiff of scandal’ not only due to 
frequent accusations of money laundering and fraud8, but also because of 
something deeper and more profound. Citizenship as we know it (at least 
since Aristotle) is comprised of political relations; as such, it is expected to 
both reflect and generate a notion of participation, co-governance, and a 
degree of solidarity among those included within the body politic. It is dif-
ficult to imagine how these values could be preserved under circumstances 
in which insiders and outsiders are distinguished merely by the ability to pay 
a certain price. The objection here is to the notion that everything, including 
political membership, is ‘commensurable’ and reducible to a dollar value. 
This is what makes cash-for-passport exchanges, even if they account for 
only a limited stream or quota of entrants per year, deeply problematic and 
objectionable. The sale and barter of citizenship, even if initially reserved 
only for a small stream of recipients, nevertheless sends a loud and unmis-
takable message in both law and social ethics about whom the contemporary 
market-friendly state gives priority to in the immigration and naturalisation 
line and whom it covets most as a future citizen. This expressive conduct 
and the new grammar of market-infused valuation it entails tell us  something 
7 Becker, G. (1992), ‘An Open Door for Immigrants – the Auction’, Wall Street 
Journal, October 14 1992, A1.
8 ‘Selling Citizenship: Papers Please’, The Economist, September 28 2013, 
available at https://www.economist.com/news/
international/21586843-hard-up-countries-flog-passports-papers-please.
Dangerous Liaisons: Money and Citizenship
12
important about the volatile state of citizenship today and the direction in 
which we may be heading.
Although economists will be quick to note that cash-for-passport pro-
grammes can create a hefty stream of revenue for governments, this is a 
hardly a strong enough justification to endorse them. The desire to enlarge 
their coffers may, as a matter of real-life experience, explain why some 
countries offer these programmes. From a normative perspective, however, 
such an exchange threatens to corrupt the good that is put on sale: what 
changes when we ‘sell’ citizenship is not just the price tag of membership, 
but its substantive content as well. As it plays a more and more important 
role in countries’ immigration and naturalisation policies and priorities, 
citizenship- for-sale may also gradually reshape the greater class of those 
who are likely to enjoy political membership. Reliance on a price mecha-
nism alone, to the exclusion of other important considerations, would not 
only prevent the vast majority of the world’s population from ever gaining a 
chance to access citizenship in well-off polities. Taken to its logical conclu-
sion (as reductio) it might also lead, corrosively and over time, to a world 
where anyone included in the pool of members must pay up, or risk ‘falling 
helplessly to the wayside’9.
Several scholars have taken up the task of imagining how our world 
might look were the market –rather than the state – to govern access to, and 
the acquisition of, political membership. As one study explains, ‘[i]f we take 
the basic incidents of citizenship to be protection of members and participa-
tion in modes of governance, the market for citizenship could form around 
offer of and demand for these services. Indeed, the offer of broader packages 
of citizenship services would be the basis for product differentiation’10. 
‘Product differentiation,’ it should be noted, is a euphemism for providing 
lesser rights and services in exchange for lower fees11. Farewell, then, to the 
hard-earned ideal of inclusive citizenship as equal membership. In its 
absence, auction mechanisms and supply-and-demand rules may well 
replace our (however imperfect) procedures of exerting some degree of 
democratic governance and collective decision-making on what it means to 
belong to a political community, how to obtain a secure legal status of citi-
zenship, and on what conditions.
9 Spiro, P. J. (2008), Beyond Citizenship: American Identity After Globalization. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 134.
10 Downes, D. M. & R. Janda (1998), ‘Virtual Citizenship’, Canadian Journal of 
Law and Society 13 (2): 27-61, at 55.
11 Jordan, B. & F. Düvell (2003), Migration: The Boundaries of Equality and 
Justice. Cambridge: Polity Press.
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Even staunch defenders of the market approach to citizenship understand 
that they are facing a hard sell. Becker, for one, admits that ‘people object to 
the sale of permits because, as they say, “citizenship is not to be for sale’”12, 
and this is a moral intuition that runs deep. As evidenced by recent debates 
over the instalment of cash-for-passport programmes, most people have 
strong reservations against attaching a price tag to citizenship13. The reasons 
are many. As already mentioned, such a move may cause irreparable harm 
to the vision of citizenship as grounded in long-term relations of trust and 
shared responsibility and may prefigure the conflation of the political and 
ethical with the economic and calculative. It may also undermine member-
ship bonds grounded in co-authorship, cross-subsidisation of risk, and even 
sacrifice that might be expected in times of need. What is more, citizenship 
currently involves making collective decisions, and translating those deci-
sions into binding commitments, in the context of a political project that is 
far larger than oneself, and that extends well beyond the lifespan of each 
generation of members – a time horizon that will be extremely hard to sus-
tain under a regime of strategic transactions, according to which ‘wealth 
buys membership.’ Turning citizenship into a money-based prize also con-
tradicts any notion of complex equality through blocked exchange accord-
ing to which advantage in one sphere (here, wealth) cannot be legitimately 
transferred to another (in this case, membership)14. This makes the idea of 
selling membership unnerving for anyone who objects to the ultimate tri-
umph of economics over politics, the reduction of our public life and ethics 
into mere pecuniary transactions, or the imperialistic idea that ‘trades’ 
occupy the full terrain of human value and meaning15.
Another set of concerns arises in the context of supranational citizenship, 
as in the derivative structure of European citizenship. The actions of those 
member states that take the liberty to put their national citizenship ‘on sale’ 
indirectly affects the supranational political membership good that is shared 
by other countries, which may resist such commodification. There are also 
complex questions about to whom (beyond its own citizenry) the transacting 
12 Above n. 7.
13 Borna, S. & J. M. Stearns (2002), ‘The Ethics and Efficacy of Selling National 
Citizenship’, Journal of Business Ethics 37 (2): 193-207, at 197.
14 Walzer, M. (1983), Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. 
New York: Basic Books.
15 Radin, M. J. (1987), ‘Market-Inalienability’, Harvard Law Review 100: 
1849-1937; Sunstein, C. R. (1997), ‘Incommensurability and Kinds of 
Valuation: Some Applications in Law’, in R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, 
Incomparability, and Practical Reason, 234-254. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press; Sandel, M. J. (2013), What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral 
Limits of Markets. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
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government is obliged to provide justificatory reasons concerning its selective 
admission and naturalisation policies. Need it justify itself to other member 
states? To the Commission of the European Union? To would-be entrants who 
might have had a shot at admission through standard migration streams (fam-
ily, employment, and humanitarian) but who are priced out of the advantage 
given to those who can afford a ‘golden passport’? From a global perspective, 
cash-for-passport programmes clearly exacerbate pre- existing inequalities 
rather than alleviate them. Should the sedentary populations of the migrant 
millionaires’ countries of origin, which are typically less stable or poorer than 
the destination countries, get to weigh in as well? Or, if an expansive all-
affected-interests principle is applied, perhaps anyone at all who may be 
unfairly and arbitrarily affected should have a voice in these decisions16. And 
what about migrants who are already settled in the country but ineligible to 
benefit from naturalisation schemes that require no knowledge or familiarity 
with the political structures, main civic institutions, history or language of the 
country, and who are subject instead to ever more demanding civic integration 
requirements? If civic integration is a required precondition to the bestow-
ment of full membership by the state (as restrictive citizenship tests increas-
ingly indicate), how can this demand only apply to some and not to others?
After all, there is no rational connection between delivering a stack of 
cash or sending in a bank wire transfer and establishing the kind of partici-
pation and equal standing among fellow citizens that the political bonds of 
membership are meant to represent and foster. From this vantage point, the 
transaction in citizenship, even if carefully regulated and implemented by 
monopolistic governments or their authorised delegates, should be prohib-
ited. Taken to its dystopian extreme, this approach may lead to a situation 
whereby the size of their wallets, and nothing else, distinguishes suitable 
from unsuitable candidates for initial entry and eventual citizenship. This 
kind of transaction, as lawyers and philosophers like to put it, is value- 
degrading: the trading in citizenship ‘taints,’ ‘degrades’ or outrightly ‘cor-
rupts’ (in the moral sense) its value as a good. We might in the same vein say 
that these cash-for-citizenship programmes detrimentally affect the ‘charac-
ter of the goods themselves and the norms that should govern them’17. As 
critics of commodification have been at pains to clarify in other contexts18, 
16 Goodin, R. (2007), ‘Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (1): 40-68.
17 Sandel, M. J. (2013), What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. 
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 113.
18 Cohen, I. G. (2003), ‘The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: 




it is not that € 1 million is too high or too low a price, but that placing a ‘for 
sale’ tag on citizenship, no matter what amount is written on it, has a corro-
sive effect on non-market relations, eroding the ties that bind and altering 
our view of what it means to belong to a political community. Just as we 
should be critical of granting citizenship according to nothing but the fortu-
itous and arbitrary circumstances of station of birth19, I believe we must 
resist, with even greater force, the notion that money can buy ‘love of coun-
try’ – or secure membership in it.
If governments and activists are listening, they should heed the warning 
signs. The ideal of equal citizenship has been inflicted with many wounds 
over the past decades, and has always been more of an aspiration than a real-
ity. However, the dangerous and increasingly frequent links between money 
and access to political membership reflected in the more calculated, 
mercantilist- like perceptions of citizenship that have given rise to unfettered 
cash-for-passport programmes threaten not only the implementation of the 
ideal, but the ideal itself. Courting the world’s moneyed elite by relaxing 
standard admission and naturalisation requirements may enrich the coffers 
of a country in the short run, but in the long haul it risks cheapening some-
thing far more important: citizenship itself.
19 Shachar, A. (2009), The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Shachar, A. (2011), ‘Earned 
Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform’, Yale Journal of Law 
& the Humanities 23: 110-158.
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Cash-for-Passports and the End of Citizenship
Peter J. Spiro
Investor citizenship programmes are becoming increasingly commonplace 
in state practice. What was once the province of outlier Caribbean micro-
states is gaining traction among more substantial states. As an instrumental 
tool, states see citizenship-for-sale as a way to help get out of an economic 
hole on the cheap. There is no marginal material cost to minting new citi-
zens, especially those with deep enough pockets to afford the price of admis-
sion. Hence the adoption of investor citizenship programmes by such 
countries as Cyprus, Malta, and Portugal.
I sympathise with Ayelet Shachar’s powerful framing of these programmes. 
There is something unseemly, at least, about putting membership in the polity 
up for sale. Cash-for-passports, as Shachar derisively labels the phenomenon, 
clashes with our received understandings of citizenship as a marker of social 
solidarity in a Walzerian sense. The emerging market for citizenship literally 
commodifies the status, the tip of an iceberg that Shachar is describing in 
other work as states come to see immigration as a talent-pool competition.
But where Shachar sees investor citizenship programmes as a threat to 
robust citizenship ties, I see them more as a manifestation of citizenship that 
is already being hollowed out. If citizenship still meant what it used to mean, 
if it still represented special ties as a sociological matter, then investor citi-
zenship schemes would not exist. In that context, citizenship-for-sale would 
have implicated serious symbolic societal costs by breaking the social con-
tract, understood not as an arm’s-length market transaction but rather as the 
locus of morally-inflected rights and responsibilities. In the old world, such 
programmes would have been inconceivable.
Today, far from inconceivable, they are becoming an accepted element of 
strategic immigration policy. Investor citizenship programmes remain con-
troversial (perhaps especially in a small, distinctive society such as Malta, 
which may more represent the old norm rather the new). But they are obvi-
ously gaining traction. States have something to sell. There must be some 
sentiment in adopting states that the revenues will exceed costs, social or 
otherwise.
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Investor programmes give the lie to notion that citizenship is sacred, in a 
civic sense. The programmes evidence the descent of citizenship from its 
former pedestal. Shachar extols a ‘vision of citizenship as grounded in long- 
term relations of trust and shared responsibility, … membership bonds 
grounded in co-authorship, cross-subsidisation of risk, and even sacrifice 
that might be expected in times of need.’ That’s the citizenship of the past, 
and passport-for-sale schemes supply another data point to prove it.
This is so notwithstanding externalities imposed on other states. In some 
contexts, these externalities will be miniscule (a citizen of Malta can travel 
to the United States visa free where the citizen of Russia cannot, but the 
numbers will be low, and the number who abuse visa-free entry will be even 
lower). In the European context they are potentially greater, as the EU mem-
ber states become subject to lowest-common-denominator citizenship poli-
cies. Those who buy Maltese citizenship are less likely to settle in Valletta 
(one wonders how many could even name the capital city before – or per-
haps even after – they have made the purchase) than in Berlin or Paris or 
Milan. When one buys Maltese citizenship one gets EU citizenship included 
in the price; it opens a backdoor to the rest of Europe. But the EU seems 
unlikely to complain. There is no legal basis for opposition, citizenship pol-
icy remaining exclusively within Member State discretion. Nor is there 
likely to be much pushback as a policy matter, so long as the price is high 
enough to depress numbers and maintain economic quality (as it were).
In material terms, the programmes are not much of a threat to provider 
states, either. The numbers will be low. (Portugal had only 330 takers in the 
first year of its program.) Because many buyers will remain non-resident, 
they will be invisible to the existing citizenry. They will not be politically 
engaged, to the extent they will feel no interest beyond protection of their 
bought-and-paid status. One possible cost would be with respect to diplo-
matic protection. It will be interesting to see whether that is a part of a bar-
gain – whether in fact states will intercede with other states on behalf of 
their paying members (and whether international tribunals would recognise 
protection of cash-only nationals).
Shachar is correct that the investor programmes show that citizenship is 
still worth something. As the market thickens, we will see how much. With 
the reference point of states that sell permanent residency, we will be able 
approximately to isolate the value of citizenship itself – the premium states 
will be able to extract with the passport. Will investor programmes like 
Malta’s, which offer citizenship, be priced much higher than Hungary’s, 
which extends residency status only? (I will leave to the economists to deal 
with asymmetries among the various packages.) I suspect that premium will 
P. J. Spiro
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not be great, especially insofar as permanent residency includes the possibil-
ity of future eligibility for naturalisation. Finally, there is the possibility of 
price competition as more states enter the market and some seek to maxi-
mise revenues by attracting more buyers at a lower price point.
Investor citizenship programmes are a symptom, not a cause. Shachar 
sees citizenship as something that can be rescued through citizenship policy. 
As material forces of globalisation fragment citizens’ solidarities, citizen-
ship law cannot revive them.
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Citizenship for Those who Invest into  
the Future of the State is Not Wrong, the Price  
Is the Problem
Magni-Berton Raul
Roughly two thousand years ago, Roman citizenship began to be sold to rich 
foreigners. As a consequence, rather than a way to share equal duties and 
rights, citizenship by the third century C.E. had become an aristocratic title. 
It divided people instead of rallying them. It increased inequalities instead 
of reducing them.
The current situation is somewhat similar. Rich people have access to 
rich countries’ membership, and poor people remain on the wrong side. 
Thus, I sympathise with Shachar’s concerns and I think we should avoid to 
reproduce what we have already experimented in our ancient history.
However, I do not agree with the way in which both Shachar and Spiro 
have identified the problem. Consider, for example, a situation in which a 
foreigner asks for access to citizenship in those terms: ‘I want to share the 
responsibility of my failures and achievements with you, and I’d like to 
invest in you and to be partly responsible of your achievements and your 
failures.’ This is a touching statement of solidarity and identification with a 
group. I have called it the stockholder principle: individual citizens are like 
a joint-stock company in which fellow-citizens invest. The consequence of 
these collective investments is a shared responsibility for individuals’ 
achievements. Moreover, the right to benefit from public support is associ-
ated with the duty to invest in other fellow-citizens’ life projects. These 
duties are embodied in specific taxes for public investment. Thus, each citi-
zen is also a stockholder with respect to other citizens.
Thus I would not say that the Maltese Parliament voted to ‘sell’ the 
Maltese passport when it granted citizenship for € 650,000. From a foreign 
investor’s point of view, given that she makes the above statement and is 
ready to invest in the future of Maltese citizens, she acquires a moral claim 
to become citizen. She does not only give a sum of money in exchange for 
rights; she also becomes more largely committed to the duties of a Maltese 
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citizen. In other words, she gains access to the Maltese nationality with an 
investment, which is a way to link her destiny to that of other Maltese.
So what is wrong with this beautiful story? Why are the Maltese people 
sceptical and why is international opinion critical? Of course, we could 
agree that the argument of externalities, mentioned by Shachar, is relevant: 
European citizens should also benefit from those new investments. Thus, the 
problem is identifying who decides the allocation of those investments: the 
government of Malta or the EU. Although these externalities are expected to 
be low, as Spiro points out, it can be argued that Maltese citizens free-ride 
because they alone benefit from the foreigners’ will to become European, 
and this could be morally disputable.
Beyond that, the main argument I would like to develop here is that € 
650,000 seems, at first sight, a lot. Not in absolute terms, of course. Suppose, 
for example, a society in which people spend € 200 on watching a film. 
Several others things are likely to be true in such a society. Firstly, there are 
some people that can afford to pay this price. Secondly, there are no other 
less expensive goods which are substitutable, such as for example theatre, 
sport or other entertainment. Perhaps this is because technological progress 
has improved cinema so that it delivers a specific pleasure one cannot find 
elsewhere. Alternatively, this may happen because theatres or circuses have 
simply gone bankrupt.
Analogically, in the case of naturalisation, several other things are likely 
to be true in virtue of the fact that people prefer to pay a considerable amount 
of money, rather than to proceed with alternatives. For example, in a society 
where people are ready to pay € 650,000 for a passport, many of these alter-
natives are likely to be extremely burdensome, impractical, or unfair.
Let me assume that, until now, the Maltese way to naturalise foreigners 
has been fair according to the stockholder principle. In other words, a ‘poor 
foreigner’ can be naturalised, if she is ready to share the responsibility for 
her failures and achievements with Maltese citizens, as well as to invest in 
them and become partly responsible for their achievements and failures. 
Under this assumption, investing money in Malta, whatever the amount, is 
one fair way, among others, to gain access to citizenship. There is no reason, 
after all, to distinguish between financial and human investments.
But, if the Maltese law was fair, people would not be likely to invest € 
650,000 to be naturalised. Of course, they could love Malta. They also could 
be so wealthy that they prefer to pay this amount rather than spend time in 
human investments. More probably, however, the fact that people are ready 
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to pay this amount reveals that the law is in fact too restrictive and does not 
provide other reasonable ways to become citizen.
Naturalisation in Malta is possible after five years of residence, but it 
includes discretionary conditions, the severity of which can vary across 
time. In other European countries specific conditions and varying periods 
of residence are required. The greater the severity, the greater the price for 
passports. Investor citizenship programmes should be used to create a fruit-
ful community, not to maximise price.
To conclude, I do not believe that investor citizenship programmes in 
themselves are unfair. On the contrary, they can reveal, via a financial argu-
ment, how hard the naturalisation process is. All European countries are 
concerned with this issue: too restrictive laws prevent motivated people to 
give their contribution to the host country and they divide humanity into rich 
and poor, rather than into different united groups. Exactly as the Roman 
Empire did.
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The Price of Selling Citizenship
Chris Armstrong
Malta’s decision to sell citizenship triggers strong reactions in many of us. It 
appears to wrongfully connect the awarding of citizenship to ability to pay. 
And as Ayelet Shachar’s contribution points out, it disregards the other 
things that theorists often emphasise as key to citizenship acquisition: root-
edness in a community, interaction with its institutions, long-standing resi-
dence, or participation in its political life.
On the other hand, we might ask, can these other things always be neces-
sary criteria for awarding citizenship? Imagine that our country is waging a 
desperate war of self-defence. Just when defeat – and the collapse of our 
community – appears inevitable, a force of foreign volunteers enters the fray 
and swings the result in our favour. These volunteers have performed a tre-
mendous service to our community – perhaps the greatest service we can 
imagine.
Imagine, next, that we decide to thank the volunteers by offering them 
citizenship in our country. Would this be morally repugnant? Far from it: the 
decision would, I think, be perfectly appropriate. What, then, of rootedness, 
interaction, residence, or participation? If giving citizenship to our imagi-
nary volunteers is appropriate, then those things cannot be as important as 
we thought. Perhaps a massive, one-off contribution to the polity can be 
enough.
We might think the Maltese example is very different, of course. Perhaps 
what we object to here is the selling of citizenship, because this rides rough- 
shod over the morally significant connection between citizen and commu-
nity. Perhaps such ‘deals’ should never be made.
I’m not so sure. We can tweak the war example so that volunteers are not 
forthcoming, and our country still faces annihilation. We then ask for volun-
teers, promising to grant citizenship as a reward for their services. Obviously, 
this looks less palatable than the original example, because instead of a self-
less sacrifice we now have a rather self-interested deal. Still, would it be 
wrong for our country to offer this deal? It seems to me that, though it might 
make some of us uncomfortable, the answer is no. Perhaps a country can be 
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in such dire straits that such deals are, all-things-considered, an acceptable 
way of proceeding. But if that is true, what if the straits are financial ones, 
and the deal in question is, simply, the selling of citizenship?
I suspect that selling citizenship is perhaps not always wrong, even if it 
often will be. In the rest of this response I set out five reasons, though, for 
restricting the sale of citizenship. Some of these concerns can be avoided. 
Others remain genuine worries. But the way they ought to concern us is 
interesting, because they suggest that what is wrong with selling citizenship 
also applies to other instances of citizenship acquisition. Perhaps, then, sell-
ing citizenship is just the most visible case of a wider phenomenon. Perhaps, 
for all its blatancy, it is not even the most important case.
1. What if selling citizenship has not been democratically authorised (or, 
as Shachar suggests, it is veiled in secrecy), whereas if ‘the people’ had been 
properly consulted, they would not have endorsed such a policy? (A survey 
shortly before the Maltese decision showed 53 per cent disapproval.1) We 
know that citizens often feel their views are very poorly represented in poli-
cies on immigration. Then again, putting great weight on popular views 
about immigration may be unwise: those views are often hostile to immigra-
tion in general, and also, at the same time, often very badly informed. But 
regardless, this objection is a contingent one, and leaves open the deeper 
question: if the public did authorise selling citizenship, would there be any-
thing wrong with doing so?
2. Perhaps admitting the kind of people who can afford to spend hun-
dreds of thousands of Euros buying citizenship is unwise. Those (rich) peo-
ple will probably turn out to wield disproportionate influence on domestic 
politics. I believe that we have every reason to fear their influence. But if 
this is so, it is not an objection to selling citizenship. It is an objection, 
surely, to granting citizenship to very rich individuals whether they pay for 
it or not. It would apply just as strongly to a policy which made it easier for 
rich individuals to access citizenship (free of charge). Less obviously, liberal 
democracies standardly grant automatic citizenship to the children of native 
citizens, some of whom also happen to inherit great wealth. Isn’t their wealth 
a problem too? Isn’t it just as large a danger to democracy? If so, what 
should we do?
1 ‘MaltaToday survey – Malta says yes to Budget, no to sale of citizenship’, 





3. Perhaps it is unfair to allow people to buy citizenship, because other 
less fortunate outsiders are thereby disadvantaged. The playing-field is sim-
ply not even. If so, the same response follows: this is an objection not to 
selling citizenship, but to making it easier for anyone to obtain citizenship 
merely because they are wealthier or, indeed, because they possess ‘desir-
able’ skills. Selling citizenship is only a very visible instance of wider dis-
tributive unfairness in allocating citizenship. It may not be the most important 
example.
4. Perhaps selling citizenship cheapens that ‘good’, and, as Shachar 
rightly points out, sends a terrible signal to existing citizens about what 
makes a good citizen. This is, I agree, a profound concern, but we can 
respond in the same way as to the last objection. Any policy which makes it 
more likely that some, rather than others, will be admitted to citizenship 
sends such a signal. A policy which makes it easier for wealthier or more 
highly-skilled people to obtain citizenship sends just the same signal. If the 
objection is a good one, its implications ripple beyond the mere selling of 
citizenship.
5. Finally, we might object that what Malta is doing is unfair to other EU 
member states, since all of those states potentially bear the costs of granting 
citizenship to outsiders, but only Malta reaps the benefits. This, I suspect, is 
at the heart of much of the resistance to what Malta is doing. But several 
responses can be made. First, this objection obviously applies only to 
EU-member states, and not to states more generally. Second, for an EU 
member state to link citizenship to buying property or investing in their 
country should be equally objectionable. Third, and more importantly, we 
can point to ripple effects again. If it is wrong for one state to pursue a citi-
zenship policy which delivers benefits to itself but imposes costs on others, 
what else might fall foul of that principle? What about countries that attract 
wealthy citizens of other states by offering them lower taxes and which 
thereby make it more difficult for progressively-minded states to pursue 
egalitarian policies? What if state competition for those wealthy individuals 
always imposes externalities, making progress towards a more equal world 
more difficult? Selling citizenship might then be, as Peter Spiro observes, 
merely the tip of a very large iceberg. And not necessarily the worst part.
I am not sure, in the end, that I agree with Shachar that selling citizenship 
is always wrong. Perhaps it is safer to say that it usually is, though we can 
imagine situations where the reverse is true. But either way, selling citizen-
ship, even if it (often) appears repugnant, pales in comparison to many of the 
other inequities attendant on the ordinary transmission of citizenship, as 
Shachar’s own work has forcefully hammered home. I am tempted to 
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 conclude precisely this: for all that selling citizenship troubles us, it might 
do us the considerable service of forcing us to think (more) about the way in 
which many people already obtain citizenship, and the way in which citizen-
ship practices more broadly both feed off, and make it harder to tackle, 
underlying global inequalities. As Spiro observes, writing better citizenship 
laws can only be part of the solution to that problem. There are many other 
important ways of tackling global inequalities that deserve at least equal 
attention.
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Global Mobility Corridors for the Ultra-Rich. 
The Neoliberal Transformation of Citizenship
Roxana Barbulescu
The problem with investment citizenship ain’t that it is for sale, the problem 
is global inequality. Citizenship-by-investment schemes do not themselves 
produce injustice but they are unjust because they build on pre-existing 
large disparities in the world: If all countries were equal in living conditions 
would the scheme be objectionable? If the answer is no, as I think it is, then 
the source of injustice is global inequality rather than policies that do not 
themselves produce injustice.
In the real world, however, citizenship-by-investment together with sim-
ilar schemes for residence opens global mobility corridors for the ultra-rich. 
In what follows I discuss how investor citizenship impacts on international 
migration and how it alters the institution of citizenship. I end by calling for 
more systematic analysis of the political conditions under which this trans-
formation of citizenship has come about.
From an international migration perspective citizenship-by-investment is 
a means for opening borders, even if only for very few affluent individuals 
(and their families). In abstract terms, the logic is the same as with the dif-
ferent competitive schemes for high-skilled migrants. The latter use talent, 
reputation, skill, work experience, previous salary and even age as proxies 
for admitting only those who can make an important contribution1. So do 
investors through their investments. The two schemes are also similar in 
their consequences: they both immobilise the less well-off individuals. The 
twin phenomena of global competition for the worlds’ best and brightest and 
for the richest correspond to the nationalisation of poverty and the confine-
ment of less well-off citizens within their national borders. For me, this 
indicates that the questions the scheme raises are indeed about global social 
justice and it is this problem on which states need to focus their efforts.
1 Shachar, A. (2006), ‘The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and 
Competitive Immigration Regimes’, New York University Law Review 81 (1): 
148–206.
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Here is one qualifier: many citizens of the rich countries benefit from 
similar privileged access to citizenship or residence in less developed coun-
tries around the world. They call themselves expats instead of migrants and 
often need not go through the normal immigration route. A basic state pen-
sion from the UK, for instance, can make one a particularly well-off person 
in the Global South. The citizenship-by-investment scheme just mirrors a 
worldwide state of affairs, but it is more visible because of the high thresh-
old of capital needed for access. The fact that this matter has only now 
entered the citizenship debate indicates how heavily theoretical and ethical 
debates build on Western cases.
My second remark has to do with the profound transformation of the 
institution of citizenship. My point here is that citizenship-by-investment 
largely contradicts the very recent efforts of states to re-substantiate citizen-
ship through tests and integration requirements (see the earlier debate hosted 
by this Forum2). Waiving these requirements for the ultra-rich raises serious 
doubts over the credentials of the previous citizenship reforms and states 
will need to justify why civic knowledge and other integration requirements 
are needed or useful and provide proof that they are something more than a 
filter to make immigration more selective.
The third point has to do with the fact that using capital as the sole 
condition for citizenship for investors (waiving requirements such as resi-
dence, language skills or ancestry) departs from traditional foundations of 
(national) citizenship which tended to privilege cultural and social ties. It 
also marks a break with the historically younger project of social citizen-
ship which went in the opposite direction and sought to incorporate the 
economically disenfranchised into the citizenry3. As Peter Spiro argues in 
2 Bauböck, R. & C. Joppke (eds.) (2010), ‘How Liberal are Citizenship Tests?’, 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory 
Working Paper 2010/41, Florence: European University Institute, available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13956/RSCAS_2010_41corr.
pdf?sequence=3.
3 See Marshall, T. H. (1973 [1950]), ‘Citizenship and Social Class’, in Class, 
Citizenship, and Social Development, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; Soysal, 
Y. (2012), ‘Citizenship, Immigration and the European Social Project: Rights 
and Obligations of the Individuality’, British Journal of Sociology 36 (1): 1-21.
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his contribution, with this revision citizenship aligns itself with other neo-
liberal and free market- inspired developments. However, such withdrawal 
of the state and the advancement of the free market in the traditional sphere 
of state sovereignty still need to be better explained rather than just 
diagnosed.
In the case of citizenship-by-investment, we need to understand better 
whether this was a supply or demand driven policy change, what stake-
holder alliances lobbied for this policy, what channels they used, who set the 
price tag (for an overview of varieties of citizenship- and residence-by- 
investment programmes across the world see Barbulescu 2016), and what 
arguments persuaded political elites to implement it. Neoliberalism does not 
spread like the flavour of a bag of tea in a cup of water: it needs promoters 
and legitimisation that will align support against other competing para-
digms, especially in citizenship policies where there are strong path- 
dependency dynamics. These are important questions because 
citizenship-by-investment departs from citizenship traditions everywhere, 
because such policy revisions are largely unpopular and may have a high 
political cost and, not least, because they de-legitimise the very existence of 
state bureaucracies administrating citizenship for the ultra-rich. With natu-
ralisation becoming a transaction over-the-counter, the organisation that 
implemented it partly loses its purpose.
So why is it important to understand how citizenship-by-investment has 
come about? Because of its large impact on an essential political institution 
and its success in carving out global mobility corridors through entangled 
states.
One final note: As several states have already implemented citizenship- 
by- investment schemes, states should quickly lose their naivety about inves-
tors as do-gooders. Those schemes that – unlike Malta’s – rely on investment 
rather than direct payment should check that the capital is indeed invested. 
The UK, one of the first states to introduce Investor Visa (with a price tag of 
£ 1 million or a bank loan from an UK financial institution and personal 
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assets worth 2 million) recently revised this policy as it came to its attention 
that investors used the capital for investment as security to back up loans 
and that investments were placed in offshore custody4,5.
4 UK Border Agency (2013), Guidelines Tier 1 (Investor). Available at http://
www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/applicationforms/pbs/tier1investor-
guidance1.pdf, p. 1; revision HC 760 came into force in December 2012; see 
also Nathan, M., H. Rolfe & C. Vargas-Silva (2013), ‘The Economic and 
Labour Market Impacts of Tier 1 Entrepreneur and Investor Migrants’, Report 
to the Migration Advisory Committee, available at www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.
uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/workingwithus/mac/economic-research.pdf
5 Barbulescu, R. (2016) Investment Migration in the World. IMC Geneva https://
investmentmigration.org/investment-migration-in-the-world/
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The Maltese Falcon, or: my Porsche  
for a Passport!
Jelena Džankić
‘We didn’t exactly believe your story, Miss O’Shaughnessy. We believed 
your 200 dollars. I mean, you paid us more than if you had been telling us 
the truth, and enough more to make it all right.’ These were the words of 
Sam  Spade  played  by  Humphrey  Bogart  in  the  1941  film  ‘The Maltese 
Falcon’. Malta’s recent amendments to the Citizenship Act suggest that for 
the country’s policymakers the amount of € 650,000 is just enough ‘to make 
it all right’ for investors to purchase the Maltese and by extension the 
European Union (EU) citizenship. But is cash-for-passport really ‘all right’, 
and does it affect the value of citizenship?
Magni Berton suggests in his contribution to this Forum that what is 
wrong with the Maltese law is that ordinary naturalisation is too difficult and 
discretionary. Indeed, for most applicants, meeting the criteria for ordinary 
naturalisation takes a long time and a lot of effort. During the years of resi-
dence that the applicants spend in their country of destination they make that 
country the focal point of their lives: they learn its language, its customs and 
establish social links with other citizens living there. Their claim to citizen-
ship of that country is based – following Shachar – on ius nexi. Hence the 
integration of such individuals is of high value for citizenship as a public 
good, as a network of communal contributions and responsibilities, as 
shared love for the country.
Yet, Magni Berton claims that the rich may as well love the destination 
country and that money may merely be an instrument for facilitating their 
access to citizenship. Instead of a ‘human investment’, which would entail 
time, establishment of social links, and acquisition of language skills, the 
wealthy can make a monetary contribution. However, as highlighted in other 
contributions to this debate, the rich usually do not spend much time in their 
destination countries. Rather, as Spiro noted, they mostly use the opportuni-
ties provided to them by virtue of possessing its passport. Now, what is love 
in this context? The one who truly loves is willing to wait and invest time 
and effort. Otherwise, we would not speak about love. Offering money in 
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exchange for practical benefits together with a claim of love sounds rather 
like something else. And that ‘something else’ is simply wrong.
In justifying investor citizenship programmes, Magni Berton further 
compares citizenship with stockholding: ‘individual citizens are like a joint- 
stock company in which fellow-citizens invest’. This reduces the scope of 
citizenship, because the interests of stockholders are determined by the 
share of stocks that they have in the company. In addition to this, stocks are 
tradable – not only from the government to an individual, but also among 
individuals themselves.
It makes more sense if, instead of regarding citizenship as stockholding, 
we compare it to stakeholding, as Bauböck has suggested1. A citizen- 
stakeholder is a person who has a fundamental interest in membership in a 
particular polity (rather than in economic or other benefits for which mem-
bership may be instrumental). We can identify such stakeholder citizens by 
looking at how a person’s interest in autonomy and well-being are structur-
ally linked to the collective autonomy (self-government) and well-being 
(flourishing) of a country. This means that those who have obtained citizen-
ship merely on grounds of investment cannot be stakeholders, because they 
only have an accidental and instrumental interest in citizenship in a state that 
offers them a favourable investment environment.
It is worth mentioning that there are different ways in which countries 
offer citizenship to the rich, which is often overlooked both in the media and 
in academic circles.2 The way in which an investor programme is regulated 
could potentially turn this instrumental interest of the rich in possessing a 
passport of a country into stakeholder citizenship. In her initial contribution 
to this debate, Shachar highlighted the difference between ‘golden resi-
dence’ and ‘investor citizenship’ programmes. While the former require the 
investors to reside in their country of destination for a number of years and 
to undergo a standard naturalisation procedure (including the knowledge of 
language, customs, etc.) before becoming citizens, the latter is an exchange 
of a fixed amount of money and citizenship (most governments do run crim-
inal record and due diligence checks of applicants). There is also a third 
mechanism for turning investors into citizens, which is discretionary 
1 Bauböck, R. (2009), ‘The Rights and Duties of External Citizenship’, 
Citizenship Studies 13 (5): 475-499.
2 Dzankic, J. (2012), ‘The Pros and Cons of Ius Pecuniae: Investor Citizenship 
in Comparative Perspective’, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory Working Paper 2012/14, Florence: European 
University Institute, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/21476
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 naturalisation on grounds of national interest. These provisions exist in 22 
out of the 28 EU Member States. Such discretionary naturalisation is the 
prerogative of the state and it is used only in a few cases annually. In several 
countries, including Austria, discretionary naturalisation has resulted in cor-
ruption and secret deals, which tells us that too much discretion can have 
adverse effects on citizenship.
Even with this in mind, we can find some support for Armstrong’s argu-
ment that investor citizenship programmes are not always wrong. That is, 
well-conceptualised ‘golden residence’ schemes may bring economic ben-
efits  to  the  state  while  also  turning  investors  into  genuine  stakeholders. 
However, such ‘golden residence’ programmes should not be based merely 
on real estate purchase, as recently approved by Spain, and they should 
require more than a compulsory residence of only a few weeks per year as a 
mechanism of eventually qualifying for citizenship, as they do in Portugal. 
The argument here is that neither the possession of real estate nor the lack of 
residence can help the wealthy to establish a true connection with the desti-
nation country. Only ‘golden residence’ programmes that are based on 
multi-annual investment, jobs for citizens of the destination country, and 
compulsory residence for the investor before qualifying for citizenship, as is 
the case in Canada, help the investor to become integrated and interested in 
the well-being of the citizens of her or his adopted country.
By contrast, the program recently passed by the Maltese government is a 
‘pure investor citizenship’ scheme, which differs from programmes in other 
EU countries that have recently adopted various ‘golden residence’ schemes 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Portugal, Spain). Besides the crisis-struck Cyprus, 
which in May 2013 opened several routes to naturalisation on grounds of 
economic contribution to the state, Malta is the only other European state 
with such a scheme. The programmes in Malta and Cyprus are thus more 
similar to the ones in the Caribbean islands – Saint Kitts and Nevis, the 
Commonwealth of Dominica, and Antigua and Barbuda, all of which oper-
ate ‘investor citizenship’ schemes.
Two things make the Cypriot and Maltese programmes more attractive 
for investors than those of the Caribbean islands. First, in the former cases 
the naturalised investor will be granted visa-free travel to 151 (Cyprus) or 
163 (Malta) states. This is considerably more than they would have by virtue 
of possessing the best-ranked Caribbean passport, that of Saint Kitts and 
Nevis which allows visa-free entry to 131 countries. Second, and more 
importantly, since in the EU the regulation of citizenship is decided by each 
Member State for herself, an individual may now obtain EU citizenship for 
roughly the price of a Porsche 918 Spyder. Hence the investor gains access 
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to all the rights stemming from EU citizenship, including free movement 
and residence within the EU, the right to vote for and stand as a candidate in 
European Parliament and municipal elections, diplomatic protection, etc. 
This raises the question of whether it is proportionate and just that access to 
this array of rights is exchanged for the price of a sports car. Doesn’t this 
dilute the value of citizenship to a tradable commodity, voiding it of the 
sense of rights and duties and undermining citizens’ solidarity? If states sell 
citizenship, what the buyer gets will no longer look like citizenship at all.
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What Is Wrong with Selling Citizenship?  
It Corrupts Democracy!
Rainer Bauböck
Like the Roman god Janus, whose head was displayed above city gates, citi-
zenship has two faces: one looks outwards, the other one inwards. The exter-
nal face turns to other states and demands that they recognise the country’s 
passport as well as to citizens living abroad whom it promises the right to 
return and diplomatic protection. The internal face speaks to citizens as mem-
bers of a democratic community. It tells them that, in spite of their different 
interests and identities, they are equal as individuals and collectively govern 
themselves through their right to vote. The two faces belong to the same head, 
but sometimes the stories that they tell become dangerously disconnected.
The European Union has strongly increased the external value of its 
member states’ citizenships. It has expanded the right to return into freedom 
of movement throughout the Union. The EU passport is, moreover, a key 
that opens the doors of a large number of third countries for visa-free entry. 
Finally, EU citizenship offers now also diplomatic protection by other mem-
ber states to EU nationals residing in third countries. When selling its pass-
port for € 650,000 to non-resident foreigners, Malta intends to cash in on 
this European added value of its external citizenship. It is not hard to under-
stand why this irritates EU institutions and other member states. Malta 
behaves like a member of a cooperative that sells membership to outsiders 
at a price that in no way reflects her own contributions.
Beyond the obvious unfairness in the division of monetary gains from the 
value of EU citizenship, member states also have reasons to be concerned 
about any one of them naturalising persons born and residing abroad without 
genuine links to the country. As Shachar and Dzankic point out, these people 
are likely to use their passports for other purposes than a ‘return’ to the state 
whose citizenship they have obtained. In this respect, Italy, Hungary and 
Romania, whose ethnic citizenship policies have created hundreds of thou-
sands of new EU citizens abroad, are worse sinners than Malta. What the 
Maltese and similar programmes do is to transform an inherited privilege of 
co-ethnic populations residing abroad into a global commodity.
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This makes it quite natural to consider the external value of citizenship 
from a global perspective, as Spiro, Armstrong and Barbulescu do in differ-
ent ways. Spiro regards the sale of citizenship as yet another symptom of its 
inevitable decline due to globalisation, alongside the increasing toleration of 
dual citizenship, as he has argued previously. While the instrumental value 
of citizenship of an EU member state for transnationally mobile populations 
has increased, citizenship as a ‘sacred bond’ between an individual and a 
state has unravelled. Armstrong and Barbulescu look instead at citizenship 
through a lens of global (in)justice and conclude that the sale of EU pass-
ports is merely one instance – and not the most significant one – of how citi-
zenship policies ‘both feed off, and make it harder to tackle, underlying 
global inequalities.’ This echoes Shachar’s initial comment that we should 
be equally critical of the comparatively rare practice of putting up citizen-
ship for sale and of ‘granting citizenship according to nothing but the fortu-
itous and arbitrary circumstances of station of birth’.
I suggest that it is useful to consider the external and internal perspec-
tives separately. From a global perspective, birthright citizenship may 
indeed look suspiciously arbitrary, although I would not regard it as a cause 
of global injustice. To see why, consider the EU as a regional model for a 
potentially more just global regime. In the EU, free movement and access to 
opportunities elsewhere is linked to citizenship in a member state, which is 
again based on birthright in each of these states. So it seems misconceived 
to point to birthright citizenship as the culprit that causes global social 
inequalities instead of blaming unequal resources, global economic gover-
nance and immigration control.
Once we walk through the city gates and listen to the voice of Janus from 
the other side, our critique of citizenship for sale will change quite radically. 
Barbulescu asks rhetorically: ‘If all countries were equal in living condi-
tions would the scheme be objectionable?’ From inside a democratic com-
munity, the answer to this question must be an emphatic yes! To understand 
why, let us focus for a moment on the core political right of citizenship, the 
franchise in democratic elections. Isn’t it objectionable to sell the right to 
vote to outsiders? Suppose that, in reaction to critiques by the other EU 
states, Malta decides to sell the franchise in its national elections rather than 
its passports. The price it could achieve would be of course much lower, but 
would it be all right to do so? Let me hasten to say that Malta and Cyprus are 
among the very few European states that currently do not allow their citi-
zens residing abroad to cast their vote in national elections. So while 
 investors can get citizenship without taking up residence, they will need to 
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move to these island states in order to vote. Yet this seems a fortuitous coin-
cidence rather than a policy design.
The corruptive political influence of linking citizenship to investment 
can be nicely illustrated by the story of Frank Stronach, a billionaire of 
Austrian origins who made his fortune in Canada. Under Austrian law, 
Stronach lost his Austrian citizenship upon becoming a Canadian citizen. 
When he established European headquarters of his company in Austria, he 
was granted citizenship under a special provision that requires neither resi-
dence nor renunciation of another nationality and that has also been used to 
naturalise Russian oligarchs alongside famous artists and sportsmen on 
grounds of “extra-ordinary achievements in the interest of the republic”. 
Once he had retrieved his Austrian citizenship, Stronach started buying 
political influence by recruiting former politicians for his company. In 2012, 
Stronach bought himself also a political party that he called ‘Team Stronach’ 
and ran an expensive election campaign. He made a bit of a fool of himself 
in TV debates and got fewer votes than expected, but there is now a party in 
the Austrian Parliament established by and named after an investor-citizen. 
Maybe Stronach should not have lost Austrian citizenship in the first place. 
But the way in which he was able to reacquire it through his investment 
opened the doors widely to his subsequent corruptive influence on Austrian 
politics.
Of course, citizenship-from-the-inside is not only about voting and being 
elected. I am not so sure that it requires loving your country, as Dzankic sug-
gests. But it certainly means being treated as an equal member and treating 
others as equal members of a political community. Magni Berton also looks 
at citizenship from the inside but does not emphasize sufficiently equality 
among citizens. He is right that the state invests into citizens and citizens 
invest into each other. But citizenship status and rights must not be propor-
tional to the investments citizens make, or even conditional on such 
investments.
Voting rights provide again the test. Throughout much of the 19th cen-
tury, the franchise was still a class privilege. ‘No taxation without represen-
tation’ also meant ‘no representation without taxation.’ Only those who 
contributed to the state coffers had a right to be represented in the making of 
laws. This is no longer our vision of democracy. True, democratic societies 
have hardly become more egalitarian since then and, as Stronach’s example 
demonstrates, wealth can rather shamelessly buy influence in politics. 
Turning the status of citizenship itself into a marketable commodity would 
mean more than this. It would tear down a wall of protection that keeps 
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social class from becoming, once again, a formal marker of inequality of 
citizenship rights and status. One could object that, once they are citizens, 
the votes of foreign investors will not formally count for more than every-
one else’s. But it seems quite naïve to think that a club that starts to sell its 
membership at a price that only the ultra-rich can afford will keep treating 
its poorer members as equals.
Barbulescu makes an interesting point that ‘citizenship-by-investment 
largely contradicts the very recent efforts of states to re-substantiate citizen-
ship through tests and integration requirements.’ It seems indeed inconsis-
tent to waive integration conditions for investors while at the same time 
insisting that citizenship can only be granted to foreign immigrants as a 
reward for their individual integration efforts. Yet from a democratic per-
spective both of these policies represent the same worrying trend: they link 
access to citizenship once again to social class. While income tests for natu-
ralisation have an explicit class bias, knowledge tests have an implicit one, 
since education and the capacity to learn for tests is strongly related to social 
class.
But isn’t the way citizenship is obtained anyhow morally arbitrary? Why 
should those who have citizen parents or who have been born in the state’s 
territory have a stronger moral claim to citizenship than foreigners who are 
ready to pay or invest? Why should even long-term residence count, if those 
who can naturalise on that basis have been pre-selected by immigration con-
trols that do not offer the same chances to the rest of the world’s population? 
These may be relevant questions from a global justice perspective. From an 
internal democratic perspective, they are wrongly asked. Long-term resi-
dence is what makes immigrants’ relation to the political community equal 
to that of native citizens in the relevant sense and is therefore not at all an 
arbitrary criterion for access to citizenship as membership in a particular 
polity. The same can be said for ius soli and ius sanguinis. Instead of giving 
citizens specific privileges based on a claim to land or to parental inheri-
tance, these birthright rules make them equal amongst each other by refer-
ring to the circumstances of birth that they share in common, be it birth in a 
territory or to citizen parents. Moreover, by providing individuals with citi-
zenship at birth and for life, states protect them in a much stronger way than 
clubs who select their members based on present members’ interests in their 
contributions or in choosing new ones who are like themselves. Selecting 
future citizens on grounds of either investment or income and knowledge 
tests departs fundamentally from the egalitarian thrust that underlies rules of 
birthright citizenship as well as residence-based naturalisation.
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So how should the EU and its member states react to citizenship-for- 
investors laws? They should protest that these policies undermine solidarity 
between member states, but they should also protest against the internal 
hollowing out of democratic standards. As a union of democracies, the EU 
must be concerned when democracy is corrupted by the rule of money in 
any of its member states. Bribing officials is not the only way in which this 
happens. Selling citizenship is, too.
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What Money Can’t Buy: Face-to-Face  
Cooperation and Local Democratic Life
Paulina Ochoa Espejo
Brief visit to Valletta: € 2,500. Maltese Passport (and visa-free travel to the 
United States and 163 other countries): € 650,000. Partaking in a democratic 
community built on principles of equality and solidarity: Priceless.
In her article, Ayelet Shachar argues a point similar to the tagline of 
Master Card’s famous advertisement: ‘there are certain things money can’t 
buy, for everything else...’ Yet, as Peter Spiro remarks, pointing it out in our 
current circumstances may appear as banal as a TV ad. The hoax in the 
Master Card ad is that the numbers appearing on screen are not presented as 
the price tag of the ‘priceless’ item. Yet the ad also tacitly reminds us that we 
live in a society where the most ‘meaningful’ experiences are, in fact, bought 
and sold all the time; a society where what really matters to the beautiful 
woman may well be the expensive ring’s promise of future riches, not the 
engagement with her fiancé. The campaign exploits our fear that priceless 
moments would simply not happen if they were not preceded by hefty pur-
chases. Indeed, we daily discover things that, in a democratic society, are 
not supposed to be for sale, and yet go to the highest bidder. For example, 
the work of such public servants as soldiers, prison wardens, and govern-
ment social workers is today frequently given by governments to private 
contractors. And today, more and more countries are selling citizenship.
But does ‘everyone’s doing it’ make it right? I agree with Shachar that it 
ought not to happen: citizenship should not be for sale. However, I think that 
she has not chosen the best grounds to argue why it shouldn’t. In her view, 
selling passports is wrong for many reasons, but what I take to be the most 
important are: first, because it undermines community; second, because it 
lets the economic sphere control the political sphere, and in doing so cor-
rupts the value of citizenship. As to the first, Shachar argues, a person who 
has enough ready cash to buy citizenship in Malta has no incentives to estab-
lish relations of mutual trust and responsibility with other Maltese, so giving 
them a golden passport weakens a community built on solidarity and collec-
tive decision-making. As to the second, says Shachar, selling the privileges 
of citizenship brings economic inequality into the political sphere, thus 
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undoing democracy’s historic commitment to shield each citizen’s political 
power from the effects of economic inequality. At first sight, these argu-
ments seem overwhelming. Yet further reflection shows that they in fact 
prove too much. For if they were right, then we ought to forbid what I deem 
an unobjectionable practice: economic immigration by the poor.
Let’s see how this could be so. On Shachar’s argument, we object to sell-
ing passports, even when it is profitable, because the buyer’s character and 
attitude undermines democratic institutions. A buyer of a golden passport is 
motivated to be a member for the wrong reasons: she is not seeking citizen-
ship so as to establish relations of mutual trust and responsibility with 
Maltese. Notice, however, that this is also true of the economic immigrant 
who jumped the fence and worked illegally in the receiving country in order 
to pull herself out of poverty. In both cases the immigrant acts primarily 
according to her own interests, rather than any desire to build relationships 
of trust and mutual responsibility with her fellows. Both types of immi-
grants move money according to their transnational personal connections 
and concerns, both invest according to their personal needs. Both immi-
grants often bought their way in: either legally or illegally. Both value their 
new dual-citizenship status highly, and are not willing to forgo the advan-
tages of either one, and both may spend huge amounts of money on immi-
gration attorneys and fees to regularise their immigration status and get 
citizenship. So Shachar’s own criterion, at least as presented, seems to rule 
out most economic immigration by the poor.
Something seems amiss. A better argument against a golden passport, I 
think, would use a criterion that would unambiguously imply both that it is 
wrong to admit rich immigrants simply because they will pay big money, 
and that it is wrong to deny admission to the poor simply because of their 
economic hopes. Let’s examine some candidates for such a criterion.
Could it be time? In Shachar’s essay, there is a muted factor that does 
seem to explain why we should not make ability to pay sufficient for citizen-
ship: Time. Both the rich and the poor immigrants pay for their new mem-
bership in one way or another, but the rich can get citizenship fast. The 
world’s rich have a degree of mobility that mirrors the speed of capital. They 
can follow the money, and they profit from their well-heeled hyper-mobility. 
This, of course, gives them few incentives to build ‘long-term relations’ and 
commitments ‘expanding beyond their life-span’. So time might seem a 
good candidate for explaining why purchase shouldn’t itself get you citizen-
ship. Yet, as Chris Armstrong argues in his response, one can in a flash make 
deep commitments that do indeed seem to expand beyond one’s life-span. 
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He reminds us of foreign volunteer soldiers like the Lincoln Brigade, who 
enter a foreign war to defend a country that is not theirs. It takes them no 
time to make a deep and seemingly long-lasting commitment. So if we think 
our criterion needs ultimately to track long-term commitments, then this 
criterion seems not to work for all cases.
Could it be the depth of the roots, then? Here is another way to explain 
why it is wrong to admit the rich passport-buyer simply because of ability to 
pay. Let’s say that the criterion should be how much and how deeply the 
would-be immigrant’s life and concerns are and will be rooted in the new 
country. For poor immigrants invest their work and efforts in becoming a 
part of the new society they join, while it might seem that a rich jetsetter 
buying a passport need make no such effort. Yet economic investment can 
be a very deep tie, as Raul Magni Berton argues in his reply. Committing a 
big sum to a new country can be done in a flash, and indeed, it can be done 
without even visiting the country in question; but if the investment is seri-
ous, it shows commitment and concern for others, and it lays down deep 
roots. So depth-of-roots cannot adequately distinguish the golden-passport 
holder from the poor immigrant.
Could it then be physical presence? This is the candidate criterion I 
favour. One of Shachar’s concerns is that the rich passport-buyers need 
hardly ever be present in the new country. Territorial presence is particu-
larly important because it forces individuals to partake in a particular way 
of doing things. Standing in queues, letting others go through, gather in 
certain occasions, stay indoors at other times. This type of action is face-to-
face, and requires commitment to local institutions and local life. By being 
there, a person must become part of a civic organisation requiring solidar-
ity and trust. And by being present in a democratic action, one can show a 
commitment to a civic community without having to share ethnic or cul-
tural ties. This way of coming into a civic organisation can be immediate 
(as in the case of the person who volunteers to defend a country), but it does 
distinguish between an immigrant who is truly invested in the new coun-
try’s institutions, from one who has just engaged in a one-time uncommit-
ted monetary transaction. And most importantly, physical presence and 
face-to-face interactions can explain why citizenship is valuable in itself: it 
allows us to have relations as political equals, regardless of economic sta-
tus. If we award passports to those without any likelihood of ever being 
there, we undermine the relevant connections built on regular interactions 
and participation in the institutions that organise local life, which is, after 
all, where equality takes place.
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At bottom, what makes the golden passport wrong is that it undermines 
political equality, not that it puts closed communities in question, or shatters 
the separations between the spheres of justice. What remains priceless is the 
active face-to-face partaking and building of democratic institutions on the 
basis of principles of equality and solidarity: that is what money can’t buy.
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If You Do not Like Selling Passports,  
Give Them for Free to Those Who  
Deserve Them
Vesco Paskalev
The Maltese idea to ‘sell’ citizenships was met with almost universal criti-
cism, not only within our Forum discussion but throughout Europe. While it 
is difficult to disagree with most of the arguments against monetization of 
citizenship, in my view they all aim at the wrong target. It is not the sale of 
citizenship per se which violates principles of justice and democracy; it is 
the existing international system of inclusion and exclusion of third country 
nationals which is deeply skewed and denigrates the value of citizenship. For 
all that I know, even the ultra-rich do not easily throw € 650,000 to the wind, 
so a condition under which anyone would give huge amounts of money for a 
travel document is deeply troubling. It is not membership but mobility which 
is at issue. Moreover, as Paulina Ochoa aptly notes, not only the rich but also 
the poor seek naturalisation for economic rather than civic reasons.
Bauböck distinguishes two sides of citizenship – an internal and an exter-
nal one. Focusing on the former, he persuasively argues that selling citizen-
ship undermines democracy. In a similar vein, Dzankic notes that in some 
cases the very fact of putting a price to a good corrupts the good. As a decent 
republican I fully agree with both of them. But as Spiro notes, the corruption 
of this good may have started long ago for reasons which have nothing to do 
with the recent fashion of investor citizenship schemes. While the policy 
makers and academics were predominantly concerned with the internal 
aspect of citizenship, various forces – from the Schengen Agreement via 
Ryanair to Moneygram – have brought the external aspect to the fore.
Is citizenship all about travel indeed, or about identity and democracy? A 
natural experiment occurred between Bulgaria and Macedonia. Most 
Bulgarians believe that Macedonians are actually ethnic Bulgarians, who 
happen to live in an artificial country because of some historic contingen-
cies. Naturally, most Macedonians are annoyed (to put it mildly) by that 
suggestion and vehemently assert their Macedonian identity against 
Bulgarian imperialism. Yet, when Bulgaria joined the EU, Macedonians 
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flocked to the Bulgarian consulates to apply for a passport. Suddenly, thou-
sands were claiming that they are ‘of Bulgarian origin’. Very few of these 
people had any actual bonds with Bulgaria and it is difficult to believe that 
anyone had suddenly woken up to her or his true Bulgarian identity. 
Apparently their Macedonian self-consciousness was in harmony with a 
Bulgarian passport and the opportunities it gives to ‘Bulgarians abroad’.
I hasten to add that Macedonia tolerates dual citizenship; if people had 
to renounce their Macedonian citizenship in order to obtain a Bulgarian 
passport, the numbers could be very different. Yet, the story is telling. It 
shows how easy it is for people to claim certain origins when this is conve-
nient despite of firmly holding on to a different identity, which in the 
Macedonian case has been explicitly constructed as excluding the Bulgarian 
one. For all the value we attach to citizenship, the relative weight of its 
internal aspect is by far superseded by that of its external dimension. When 
asserting that a passport is more about travel than about anything else I am 
not being cynical – most citizens do care about membership, too. But when 
your passport matters so much outside of your country, you are under pres-
sure to adjust your priorities. Thus, in the extreme case, your passport may 
be completely unrelated to your emotional belonging. Virtually all coun-
tries in the world discriminate among those wishing to enter on the basis of 
the completely arbitrary facts of their birthplace and descent. It is this arbi-
trariness which corrupts the value of citizenship (and by implication of 
domestic democracy), not the availability of a bypass or two for a tiny 
minority, be it rich or poor.
So what should an EU Member State do in the face of the Maltese scheme 
if it is concerned with rescuing the value of citizenship as Shachar pleads? 
For sure, trying to prevent the Maltese from making some cash from a sys-
tem which is already so unjust and distortive would not help much. Yes, 
selling citizenship does not do anything to help either, but if a wealthy 
European democracy is truly appalled by the idea of selling passports to the 
rich, why not start giving its passports for free to a more deserving crowd? 
The only decent response to the opening of a mobility corridor for the rich 
would be to open mobility corridors for the righteous – those who have 
shown exemplary civic virtue, have made sacrifices for democracy or human 
rights or are subject to outrageous persecution. A tentative list of candidates 
would include convicted Russian punks, jailed Egyptian protesters and 
Chinese dissidents, American whistle-blowers, Iranian adulterers facing 
stoning, etc. Certainly, one can immediately think about a number of prob-
lems that such a policy could create, yet if Raoul Wallenberg took the risk of 
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handing out Swedish passports to save hundreds of Hungarian Jews from 
the Nazis, why shouldn’t a proud member of the EU do something similar?
In practical terms granting citizenship to prominent civil rights activists 
can spare them from persecution at home and provide them with a mobility 
corridor to the Western world. Symbolically, it can become a way of recog-
nition of their civic virtues and exploits (certainly, despotic regimes may 
frame it as evidence for treason). Critics are right to claim that the very fact 
that an immaterial value has a price tag undermines it, but the opposite can 
also be true – giving passports to highly esteemed figures can make these 
passports highly esteemed, too. If you are rich, go get a passport from Malta! 
If you are righteous, maybe you should be able to get a passport from say, 
Sweden. Comparing the existing investor citizenship schemes, the Financial 
Times feared that selling citizenship may start a race to the bottom.1 Why 
not try launching a race to the top instead?
1 ‘“Passport for sale” plan raises concern among EU members’, Financial Times, 
9 December 2013, available at https://www.ft.com/content/b8a2adfa-6106-11e3- 
b7f1-00144feabdc0
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Citizenship for Real: Its Hypocrisy, Its  
Randomness, Its Price
Dimitry Kochenov
Peter Spiro’s tactful diagnosis of the flaws in Ayelet Shachar’s kickoff text 
to this Forum is correct: Shachar fails to convince when arguing for saving 
citizenship against itself. (1) She understates the hypocrisy and randomness 
underlying any determination of citizenship. (2) She ignores the problem of 
de facto statelessness, which reveals a questionable understanding of dis-
crimination. (3) She exaggerates the importance of the political dimension 
of citizenship and presents the link between citizenship and political partici-
pation as unproblematic. (4) Shachar claims that the sale of EU citizenship 
affects other member states, but this is perfectly legitimate since there is no 
breach of EU law involved. (5) There are multiple ways how to acquire EU 
citizenship which shows why Shachar’s acceptance of naturalisation as a 
state-mandated purification ritual fails to capture reality. Overall, Shachar’s 
argument against the Maltese policy does not stand. If we take democracy 
seriously, then it should be for the Maltese alone to set the price. I thus dis-
agree also with Magni Berton when he claims that the high price at which 
Malta sells EU passports is problematic.
 I.
There are many stories about how selling things is bad: land is not for sale; 
love is not for sale; salvation is not for sale. Such proclamations make one 
wonder whether the purpose of ethical high points is to totally contradict 
reality. Hypocrisy itself is difficult to sell as an argument: land can be bought, 
prostitution is often legal and some of the greatest art was sponsored by 
those who wanted to buy salvation for themselves. To insist that citizenship 
is not for sale is to ensure the perpetuation of the outright randomness of its 
conferral as well as hypocritical and self-righteous excuses lurking behind 
fundamental mechanisms of exclusions. Those boasting Italian great grand-
parents in Paraguay, members of Polish diasporas in Australia and else-
where, large benefactors and talented sportsmen – all these people can 
become Europeans, however random the rules. But the critique focuses on 
those countries that offer citizenship for sale in a perfectly transparent way. 
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It is wrong to pretend that any other principle than outright randomness is at 
the core of the assignment of citizenship statuses in today’s world. Once the 
inevitable randomness of exclusion is admitted – as Shachar did in her book 
on the birthright lottery1 – we need to ask what citizenship is actually about.
 II.
Shachar is worried about any discrimination at the point of acquisition of 
citizenship. However, a strict non-discrimination approach would deprive 
citizenship of its main function, i.e. random exclusion of large parts of soci-
ety. Crucially, both de facto and de jure aspects of exclusion must be taken 
into account, a point that Shachar ignores in her statement. The fact that 
many de jure citizens are de facto stateless, in the sense of not receiving 
protection by their state of origin or enjoying substantive rights to return 
there, is of crucial importance. Idealistic images of a citizenship of the past 
are based on misrepresentation of social facts, perpetuating an often repug-
nant status quo where plenty of people are failed by their states day after 
day. Thus real citizenship starts with the actual extension of rights and giv-
ing the voice to those who are already formally included: women, minori-
ties, the poor and the weak: plentiful problems remain in this regard.
Naturalisation is but a second step which serves three functions: provid-
ing citizenship status to long-term resident immigrants, respecting and rec-
ognising citizens’ family ties through special naturalisation rules for family 
members, and reinforcing the society with talent, money, inspiration and 
diversity – which translates into inviting the rich, the beautiful and the smart 
(sometimes these three categories overlap of course).
No confusion between different groups of applicants should arise: to ask 
that all follow the same path is rarely helpful. Arguing for making the rules as 
strict as possible for all misses the different purposes of conferring nationality 
in the first place. Be it sports, science, money or family, it is up to the national 
democratic process to determine the criteria. Crucially, there is no ethical 
point to be made in arguing against money when loving a citizen, expensive 
education, or muscular power can also do the trick. Money is no less random 
a criterion and this is exactly what citizenship is about. Real discrimination 
would be to sell a partial rather than fully fledged citizenship, as Tonga does 
when selling its ‘Tongan Protected Person Passport’, which is not recognised 
by many other states and does not entail a right to enter and settle in Tonga. 
The attractiveness of such a second class citizenship is clearly limited.
1 Shachar, A. (2009), The Birthright Lottery. Citizenship and Global Inequality. 




Shachar overstates the actual importance of the political dimension of citi-
zenship. In the age of post-heroic geopolitics plenty of people naturalise or 
cherish the nationality they already have for entirely different reasons. 
Indeed, the political aspect, rather than being at the core of citizenship, 
regrettably becomes the scapegoat for justifying refusals to extend the status 
to those who already belong to the society. The idea that only the right peo-
ple participate in political life is so important that you will be discriminated, 
threatened with deportation, exploited and humiliated in order to protect the 
sacred body politic. The troubling truth is that more and more people do not 
care about politics, as opinion polls amply testify. And those who do can be 
politically engaged despite not having the formal status of membership – as 
the German citizen Daniel Cohn-Bendit was in Paris 1968. The basic pre-
sumption of the necessary connection between citizenship and political par-
ticipation should be approached critically and is hardly defensible, especially 
in the EU (see the earlier EUDO CITIZENSHIP Forum on national voting 
right for EU citizens in other member states2). Insisting on the political 
dimension misrepresents thus what citizenship is about and ruins many lives 
by blowing a luxury right to politics totally out of proportion for the sake of 
justifying random exclusion.
 IV.
It is clear that, just as the passports of other micro-states, Maltese citizenship 
as such is of very little practical value apart from visa-free travel. All the 
rights it brings – to work and live in the EU, non-discrimination in the EU 
and diplomatic protection outside the EU (when was the last time you saw a 
Maltese embassy?) – are related to the EU and the EU only. Clearly, what 
the Maltese are selling is EU citizenship and they are quite right to do so, 
since Member States are fully competent in this field, as international and 
also European law teaches us. Rich newly-minted Maltese will satisfy all 
the formal requirements of the EU Citizenship Directive 2004/38, thus 
becoming ideal EU citizens in London and Paris.
Following the Micheletti and Rottmann decisions of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, the principles of EU law should be respected – and 
2 Bauböck, R., P. Cayla & C. Seth (eds.) (2012), ‘Should EU citizens living in 
other Member States vote there in national elections?’, Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies EUDO Citizenship Obervatory Working Paper 2012/32, 
Florence: European University Institute, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/
handle/1814/22754.
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they are, since it is unlikely that the number of Maltese investor-citizens will 
represent a problem in the EU context: the scale of sales will remain small – 
even compared with the extension of EU citizenship by other states where a 
connection with the state itself is unnecessary, such as turning Argentinians 
into Italians based on the romantic ideas of inter-generational continuity or 
distributing Hungarian passports in the Serbian province Voivodina. 
Importantly, there is nothing wrong at all with these practices which are 
democratic and legal and supply thus a strong argument in support of the 
Maltese law. Indeed, investing into your nationality is at least as random 
(read ‘sound’) as investing in a lawyer to discover your Italian heritage for 
the sake of claiming an Italian passport.
 V.
EU citizenship provides the most vivid reminder of the radical shift in the 
meaning of citizenship that made it a more ethically acceptable institution. 
Non-discrimination on the basis of nationality – the very core of EU law – 
provides the litmus test for what national citizenship is really about in the 
EU today. France is prohibited from ‘loving’ its own nationals more than, 
say, resident Estonians or Maltese. The stigmatising function of citizenship 
is thus deactivated: humiliation of a randomly proclaimed other is not any 
more an option, at least legally speaking, among EU Member States. Full 
belonging to a society is thus not subjected any more to an arbitrary approval, 
putting all the bizarre language, culture and other tests that states subject 
newcomers to in a very interesting perspective: the very existence of the EU 
disproves their validity and relevance. They consist in nothing else but puri-
fication through humiliation: the ‘others” language and culture is presumed 
as not good enough and social learning is dismissed, forcing people to waste 
their time by subjecting them to profoundly disturbing rituals3. The very 
success of EU citizenship is the strongest argument against these practices, 
which Shachar wants to see applied to all without questioning their effec-
tiveness and common sense. Indeed, if a Romanian is good enough to be 
embraced by British society as equal, subjecting a Moldovan to any kind of 
tests is utterly illogical: the arguments of the protection of culture, language, 
etc. are simply devoid of relevance when more than half a billion EU citi-
zens a exempted from them.
3 Kochenov, D. (2011), ‘Mevrouw de Jong Gaat Eten: EU Citizenship and the 
Culture of Prejudice’, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory Working Paper 2011/06, Florence: European 




For the reasons above, I do not find Shachar’s arguments convincing. 
Maltese democracy should be respected. Distorted dreams of the past, just 
as contemporary hypocrisy, are not worth defending. From a purely legal 
perspective, Malta’s case is solid: EU law is unquestionably on its side. 
From a human perspective, if I could have done it, I would definitely have 
bought EU citizenship instead of naturalising, which I experienced as a 
deeply humiliating process.
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Trading Citizenship, Human Capital  
and the European Union
David Owen
In 2003 the brilliant Kenyan steeplechaser Stephen Cherono switched his 
allegiance to Qatar and took the name Saif Saaeed Shaheen. Under this 
name he has set a world record and won a number of global medals for Qatar 
which, alongside Bahrain, pioneered the explicit policy of recruiting ath-
letes who have no prior connection to the state but whose human capital 
would contribute to its self-determined goals. Such practices are not entirely 
new – for example, the Australian and New Zealand national rugby teams 
(union and league) have maintained their standing in world rugby in part by 
actively recruiting young talent from the Pacific nations - Fiji, Papua New 
Guinea, Cook Islands, Tonga and especially Samoa – to the detriment of the 
national teams of those states. But, as with the case of Malta selling its citi-
zenship for € 650,000, the policies adopted by Qatar and Bahrain are blatant 
in making explicit what was merely implicit in the rather widespread poli-
cies of other states, namely, the trading of access to citizenship for forms of 
capital (economic, cultural, political, etc.) held by individuals which the 
state deems valuable to acquire. Whether it is inducements to foreign mil-
lionaires (where other EU countries are playing catch up with long-standing 
UK policies) or to skilled workers in medical, finance or IT sectors, the 
immigration policies of states are perennially engaged in the practice of 
identifying valued forms of capital and facilitating the inward flow of such 
capital. The emigration policies of states exhibit similar patterns whether in 
terms of the deliberate creation of human capital for export markets (e.g., 
Indian medics and Filipino nurses) and/or the maintenance of thick links to 
diasporic communities to support trade, knowledge transfers, remittance 
flows and the recruitment of sporting talent. The state as a self-determining 
agent has a clear and well-established interest in structuring ‘access to citi-
zenship’ in ways that support its goals, whether these goals concern eco-
nomic development, health and social welfare, cultural standing or sporting 
glory. The legitimacy of the ways in which it pursues these goals is however 
another question.
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For the states that compose the EU, we can distinguish three dimensions 
of democratic legitimacy that address, respectively, the composition of the 
demos of the state, associative obligations between member states and dem-
ocratic obligations to non-members. Let’s take them in turn.
If we focus on the composition of the demos, then it is important to 
acknowledge the difference of selling citizenship in a global market with 
schemes that, as Ayelet Shachar rightly notes, simply facilitate residence for 
selected types of highly valued persons and hence the acquisition of citizen-
ship via residence-based naturalisation procedures. As Bauböck, Dzankic 
and Ochoa all stress, the ‘golden residence permit’ schemes (whatever other 
faults they may have) require a multi-year period of residence within, and 
hence subjection to, the authority of the state in question prior to, and as a 
condition of, the acquisition of citizenship. Such required residence grounds 
the claim to political equality that is given expression in access to member-
ship of the demos.
Turning to the second dimension of democratic legitimacy of EU states, 
the associative obligations of member states, we can note that the explicit 
Treaty-based commitment to solidarity among these states has a specific 
implication for their democratic composition in that, normatively, it con-
strains states to treat their own citizenship (over which the EU has no – or 
via the Court of Justice of the European Union, very limited – competence) 
as integral to the democratic character of the EU. In this respect, Bauböck is 
surely right to highlight the point that selling national citizenship (and hence 
also EU citizenship) is incompatible with the associative obligations of 
member states as it admits persons to EU citizenship in all member states 
who do not have any genuine connection to any of these states. However, 
the scope of such obligations is not merely tied to such blatant examples of 
the commodification of citizenship but extends to the wider range of prac-
tices that are brought into focus by such extreme examples insofar as these 
undermine political equality with the EU by, for example, importing class 
and status differentials into access to citizenship.
The third dimension of democratic legitimacy for EU member states 
concerns those non-members whose morally significant interests are affected 
by the citizenship policies of these states. The requirement here is that these 
interests are impartially considered within the policy-making process. In 
contrast to Bauböck’s distinction between democracy and global justice, I 
want to stress that this third dimension links the two and ties the concerns 
acutely raised by Barbulescu and, in more fatalistic mode, by Spiro directly 
to democratic legitimacy. As Barbulescu notes, the neo-liberalisation of citi-
zenship that is expressed in practices of trading citizenship entails that the 
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policy-making process does not give impartial consideration to all those 
whose morally significant interests are affected by these citizenship policies. 
Rather, the duty of justification owed to those affected is abrogated through 
a deliberate practice of partiality in which the rich and those who possess 
talents that are highly valued by the states in question are provided with 
unequal access to residence and hence to citizenship. Practices that support 
the emergence of transnational class and status stratification in which mobil-
ity rights become radically unequally distributed are not compatible with the 
democratic legitimacy of states or of the EU.
Oddly then we have reason to be grateful to states such as Qatar and 
Malta whose policies, in pushing to the neoliberal extreme, help bring into 
focus a wider range of policies that are hollowing out democratic citizenship 
from within.
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Citizenship for Sale: Could and Should the  
EU Intervene?
Jo Shaw
On 15 January 2014, the European Parliament will debate1 the issue of ‘EU 
citizenship for sale’ as a ‘topical subject’ in its plenary. The Council and the 
Commission will both make statements on the issue, and the debate will be 
the culmination of a process whereby numerous parliamentarians from vari-
ous political groups (ALDE, Verts/ALE, PPE – although not the S&D group 
of which the Maltese Labour Party currently in government is a member) 
have addressed questions to the Commission and the Council and expressed 
their concerns about the trend towards selling citizenship.
Can such critiques rely on European law or should the case be argued 
politically? And if the latter, is the Commission or the European Parliament 
the right institution to take the lead?
Dimitry Kochenov has made the point that there does not appear to be a 
case to argue that the decision by Malta to ‘sell’ its citizenship – whatever the 
price – raises an issue of EU law. It is well established that the conditions 
under which the Member States provide for the acquisition or loss of their 
citizenship are a matter to be decided by these states, provided that the rules 
put in place observe the requirements of EU law. The 1992 Micheletti judg-
ment of the Court of Justice of the EU established that Member States must 
recognise the ‘EU part’ of a person’s dual citizenship, as to do otherwise 
would deprive that person of the benefit of the free movement rights. In its 
2010 Rottmann decision, the Court acknowledged that decisions on the loss 
of citizenship, where these would entail the loss of EU citizenship and thus 
deprive the person concerned of their rights and duties under that status, 
should be subject to a test of proportionality. In Rottmann, Advocate General 
Maduro did suggest a broader basis in the norms of EU law for constraining 
the actions of the Member States. He referred specifically to the case of mass 
naturalisations of third country nationals by a Member State  undertaken 
1 European Parliament Resolution on the sale of EU citizenship, 
2013/2995(RSP), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/
ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2013/2995%28RSP%29
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without consulting the other Member States. Maduro argued that such prac-
tices might entail a breach of the duty of loyal or sincere cooperation con-
tained in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union.2 According to that 
provision ‘The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s 
tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of 
the Union’s objectives.’ But, as Kochenov notes, compared to the large num-
bers of Italian citizenships given out in Latin America to those demonstrating 
Italian ancestry, or indeed the effects of the external citizenship provisions of 
some of the newer Member States (e.g. Hungary in Serbia or Croatia in 
Bosnia and in many non-European countries where there are large Croatian 
diasporas such as in Australia), the effects of the Maltese provisions will be 
marginal in terms of numbers and thus have little impact on other Member 
States. The case for a legal obligation under the Treaties to moderate this type 
of national citizenship policy seems rather weak. It may be a mercantilist 
practice, but it is not arbitrary according to the norms of EU law.
So is that the end of it? Will the debate on 15 January be limited to the 
Commission rehearsing these legal points and pointing out its lack of compe-
tence in the matter, and MEPs wringing their hands about the ‘abuse of rights’ 
and the ‘lack of respect’3 for other Member States which is said to be involved 
in the creation of new citizens by such means? And will objections to the 
actions of Malta (and potentially other Member States which have introduced 
variants of these schemes) have no more traction than objections to a Member 
State exploiting its own natural resources, or exporting things for profit that it 
is particularly good at making, even if these might have environmental costs 
(such as cheaply produced French nuclear power or large German cars)?
As the contributions to this Forum have shown, the proposal by Malta to 
sell citizenship is just one example of why and how (national) citizenships 
can be most effectively monetized precisely because those citizenships are 
more attractive to those who ‘invest’ (it does not matter whether by means 
of work, long residence and civic integration or by direct financial contribu-
tion to the national exchequer), because they confer the benefits of EU citi-
zenship. EU citizenship thus connects the external and internal dimensions 
of citizenship and offers incentives to states to exploit citizenship (and 
 associated rights such as residence or the right to work) as a tradable good 
in a market system.
2 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, available at https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT





If Malta’s policy exploits EU citizenship in a way that does not conflict 
with EU law, should the European Parliament – as an institution rooted in 
the principle of representative democracy – not use the opportunity to reflect 
instead more deeply upon the meaning of (national and EU) citizenship in a 
compact between states such as the European Union?
In that context, a comparison of the position of the Commission and the 
Parliament can be instructive. The Commission – unlike the Parliament – can 
speak with one voice, and has been assigned executive and enforcement powers 
under the Treaties. So a standard argument based on the duty of Member States 
to comply with EU law involves trying to get the Commission to say something 
about a situation in a given Member State, perhaps as a precursor to doing 
something such as bringing an enforcement action. But time and again, the 
argument fails, precisely because the issue falls outside the scope of EU law.
The powers of the Commission to take such actions are often overesti-
mated because observers have watched how it has dealt with accession 
states. However, the context of enlargement deceives us, because it is during 
that phase of pre-accession negotiations – and whilst states live in fear of 
being told they do not comply with the Copenhagen criteria in relation to 
democracy and fundamental rights – that the Commission can make pointed 
interventions in areas of national sovereignty, including citizenship. Changes 
to the citizenship regimes of many of the Western Balkan states can be 
attributed directly or indirectly to pressure from ‘Europe’. Perhaps the most 
obvious example is that of Macedonia4, which changed its rules on acquisi-
tion of citizenship as one step towards a more consociational settlement 
involving the majority of ethnic Macedonians and the minority Albanian 
group. Similar effects via the implementation of national visa liberalisation 
roadmaps can be seen in Montenegro and Serbia. On the other hand, as the 
case of the controversial constitutional amendments in Hungary has shown, 
there is little the Commission can do to intervene in Member States, given 
the limitations of its current enforcement instruments5, however egregious 
would appear to be the effects of the amendments introduced upon the ‘enti-
tlement’ of that particular state to be a full member of Europe’s democratic 
community of states.
4 Spaskovska, L. (2011), Macedonian Citizen: ‘Former Yugoslav’, Future 




5 Ungarn – was tun? Folge 2: ein besonderes Vertragsverletzungsverfahren, 
Verfassungsblog, available at https://verfassungsblog.de/category/debates/
ungarn-was-tun-folge-2-ein-besonderes-vertragsverletzungsverfahren/
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It is therefore not for the Commission to make the point that the creation 
of EU citizenship has indeed contributed to the hollowing out of national 
citizenship, not by taking away the prerogatives of national citizens (voting 
in national elections remains overwhelmingly reserved to national citizens 
only), but by incentivising its instrumentalisation for reasons of domestic 
gain (in Malta’s case, a wish to improve the financial situation of a micro 
state buffeted by the effects of the Eurozone crisis).
But what about the European Parliament? As the democratically elected 
representative of the people(s) of the European Union and its Member States, 
and as a body elected on a franchise that deliberately goes beyond borders, the 
European Parliament can and indeed should take a careful look at the issues 
that the Maltese case raises. Yet it should do so not through a narrow focus on 
Malta, but rather through taking a sober look at the wider injustices and nega-
tive effects on democratic principles that may be highlighted by this newly 
identified dimension of the Fortress Europe construction (and how ironic it is, 
that Malta is also at the frontline of the physical Fortress Europe, as an island 
state located close to the southern shoreline of the Mediterranean sea).
‘Intervention’ is much too strong a word for whatever it is that the 
European Parliament could and should do on 15 January, when it debates the 
issue of EU citizenship for sale. But a first and wide-ranging reflection on 
some of the emerging consequences of EU citizenship for national democra-
cies would at least be a start. 2013 was the year of the EU citizen. It did not 
do much to raise public awareness about EU citizenship and it ended with 
moves towards its commodification. Wouldn’t it be appropriate for the 
European Parliament to start the new year with a real debate on the relation 
between national and EU citizenship?
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Linking Citizenship to Income Undermines  
European Values. We Need Shared Criteria 
and Guidelines for Access to EU Citizenship
Hannes Swoboda
The decision by the Maltese Parliament to offer Maltese citizenship – and 
consequently – EU citizenship to third country nationals who can afford to 
pay € 650.000 comes as a closure of the EU year of citizens and reflects a 
worrying trend in the conception of all those rights related to EU citizenship, 
including above all freedom of movement.
Malta is not an isolated case, though. As highlighted by other contribu-
tions to this Forum, other EU Member States have in time come to link 
access to residence and hence – albeit indirectly – to citizenship to income 
or to economic investment, although the Maltese proposal goes a step fur-
ther by introducing a direct and free gateway to citizenship purely based on 
a monetary payment.
Some may say that access to nationality is an exclusive competence of 
Member States and that the European Union has no right to interfere in these 
choices. From a purely legal perspective I would agree, but I believe we 
would miss the point if we did not see that, behind monetization of citizen-
ship and residence, there is a vital political issue for the European Union to 
face, if we believe that Europe is more than just a wide single market.
The political debate about the so-called ‘poverty migration’ in the EU 
and on limitations to free movement for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens is 
just another side of the same coin. The supporters of the idea that ‘free 
movement has to be less free’ base their belief on the assumption that free 
movement should be free for those citizens who have a suitable income and 
less free for those who have not.
This questions the idea of citizenship as the core of a society, as the set 
of rights and duties defining active participation in the political, social and 
economic life of a community on an equal basis. And it questions the very 
idea of a European citizenship as a set of special rights connected to being a 
member of the European Union as a political Union, where individuals, 
 notwithstanding their income and social position, can on an equal footing 
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organise, participate in decisions in a wider European public space and feel 
part of a common project because that project is a collective benefit for all.
I would say that the very idea of the European Union as a community of 
values is put in question by these trends, particularly the idea that it is the 
duty of the EU to reinforce social cohesion, to eliminate discriminations and 
to provide a level playing field for the material exercise of the fundamental 
rights defined in the EU Charter.
I have often expressed the idea, including in the framework of EUDO 
debates, that access to EU citizenship needs to be expanded and not limited 
further, if we believe in making progress in the conception of a political and 
social Union.
I have often mentioned, for example, that many ‘new Europeans’ already 
live, study, work in our societies and contribute to them – some have been 
born and raised in Europe – but still are limited in their access to citizenship. 
These fellow Europeans have to go through detailed and lengthy citizenship 
tests before they can hope to achieve naturalisation in a Member State and 
therefore be fully EU citizens. I am convinced that – should Member States 
go in the direction of a privileged gateway to national citizenship solely 
based on income – this would create an unacceptable discriminatory situa-
tion that is probably also incompatible with EU law as it currently stands.
This is why I believe that a serious reflection at EU level is necessary 
ahead of European elections this year – also taking stock of the debates that 
characterised 2013 as the Year of EU citizens – on which common and 
shared criteria and guidelines should guide access to national citizenship 
and hence to EU citizenship at national level.
I think this is a necessary and urgent discussion we need to face. The 
background for the trend in citizenship policies that we are currently wit-
nessing is of course more complex and it has to do with the on-going erosion 
of trust in institutions and with the fact that more and more among those 
who possess citizenship of the Union feel that they are not yet (or not fully) 
citizens, both at national and European level.
The real challenge is how European citizenship can be relaunched in a 
bottom-up process where EU citizens can enter the stage of the EU political 
arena, campaign for policy options, actively debate in a truly European pub-




If we don’t want to leave a golden opportunity to Eurosceptics, national-
ists and populists, we must seize the chance for a leap forward in the 
European process involving a much wider concept of citizenship than that 
defined in the letter of the EU Treaties.
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That the European Parliament will debate the sale of ‘golden visas’ and 
‘golden passports’ on 15 January 2014 is a victory for democracy and a tes-
tament to the vital importance of the issues raised by this Forum Debate, 
with its rich and illuminating contributions.
The ‘selling of citizenship,’ as many of my commentators have rightly 
noted, is indicative of larger and deeper transformations of our conception 
of political membership in a more globalized and competitive world. It is 
hoped that these tectonic changes will, on the whole, ultimately prove eman-
cipatory and inclusionary. Placing a price tag on citizenship is not, however, 
a step in that direction. Globally, it secures privileged access to membership 
for multimillionaires who can afford it, while excluding all others. 
Domestically, it strains the ties that bind us together, which may in turn lead 
to erosion of the civic bonds and practices that allow a democratic society 
not only to survive, but to thrive.
The grant of citizenship is, as a pure legal matter, a last bastion of sover-
eignty. This is precisely what makes cash-for-passport programmes so con-
troversial. They may be formally permissible, but they are nevertheless open 
to ethical and political contestation. Laws do not only guide action. They 
also carry meaning and have an expressive function. The grant of citizenship 
in exchange for nothing but a large pile of cash sends a loud message in both 
law and social ethics about whom the contemporary market-friendly state 
gives priority to in the immigration and naturalisation line and whom it cov-
ets most as future citizens.
These pressures are felt everywhere, but Europe is unique. It has devel-
oped the world’s most advanced system of supranational-citizenship-in- 
action. In this system, when one member state ‘sells’ national citizenship as a 
gateway to gaining Union citizenship, tension inevitably arises, since the 
state’s action in doing so also affects other EU member states as well as the 
very membership good at issue: European citizenship. For policymakers, 
there is an unfavourable track record to consider. Citizenship-by-investment 
schemes have in the past been closed down after concerns about their integrity 
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led to the revocation of visa waiver policies in third countries. The programme 
set up by Grenada, for instance, was suspended after Canada imposed visa 
requirements on the island’s passport holders. It is unclear whether similar 
responses by third countries are to be expected here, but this is a risk factor 
that must be acknowledged if European member states proceed with their 
plans to grant immediate citizenship based on payment alone and without 
requiring grantees to ever live in, or even visit, the passport- issuing country.
The discomfort we may feel toward the mercenary-like quality of cash- 
for- passport programmes brings additional, hard questions to the forefront: 
is citizenship merely about rights, or also responsibilities? Could (and 
should) proportionality apply not only to the loss of citizenship but also to 
its acquisition? And what justification, if any, is owed (and to whom) if a 
member state’s action ‘cheapens’ the fundamental status of Union citizen-
ship, in this case by commodifying it?
We are dealing here with some of the most foundational aspects of our 
collective and public life. The decision to place ‘citizenship for sale’ on the 
agenda for debate in the European Parliament and possibly the Commission 
as well is meaningful, both expressively and practically. It will offer a unique 
opportunity for all involved stakeholders to think critically about the law as 
we know it, while imagining the law as it could be.
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Abstract
Can the widespread legal rule of ius sanguinis, through which citizenship is 
transmitted at birth from parent to child, still be justified in the contempo-
rary world? Together with addressing more traditional objections to ius san-
guinis, such as its alleged ethno-nationalist character or its negative effects 
on the global distribution of wealth and opportunities, the debate also looks 
into more recent challenges to ius sanguinis, such as those posed by dra-
matic changes in family norms and practices and the rapid development and 
spread of reproductive technologies. One major worry is that current forms 
of ius sanguinis are unable to deal adequately with uncertainties related to 
the establishment of legal parentage, especially in cross-border surrogacy 
arrangements. Whereas most contributors agree that ius sanguinis should be 
reformed in order to adapt to contemporary circumstances, plenty of dis-
agreement remains as to how this reform should be done. The debate also 
tackles the questions of whether and in what way ius sanguinis could be 
justified as a normative principle for admission to citizenship. Authors dis-
cuss important normative considerations, such as the need to prevent state-
lessness of children, to ensure the preservation of family life and to provide 
opportunities for intergenerational membership.
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Bloodlines and Belonging: Time to Abandon  
Ius Sanguinis?
Costica Dumbrava
The transmission of citizenship status from parents to children is a wide-
spread modern practice that offers certain practical and normative advan-
tages. It is relatively easy to distribute legal status to children according to 
parents’ citizenship, especially in the context of high mobility where the 
links between persons and their birthplace are becoming increasingly 
strained. Granting citizenship status to children of citizens may also be 
desirable as a way of avoiding statelessness, acknowledging special family 
links and fostering political links between children and the political com-
munity of their parents. These apparent advantages of ius sanguinis citizen-
ship are, however, outweighed by a series of problems. In what follows I 
argue that ius sanguinis citizenship is (1) historically tainted, (2) increas-
ingly inadequate and (3) normatively unnecessary. Ius sanguinis citizenship 
is historically tainted because it is rooted in practices and conceptions that 
rely on ethno-nationalist ideas about political membership. It is inadequate 
because it becomes increasingly unfit to deal with contemporary issues such 
as advances in assisted reproduction technologies and changes in family 
practices and norms. Lastly, ius sanguinis citizenship is normatively unnec-
essary because its alleged advantages are illusory and can be delivered by 
other means.
 Tainted
As a key instrument of the modern state, the institution of citizenship has 
been closely linked to nationalism. Ius sanguinis citizenship was reintro-
duced in Europe by post-revolutionary France, which sought to modernise 
French citizenship by discarding feudal practices such as ius soli.1 Whereas 
in modern France the adoption of ius sanguinis was premised on the idea of 
a homogenous French nation, in countries with contested borders, such as 
Germany, ius sanguinis played a key role in maintaining ties with co-ethnics 
1 Weil, P. (2002), Qu’ est-ce qu’un Français? Paris: Grasset.
74
living outside borders and thus in nurturing claims to territorial changes. 
Although ius sanguinis citizenship is not conceptually ‘ethnic’ (in the same 
sense in which ius soli citizenship is not necessarily ‘civic’), there are a 
number of ways in which the application of the ius sanguinis principle has 
been used in order to promote ethno-nationalist conceptions of 
membership.
Firstly, the application of unconditional ius sanguinis in the context of a 
long history of emigration means that emigrants can pass citizenship auto-
matically to their descendants regardless of the strength of their links with 
the political community. No less than twenty countries in Europe maintain 
such provisions.2 Whereas one can find several non-nationalist arguments 
for justifying emigrants’ citizenship, these weaken considerably when 
applied to successive generations of non-residents.
Secondly, there are cases in which countries rely on the principle of 
descent in order to confirm or restore citizenship to certain categories of 
people whom they consider to be linked with through ethno-cultural ties. 
Apart from cases where ethnic descent is an explicit criterion of admission 
(e.g. in Bulgaria, Greece), there are countries where ethnicity is camou-
flaged in the language of legal restitution or special duties of justice (e.g. in 
Latvia, Romania). In this way, persons can have their citizenship status 
‘restored’ on the basis of descent from ancestors who had been citizens or 
residents in a territory that once belonged, even if briefly, to a predecessor 
state with different borders.
Thirdly, the combination of unconditional ius sanguinis citizenship with 
the reluctance to accept alternative ways of incorporating children of resi-
dents (such as ius soli) is also a strong indicator of an ethnic conception of 
citizenship, especially in the context of a long history of immigration. 
Convoluted attempts to adopt and expand ius soli provisions in Germany 
and Greece illustrate this point. In 2000 Germany adopted ius soli provi-
sions3 but maintained that, unlike persons who acquire German citizenship 
through ius sanguinis, those who acquire citizenship via ius soli could retain 
2 Dumbrava, C. (2015), ‘Super-Foreigners and Sub-Citizens. Mapping Ethno-
National Hierarchies of Foreignness and Citizenship in Europe’, Ethnopolitics 
14 (3): 296–310, https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2014.994883.
3 Hailbronner, K. & A. Farahat (2015), Country Report On Citizenship Law: 
Germany. Florence: EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Robert Schuman Centre 





it only if they relinquish any other citizenship before their 23rd birthday. In 
2011 the Greek Council of State halted an attempt to introduce ius soli citi-
zenship in Greece4 by claiming that ius sanguinis is a superior constitutional 
principle whose transgression would lead to the ‘decay of the nation’.5
 Inadequate
Consider the following two real cases.
Samuel was born in November 2008 in Kiev by a Ukrainian surrogate 
mother hired by Laurent and Peter, a married gay couple of Belgian and 
French citizenship respectively.6 Samuel was conceived through in vitro fer-
tilisation of an egg from an anonymous donor with Laurent’s sperm. Upon 
his birth and according to practice, the surrogate mother refused to assume 
parental responsibility and thus transferred full parentage rights to Samuel’s 
biological father. When Laurent requested a Belgian passport for Samuel, 
the Belgian consular authorities refused on grounds that Samuel was born 
through a commercial surrogacy arrangement, which was unlawful accord-
ing to Belgian law. After more than two years of battles in court, during 
which Laurent and Peter also attempted and failed to smuggle Samuel out of 
Ukraine through the help of a friend pretending to be Samuel’s mother, a 
Brussels court recognised Laurent’s parentage rights and ordered authorities 
to deliver Samuel a Belgian passport. With it, Samuel was able to leave 
Ukraine and settle with Laurent and Peter in France.
4 Christopoulos, D. (2011), ‘Greek State Council strikes down ius soli and local 
voting rights for third country nationals. An Alarming Postscript to the Greek 




5 The Greek parliament has recently pushed forward another proposal regarding 
ius soli in an attempt to overcome the deadlock. See Christopoulos, D. (2015), 
The 2015 reform of the Greek Nationality Code in brief, Florence: EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory, Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies, 




6 European Parliament (2013), A comparative study on the regime of surrogacy 
in EU Member States. Directorate-General of Internal Affairs, Policy 
Department: Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs, available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.
html?reference=IPOL-JURI_ET(2013)474403.
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In 2007 Ikufumi and Yuki, a married Japanese couple, travelled to India 
and hired Mehta as surrogate mother for their planned child.7 Using Ikufumi’s 
sperm and an egg from an anonymous donor, the Indian doctors obtained an 
embryo, which they then implanted in Mehta’s womb. Only one month 
before the birth of Manji, the resulting child, Ikufumi and Yuki divorced. 
When Ikufumi attempted to procure a Japanese passport for Manji, the 
Japanese authorities refused on grounds that Manji was not Japanese. 
According to the Japanese Civil Code, the mother is always the woman who 
gives birth to the child. Despite having three ‘mothers’ – a genetic mother, 
who contributed with the egg, an intended mother who later declined 
involvement, and a surrogate mother, who did not plan to take up parental 
responsibilities – Manji had no obvious legal mother. Indeed, Manji’s Indian 
birth certificate mentioned Ikufumi as the father but left the rubric concern-
ing ‘the mother’ blank. After much legal wrangling Manji was issued a cer-
tificate of identity stating that she was stateless, with which Ikufumi managed 
to take her to Japan.
These are just two of a growing number of cases that test the legal and 
normative linkage between human reproduction, legal parentage and citi-
zenship. Not only do they question conventional assumptions about the bio-
logical and cultural basis of citizenship, but they also show the limits of the 
principle of ius sanguinis in ensuring the adequate determination of citizen-
ship status.
The incongruity between reproduction, legal parentage and citizenship is 
not an issue triggered solely by advances in reproductive technologies. 
Traditionally, children born out of wedlock could not acquire the father’s 
citizenship through descent. Many countries still maintain special proce-
dures for the acquisition of citizenship by children born out of wedlock to a 
foreign mother and a citizen father. In most cases this implies submitting a 
request for citizenship after parentage is legally established, although in 
Denmark these children can acquire citizenship only if the parents marry. In 
the Czech Republic and the Netherlands (for children older than 7), the 
determination of parentage for the purpose of citizenship attribution requires 
showing evidence of a genetic relationship between the father and the child. 
As argued by the European Court of Human Rights in its 2010 judgment on 
7 Points, K. (undated), Commercial surrogacy and fertility tourism in India: The 
case of Baby Manji. Durham: The Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke 




Genovese v Malta,8 the differential treatment of children born within and out 
of wedlock with respect to access to citizenship amounts to discrimination 
on arbitrary grounds. This practice is also at odds with contemporary trends 
that indicate an impressive surge in births out of wedlock; the share of such 
births in the EU27 rose from 17 per cent of total births in 1990 to 40 per cent 
in 2013.9
One of the biggest challenges to ius sanguinis citizenship comes from the 
spread of assisted reproduction technologies (ART). About 7 million babies 
worldwide have been born through ART since the birth of Louise Brown, 
the first ‘test-tube baby’, in 1978.10 ART have developed rapidly generating 
a multi-billion dollar market in assisted reproduction. A significant share of 
this market involves the international movement of doctors, donors, parents, 
children and gametes. In order to avoid legal restrictions or to cut costs, a 
growing number of infertile men and women, usually from high-income 
countries, travel to destinations such as India, Thailand or Ukraine in order 
to have ‘their’ babies conceived through in vitro fertilisation procedures 
using sperm or eggs (or both) donated by people from places such as Spain 
or Romania.
Many problems arise because the international market for assisted repro-
duction is not properly regulated, which means that national regulations 
often conflict with one another. Countries that oppose surrogacy consider 
the surrogate mother as the legal mother even if they are not genetically 
related to the child. According to this reasoning, the husband of the surro-
gate mother is the presumed father of the child. However, countries that 
encourage surrogacy usually recognise the intended mother and father as the 
legal parents, regardless of whether they are genetically related to the child. 
As the stories on Samuel and Manji show, when these two approaches col-
lide the children risk becoming, as Justice Hedley put it, ‘marooned, state-
less and parentless’.11
8 Genovese v. Malta, Application no. 53124/09, European Court of Human 
Rights, 11 October 2011, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-106785#
9 ‘Two in five EU babies born out of wedlock’, BBC News, 26 March 2013, 
available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21940895
10 This number has been updated to the most recent figure. See: The European 
Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (2017), ESHRE fact sheets 
1, available at https://www.eshre.eu/~/media/sitecore-files/Press-room/
Resources/1-CBRC.pdf?la=en
11 Re: X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), [2008] EWHC (Fam) 3030 (U.K.), available 
at http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed28706
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In some cases intended parents have the possibility to establish parentage 
and citizenship for their children born through surrogacy. However, such 
special arrangements often discriminate between (intended) mothers and 
fathers. For example, in the US children born to surrogate mothers outside 
the country are treated as children born out of wedlock, so fathers can be 
recognised as legal parents and therefore extend citizenship to children if 
they provide proof of a genetic relationship with the child (through a DNA 
test). Intended mothers, however, cannot be recognised as mothers even if 
the child was conceived using their eggs and even if they are married to the 
intended father.12 It follows that, in cases where another woman’s womb is 
involved, paternity and citizenship can still follow the sperm but not the 
eggs.
The practice of gamete donation has become increasingly accepted and 
regulated, so donors are in principle discharged of parental responsibilities 
with regard to children they help to conceive. However, it is not always clear 
what counts as donation. In a recent US case, a man successfully claimed 
parentage with regard to a child who was born after an informal agreement 
in which he agreed to ‘donate’ sperm to a friend. The Court decided in the 
man’s favour arguing that his act did not count as donation because the pro-
cedure used in the insemination did not involve ‘medical technology’ (they 
used a turkey baster). The ultimate test of paternity in this case relied on a 
mere technicality, which can hardly be seen as a morally relevant fact for 
establishing fundamental ties of filiation and citizenship.13
The development of ART is likely to further complicate questions about 
parentage and citizenship. The new techniques of embryo manipulation, for 
example, make now possible the transfer of a cell nucleus from one wom-
an’s egg to the egg of another, which means that the resulting child will have 
three genetic parents. Advances in technologies for freezing gametes and 
embryos raise questions about the rights and responsibilities over future 
births and about the status of future children. There have already been a 
number of cases of posthumous conception in which the sperm or eggs of a 
deceased person were used by the spouse or another relative in order to con-
ceive children. For example, it was recently reported that a 59 years old 
12 Deomampo, D. (2014), ‘Defining Parents, Making Citizens: Nationality and 
Citizenship in Transnational Surrogacy’, Review of Medical anthropology 34 
(3): 210–225, https://doi.org/10.1080/01459740.2014.890195.
13 Brandt, R. (2015), ‘Medical intervention should not define legal parenthood’, 




woman from the UK gave birth to ‘her’ daughter’s child.14 These practices 
raise obvious questions as to whom these children belong to and they may 
as well trigger issues of citizenship. Lastly, progress has been made on the 
creation or ‘artificial’ gametes through the modification of other types of 
human cells. Apart from opening possibilities for bypassing the heterosex-
ual model of procreation,15 these techniques raise concerns about abuse or 
reproductive ‘crime’. Imagine a world in which it would be possible to cre-
ate a child from a tissue sample collected from somebody’s cup of coffee. 
Those famous actors and footballers would probably think twice before 
shaking their fans’ hands.
 Unnecessary
One could argue that the main problems do not lie with ius sanguinis citizen-
ship but with the determination of legal parentage. Once we solve issues 
related to legal parentage, then the ius sanguinis principle will effectively 
address citizenship matters. However, this view ignores that dilemmas 
regarding the attribution of parentage are often triggered or complicated by 
citizenship (and migration) issues. It can also be argued that relying solely 
on legal parentage to settle citizenship issues disregards fundamental nor-
mative questions about who should be a citizen in a political community.
Despite much liberal-democratic talk about social contract, democratic 
inclusion and active citizenship, the overwhelming majority of people in the 
world acquire citizenship by virtue of contingent facts about birth (descent 
or place of birth). While ius soli citizenship has received considerable politi-
cal and academic attention recently due to pressing concerns about the 
inclusion of children of immigrants, ius sanguinis continues to be taken for 
granted. In the remainder of this essay, I briefly challenge two main theoreti-
cal defences of ius sanguinis: (a) that ius sanguinis citizenship recognises 
and cements the special relationship between the parent and child; (b) that 
ius sanguinis citizenship ensures the intergenerational stability of the politi-
cal community.
The main problem of ius sanguinis citizenship is that it is parasitic on 
external factors concerning the legal determination of parentage. As one of 
the examples presented above shows, it may only take a choice between a 
14 Smajdor, A. (2015), ‘Can I be my grandchild’s mother?’, BioNews, 9 March 
2015, available at http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_504476.asp.
15 Shanks, P. (2015), ‘Babies from Two Bio-Dads.’ Biopolitical Times, 3 April 
2015, Center for Genetics and Society, available at http://www.biopolitical-
times.org/article.php?id=8418.
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petri dish and a turkey baster to make somebody a parent and hence a sup-
plier of citizenship status. The relevance of horizontal family ties between 
spouses in citizenship matters has largely diminished, as a flipside of the 
spread of gender equality norms, since in liberal states wives no longer auto-
matically acquire their husbands’ citizenship. By contrast, parental ties con-
tinue to remain paramount for the regulation of citizenship. Even if there are 
good reasons for seeking to ensure the swift transfer of citizenship from 
parents to children (e.g. to prevent statelessness), this approach is question-
able because it renders children vulnerable. Ius sanguinis citizenship makes 
access to citizenship for children dependent on parents’ legal status, actions 
or reproductive choices.
As in the case of spouses, joint citizenship adds little to the legal and 
normative character of the parent-child relationship. There is little doubt 
that the law should treat children and the parent-child relationship with spe-
cial attention. However, this could and should be achieved regardless of the 
citizenship status of children and parents. One could, for example, extend 
the legal rights associated with parentage and filiation (e.g. conferring full 
migration rights to children of citizens) or seek to establish a universal status 
of (legal) childhood that confers fundamental right and protection to chil-
dren regardless of their or their parents’ citizenship or migration status.
The second argument for ius sanguinis citizenship is that the automatic 
transition of membership status from parents to children ensures the smooth 
reproduction of the political community. As children of citizens grow, they 
become socialised in the political community of their parents and develop 
political skills necessary for furthering their parents’ project of democratic 
self-government, skills that they will eventually pass on to their own chil-
dren. An easy objection to this view is that it is empirically naïve, especially 
in the context of increased migration and diversification of family practices. 
Citizenship is thus based on a contested expectation. Instead of granting citi-
zenship ex-ante to persons who are likely to develop desirable citizenship 
attitudes and skills, we could delay the attribution of citizenship until such 
attitudes and skills are confirmed. Alternatively, there may be other norma-
tive considerations for turning children into citizens. For example, being 
born in the country and/or living there at a young age makes children not 
only subject to the law of the country but also highly dependent on the state, 
which, for example, is required to provide regular and reliable access to 
medical care such as vaccinations. These considerations could justify grant-
ing children at least provisional citizenship.
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The intergenerational dimension of democratic membership can hardly 
be achieved by relying on legal fictions or on biological contingencies. Our 
efforts should rather be channelled towards consolidating democratic insti-
tutions and promoting citizenship attitudes and skills among all those who 
find themselves, by whatever ways and for whatever reasons, in our political 
community. As for the children who happen to be born here, we should treat 
them as political foundlings and give them all the care and support they need 
to become full political members.
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Ius Filiationis: A defence of Citizenship  
by Descent
Rainer Bauböck
Aristoteles famously defined a citizen as someone ‘giving judgment and 
holding office’ in the polity.1 Yet, this does not settle the issue since we first 
need to know who qualifies for holding office. And so he continues: ‘For 
practical purposes a citizen is defined as one of citizen birth on both his 
father’s and his mother’s side’.2 Times have changed. From the French 
Revolution, which revived ius sanguinis, until the second half of the 20th 
century, citizenship was mostly transmitted only from the father to the child. 
Today, largely as a result of international conventions against the discrimi-
nation of women, all democratic states define a citizen as one of citizen birth 
on either the father’s or the mother’s side. Yet ius sanguinis remains the 
dominant rule for acquisition of citizenship worldwide. True, in the Americas 
the stronger principle is ius soli, the acquisition of citizenship through birth 
in the territory. But even there those born abroad to citizen parents who were 
themselves born in the country are recognised as nationals by birth.
Given this overwhelming presence of ius sanguinis in nationality law, 
Costica Dumbrava’s call for abandoning it is bold. Some might even say, it 
is quixotic, but I disagree. It is indeed time to reflect on the future of ius 
sanguinis and to abandon it as a doctrine linking citizenship to biological 
descent. Yet there are good practical and normative reasons why the princi-
ple of citizenship transmission from parents to children will remain alive 
and ought to be retained.
Dumbrava runs three main attacks against ius sanguinis: It is tainted by 
its association with ethno-nationalism; it is inadequate because, in an age of 
artificial reproduction technologies, same sex marriage and patchwork fami-
lies, biological descent no longer traces social parenthood; and it is unneces-
sary since its protective effects can be achieved by other means. I will accept 
the first and second argument with some modifications but reject the third.
1 Aristotle (1962), The Politics. Transl: T.A. Sinclair, revised and commentary: 
T. J. Saunders (ed.). London: Penguin, III. i: 169.
2 Ibid, III.ii: 171-2, original emphasis.
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 Not the only one tainted
As Dumbrava points out, modern ius sanguinis was seen as a democratic 
and revolutionary principle in contrast with ius soli that had its origins in the 
feudal idea that any person (or animal) born on the territory was subject to 
the ruler of the land. Deriving citizenship from citizen descent rather than 
territorial birth made it possible to imagine a self-governing people repro-
ducing itself. Dumbrava is of course right that seeing the nation as a com-
munity of shared descent across generations made it also easier to justify the 
exclusion of foreigners as well as the inclusion of co-nationals across the 
border. Yet this is not a sufficient reason for abandoning ius sanguinis.
First, an ethnonationalist disposition can be overcome while maintaining 
ius sanguinis if this principle is supplemented with ius soli and residence- 
based naturalisation. The latter has created an ethnically highly diverse citi-
zenry in continental European immigration countries even in the absence of 
the additional inclusionary effects of ius soli. The reason for this ethnically 
inclusive effect of ius sanguinis is simple: If first generation immigrants 
have access to citizenship and take it up, then ius soli and ius sanguinis does 
not make much difference: the children of immigrants will be citizens under 
either rule.
Secondly, a pure ius soli regime is also tainted and not only because of 
the feudal origins of the principle. Territorial nationalism can be just as nasty 
as ethnonationalism and may be fanned by thinking of ius soli as the right of 
the ‘sons of the soil’. Even the case of Romania that Dumbrava lists among 
the problematic ones is ambiguous in this regard. If Romania awards citi-
zenship to the descendants of those born in its lost territories, is this an 
instance of ius soli or ius sanguinis and an illustration of ethnic or of territo-
rial nationalism? The answer is probably: both. Ius soli and ius sanguinis are 
therefore not alternatives, but can be combined in benign ways that neutral-
ise the potentially illiberal effects of either principle, as well as malign ways 
that enhance their nationalist potential for ethnic exclusion and territorial 
expansion.
Thirdly, pure ius soli also has vicious exclusionary effects for migrants. In 
most American states, the immigrant generation 1.5 – those who have entered 
the country as minor children – cannot acquire citizenship before the age of 
majority. President Obama’s Dream Act is an attempt to mitigate some of the 
worst consequences for the children of irregular immigrants. Even more prob-
lematic is the common distinction between nationals and citizens in many Latin 
R. Bauböck
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American states.3 Only those born in the territory are considered nationals (they 
are sometimes also called ‘naturals’). They turn into citizens with full voting 
rights at the age of majority. Immigrants who naturalise become citizens, but 
not nationals. They remain excluded from many public offices (also the US 
president still has to be a ‘natural born citizen’) and they can be deprived of 
their citizenship status, whereas nationality can often never be lost. In Uruguay 
even the concept of ‘naturalisation’ does not exist because those who are not 
born in the territory can never become ‘naturals’. Similar exclusionary effects 
of ius soli traditions apply to those born abroad to citizen parents. They often 
do not acquire citizenship unless they are registered in time by their parents and 
they may lose it unless they ‘return’ before the age of majority.
If both ius sanguinis and ius soli are tainted in these ways, should we 
consider an even more radical alternative of abandoning citizenship by birth 
altogether? Why not replace it with ius domicilii so that citizenship is acquired 
automatically with taking up residence and lost with outmigration? Or should 
we maybe replace it with ius pecuniae,4 i.e. a global market for citizenships 
in which individuals can bid for membership status anywhere and states can 
set the admission price? Neither of these alternatives is morally attractive 
and something important is lost when we give up birthright citizenship.
 Why not ius filiationis?
Dumbrava’s second argument is that developments in reproduction tech-
nologies and in the social and legal recognition of new family patterns make 
ius sanguinis increasingly unworkable and obsolete.
This problem is not entirely new and a solution is already available. 
International law has long abandoned the idea that children should acquire 
only one citizenship at birth. Since they can inherit two different  citizenships 
from the mother’s and the father’s side (maybe in addition to a third one 
acquired iure soli), why should they not receive the citizenship of both an 
3 Acosta D, (2016), ‘Regional Report on Citizenship: The South American and 
Mexican Cases’, EUDO Citizenship Observatory Comparative Reports 
2016/01, Florence: European University Institute, available at http://cadmus.
eui.eu//handle/1814/43325
4 Stern, J. (2011), ‘Ius Pecuniae – Staatsbürgerschaft zwischen ausreichendem 
Lebensunterhalt, Mindestsicherung und Menschenwürde’, Migration und 
Integration – wissenschaftliche Perspektiven aus Österreich, Jahrbuch 1/2011, 
Dahlvik/Fassmann/Sievers (eds.). See also Part I of this volume; Dzankic, J. 
(2015), ‘Investment-based citizenship and residence programmes in the EU’, 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 2015/08, 
Florence: European University Insitute.
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intended and a surrogate mother or an intended father and a sperm donor? 
Asking the question makes it already clear that the problem is not the multi-
plicity of citizenships per se, but the mismatch between biologically deter-
mined citizenship and parental care arrangements that would also open the 
door to abusive claims. The traditional solution that is already available in 
most nationality laws for cases where the biological parent is not the social 
parent is transmission of citizenship through adoption.5 Why should it not be 
possible to generalise this model from the marginal case of adoption so that 
a modified ius sanguinis refers to social rather than biological parenthood 
(as it already does in several jurisdictions)?
The main issue with such a new ius filiationis might be that determination 
of citizenship is less automatic than it used to be for children born in wedlock 
to their biological mother and father. Yet states that are committed to the 
welfare of children have to figure out anyhow how to determine legal parent-
hood in the more complex family arrangements of contemporary societies. In 
order to avoid statelessness it is important that every child obtains at least one 
citizenship immediately at birth. And in order to make sure that children are 
not caught between conflicting legal norms and can develop stable relations 
to their countries of citizenship it is important that their citizenship status 
does not change automatically when they become part of a new family. If 
these concerns are taken into account through a combination of ius soli with 
legally determined initial parenthood, what objections can be raised against 
recognizing primary caregivers as well as persons with additional custodial 
rights as legal parents who can transmit their citizenship to the child?
 Don’t abandon the children!
Dumbrava’s third argument is that ius sanguinis is not necessary because 
children’s rights can be protected through other means. He claims that ius 
sanguinis renders children vulnerable by making their ‘access to citizenship 
… dependent on parents’ legal status, actions or reproductive choices This 
is indeed a reason why the children of immigrants need ius soli as an inde-
pendent right to citizenship in their country of birth. Unfortunately, in the 
US, their birthright citizenship does not prevent them from being deported 
together with their undocumented parents, whereas immigrant minors who 
are EU citizens have a right to stay that protects also their primary caregiv-
ers from deportation.6
5 See the EUDO CITIZENSHIP Database on Modes of Acquisition of 
Citizenship in Europe, available at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/admin/?p=dataE
UCIT&application=modesAcquisition.
6 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
2004; Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v Office National de L’emploi, 2011.
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Yet small children are in any case dependent on their parents’ migration 
decisions. This is a an equally strong reason why they also have a claim to 
share their parents’ citizenship, since they risk otherwise to remain stranded 
in their country of birth or be treated as foreigners in their parents’ country 
of nationality. Dumbrava suggests preventing this by ‘conferring full migra-
tion rights to children of citizens’. But would migration rights become more 
secure if they are disconnected from the legal status of citizenship that is the 
only one obliging states to unconditionally admit them? Alternatively, he 
suggests to ‘establish a universal status of (legal) childhood that confers 
fundamental rights regardless of their or their parents’ citizenship or migra-
tion status’. This is what the Children’s Rights Convention, which is one of 
the mostly widely signed and ratified human rights documents, aims to do. 
The question is not only whether states are willing to respect these rights, 
but whether they can be held responsible for protecting them. For this, chil-
dren need not only human rights, they also need their parents’ citizenship.
 Delayed citizenship for all?
Dumbrava has, however, a much more fundamental objection that targets 
both ius sanguinis and ius soli: Citizenship as membership in a political 
community should not depend on ‘contingent facts of birth (descent or place 
of birth)’. This is a common critique that always leaves me puzzled.7 My 
very existence depends on these contingent facts. Humans cannot will them-
selves into being but are thrown into the world without choosing where to be 
born and to which parents. What is morally arbitrary is not that states use 
these fundamental features of personal identity to determine membership in 
political communities, but that in our world citizenship provides individuals 
with hugely unequal sets of opportunities. This is not an inherent feature of 
birthright citizenship but of the global economic and political (dis)order. If 
we want to overcome it, we have to address the causes of global inequality 
directly instead of attributing them to those rules that make individuals equal 
in status and rights as citizens of a particular state.
Dumbrava’s critique focuses, however, on another birthright puzzle that 
has bothered republican theorists. Shouldn’t membership in a self- governing 
political community be based on consent? And does it not presuppose cer-
7 For nuanced critiques of birthright citizenship based on this idea see Carens, 
J. H. (2013), The Ethics of Immigration. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
Shachar, A. (2009), The Birthright Lottery. Citizenship and Global Inequality. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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tain attitudes and skills that first need to be developed?8 We may expect that 
children who are born and grow up in the state territory or who are raised by 
citizen parents will eventually want to join the political community and will 
also acquire the skills required for political participation. Yet these are 
expectations rather than certainties. Dumbrava suggests therefore that ‘we 
could delay the attribution of citizenship until such attitudes and skills are 
confirmed’. However, since children also depend on the state for their health 
and education, he adds that they could at least be granted provisional citi-
zenship. The Latin American distinction between nationality acquired at 
birth and citizenship acquired at majority seems to approximate this idea.
One reading of Dumbrava’s proposal is that this is just a terminological 
distinction harking back to Aristotle’s two definitions of citizenship. If we 
consider as citizens those who ‘give judgments and can hold office’, i.e. the 
members of the demos, then children are indeed only provisional citizens 
but will automatically become full citizens at the age of majority. The other 
interpretation draws, however, a line between the two statuses that can only 
be crossed by demonstrating the right attitude and skills. Instead of natural-
ising immigrants into a birthright community, this community itself would 
be denaturalised and reconstituted through a citizenship test imposed on all 
provisional native citizens. It may seem a form of poetic justice to treat 
natives like immigrants. Yet there is a big difference between expecting and 
promoting citizenship attitudes and skills and making them a requirement 
for access to citizenship rights. The only reason why immigrants can be 
expected to spend a few years as residents before becoming citizens, which 
gives them time to develop citizenship skills, and to apply for naturalisation, 
which demonstrates a civic attitude, is that they are birthright citizens of 
another state who have grown up there.
 Citizenship across generations
Dumbrava concludes by suggesting that the intergenerational continuity of 
democratic membership should be achieved through consolidating institu-
tions and educating citizens rather than the legal fictions and biological con-
tingencies of birthright citizenship. One might ask why democracies need 
intergenerational continuity. The answer leads us back to the original justifi-
cation for ius sanguinis after the French Revolution. It should not be the rul-
ers who determine who the citizens are, nor the citizens themselves through 
8 See Dumbrava, C. (2014), Nationality, Citizenship and Ethno-Cultural 
Belonging, Preferential Membership Policies in Europe. Houndmills 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 8, 9.
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some democratic procedure in which they decide whom to admit or reject, 
nor the mere fact of subjection to the laws due to temporary presence in the 
territory. All of these rules lead to too much contingency and discontinuity 
with regard to the composition of the citizenry. Promoting civic attitudes and 
skills among those who are citizens is important, but it cannot resolve the 
puzzle who has a claim to be a citizen in the first place. Automatic acquisition 
of membership at birth and for life sets this question aside. It makes citizen-
ship a part of citizens’ personal identities that they are likely to accept. And 
it allows democracies to tap into resources of solidarity and to promote a 
sense of responsibility towards the common good and future generations.
In a nutshell, these are my two arguments why a modified version of ius 
sanguinis should be accepted as necessary for democratic states:
In a world of territorial states that control immigration, ius sanguinis (or 
ius filiationis) is as indispensible as ius soli for protecting the children of 
migrants. It provides them with the right to stay and to be admitted in their 
country of birth as well as their parents’ country of origin. No other legal 
status can secure these rights as well as a birthright to dual nationality.
Deriving citizenship from unchosen and permanent features of personal 
identity – where and to whom one is born – sets aside the politically divisive 
membership question for the vast majority of citizens, creates a quasi- natural 
equality of status among them and signals that membership is linked to 
responsibilities for the common good and for future generations. No citizen-
ship education programme can fully substitute for these signalling effects of 
birthright citizenship.
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Tainted Law? Why History Cannot provide 
the Justification for Abandoning Ius Sanguinis
Jannis Panagiotidis
In his thought provoking piece, Costica Dumbrava rejects ius sanguinis as 
1) historically tainted, 2) increasingly inadequate and 3) normatively unnec-
essary. In my response, I will mainly focus on the first, historical dimension. 
Drawing on examples from the case of Germany, often used as the prime 
example to show what is wrong with ius sanguinis, I will contest the idea 
that ius sanguinis as such has been discredited by history.
Regarding the second and third points, I will restrict myself to the fol-
lowing brief observations, which are broadly in line with Rainer Bauböck’s 
comments: while the issue of ART and citizenship raised by Dumbrava is 
indeed intriguing, I would go along with his own observation that this is 
more about the determination of legal parentage than about ius sanguinis, 
and with Bauböck’s emphasis on social rather than biological parenthood. 
Discarding the ius sanguinis principle due to certain specific cases it 
might not adequately cover would mean throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater.
I am also simultaneously intrigued and sceptical regarding the suggestion 
to introduce a sort of ‘a-national’, universal status for children. Against the 
backdrop of recent historical research into children as the object of national-
ist contestation and agitation during the first half of the twentieth century, a 
scenario in which ‘children belonged more rightfully to national communi-
ties than to their own parents’, this idea appears intuitively attractive.1 Having 
said that, one can turn the argument around and see the suggested disconnec-
tion of parent and child citizenship as another attempt to claim children from 
their parents, this time on behalf on an imaginary inter- or supranational com-
munity. Yet in a world still (and for the foreseeable future) structured by 
nation states, where most so-called human rights are in fact citizens’ rights, 
1 Zahra, T. (2008), Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for 
Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 3; See also: 
Zahra, T. (2011), The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe’s Families after 
World War II. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 20.
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one may indeed wonder about the benefits of such a status ‘above’ or perhaps 
‘beyond’ the nation if the parents cannot enjoy similar rights.
 Tainted by history?
As to the argument of ius sanguinis being historically tainted, Dumbrava 
first of all needs to be commended for recognising that ‘ius sanguinis citi-
zenship is not conceptually “ethnic”’. Nevertheless, he argues that ‘there are 
a number of ways in which the application of the ius sanguinis principle has 
been used in order to promote ethno-nationalist conceptions of member-
ship’. These include 1) the maintaining of emigrant citizenship beyond the 
first generation of emigrants; 2) the use of ‘the principle of descent in order 
to confirm or restore citizenship to certain categories of people whom 
[states] consider to be linked with through ethnocultural ties’; and 3) the 
exclusion of immigrant children from citizenship by an exclusive use of ius 
sanguinis with no ius soli elements.
Regarding the third point, I fully agree with Bauböck that it can be rem-
edied quite easily by combining these two principles of citizenship alloca-
tion and simultaneously allow for residence-based naturalisation. The first 
issue is similarly unproblematic: extra-territorial transmission can simply be 
interrupted at a certain generational stopping point, much like the rule 
Germany introduced in section 4, paragraph 4 of its reformed 1999 citizen-
ship law regarding the non-acquisition of German citizenship by the off-
spring of German citizens who themselves were born abroad after 31 
December 1999.2 There is no rule that says that the transmission of citizen-
ship to descendants has to be possible ad infinitum.
 Not all types of ‘descent’ are the same
I would like to discuss the second point in more detail, which touches upon 
the topics of preferential membership policies and co-ethnic citizenship and 
migration.3 Here we are dealing with a terminological confusion quite typi-
cal for much of the literature in this field. The ‘ethnic descent’ that Dumbrava 
2 Joppke, C. (2003), ‘Citizenship Between De- and Re-Ethnicization’, Russell 
Sage Foundation Working Paper No. 204, 12–13. The full text of the law can 
be found at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/rustag/BJNR005830913.html
3 Dumbrava, C. (2014), Nationality, Citizenship and Ethno-National Belonging: 
Preferential Membership Policies in Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan; Panagiotidis, J. (2012), Laws of Return? Co-Ethnic Immigration to 




mentions as a criterion of admission to citizenship in some cases and the 
descent implied in the ius sanguinis principle are not the same and should 
not be conflated. In fact, they are mutually exclusive: ‘descent’ in ius sangui-
nis is about descent from a citizen, whatever his or her ‘ethnicity’. The ‘eth-
nic descent’ used as a criterion in some cases of co-ethnic inclusion is 
precisely about people who are not citizens.
The supposed historical taintedness of the ius sanguinis principle results 
from the conflation of these different types of ‘descent’, and of the related 
unhappy connotations of the term ‘blood’, which invokes associations of 
‘race’. A lot of this confusion was created in the Brubaker-inspired debates 
of the 1990s about German citizenship. In a telling example, political scien-
tist Patricia Hogwood claimed that ‘the concept and law of citizenship in 
Germany were originally formulated in the context of nation-state develop-
ment based on cultural or ‘völkisch’ nationalism. … The fact that the German 
legal framework for citizenship and naturalisation remains firmly rooted in 
the jus sanguinis principle has meant that citizenship policy in Germany is 
inextricably entangled in concepts of ethnicity and race. … The principle of 
legal privilege [for ethnic Germans] on the basis of racial origins smacks of 
the racial policies of the Nazi period …’ (my emphasis, J.P.).4
Yet ius sanguinis per se has nothing to do with ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’. As 
Dieter Gosewinkel pointed out in his important book on German citizen-
ship, the ‘blood’ here is a ‘formal and instrumental’ notion, not to be con-
fused with ‘substantial’ blood conceptions of racial biology.5 Those only 
entered German citizenship law through the Nazi Nuremberg laws. Before, 
a German Jew, whom the Nazis would later construe to be of a different 
‘race’ for having the wrong ‘blood’, would transmit his German citizenship 
to his children iure sanguinis, just like other Germans whom the Nazis 
would construe as ‘Aryans’. Ius sanguinis is ethnicity-blind. In fact, when 
young Israelis nowadays claim German citizenship with reference to an 
ancestor who fled from Germany, they also do so iure sanguinis. I would 
find it hard to interpret this as an objectionable völkisch practice. This exam-
ple shows that the problem is not with ius sanguinis itself, but with the 
respective contexts in which it is embedded.
4 Hogwood, P. (2000), ‘Citizenship Controversies in Germany: the twin legacy 
of Völkisch nationalism and the Alleinvertretungsanspruch’, German Politics 9 
(3): 125–144, here 127, 132–133.
5 Gosewinkel, D. (2001), Einbürgern und Ausschließen: Die Nationalisierung 
der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [Naturalising and Excluding: Nationalisation of Citizenship from 
the German Confederation to the Federal Republic of Germany]. Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 327.
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 Co-ethnic citizenship is a different story
Nor is ius sanguinis particularly useful (or even necessary) for the convey-
ing of citizenship upon ‘co-ethnics’ in other countries. This is a whole dif-
ferent discussion in my opinion which cannot be used to make a case against 
the ius sanguinis principle. Taking again the example of Germany, the main 
European supplier of co-ethnic citizenship in past decades, it needs to be 
stressed that ‘ethnic Germans’ from Eastern Europe did not receive German 
citizenship by means of the ius sanguinis of the 1913 citizenship law. This 
was not possible, as in most cases they had no ancestor with German citizen-
ship to refer to. Their claim to citizenship rested on special provisions in the 
constitution and expellee law, which equalised the status of German 
Volkszugehörige with that of German citizens.
At this point we leave the solid ground of formal citizenship and enter 
into the murky territory of ‘ethnicity’. But even here, it is not all about 
‘descent’. While the peculiar notion of Volkszugehörigkeit is often identified 
with ‘ethnic descent’, it was much more complex than that: it was actually 
very much a political-plebiscitary notion predicated on self-avowal 
(Bekenntnis) as German to be confirmed by an ‘objective’ criterion, which 
could be language, descent, upbringing, or culture (section 6 of the 1953 
Federal Expellee Law).6 ‘Descent’ (Abstammung) – notoriously hard to 
define in administrative practice – was thus neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for recognition as a German.7
 Conclusion
In sum, I would argue that the supposed ‘taintedness’ of ius sanguinis has 
to do with issues not intrinsic to this principle of transmitting citizenship, 
namely restrictive admission practices and racially based exclusion. The 
issue of co-ethnic citizenship should be kept apart from this discussion 
altogether. History cannot provide the justification for abandoning ius san-
guinis, as its use in certain problematic ways and contexts in the past does 
6 See: http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_
BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl153022.pdf
7 I elaborate on the plebiscitary, quasi-‘Renanian’ nature of the German concep-
tion of Volkszugehörigkeit in: Panagiotidis, J. (2012), ‘The Oberkreisdirektor 
Decides Who Is a German’: Jewish Immigration, German Bureaucracy, and the 
Negotiation of National Belonging, 1953–1990. Geschichte und Gesellschaft 
38, 503–533, esp. 511.
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not mean it necessarily has to be used like that in the future. If comple-
mented by other, inclusionary mechanisms of allocating citizenship in con-
junction with increased tolerance for multiple citizenship it certainly 
remains a useful – and necessary – method of transmitting citizenship in the 
day and age of multiple transnational migrations.
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Family Matters: Modernise, Don’t Abandon,  
Ius Sanguinis
Scott Titshaw
I appreciate the ideas that Costica Dumbrava and others have introduced 
into this debate. States’ concerns about the quality and political conse-
quences of their citizenship are important. But citizenship is a two-way 
street. Our discussion of ius sanguinis laws should extend beyond the con-
cerns of states to also consider the serious practical consequences of citizen-
ship laws on citizens, including the long-term unity and security of their 
families. Families facing instability or separation because children are 
denied their parents’ citizenship are unlikely to be satisfied with the explana-
tion that ius sanguinis is inadequate or historically tainted; the resulting indi-
vidual sense of injustice might even discourage the loyalty and identification 
states seek in citizens.
This debate about citizenship transmission is necessary because of two 
modern changes in the facts of life: (1) increased international mobility 
based on cheap and easy transportation and communication; and (2) the 
advent and diffusion of assisted reproductive technology (ART) and new 
legal family forms (e.g., same-sex marriage and different-sex registered 
partnership). I will address each in turn. First, I’ll explain why Dumbrava’s 
proposal to abandon the ius sanguinis principle is an undesirable response to 
increased international mobility. Second, I’ll build on Dumbrava’s and 
Bauböck’s recognition of the inadequacy of unlimited and exclusive ius san-
guinis rules for today’s families by suggesting that ius sanguinis be mod-
ernised rather than abandoned altogether. I’ll also illustrate how citizenship 
in federal states can add an additional layer of complexity to any universal 
proposal regarding citizenship.
 In a mobile world children need their parents’ citizenship
Dumbrava’s proposal to eliminate the ius sanguinis principle would 
increase, rather than decrease, problems based on greater international 
mobility. It would eliminate one tool parents currently use for transmitting 
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citizenship to children conceived through ART. While current versions of 
ius sanguinis are inadequate to deal with other ART issues, that problem 
can be corrected. And, as Jannis Panagiotidis points out, abandoning ius 
sanguinis because of this inadequacy would be like ‘throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater’. Most children are still conceived through sexual repro-
duction rather than ART, and many of their families would be worse off 
without ius sanguinis.
An example is easy to imagine. Let’s say an Indian couple moves every 
seven years for employment reasons. They obtain residence permits, but not 
citizenship, in South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in 
turn. They also have a child in each country. Under ius soli regimes with no 
ius sanguinis rules, the children of these Indian parents would each have 
different passports (from South Africa, the UK, and the US). This might 
pose no problem in the short term. But what happens if a parent dies or loses 
his job?
Under a ius sanguinis regime, the surviving family members would be 
able to enter India and remain there together permanently as citizens.1
Dumbrava argues that such common citizenship is unnecessary to recog-
nise and cement parent-child relationships if children of citizens have ‘full 
migration rights. But ‘migration rights’ or benefits are substantially less 
stable than citizenship rights. What if a non-citizen family member becomes 
deportable because he or she commits a crime?2 What if both Indian parents 
die while the children are minors? Without ius sanguinis, the children with 
their different nationalities might not be allowed to remain together any-
where, let alone in India where their extended family members (grandpar-
ents, aunts and uncles) most likely live.
Dumbrava’s proposal of a universal legal status for all children would ame-
liorate some of these problems, but only until each child reaches the age of 
majority. At that time they might be separated from their parents and siblings.
1 India would have automatically recognised these children as Indian citizens 
through 2004; it still recognises a greatly eased path to apply for citizenship in 
this context. http://www.loc.gov/law/help/citizenship-pathways/india.php
2 While hardship of citizen relatives is sometimes considered, US immigration 
law generally requires removal of non-citizens who commit any of a long list 





I agree with Dumbrava’s and Bauböck’s rejection of exclusive, uncondi-
tional ius sanguinis rules as inadequate in dealing with the consequences of 
ART and modern family law.
I disagree, however, with the conclusion Dumbrava draws from his argu-
ment that ‘joint citizenship adds little to the legal and normative character of 
the parent-child relationship’. In fact, the permanence and stability stem-
ming from common citizenship among close family members can have pro-
found consequences for the unity required to develop and maintain family 
relationships.
I also disagree with Dumbrava’s argument that ‘the main problem’ is 
that ius sanguinis ‘is parasitic on external factors concerning the legal 
determination of parentage’. In fact, some federal States already delink fed-
eral citizenship determination and state or provincial family law,3 creating 
greater problems than do citizenship laws that reflect legal parentage. In the 
United States, for example, legal parentage is generally a matter of state 
law. Yet, the US Constitution defines citizenship as an exclusively federal 
matter,4 and Congress has established and revised a complex, autonomous 
algorithm for determining when a citizen parent transmits US citizenship to 
a child born abroad.5 The problematic example Dumbrava points out 
regarding parents’ inability to transmit US citizenship to children conceived 
through ART was created by a misguided autonomous federal policy, 
not parentage determinations under family law.6 It could, and should, be 
3 HCCH (2014), A Study of Legal Parentage and the Issues Arising from 
International Surrogacy Arrangements, Prel. Doc. No 3C. Hague Conference 
on Private International Law,66–68 (listing Australia, Canada and the United 
States as examples). Available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/
gap2015pd03c_en.pdf
4 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that ‘[a]ll persons born or naturalized 
in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the 
United States and the state in which they reside’. Not only does this 
Amendment adopt a nearly absolute ius soli rule, but it clarifies that citizenship 
is a purely federal matter, with no meaningful state role beyond establishment 
of its own standards for recognising state residence.
5 8 USC §§1401–1409. Available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29/0-0-0-9696.html
6 Under current US law, a genetic and legal father and/or one or more legal and 
‘biological’ mothers (i.e., genetic and gestational mother(s)) transmit birthright 
citizenship to children conceived through ART, but non-biological parents do 
not. Titshaw, S. (2014), ‘A Transatlantic Rainbow Comparison: “Federalism” 
and Family-Based Immigration for Rainbow Families in the U.S. and the 
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corrected by federal reinterpretation of its rules to rely on family law par-
entage determinations.7
Rather than misplaced reliance on family law, the problems Dumbrava 
and Bauböck describe regarding the application of ius sanguinis following 
ART are consequences of outdated family law or of international conflict- 
of- law issues where relevant jurisdictions define parentage differently.
To the extent that the problems stem from conflict-of-law issues, it is 
worth noting that the Hague Conference on Private International Law is cur-
rently exploring whether to draft a multilateral instrument on international 
parentage and surrogacy, which might resolve some issues.8
To the extent that the problems stem from outdated family law, the best 
solution is to fix the family law. Family law generally reflects a more indi-
vidualized, in-depth understanding of parent-child relationships than do citi-
zenship or migration laws. Based on long experience and empirical data, 
family law tends to favour the stability of permanent family relationships 
with commensurate duties and benefits in the best interests of children. By 
tending to ensure the same citizenship for children and their parent(s), ius 
sanguinis rules also generally promote stable solutions in the best interests 
of children in a way that less permanent migration rules do not.
I agree with Bauböck that multiplicity of citizenships for children is gen-
erally not a problem, and I support his call for a more generous understand-
ing of parenthood for purposes of citizenship transmission. But I would not 
opt for a ius filiationis proposal if it requires an entirely independent deter-
mination of social parenthood for citizenship transmission purposes. 
Officials dealing with citizenship issues are not as well suited to determine 
these issues as those administering family law. Also, too much generosity in 
this area might instigate cross-border mischief in familial disputes by ‘social 
parents’.
E.U.’, in C. Casonato & A. Schuster (eds.), Rights on the Move: Rainbow 
Families in Europe: Proceedings of the conference: Trento, 16–17 October 
2014, Trento: 189–200 (194-9). Trento: Università degli Studi di Trento, 
Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, available at http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/4448/
7 Titshaw, S. (2013), ‘Revisiting the Meaning of Marriage: Immigration for 
Same-Sex Spouses in a Post-Windsor World’, Vand. L. Rev. (66): 167–177 






Instead, I would suggest replacing all outmoded rules that fail to consider 
parental intent and the best interests of the child in the context of children 
conceived through ART, whether these are family laws determining parent-
age or autonomous federal citizenship laws reading ius sanguinis as a literal 
‘right of blood’.
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Abolishing Ius Sanguinis Citizenship:  
A Proposal Too Restrained and Too Radical
Kristin Collins
Costica Dumbrava maintains that ius sanguinis citizenship is a historically 
tainted, outmoded, and unnecessary means of designating political member-
ship. He argues that it is time to abandon it. His proposal is bold, and it has 
significant implications for an array of policies and practices. The parent- 
child relationship not only serves as a basis for citizenship transmission; it 
also entitles individuals to immigration preferences, and – in some coun-
tries – it facilitates automatic or ‘derivative’ naturalisation of the children of 
naturalised parents. In many countries that recognise ius soli citizenship, the 
parent-child relationship serves as an added requirement: one must be born 
in the sovereign territory and be the child of a citizen or a long-term legal 
resident. Dumbrava limits his challenge to ius sanguinis citizenship per se, 
and even suggests that family-based migration rights could be used to mini-
mise the disruptive effect of abolishing citizenship-by-descent. But his core 
complaints about ius sanguinis citizenship – the mismatch of biological par-
entage and political affinity, the difficulties of determining legal parentage – 
can be, and have been, levied against these various family-based preferences 
and statuses, which are likely found in every nation’s nationality laws. It is 
therefore important to consider his proposal in light of the role that the 
parent- child relationship plays in the regulation of migration, naturalisation, 
and citizenship more generally. With this broader context in mind, I concur 
with Rainer Bauböck and Jannis Panagiotidis that Dumbrava’s proposal 
rests on an under-informed assessment of the historical record. I also argue 
that that, as a remedy for the problems that he has identified, Dumbrava’s 
proposal is at once too restrained and too radical.
 The complex history of ius sanguinis citizenship
Dumbrava first argues that ius sanguinis citizenship should be abolished 
because, historically, it has been associated with ethno-nationalist concep-
tions of citizenship. I appreciate Panagiotidis’ insistence that ‘the problem is 
not with ius sanguinis itself, but with the respective contexts in which it is 
embedded’. Panagiotidis also reminds us that ius sanguinis citizenship has 
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sometimes functioned to create political communities that draw from differ-
ent ethnic and religious groups, as in the case of German Jews whose mem-
bership in the German polity was secured by the country’s ius sanguinis 
laws prior to the Nazi era. I want to elaborate and underscore the importance 
of this point with an additional example from United States history: During 
seventy years of Chinese exclusionary laws, ius sanguinis citizenship pro-
vided one of the very few routes to entry, and to American citizenship, for 
ethnic Chinese individuals born outside the U.S. For precisely that reason, 
exclusionists sought to limit or repeal the ius sanguinis statute, which recog-
nised the foreign-born children of American fathers as citizens.1 If one 
expands the historical frame to include parent-child immigration prefer-
ences and derivative naturalisation, the story becomes even more complex. 
By 1965, the race-based exclusions and national-origins quotas had been 
abolished, and previously excluded Asian families began immigrating to the 
U.S. in unprecedented numbers.2 They were able to do so by relying on the 
generous family-based preferences in American immigration and national-
ity laws, which facilitated entry, settlement, and – especially significant to 
this discussion – derivative naturalisation for children.3
Even a cursory review of the historical record thus counsels a cautionary 
assessment of the contention that ius sanguinis citizenship’s tainted past jus-
tifies its abolition. First, calls to end ius sanguinis citizenship have their own 
ugly history. Second, although one cannot gainsay that, in certain circum-
stances, ius sanguinis citizenship has been used to maintain ethnic homoge-
neity, the notion that parents and children do and should share the same 
political affiliation has also facilitated racial, ethnic, and religious diversifi-
cation of some political communities. Rather than abolish ius sanguinis citi-
zenship wholesale, we should be alert to the ways that it can operate as a tool 
1 For a discussion of these laws and efforts to restrict the recognition of ethnic 
Chinese individuals under the ius sanguinis citizenship statute, see Collins, 
K.A. (2014), ‘Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal 
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation’, Yale Law Journal 123 (7) 2134–
2235 (at 2170–2182). Starting in 1934, the ius sanguinis statute also allowed 
American mothers to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children. See id. 
at 2157.
2 See Reimers, D. (1983), ‘An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act 
and Third World Immigration to the United States’, Journal of American 
Ethnic History 9 (3): 23–24; Ong Hing, B. (1999), Making and Remaking 
Asian America Through Immigration Policy, 1850–1900. Stanford: SUP, 
81–120.




of ethnic exclusion and degradation in particular socio-legal contexts, and 
work to minimise those effects.4
 A proposal too restrained and too radical
To be fair, Dumbrava does not extend his proposal to migration and naturali-
sation policies that enlist the parent-child relationship; indeed, he would 
preserve such migration policies. He speaks only of traditional ius sanguinis 
citizenship, and argues that it often fails to map on to the reality of modern 
family formation, making it inadequate to ‘deal with contemporary issues 
such as advances in assisted reproduction technologies’ (ART), same-sex 
coupling and marriage, and the steady rise of nonmarital procreation. The 
problems Dumbrava identifies in this regard are important and difficult. But 
as a remedy for these problems, abolishing parent-child citizenship trans-
mission is simultaneously too restrained and too radical. It is too restrained 
because, after abandoning ius sanguinis citizenship we would still be con-
fronted with the difficulty of determining which parent-child relationships 
should count for purposes of regulating migration, derivative naturalisation, 
and (in many countries) ius soli birthright citizenship. Moreover, in all of 
these contexts, the ‘fundamental normative questions about who should be 
a citizen in a political community’ – and about the role that the parent-child 
relationship should play in that determination – would persist.
At the same time, Dumbrava’s proposal is too radical. He argues that ius 
sanguinis citizenship is not necessary to protect children from statelessness 
and ‘adds little to the legal and normative character of the parent-child rela-
tionship’. On this point I agree entirely with Bauböck and Scott Titshaw that 
Dumbrava underestimates the disruptive potential of his proposal. If all 
countries recognised unrestricted ius soli citizenship, Dumbrava’s assertion 
that ius sanguinis citizenship is unnecessary to prevent statelessness would 
be basically correct. But, in fact, very few ius soli countries go that far. 
Instead, as noted, they use ius sanguinis concepts to restrict the operation of 
ius soli birthright citizenship, thus leaving some children at a risk of state-
lessness if traditional ius sanguinis citizenship were abolished. And it is not 
just formal statelessness that would increase in a world without ius sangui-
nis citizenship. Children whose citizenship does not align with that of their 
4 A particularly notable example of how ius sanguinis principles can operate as 
tools of ethno-racial exclusion is the 2013 ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal 
of the Dominican Republic, TC/0168/13, which effectively expatriated 
ethnic-Haitian individuals born and residing in the D.R., leaving hundreds of 
thousands of people stateless.
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parents can find themselves divided by nationality from the individuals who 
are charged, ethically and legally, with their care. As Bauböck and Titshaw 
observe, in an era of voluntary and compelled migration, ius sanguinis is the 
most effective method of protecting against such destabilising and precari-
ous circumstances.
 How to modernise?
I agree with Titshaw and Bauböck that the modernisation of ius sanguinis 
citizenship, rather than its complete repudiation, offers a better way to 
address the problems Dumbrava identifies. The difficult question is how? I 
am hesitant to embrace Titshaw’s proposed method of modernisation, and I 
offer a friendly but important amendment to Bauböck’s proposal.
Titshaw argues that the officials who administer citizenship law should 
adhere to the parentage determinations made by officials who generally 
administer family law. In the U.S., these are state-level family law judges 
applying state law. But domestic family law, in the U.S. and elsewhere, does 
not necessarily generate ideal or even tolerable outcomes on questions of 
citizenship. Titshaw holds up a particularly poorly drawn U.S. federal policy 
that regulates ius sanguinis citizenship as it applies to foreign-born children 
conceived using ART, but there are many examples of how the use of state 
family law to regulate citizenship transmission has generated equally objec-
tionable outcomes. 5
Alternatively, Bauböck would have us adopt a ‘ius filiationis’ standard 
that recognises the ‘social parent’ or the ‘primary caregiver’ as the parent for 
purposes of ius sanguinis citizenship. He urges that this would help remedy 
the ‘mismatch between biologically determined citizenship and parental 
care arrangements that would also open the door to abusive claims’. He is 
correct. My concern, however, is that his emphasis on ‘social parenting’ and 
‘primary caregiving’ is insufficient and has its own perils. First, it could 
5 For example, in 1940 the federal ius sanguinis citizenship statute was amended 
to include the nonmarital children of U.S. citizen fathers under certain circum-
stances, such as when the father had ‘legitimated’ the child. Federal officials 
turned to the law of the father’s domiciliary state to determine whether 
legitimation had, in fact, occurred. In the 1940s and 50s, marriage to the 
child’s mother was a very common mode of legitimation, but federal officials 
making citizenship determinations would not recognise an interracial marriage 
as the basis of a child’s citizenship claim if the father’s home state banned such 




increase the likelihood of abusive denials of citizenship by officials who, at 
least in the U.S., are often all too eager to find reasons to reject claims to citi-
zenship.6 In the case of nonmarital children – who make up a far greater 
portion of the global population than children conceived through ART – the 
restriction of parent-child citizenship transmission to ‘primary caregivers’ 
could lead to circumspect treatment, or outright rejection, of the father-child 
relationship as a basis for citizenship transmission. Indeed, the primary 
caregiver standard could stymie the caregiving efforts of unmarried fathers 
who are divided by nationality from their children, and hence may never be 
able to establish themselves as the ‘primary caregiver’. The emphasis on 
caregiving as a prerequisite could also aid unmarried fathers who prefer to 
avoid parental responsibility by distancing themselves geographically from 
their children. The result: a ius sanguinis citizenship regime that would but-
tress gender inequality by undermining men’s parental rights and helping 
them to avoid their parental responsibilities.7 Moreover, and regardless of 
one’s view of the equities as between parents, it is ultimately the nonmarital 
child’s citizenship and migration rights that could be destabilised, depend-
ing on how officials understood the concept of ‘social parent’. Dumbrava 
recognises the inequities associated with ‘the differential treatment of chil-
dren born within and out of wedlock with respect to access to citizenship’, 
but his solution – to abolish parent-child citizenship transmission alto-
gether – would give cold comfort to nonmarital children and marital chil-
dren alike.
This is not an endorsement for a purely genetic model of citizenship 
transmission. Despite the references to ‘blood’, ius sanguinis citizenship has 
never rested on purely biological conceptions of citizenship. Traditionally, 
marriage was fundamental to the ability of fathers to secure citizenship for 
their children, and – at least in the development of U.S. law – the presump-
tion that the mother is the sole caregiver of the nonmarital child led to the 
recognition of the mother-child relationship as a source of citizenship for 
foreign-born nonmarital children.8 Rather, I suggest that – unless and until 
we move beyond citizenship as the enforcement mechanism for basic human 
rights, and beyond the family as a foundational source of material and psy-
chological support for children, we cannot overstate the importance of 
6 See, for example, Saldana Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2013).
7 I develop this argument in: Collins, K.A. (2000), ‘When Fathers’ Rights Were 
Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright’, Yale 
Law Journal (109) 1669–1708 (1699–1705), and in ‘Illegitimate Borders’, 
above n. 2, at 2230–34.
8 See Collins, ‘Illegitimate Borders’, above n. 2, at 2199–2205.
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the generous recognition of the parent-child relationship for citizenship 
 transmission. The modernisation of ius sanguinis citizenship should thus 
include the recognition of ‘social parents’ and parents with ‘custodial 
rights’– as Bauböck rightly asserts – and also recognition of all who can be 
held legally responsible for a child’s care or support. Dumbrava may be 
unhappy that the whims of parents, people’s reproductive choices, and fac-
tors beyond the control of the individual would continue to determine mem-
bership in a political community. But it is precisely because citizenship 
designations rest on factors such as these that I wholly agree with his admo-
nition that we channel our efforts ‘towards consolidating democratic institu-
tion and promoting citizenship attitudes and skills among all those who find 
themselves, by whatever ways and for whatever reason, in our political 
community’.
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I share Costica Dumbrava’s critique of ius sanguinis citizenship, and ulti-
mately what is, I think, his rejection of birth as the basis for political mem-
bership generally. Of course, there are issues of practicality – of the world as 
we find it – that might limit whether and how one would advance the abol-
ishment of birthright citizenship in light of specific political dynamics. But 
it is precisely those practicalities, and the near unthinkability of alternatives 
to birth-based citizenship that demand our interrogation of birthright in the 
first instance. As Joseph Carens has argued with respect to his advocacy of 
open borders, ‘even if we must take deeply rooted social arrangements as 
givens for purposes of immediate action in a particular context, we should 
never forget about our assessment of their fundamental character. Otherwise 
we wind up legitimating what should only be endured’.1
In his contribution to this Forum, Rainer Bauböck defends birthright 
citizenship and argues that in both of its iterations (ius sanguinis and ius 
soli) it avoids political division and ‘creates a quasi-natural equality of 
status’ among citizens who are entitled to claim it. But what about the 
inequality that divides the entitled from the unentitled? Political communi-
ties may be unavoidably bounded, but if a normative commitment to human 
rights is our guiding frame, it seems incumbent upon us to advance meth-
ods or prospects for membership that reduce the barriers to belonging as 
much as possible. Moreover, as Jacqueline Stevens trenchantly observes, 
in defining the bounds of equal citizenship, borders also form the boundar-
ies of our non- emergency expressions of compassion.2 To the extent that 
birthright entitlement advances a seemingly unassailable claim to exclu-
sionary membership, its advocacy runs counter to a broader commitment to 
humanitarianism.
1 Carens, J. (2013), The Ethics of Immigration. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 229.
2 Stevens, J. (2010), States without Nations: Citizenship for Mortals. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 9.
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Bauböck’s description of birthright citizenship evades the fact that 
establishing citizenship through birth, as with any other basis for member-
ship, is an inherently political decision. One of the central appeals of birth-
right is that it involves innocent, vulnerable babies, infants who are not 
(yet) marked by misdeeds, criminality, inadequate knowledge or commit-
ment, or the wrong ideological proclivities. It is this innocence that helps to 
obscure the profoundly political basis of birthright; that makes it possible to 
describe birthright citizenship as avoiding political division and establish-
ing a quasi- natural equality. However, the use of criteria of birth to deter-
mine political membership – whether it is birth to a citizen parent (variously 
defined) or birth in the territory (variously defined) – is not innocent. 
Prevailing views about
• wedlock and patriarchal forms of social organisation (e.g. unwed mothers 
having responsibility for their children and conferring citizenship, but 
unwed fathers having no such responsibility or capacity);
• the relative significance of biological and social parenting as well as gen-
der and sexuality (can a lesbian co-mother confer citizenship on her 
genetic progeny to whom she did not give birth – just as fathers do?);
• national attachment (is this child born abroad as second or subsequent 
generation?); and
• how generous territorial definitions should be (is a child born to a Ugandan 
mother on an American airline flying in Canadian airspace from 
Amsterdam to Boston a Canadian? Answer = yes) 3
all play out in the rules that determine birthright entitlement. The magi-
cal power of birthright citizenship is that it makes it possible for us to 
know and rehearse these rules while simultaneously making birthright 
seem straightforward, static and apolitical. In contrast to citizenship 
debates that engage migration, legal and illegal status and naturalisation, 
birthright citizenship makes these political choices disappear with a wave 
of a wand.
I am currently researching a book on the lost Canadians. These are 
people who thought they had a birthright claim to Canadian citizenship, 
but subsequently learned that they were mistaken. Their difficulties arose 





for various reasons, and have now largely been resolved through statutory 
amendment (a rule change). In making their case to Parliament, the courts 
and the media, their primary, and highly successful, strategy, was to deni-
grate the rule-boundedness of ‘mean-minded bureaucrats’ and advance 
the merits of their claims through appeals to lineage and blood-based 
belonging.4 Despite being born in the UK, residing in Canada for five 
years as a small child, and having subsequently lived in the UK for six 
decades, one such lost Canadian insisted, ‘I, sir, am a Canadian. To the 
roots of me, to the spirit of me, to the soul of me, I’m Canadian’. 5 This 
impassioned claim to Canada – not exactly your ‘go to’ example of an 
ethnic nation – nonetheless succeeds as a rhetorical strategy because it 
re-enchants the nation,6 underscoring the country’s desirability to the 
Canadian public, and insisting that this connection is an essential feature 
of her identity. This is a logic that only works in a world of birthright citi-
zenship. And it is a strategy that eventually succeeded in securing legisla-
tive amendments, because the birth-based claims of the lost Canadians 
(and not necessarily residency or connection) carried an overwhelming 
political potency.
To the extent that birthright citizenship enables progressive people to 
cordon off a substantial portion of membership determination from a poten-
tially nasty political debate, one can certainly understand its attractions. But 
the occlusion of politics with an unsupportable appeal to nature is ethically 
dubious. If we are committed to democratic equality, we need principles to 
manage how we live together that refuse the privilege of birth over naturali-
sation, and that require us to come to terms with our mortality.7 Political 
membership should be a lively, on-going process of negotiation in which 
everyone has a stake. Some critics might argue that abandoning birthright 
citizenship and its intergenerational character will create the conditions for 
decision making in which we are no longer future-oriented, or indeed, that 
we will neglect the lessons and obligations of our past. If our children do not 
4 Canada, 26 February 2007, House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Citizenship and Immigration 39th Parliament 1st Session no. 38. (at 11:50).
5 Canada, 26 February 2007, House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Citizenship and Immigration 39th Parliament 1st Session no. 38. (at 11:45).
6 Honig, B. (2001), Democracy and the Foreigner. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 74.
7 For a full elaboration on the dangers of intergenerational citizenship, see 
Stevens (2010), at n.2 above.
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have a stake in the polity to come, why should we commit ourselves to mak-
ing it better? This kind of argument is morally bereft. We can continue to 
care about the future and attend to the damages we, and our ancestors, have 
wrought, even if, or precisely because, our political membership is limited 
by our mortality. It was, of course, ever thus.
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The Janus-Face of Ius Sanguinis: Protecting  
Migrant Children and Expanding Ethnic  
Nations
Francesca Decimo
Costica Dumbrava’s proposal for abandoning ius sanguinis is timely and 
bold. My intuition is to reject his suggestion that children’s citizenship might 
be disconnected from that of their parents, but to join his advocacy for a 
radical rethinking of the ius sanguinis principle with a view towards elimi-
nating it once and for all. These are rather contrasting stances in relation to 
the same principle. Let us see if the apparent contradiction can be resolved.
To begin, let us consider the element of Costica Dumbrava’s proposal 
that has elicited most attention and controversy among the respondents, but 
was picked up and expanded by Lois Harder, namely the assertion that 
granting citizenship at birth is unnecessary and, above all, that making chil-
dren dependent on the legal status of their parents exposes them to a form of 
vulnerability. The idea of postponing the acquisition of citizenship until 
adulthood, taking into account birthplace and residence or possession of the 
appropriate attitudes and skills, derives from the classic opposition between 
ius sanguinis and ius soli according to which the former is considered ethnic 
and exclusive while the latter is considered civic and inclusive. Yet Rainer 
Bauböck’s comments on this point explain how, in the absence of parental 
transmission of citizenship to children, ius soli and ius domicilii can gener-
ate individual and familial conditions that are both legally paradoxical and 
morally unfair.
I share the doubts and critiques raised by Rainer Bauböck, Scott Titshaw 
and Kristin Collins regarding the alleged emancipatory value of a citizen-
ship system that disconnects children from their parents. Particularly, I con-
sider any legal system that fails to specifically protect the relationship 
between parents and children to be highly risky. Indeed, who should chil-
dren depend on if not their parents? Dumbrava’s proposal that children 
might instead be subject to, and protected by, a kind of international law 
faces the problem of subordinating the individual and familial reproductive 
spheres to institutional logics.
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As Luc Boltanski has noted,1 the event of birth is inextricably linked to 
the definition of belonging and social descent – and therefore legal, political, 
cultural, national, etc. descent as well. Historically, devices for legitimating 
the procreative event were provided by religion, ancestry, the nation-state 
and, in more recent times, a long-term relationship among a couple. In a 
scenario in which parentage and citizenship are not tightly connected from 
the beginning, the risk is not only that of generating stateless children but 
also an excess of state power. Even after World War Two, the Catholic 
Church in Ireland took children considered illegitimate away from their 
unmarried mothers. It was nationalist demographic policies, both in Europe 
and overseas, that shaped the reproductive choices of individuals and fami-
lies during the 20th century with a view to producing children for the father-
land. We might recall these policies when interpreting some recent 
nationally-oriented arguments encouraging the children of immigrants to rid 
themselves of the burden of their cultures of origin in which their inade-
quately assimilated mothers and fathers remain stuck.2 With this in mind, do 
we really want to define children’s citizenship irrespective of their parents’? 
Do we really want to shift the task of determining the legitimate member-
ship of our offspring from relationships to institutions?
The considerations made thus far therefore lead me to agree with those 
who have argued that, as long as the system of nation-states regulates our 
rule of law, children’s citizenship must be linked from birth to that of their 
parents.
At the same time, it seems to me that ius sanguinis is a legal instrument 
which, especially in a global context of increased geographical mobility, 
opens the way to policies of attributing nationality that go far beyond pro-
tecting the parent-child relationship. This point relates to Dumbrava’s obser-
vation that ius sanguinis is historically tainted that was critically addressed 
by Jannis Panagiotidis but has not yet been decisively refuted.
As scholars have noted, ius sanguinis makes it possible to recognise a 
community of descendants as legitimate members of the nation regardless 
of its territorial limits, but that is not all. This principle has been used to 
grant the status of co-national to individuals dispersed not only across space 
but also across time, leading to the construction of virtually inexhaustible 
intergenerational chains.3 This principle is based on blood, identified as the 
1 See Boltanski, L. (2004), La condition foetale. Paris: Gallimard.
2 See Hungtinton, S. (2004), Who are we? New York: Simon and Schuster.
3 See: Brubaker, R. (1992), Citizenship and Nationhood in France and 
Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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essential and primordial element of descent, belonging and identification. It 
is true that this potential for unlimited intergenerational transmissibility is 
effectively defused by the fact that many countries interpret ius sanguinis 
narrowly, applying it generally only up to the second generation born abroad. 
And yet, is this limit enough to bind and delimit the potential of ius sangui-
nis? In national rhetoric the image of a community of descendants continues 
to exert a powerful appeal that goes beyond the attribution of birthright citi-
zenship. In historical emigration countries – but also others –,4 ius sanguinis 
as a legal practice is used to grant preferential conditions and benefits to 
descendants as part of the direct transmission or ‘recovery’ of ancestral citi-
zenship well beyond the second generation.5 Generational limits in the 
granting of citizenship to descendants can thus be bypassed because, in prin-
ciple, ius sanguinis itself poses no particular restrictions in this regard.
The most controversial aspects of ius sanguinis emerge when this prin-
ciple ends up competing with ius soli or ius domicilii, that is, when individu-
als born and raised elsewhere enjoy a right to citizenship in the name of 
lineage and an assertion of national affiliation while immigrants who par-
ticipate fully in the economic, social and cultural development of the coun-
try are denied this same right or face serious obstacles in accessing it. In 
such context – Germany in the past and Italy today – the right to citizenship 
effectively becomes a resource which, like economic, human and social 
capital, is distributed in a highly unequal way, benefitting certain categories 
of people – ‘descendants’ – at the expense of others – ‘foreigners’.
In view of its unlimited intergenerational potential, I conclude that, if its 
purpose is merely to bind children’s citizenship to that of their parents, ius 
sanguinis as a legal instrument suffers from ambiguity and disproportional-
ity. All of these critical points seem to be implicitly overcome in Bauböck’s 
proposal of a ius filiationis principle, which would focus entirely on linking 
children’s citizenship to that of their parents, especially for migrants and 
non-biological offspring. Under a different name and with distinct content, 
4 Joppke’s comparison of three highly divergent countries, France, Italy and 
Hungary, is quite effective in shedding light on this issue in Joppke, C. (2005), 
Selecting by Origin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 240–250.
5 For an in-depth analysis of the Italian case, see Decimo, F. (2015). Nation and 
reproduction: Immigrants and their children in the population discourse in 
Italy. Nations and Nationalism, 21(1), 139–161; Tintori, G. (2013), 
Naturalisation Procedures for Immigrants. Florence: European University 
Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory, available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29787/
NPR_2013_13-Italy.pdf?sequence=1
The Janus-Face of Ius Sanguinis: Protecting Migrant Children and Expanding…
116
does this move not suggest that, rather than modifying or modernising ius 
sanguinis as advocated by Rainer Bauböck and Scott Titshaw, it is time to 
abandon it once and for all, adopting in its place a principle that explicitly 
protects parentage and citizenship in contexts of geographical mobility 
instead of linking it to genealogical lineage and nationhood?
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The Prior Question: What Do We Need State 
Citizenship for?
David Owen
In his kick-off contribution, Costica Dumbrava offers a threefold critique of 
ius sanguinis as a norm of citizenship acquisition. In reflecting on this cri-
tique, I share the scepticism expressed by Rainer Bauböck, Jannis 
Panagioditis, Scott Titshaw and Kristin Collins. In particular I would note, 
along the lines of Titshaw’s Indian family example, that the abolition of ius 
sanguinis would have led in my own family context to four siblings, of 
whom I am one, being split among three different nationalities: Nigerian, 
British and Malaysian). However rather than address Dumbrava’s critique 
head on, I want to suggest that the kind of critique of ius sanguinis that he 
offers – and the same point would apply to the critique or defence of any of 
the classic membership rules taken singly as free-standing norms – gets 
things moving askew from the start. To see this, one needs to take a step 
back and situate this debate within a slightly different context. When asking 
what citizenship rules we ought to endorse or reject, we ought to begin with 
a prior question: ‘what do we need state citizenship rules for?’
In a world of plural autonomous states, there are two basic functions that 
such rules are to play:
 1. to ensure that each and every human being is a citizen of a state and hence 
that everyone has, at least formally, equal standing in a global society 
organised as a system of states;
 2. to allocate persons to states in ways that best serve the common interest, 
that is, where this allocation supports protection of the fundamental inter-
ests of individuals, the realization of the common good within states and 
the conditions of cooperation between states.
A plausible response to these requirements is a general principle that Ayelet 
Shachar calls ‘ius nexi’ which highlights the importance of a genuine con-
nection between persons and the state of which they are citizens.1 The notion 
1 Shachar, A. (2009), The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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of ‘genuine connection’ can be glossed in terms of Bauböck’s ‘stakeholder’ 
view which proposes that those and only those individuals have a claim to 
membership of a polity whose individual autonomy and wellbeing is linked 
to the collective self-government and flourishing of that polity.2 It seems to 
me that we should see ius soli, ius sanguinis and ius domicilii under the 
general principle of ius nexi as denoting different routes through which a 
genuine connection is presumptively established: through parental citizen-
ship, through place of birth and through residence.
Seeing each of these rules under this more general principle, rather than 
seeing each as a single free-standing norm, makes clear two points that are 
salient to this discussion. First, that in adopting any of these rules we are not 
reifying ‘blood’ or ‘territory’ or ‘residence’. We regard them instead simply 
as acknowledgments of the diverse ways in which ius nexi may be given 
expression – and we need each of them if we are to do justice to the relations 
of persons to states. Second, that each of the ius soli, ius sanguinis and ius 
domicilii rules should be qualified by the general principle of ius nexi that 
they serve. So, for example, an unlimited ius sanguinis rule or a ius soli rule 
that included a child born to visiting tourists or a ius domicilii rule that 
granted citizenship after three months residence would be incompatible with 
the overarching ius nexi principle.
Still it would be in line with Dumbrava’s argument for him to object that 
the ‘birthright’ rules of ius soli and ius sanguinis can only operate on the 
basis of the general presumption that parental citizenship and place of birth 
establish a genuine connection, so why not wait until the children reach their 
majority? Here I concur with the view advanced by Bauböck that the ade-
quate protection of children’s rights implies that ‘children need not only 
human rights, they also need their parent’s citizenship’. Titshaw’s example 
of the serially mobile Indian family and my own peripatetic family history 
suffice to make this point. Contra Harder, I don’t think that ‘birthright’ rules 
disguise the political character of membership norms, rather they acknowl-
edge important interests of children, parents and states. Harder’s stress on 
the relationship of those entitled to citizenship of a given state and those not 
so entitled doesn’t provide reasons to drop either ius soli or ius sanguinis, 
what it does is provide reasons for relatively generous ius domicilii rules, of 
2 Bauböck, R. (2015), ‘Morphing the Demos into the Right Shape. Normative 
Principles for Enfranchising Resident Aliens and Expatriate Citizens’, 




rights to dual/plural nationality and of a more equitable distribution of trans-
national mobility rights.
And perhaps there may be a clue here to an unstated background com-
mitment of Dumbrava’s critique. If we ask under what, if any, circum-
stances in a world of plural states, it could make sense to abolish ius 
sanguinis rules, then I think that the only answer that has any plausibility is 
a world of open borders characterised by rapid access to citizenship through 
ius domicilii rules. It may even be plausible that the abolition of ius sangui-
nis rules would generate political support for more open borders given the 
problems liable to be posed for sustaining the human right to a family life 
after the removal of such rules. Whether this is a prudent way of seeking to 
realise such a world and whether such a world is desirable are, of course, 
further questions.
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Problems have plagued the ius sanguinis principle – the transmission of citi-
zenship from parent to child – for as long as it has existed. Costica Dumbrava 
is surely correct that the time has come to ask whether ius sanguinis is still 
necessary. But the core problem with ius sanguinis, I would argue, is not that 
it uses the parent-child relationship to determine membership but that it 
overemphasizes the importance of the genetic tie to this relationship.
The very term ius sanguinis – ‘right of blood’ – makes the genetic tie the 
sine qua non of belonging. It is this obsession with genetic purity that has 
linked ius sanguinis to tribalism, xenophobia, and even genocide. This prob-
lem, I believe, is distinct from the very real need to ensure children’s access 
to the same geographic territory and legal system as that of their parents. 
Rainer Bauböck’s proposal for a ‘ius filiationis’ based on family association 
rather than genetic ties would excise many of the problems caused by a 
focus on blood while protecting the parent-child relationship and the stabil-
ity for children that flows from it.
Let me explain in more detail why I think that retaining recognition of 
parent-child relationships while abandoning the other features of ius sangui-
nis is sensible. At first glance, protecting the tying of children’s citizenship 
to that of their parents may appear problematic because of that relationship’s 
historical ties to property ownership. But a closer look shows that children 
really do deserve different legal treatment than adults, and ius filiationis is 
one critical way the law can recognise that difference.
Ius sanguinis feels retrograde today because it developed during a time 
in which relationships between parents and children, as well as relationships 
between husbands and wives and masters and servants, were much more 
akin to property-chattel relationships than we understand them to be today. 
Today’s family law was yesterday’s law of the household, which set forth 
entitlements and obligations based on reciprocal legal statuses – parent and 
child, husband and wife, master and servant, master and apprentice (and 
sometimes master and slave). Each of these relationships was hierarchical, 
involving responsibilities on the part of the superior party in the hierarchy 
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(father, husband, or master) and obligations of service on the part of the 
inferior party (child, wife, servant, apprentice, or slave).1 The inferior party 
derived identity from the superior: a wife or a child’s nominal citizenship 
often followed that of the husband or father, but this identity did not confer 
the same rights enjoyed by the superior party. In early America, for example, 
male citizens were often entitled to the right to vote, right to contract, and 
right to own property (in fact, ownership of property was often a prerequi-
site for voting) but their wives – also technically citizens – were not entitled 
to any of these rights. Their political participation took the form of provid-
ing moral guidance to their husbands and raising virtuous sons who could 
themselves exercise political power. 2
Today, we no longer think of citizenship in this way. The rights con-
ferred by citizenship are understood in Western democracies as universal. 
If, for example, I become a naturalised U.S. citizen, the same neutral voting 
laws apply to me that apply to any other citizen, regardless of my gender, 
marital status, race, or national origin. Likewise, laws that imposed deriva-
tive citizenship on wives, and even laws that expatriated women upon mar-
riage – both of which used to be widespread – are no longer the norm. In 
many parts of the world, women are no longer understood as intellectually 
and financially dependent on their husbands but instead as autonomous 
adults, capable of making their own economic, moral, and legal decisions, 
including the decision to consent to citizenship or renounce it. And even 
more dramatically, we no longer think of servants as deriving legal identity 
from their masters; instead, workers are free to participate in free, if regu-
lated, labour markets and their citizenship status is independent of their 
employee status. 3
The one legal distinction, however, that all countries still maintain in 
determining the capacity to exercise the rights associated with citizenship is 
age. Children are generally considered to be incapable of giving legal 
1 Halley, J. (2011), ‘What is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part I’, Yale Journal of 
Law & Humanities 23 (1): 1–109, at 2.
2 Kerber, L. (1980), Women of the Republic: Intellect & Ideology in 
Revolutionary America. Chapel Hill: UNC Press.
3 In contrast to the independent citizenship status of workers, employer-spon-
sored immigration provisions may represent the vestiges of the ancient 
master-servant status relationship. See Raghunath, R. (2014), ‘A Founding 
Failure of Enforcement: Freedmen, Day Laborers, and the Perils of an 
Ineffectual State,’ C.U.N.Y. L. Rev. 18 (1): 47–91.
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 consent and in need of legal protection. The particular age at which they 
become capable of reasoning is contested, but it is incontestable that a new-
born cannot care for himself nor meaningfully choose a nationality. In many 
circumstances, the law provides the protection children need by requiring 
children’s parents to provide for them, care of them, and make decisions for 
them; in some instances, the state takes on this responsibility (foster care 
and universal public education are both examples). Children occupy a very 
different legal space than women or workers, one that makes them vulnera-
ble when their ties to their parents are weakened. Providing children with a 
citizenship that they can exercise simultaneously with that of at least one of 
their parents is a critical protection for their wellbeing. We can believe this 
to be so while simultaneously rejecting the traditional hierarchies of parent- 
child, husband-wife, and master-slave. The United Kingdom’s move away 
from conceptualizing parent-child relationships as ‘custodial’, property-like 
relationships and instead describing them as involving ‘parental responsibil-
ity’ is a good example of this shift. The emphasis has changed from owner-
ship and control to care and protection.
If, then, we still need a form of parent-to-child citizenship transmission, 
is ius sanguinis as traditionally understood what we need? Scholars, courts, 
and government agencies often take ius sanguinis literally, as the ‘rule of 
blood’. But I think that rigidity is misplaced. Even centuries ago the notion 
of ius sanguinis meant something distinct from a pure genetic tie. For men, 
who could never be certain of their child’s paternity, transmission ‘through 
blood’ often really meant transmission through choice. A man chose to 
acknowledge his children by marrying, or already being married to, their 
mother. Children born to unmarried mothers generally took on the citizen-
ship of their mothers, not their fathers, regardless of whether the father was 
known. The notion of ‘blood’, then, was complicated by the requirement of 
marriage for citizenship transmission through the father and the man’s 
unique ability to embrace or repudiate his offspring based on his marital 
relationship to their mother. Presumably, many children, prior to blood and 
DNA testing, acquired citizenship iure sanguinis when there was actually no 
blood tie, sometimes in circumstances where the father was ignorant of this 
fact and sometimes where he knew full well no blood relationship existed.4 
Ius sanguinis has always been about more and less than simply blood.
4 Abrams, K. & K. Piacenti (2014), ‘Immigration’s Family Values’, Va. L. Rev. 
100 (4): 629–709, at 660, 663, 692.
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Thus, Bauböck’s notion of ius filiationis seems to me both the most 
appropriate form today for citizenship transmission from parent to child to 
take, and a more accurate description of what really occurred historically. As 
I see it, the most challenging obstacle to implementing a ius filiationis sys-
tem is that birthright citizenship is fixed in time. Courts are not in a position 
to predict on the date of a child’s birth the adult who will ultimately assume 
parental responsibility for a child, but they can determine who the genetic or 
marital parent is. Shifting to a ius filiationis system, then, requires a multi-
faceted response. First, statutes outlining the requirements for citizenship 
transmission at birth should be amended to identify the intended parents. In 
most circumstances, the intended parents will be the genetic parents, but in 
some instances they might be someone else – for example, a non-genetic 
parent who contracts with a gestational surrogate or the spouse or partner of 
a genetic parent. Various pieces of evidence, from birth certificates to con-
tracts to court judgments, would be necessary to determine parentage. In 
cases involving ART, this solution would solve many of the current prob-
lems. A genetic tie would be but one piece of evidence in determining citi-
zenship at birth.
In addition to reforming ius sanguinis statutes, however, I believe we 
must also broaden the other available pathways to citizenship outside of 
birthright citizenship and traditional forms of naturalisation. There could 
be a deadline – perhaps by a specified birthday – by when a functional par-
ent could request a declaration of citizenship for the child he or she has 
parented since birth. This alternative means of citizenship transmission 
should not substitute for birthright citizenship; as Kristin Collins points 
out, making citizenship determinations using only functional tests would 
put children at the mercy of officials seeking to deny citizenship and could 
disadvantage genetic or intentional fathers who may be unable to demon-
strate that their care has been substantial enough to be ‘functional.’ But 
combined with a robust recognition of genetic and intentional parentage at 
birth, recognition of functional parentage later on could serve a supplemen-
tal purpose, ensuring that children will ultimately have access to citizen-
ship rights in the country in which their functional parents reside. Full 
recognition of parent- child relationships requires going beyond the moment 




It is premature to forsake the recognition of parent-child relationships in 
citizenship law, not when citizenship is still the mechanism for ensuring that 
every human being has membership in at least one state and providing 
access to basic human rights. But it is time that we abandoned the idea that 
‘blood’ is the sole basis of these relationships.
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Law by Blood or Blood by Law?
David Armand Jacques Gérard de Groot
I agree to certain extent with Costica Dumbrava that ius sanguinis encom-
passes certain problematic issues, especially where it concerns newer forms 
of procreation, like IVF for lesbian couples and surrogacy. However, the 
origin of the problem cannot be attributed to ius sanguinis, but to non- 
solidarity of states that overuse the ordre public exemption for the denial of 
the recognition of parentage. But before delving into family relations and 
private international law conflicts, I would like to first argue that ius sangui-
nis is still the most suitable option for the main purposes of nationality law 
where it concerns children.
 The main purposes of nationality
The commonly accepted main purposes of nationality are, first of all, that 
there is a territory to which an individual can always return and from which 
he cannot be deported, as was already pointed out by Bauböck and Titshaw; 
secondly, diplomatic and consular protection while being abroad; thirdly, 
national political participation in the state of nationality; and lastly, for EU 
citizens, free movement rights within the EU.
An abandonment of ius sanguinis in favour of ius soli might lead to the 
situation described by Titshaw, where within the same family the children 
might have different nationalities, which could, for example, lead to the situ-
ation that they would have to move to different countries in case of their 
parents’ death while they are minor or that they might need to seek diplo-
matic protection from different foreign representations. Such a break-up of 
the family unit due to differing nationalities would certainly conflict with 
the right to family life. Therefore, for the purpose of preserving the unity 
and protection of the family, ius sanguinis is the most suitable option. If, 
when having attained majority the children feel that they have a closer bond 
with another nationality, they could still apply for naturalisation in that state.
This bond of attachment brings me to the national political participation 
purpose of nationality which is connected to Dumbrava’s argument 
 concerning the reproduction of the political community. Having the nation-
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ality of a certain state does not automatically mean integration into its soci-
ety. This problem, depending on the mobility of the persons involved, does, 
however, not only occur with ius sanguinis and ius soli, but also with every 
other form of nationality transmission that one could think of. It should 
therefore be decided whom national political participation concerns most. If 
the definition of a ‘state’ refers primarily to a permanent population within 
its borders, long-term (non-national) residents should have national political 
participation rights and long-term absent nationals should not (except if they 
are working abroad in service of the state). National political participation 
rights should then be detached from nationality and therefore actually not be 
seen as a purpose of nationality (but that is a different discussion).
It should however be noted that for purpose of inclusion of long-term 
resident families, who for some reason have not acquired the nationality by 
naturalisation, into the national population, a third generation ius soli or 
even a second generation ius soli, in cases where the first generation migrant 
has entered the country at a young age, would be appropriate. However, this 
should not come with an option requirement for dual nationals at reaching 
majority, as in Germany, in order to avoid a conflict of identity if one is 
forced to make a choice between the nationality acquired iure soli and 
another nationality acquired iure sanguinis.
 Non-solidarity of states
The problems that arise when a state does not grant its nationality to a child 
due to non-recognition of parentage can only occur in cases where parentage 
has been established by another state in accordance with its national family 
law. In surrogacy cases this means a non-recognition of a foreign judgement 
or birth certificate and in cases of dual motherhood of married or registered 
lesbian couples a non-recognition of the extended pater est quem nuptiae 
demonstrant principle. The pater est principle means that the husband of the 
woman that gives birth to the child is automatically considered to be the 
father and therefore directly at birth has a parentage link to the child. 
Increasingly, states have extended this principle to stable non-marital rela-
tionships and to same-sex marriages.
If the child is born in the state of the discussed nationality the national 
family law (mostly) applies to the establishment of parentage. It would 
therefore not make any sense that parentage ties to a national could be estab-
lished at birth by the state in question, without also granting the nationality 
D. A. J. G. de Groot
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(if ius sanguinis is applied). The problems that arise are thus nearly always 
recognition issues between states.
There is a general principle of recognition of a civil status which was 
legally established abroad. Recognition can only be refused in cases of over-
riding reasons of ordre public. This ordre public principle should be limited 
by the best interest of the child and the right to family life. It can never be 
considered to be in the best interest of the child to have no parents at all 
instead of having parents with whom (s)he has no blood ties who want to care 
for her or him. This has also been stated by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy case. In that case an Italian 
couple had gotten a child through a surrogacy arrangement in Russia. When 
they brought the child to Italy the state refused to recognise the parentage 
ties, took the child away and placed him under guardianship. The Court 
stated in the Chamber judgment that Italy had failed to take the best interest 
of the child sufficiently into consideration when weighting it against ordre 
public. It had especially failed to recognise the de facto family ties and 
imposed a measure reserved only for circumstances where the child is in 
danger. In 2017 in its Grand Chamber judgment the Court overruled this 
considering that in cases where there are no biological ties there must have 
been a longer period of cohabitation in order to establish family life with the 
child compared to cases where there is a biological tie. However, one should 
consider that if the parents had not moved to Italy, but to another Member 
State where the Russian birth certificate is recognised, the child might have 
been stateless, but family life would have been assured. After some years of 
family life, Italy would have no choice but to recognise this parentage and 
consequently grant the nationality. Therefore, slightly paradoxically, it would 
be in the best interest of the child if Italy would grant the nationality imme-
diately if the parents reside in another Member State, while it is under no 
such obligation if they reside in Italy. Another example where the best inter-
est of the child should prevail is when the child from a second (polygamist) 
marriage is put in a worse position than a child born out of wedlock.
The problem is thus a lack of solidarity between states that do not recog-
nise family ties legally established in another state. The parentage for the 
purpose of acquisition of nationality should thus be based on family law, 
including a more lenient approach in the private international law rules to 
recognition of a civil status acquired abroad.
Law by Blood or Blood by Law?
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I therefore like Bauböck’s proposal of a ius filiationis. I see it, however, 
more as a change from ‘law by blood’, meaning parentage ties based on 
blood relationship, to a ‘blood by law’ relationship, meaning that parentage 
ties are seen to be established by the law. This thus means only an extension 
of the ‘blood’ definition. Bauböck’s fear that this could create a situation 
where the child could not acquire a nationality at birth, due to the complex 
determination of parenthood, could technically be avoided by a pre-birth 
determination of parentage.
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Limiting the Transmission of Family  
Advantage: Ius Sanguinis with an  
Expiration Date
Iseult Honohan
Costica Dumbrava has done a great service in stimulating us to reconsider 
the justification of ius sanguinis and to disaggregate its different forms.
I am sympathetic to critiques of ius sanguinis as a dominant mode of citi-
zenship acquisition. Yet I acknowledge that the significance of family life 
for parents and children seems to offer some grounds for ius sanguinis citi-
zenship – at least in a world of migration controls where citizenship is the 
only firm guarantee of right of entry to a country. I will argue here that to 
limit the extension of inherited privilege in this domain, however, this form 
of citizenship should be awarded provisionally.
Others here have shown convincingly that there is nothing inherently 
ethnically exclusive about ius sanguinis. Furthermore, it does not have to be 
understood in terms of bare genetic descent; so sorting out the deficiencies 
of current ius sanguinis provision does not depend on resolving all the issues 
of biological parenthood raised by the new reproductive technologies. If ius 
sanguinis can be detached from the strict genetic interpretation, it no longer 
provides a warrant for indefinite transmission across successive generations 
on the basis of biological descent. Thus two of the sharpest criticisms of ius 
sanguinis seem to have been defused.
It remains to consider in what way ius sanguinis might be necessary. 
On the one hand, various forms of ius soli can be seen as giving continu-
ity of membership for the state and security for children born in the coun-
try. For those born in the country of their parents’ citizenship there is 
little material difference between ius soli and ius sanguinis. But ius san-
guinis citizenship may be seen as necessary when a child is born to par-
ents living outside the state of their citizenship. Even if the child gains ius 
soli citizenship in the country in which she is born, this does not guaran-
tee the security of the family. Focusing on what have been termed ‘social 
parenthood’, or functional parenting relationships of care, rather than 
simply biological descent, others here (Bauböck, Owen and Collins) have 
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pointed to the way in which  common citizenship best secures family life 
in allowing parents and children to stay together or move back to the 
country of their parent’s citizenship.
What I want to address here is the further question: what forms or extent 
of ius sanguinis citizenship are warranted on the basis of this account?
 Protecting families but not privilege
We may start from the consideration that those in the position of parents 
have an interest in and a particular responsibility to care for their children 
when young, implying a clear and fundamental interest in living together 
and being able to move together. These can be seen as necessary condi-
tions for realising many of the intrinsic and non-substitutable goods of 
family life, or what have been called ‘familial relationship goods’, which 
include child- rearing and asymmetric intimacy.1 These involve agent-spe-
cific obligations that can be realised only within family relationships of 
care and throughout childhood.2 Thus this fundamental interest should be 
protected. Brighouse and Swift emphasise however, that we should not, in 
protecting these intrinsic goods, fail to distinguish them from other advan-
tages external to familial relationship goods that parents can confer on 
their children, such as private education or concentrated wealth, which do 
not warrant protection. 3
Can ius sanguinis citizenship, even if not based solely on genetic descent, 
support such unwarranted transmission of privilege? Citizenship grants more 
than the opportunity to live with and be cared for by your parents when you 
are a child. It provides membership of a political community and the benefits 
at least of entry and residence in that state, the right to participate in national 
elections and sometimes access to other rights. Under a regime of ius sangui-
nis, even understood as grounded in the rights of parents and children to 
share citizenship, the transmission of citizenship to children born to citizens 
abroad can mean that people with no connection to the country retain the 
benefits of citizenship, and, at the very least, can lead to a mismatch between 
the citizen body and the community of those who live in, and are particularly 
subject to, the state. Thus, life-long citizenship in the absence of real connec-
1 Brighouse, H. & A. Swift (2014), Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child 
Relationships. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
2 Honohan, I. (2009), ‘Rethinking the claim to family re-unification’, Political 
Studies 57 (4): 765–87.
3 Brighouse, H. & A. Swift (2014), Family Values: The Ethics of Parent-Child 
Relationships. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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tions could well be seen as falling into the category of  advantages that par-
ents should not necessarily be able to convey to their children.
This is not to suggest that ius sanguinis citizenship is just a form of prop-
erty or unearned privilege.4 But there are still concerns about how to secure 
the legitimate interests of parents to care for their children, and of children 
to be protected, without justifying the transmission of privilege. My focus 
here is on considering how to guarantee the security of children to live and 
move with their parents through shared citizenship without supporting the 
unwarranted extension of privilege in the domain of citizenship.
This suggests the following limited justification for birthright ius sangui-
nis citizenship - rather than the universal child status and deferred, or provi-
sional, ius soli citizenship that Dumbrava recommends.
 Provisional ius sanguinis
First, birthright citizenship per se is justified because people need the pro-
tection of citizenship from birth.5 Note that this is not mainly because they 
are children and thus innocent or particularly vulnerable (pace Harder), nor 
despite the fact that they are children and thus (arguably) not capable of 
consenting or participating politically, but while they are children, and like 
others, are both subject to the power of a state and in need of protection by 
a state. Dumbrava’s proposal that children might gain a universal status of 
childhood and that citizenship should depend on their being able to choose, 
have established a connection, and developed capacities and virtues of citi-
zenship overlooks the centrality of the legal status of citizenship to security, 
and the fact that this security should not be conditional on the qualities or 
practices of citizens.
The specific justification of ius sanguinis citizenship then derives from 
the way in which common citizenship between parents and children is the 
most secure way of guaranteeing their ability to live and move together. This 
can be in addition to the citizenship the child may acquire by ius soli; dual 
citizenship of the state of birth and that of parents’ is not in itself problem-
atic if a person has connections in both countries.
4 Shachar, A. (2010), The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
5 Of course, not all birthright provisions apply from birth, rather than on the 
basis of birth, but they generally apply from the establishment of the fact of 
birth, whether in the country or to a citizen.
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Because children need citizenship from birth, there is an argument for 
birthright citizenship; because young children need to be able to live with 
(and be cared for by) their parents, there is an argument for ius sanguinis 
citizenship at the time where this is most needed. Both of these concerns 
support an award of citizenship that is not deferred, but that is also not 
always retained indefinitely.
It may be objected that the withdrawal of citizenship should not be lightly 
recommended. Indeed this is true. But the strongest ground for withdrawal 
is the absence of any genuine link between a person and the state of citizen-
ship. Thus, writing on birthright citizenship, Vink and De Groot offer a simi-
lar suggestion6: ‘an alternative to limiting the transmission of citizenship at 
birth is the provision for the loss of citizenship if a citizen habitually resides 
abroad and no longer has a sufficient genuine link with the state involved’.7 
Indeed they go on to say that ‘[f]rom our perspective, a provision on the loss 
of citizenship due to the lack of a sufficient link is to be preferred to limiting 
the transmission of citizenship in case of birth abroad’, on the grounds that 
this gives the child herself the opportunity to decide whether to establish 
that link, which thus should remain available until after majority, at the point 
when the child is better placed to make an independent decision.8
Thus, the parsimonious account of ius sanguinis defended here suggests 
that it should be awarded only provisionally – held through childhood, but 
requiring the establishment of connections of certain kinds, most clearly by 
a period of residence in the country of that citizenship by, or soon after, 
majority.9 Confirmation would not depend on abjuring any other citizenship, 
as the aim would not be to avoid or reduce dual citizenship, but rather to 
reduce the numbers of citizens whose connections to a country are minimal 
or non-existent.
6 Vink, M. P. & G. R. De Groot (2010), ‘Birthright citizenship: trends and 
regulations in Europe’, EUDO Citizenship Observatory Comparative Report 
No. RSCAS/EUDO-CIT-Comp. 2010/8. Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies.
7 Such provisions already exist in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland (see above n. 6). In many 
of these cases, however, loss of citizenship can be pre-empted by submitting a 
request to retain it.
8 Above n. 6, at 12.
9 This would not necessarily be the only basis for retaining citizenship. If, for 
example, the parent(s) had returned to the country of their citizenship, this also 
could create a connection of their potential care in old age by adult children, 
which might justify their retaining citizenship.
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Such a conditional citizenship could take seriously the justifiable claims 
of families without leading to the unwarranted extension of family 
advantage.
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Retain Ius Sanguinis, but Don’t Take it  
Literally!
Eva Ersbøll
There is no doubt that Costica Dumbrava has raised an important question 
about whether to abandon ius sanguinis citizenship. His arguments are 
that ius sanguinis is historically tainted and unfit to deal with contempo-
rary issues such as developments in reproductive technologies and 
changes in family practices and norms; he also claims that ius sanguinis is 
normatively unnecessary, as it is possible to deliver its advantages by 
other means.
In my opinion, it is not time to abandon ius sanguinis, mainly because it 
is impossible to secure its advantages by other means. Admittedly, ius san-
guinis, if taken literally, is unfit to deal with contemporary issues such as 
complex family arrangements involving, among other things, assisted repro-
duction technologies (ART). However, it seems possible to solve many 
problems by applying a modified principle of ius sanguinis translated into 
ius filiationis, as suggested by Rainer Bauböck and supported by most of the 
participants in this debate.
What matters is, as also expressed by many authors, that children from a 
human rights perspective need their parents’ citizenship - or rather, the citi-
zenship of their primary caretakers, be they biological parents or not.
A solution to many of the problems related to reproductive technologies 
has been advanced by the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers, in 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)13 on the nationality of children:
Member states should apply to children their provisions on acquisition of 
nationality by right of blood if, as a result of a birth conceived through medi-
cally assisted reproductive techniques, a child-parent family relationship is 
established or recognised by law.1
Still, it is of course necessary to examine more closely the arguments against 
ius sanguinis and the practical solutions to its shortcomings.
1 See the recommendation at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1563529
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 History is not an argument
As Jannis Panagiotidis writes, history cannot justify abandoning ius sangui-
nis. The use of the principle may have been problematic in the past, and still, 
it may be all right today. Besides, as argued by Rainer Bauböck and others, 
it is possible to overcome ethno-nationalist dispositions by modifying a ius 
sanguinis principle, supplemented with ius soli and residence-based modes 
of acquisition.
As things stand, ius sanguinis citizenship is in my opinion irreplaceable. 
It provides, in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(article 7) for automatic acquisition of citizenship by birth. In addition, it 
seems to be one of the most simple and secure acquisition modes when it 
comes to protection against statelessness, as it has the ability to protect 
(most) children against statelessness from the very beginning of their life.
What is more, it is a central international law principle. For instance, 
state parties to the European Convention on Nationality are obliged to grant 
citizenship automatically at birth to children of (one of) their citizens (if 
born on their territory, cf. article 6(1)).
To me, it seems risky to jettison such an effective principle anchored in 
binding human rights standards.
 Unity of the family
Ius sanguinis is not the only relevant principle. Others, like the unity of the 
family, safeguard the same interests and may be applied in a broader per-
spective. To mention a few situations, take acquisition by adoption and 
acquisition by filial transfer based on the fact that the target person is a natu-
ral, adopted or foster child of a citizen.
In addition, new automatic modes of acquisition by birth are developing. 
Denmark, for instance, has amended its law in 2014 to provide for automatic 
acquisition of citizenship by birth by children with ‘a Danish father, mother 
or co-mother’. 2 This is an example of citizenship acquisition based on ius 
filiationis as advanced by Rainer Bauböck.
2 Costica Dumbrava gives an inadequate Danish example regarding the acquisi-
tion possibilities for children born out of wedlock. For long, such children 
have been entitled to naturalise regardless of residence in Denmark, although 
until 2013, it was a requirement that the father had (shared) custody over the 
child. This requirement is now repealed.
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As Costica Dumbrava rightly anticipatesd, a reasonable reservation in 
this debate has been that the main problems connected with the development 
of ART do not lie with ius sanguinis citizenship but with the determination 
of legal parentage. Such determination may take long time and involve a 
number of legal uncertainties and ethical dilemmas. Still, as argued by 
among others Rainer Bauböck and Scott Titshaw, states have in any case to 
fix their family law and figure out how to determine legal parenthood. 
Subsequently, children’s right to their legal parents’ citizenship may not 
raise major problems.
 Ius filiationis benefits
Developing a ius filiationis principle may entail even more advantages. 
Among others, it may solve some of the problems originating from loss or 
so-called quasi-loss of citizenship following the disappearance of a family 
relationship.3 Disappearance or annulment of a family relationship may 
have consequences for a person’s citizenship based on that family relation-
ship. Many states assume that if a person has acquired his or her citizenship 
through a child-parent family relationship that citizenship will be lost or 
even nullified if the family relationship disappears.4 If, however, states rec-
ognise citizenship based on social rather than biological parenthood, the 
threat of loss or quasi-loss may not arise in the case of disappearance of a 
biological family relationship.
 Human rights protection at this stage
According to the Council of Europe recommendations on the nationality of 
the child, quoted in the introduction, member states should apply the ius 
sanguinis principle in ART-cases where the child-parent family relationship 
is established or recognised by law. The crucial question is of course under 
which conditions the intended parents’ country must recognise such a family 
relationship if it has been legally established abroad.
David de Groot points out that states can only refuse recognition in case 
of overriding reasons of ordre public, and he criticises states’ overuse of the 
ordre public exemption for the denial of parentage. As he rightly argues, it 
cannot be in the best interest of the child to have no parents at all, instead of 
3 See more about quasi-loss of citizenship at http://www.ceps.eu/publications/
reflections-quasi-loss-nationality-comparative-international-and-european-
perspective
4 See more about quasi-loss etc. at http://www.ceps.eu/publications/
how-deal-quasi-loss-nationality-situations-learning-promising-practices
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caring parents without blood ties. David de Groot refers to the 2015 judg-
ment of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Paradiso and 
Campanelli v. Italy.5 Here, the Court ruled that the removal of a child born 
to a surrogate mother and his placement in care amounted to a violation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights article 8 on respect for private 
and family life.
In 2014, the ECtHR dealt with another case concerning the effects of 
non-recognition of a legal parent-child relationship between children con-
ceived through assisted reproduction, Mennesson v. France.6 A French mar-
ried couple had decided to undergo in vitro fertilisation using the gametes of 
the husband and an egg from a donor with the intention to enter into a ges-
tational surrogacy agreement with a Californian woman. The surrogacy 
mother gave birth to twins, and the Californian Supreme Court ruled that the 
French father was their genetic father and the French mother their legal 
mother. France, however, refused on grounds of ordre public to recognise 
the legal parent-child relationship that was lawfully established in California 
as a result of the surrogacy agreement.
The ECtHR ruled that the children’s right to respect for their private 
life – which implies that they must be able to establish the substance of their 
identity – was substantially affected by the non-recognition of the legal 
parent- child relationship between the children and the intended parents. 
Having regard to the consequence of the serious restriction on their identity 
and right to respect for their family life, the Court found that France had 
overstepped the permissible limits of its margin of appreciation by prevent-
ing both recognition and establishment under domestic law of the children’s 
relationship with their biological father. Considering the importance of hav-
ing regard to the child’s best interest, the Court concluded that the children’s 
right to respect for their private life had been infringed.
The Court also dealt with the children’s access to citizenship as an ele-
ment of their identity (see also Genovese v Malta).7 Although the children’s 
biological father was French, they faced a worrying uncertainty as to their 
possibilities to be recognised as French citizens. According to the Court, that 
uncertainty was liable to have negative repercussions on their definition of 
their personal identity.
5 Case of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, judgment of 27 January 2015.
6 Case of Mennesson v. France, judgment of 26 September 2014 (Final).
7 Case of Genovese v. Malta, judgment of 11 October 2011.
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In Mennesson, the ECtHR’s analysis took on the special dimension 
where one of the parents was the children’s biological parent; it is, however, 
in my opinion difficult to imagine that the Court should reach a different 
conclusion in a similar case where both gametes and egg were from a donor. 
Paradiso and Campanelli may underpin this position that also appears to be 
supported by the fact that the Court has explicitly recognised that respect for 
the child’s best interest must guide any decision in cases involving chil-
dren’s right to respect for their private life. In this context the Court has 
made it clear that respect for children’s private life implies that they must be 
able to establish the substance of their identity, including the legal parent- 
child relationship.
 Other ways to protect parent-child relationship
Costica Dumbrava argues that there are other and better ways to protect the 
parent-child relationship than through the same citizenship status, for 
instance by conferring full migration rights to children of citizens or estab-
lishing a universal status of legal childhood that protects children regardless 
of their or their parents’ status.
I find it hard to believe that any of these means can afford children a simi-
larly effective protection of their right to a family life with their parents in 
their country.
Children need their parents’ citizenship¸ as pointed out by Rainer 
Bauböck and many others, because citizenship is a part of a person’s iden-
tity. Where and to whom one is born are facts that feed into developing a 
sense of belonging. Moreover, the unity of the family in relation to citizen-
ship secures that children can stay with their parents in their country.
The course of events that followed the independence of women in citi-
zenship matters seems illustrative. In Denmark for instance, when married 
women gained independence in citizenship matters in 1950, it was a major 
concern that in mixed marriages, where the spouses had different citizen-
ship, the woman might lose her unconditional right to stay in her husband’s 
country. The legislator assumed that the aliens’ law would be administered 
in such a way that a wife would not be separated from her husband unless a 
pressing social need necessitated the separation.8 Things have, however, 
developed differently. Nowadays, foreigners married to Danish citizens are 
subject to the same requirements for family reunification as foreign couples. 
8 See the Danish citizenship report at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/han-
dle/1814/36504/EUDO_CIT_CR_2015_14_Denmark.pdf?sequence=1
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Thus, a foreign spouse may be expelled if for instance her Danish husband 
has received cash benefits within the last three years before a residence per-
mit could be granted; notably, this may apply regardless of whether the cou-
ple has a child with Danish citizenship.
 A need for international guidelines on legal recognition 
of parenthood
As already mentioned, there is no doubt that Costica Dumbrava has raised 
an important discussion about continuous application of ius sanguinis citi-
zenship. While there seems to be little support for abandoning the ius san-
guinis principle, there seems to be almost unanimous support for modifying 
and modernising it. As recommended by the Council of Europe, states 
should apply to children conceived through medically assisted reproductive 
techniques their provisions on ius sanguinis acquisition of citizenship.
The problem remains that states must establish or recognise the child- 
parent family relationship by law, and often, two states with different 
approaches are involved in the recognition procedure. Therefore, ordre pub-
lic considerations may arise as demonstrated in many of the concrete cases 
mentioned in this Citizenship Forum. In order to achieve consensus about 
the recognition of a parent-child family relationship in the best interest of 
the child, states should engage in international cooperation with a view to 
adopting common guidelines – as they have done in adoption matters.
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Distributing Some, but Not All, Rights of  
Citizenship According to Ius Sanguinis
Ana Tanasoca
In an article published in 1987 Joseph Carens famously remarked that ‘[c]
itizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal 
privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances. Like 
feudal birthright privileges, restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when 
one thinks about it closely’.1 Some 30 years after, he himself offers a justifi-
cation of birthright citizenship, a change of heart and mind that he partly 
explains by the following: ‘I thought that my open borders argument was 
getting at an important truth. At the same time, I recognised that it was not a 
practical proposal and that it did not provide much guidance for actual pol-
icy issues…’; ‘In thinking about what to do in a particular situation, we have 
to consider questions of priority and questions of political feasibility, among 
other factors. One cannot move always from principles to a plan of action’.2 
Yet succumbing too much to such feasibility constraints, to use a popular 
term in the field, is dangerous. Moral (political) theorising should not be too 
tightly hemmed in by empirical facts. Rather it should be the other way 
around, insofar as our moral and political theory aims to tell us what existing 
empirical facts we should strive to change or overcome.
That is why Costica Dumbrava’s critique of the ius sanguinis principle of 
citizenship ascription is, in a way, a much-needed intervention.3 While I 
overall agree with Dumbrava’s argument that ius sanguinis is unable to cope 
with the diversification of family structures and is not that morally appealing 
to begin with, I disagree with him on the details. I disagree especially with 
his background assumption that family ties (although not exclusively 
genetic, as it is presently the case) must play a salient role in the distribution 
of citizenship – although in the second part of this contribution I do offer a 
1 Carens, J. (1987), ‘Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders’, Review of 
Politics 49 (2): 251–73.
2 Carens, J. (2013), The Ethics of Immigration. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
x, 3.
3 I say ‘in a way’ because he also relies heavily on empirical facts when arguing 
against ius sanguinis.
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potential defence of his view against what is probably the strongest objec-
tion to his argument, which is that the abolishment of ius sanguinis would 
split families apart.
The main question is: Why should we insist on ius sanguinis except 
because it would ensure that nobody is stateless, that is, that everyone’s 
human right to citizenship is satisfied? And insofar as statelessness can be 
equally avoided via ius soli, why should blood ties create an entitlement to 
citizenship?
 The problem of making citizenship dependent on family ties
Dumbrava notices that ius sanguinis is unable to cope with the increased 
diversification of family structures made possible by the assisted reproduc-
tion technologies (ART). Yet there are solutions to that problem.
One would be, as Scott Titshaw notices, to reform family laws as to rec-
ognise diverse forms of parentage. Another one would be to replace ius san-
guinis with ius filiationis, as Rainer Bauböck proposes. If the purpose of 
upholding ius sanguinis citizenship is to recognise and protect the family, 
we should replace it with more reliable indicator(s) of parenthood in the 
case where parenthood is no longer uniquely a matter of biology. As Kerry 
Abrams argues, the recognition of parenthood now requires ‘going beyond 
the moment of birth’.
Notice, however, were multiple indicators of parenthood to be accepted, 
those individuals born via ART might be entitled to multiple citizenships. 
They might, for example, be entitled to the citizenship of the egg donor or 
the sperm donor or the surrogate mother, as well as to the citizenship of 
those who intend to raise the child. Such a situation may be deemed prob-
lematic in various respects: first because it would create great inequalities; 
second, because it would end up trivializing citizenship if all types of par-
enthood (e.g., the relationships the surrogate mother, the egg donor or the 
sperm donor, and the intended parents have with the child) were to be treated 
as equally morally relevant and therefore worthy of state recognition.
Dumbrava also bemoans ius sanguinis as failing to capture the political 
function of citizenship. If we grant citizenship to the children of citizens 
because we expect such children to develop the attitudes and skills required 
for political participation in their parents’ state, why not wait to confer citi-
zenship until these attitudes and skills are actually confirmed? And what if 
they never developed these skills and attitudes? Should people be deprived 
of their birthright citizenship altogether, or perhaps only of their political 
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rights? Besides, while we might have a clear idea of what skills (e.g., read-
ing and writing to enable voting) citizenship requires, what can we say of 
the attitudes citizens should display? Should apathetic voters be stripped of 
their political rights for failing to display the right attitude towards their 
right to vote? According to Dumbrava’s reasoning, perhaps they should.
But the main problem both with Dumbrava’s critique and the other con-
tributors’ accounts is that they conceive of citizenship as primarily reflecting 
a bond (genetic or affective or intentional) between two individuals – the 
parent and the child – and not as a bond between an individual and a state, 
or an individual and a political community. Such accounts overlook the 
political nature and function of citizenship and are also likely to leave us 
with a very limited, rigid, and exclusionary conception of the demos, one 
that is at the same time unjust and inefficient. As Rainer Bauböck put it else-
where, ‘[n]ormative principles for membership must instead lead to bound-
aries that avoid both under- und over- inclusiveness’,4 particularly in the 
context of increased global mobility.
In his contribution to this Forum, however, Bauböck argues that birth-
right citizenship creates a ‘quasi-natural equality of status’ among those 
entitled to it. He represents it as avoiding divisions, by making citizenship 
part of people’s unchosen and permanent personal features, namely, where 
and to whom one is born.5 Yet as such birthright creates exclusion and 
inequality between those entitled and those unentitled that can be hard to 
justify or overcome, as Lois Harder rightly notices. Why should the son of a 
citizen of state A be entitled to citizenship in that state, but not a regular 
immigrant residing for years in state A, paying taxes there and having virtu-
ally all of his interests deeply affected by the institutions of state A? While 
the first has unconditional and automatic access to citizenship – a right to 
citizenship in virtue of his blood ties to another citizen – the second has to 
apply for naturalisation, which is subject to the state’s discretionary powers. 
That is, his residence in that state, contributions to the community, or his 
interests being affected by that state’s institutions do not automatically 
ground any right to citizenship for him in the same way blood ties do for the 
citizens’ progeny.
4 Bauböck, R. (2015), ‘Morphing the demos into its right shape. Normative 
principles for enfranchising resident aliens and expatriate citizens’, 
Democratization 22 (5): 820–39.
5 This last bit is problematic in itself. Tying citizenship – that has an immense 
influence on individuals’ life opportunities and welfare – to underserved and 
permanent personal features like ancestry is after all morally problematic even 
if practically convenient for states.
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Why should the boundaries of the demos be defined by family ties, rather 
than by social or political kinship? By ascribing citizenship on the basis of 
blood ties we conceive of political communities as big extended families 
rather than communities gathered around common interests, values, and 
goals. Such a conception of the demos is disrespectful of individual consent 
(no one consents to being born, to having these parents rather than others, or 
to the colour of their passport). It attaches too much value to contingencies 
and too little value to individual choices. A political community based on 
ancestry is, after all, just an overinflated dynasty.
 Limiting the scope of ius sanguinis
While abolishing ius sanguinis might be a good idea, we could nonetheless 
be worried that the transition costs would outweigh potential benefits. After 
all, most families today are still founded on blood ties. Abolishing ius san-
guinis altogether could create situations where parents and children are not 
citizens of the same state. Such policy, it is argued by several contributors, 
would have the disruptive effect of potentially separating families, prevent-
ing parents from discharging their parental duties, and leaving children 
deprived of the care they are entitled to. (Of course, nothing prevents par-
ents from applying for a visa or for citizenship if they wish to reside or share 
a citizenship with their progeny; but let us assume that the parents do not 
have the means to do that, or that even doing that would not guarantee that 
they can be reunited with their child immediately as we would wish.) This 
is, I think, the strongest argument against Dumbrava’s proposal.
One solution would be, of course, to replace ius sanguinis with another 
principle for citizenship allocation, perhaps affected interests or perhaps ius 
domicilii. As children’s and parents’ interests are interdependent, the 
affected interests principle would ensure that children and parents are mem-
bers of the same state. So would ius domicilii, at least in cases where parents 
and children are currently domiciled in the same state (although it would 
provide no citizenship-based grounds for family reunion, in cases where 
they are not).
My proposal, however, takes a different tack. Notice that in a world with 
genuinely open borders we need not be worried that parents and children 
would be separated if they are citizens of different states. The solution I 
propose would therefore be to limit the scope of ius sanguinis – that is dis-
tribute some, but not all rights traditionally associated with citizenship, on 
the basis of ius sanguinis. This would be an appealing compromise, insofar 
as some of us may think citizenship should not be distributed on the basis of 
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blood ties, while nonetheless accepting that blood ties are one (albeit not the 
only) relevant ground for the distribution of some categories of rights.
As Bauböck notices in his contribution, immigrant minors who are EU 
citizens have a ‘right to stay’ that protects their primary caregivers from 
deportation. Yet, most likely, this policy is a recognition of an entitlement to 
care that the child has – not a recognition of a right the parents have to stay 
strictly in virtue of their blood ties to the child. Blood ties may simply serve 
as the operational indicator of the primary caregivers.
My preferred solution, however, would entitle a person to the limited 
enjoyment of some rights in a state, on the basis of having blood ties to 
someone who is already a citizen of that state. I primarily have in view, 
among that limited subset of rights, the right to enter and leave the state and 
the right of residence. By ‘limited’ I also mean that the enjoyment of these 
rights, purely on the basis of ius sanguinis, should be time-constrained. 6
Take the case of minors having a different citizenship from their parents. 
My proposal would be: either the parents should be granted extensive resi-
dence rights, until the minor reaches adulthood as in the case above; or else 
the minor should be granted these rights, provided the parents wish to remain 
in their country of citizenship. Consider the case of a couple, both citizens 
of state A, who move to state B and give birth there to a child, who becomes 
via ius soli citizen of B. Under my proposal, the parents would be automati-
cally entitled to residence in state B until the child is 18, provided the family 
decides to reside in state B; equally, the child would be automatically enti-
tled to reside in state A until 18 if the family decides to reside there.
Things would be different in the case of adults. Say my mother and I are 
citizens of different countries, she of state A and I of state B. Under my pro-
posal, I as an adult would not be entitled to all the current rights of citizen-
ship in state A on the basis of ius sanguinis. Still, I may nonetheless be 
automatically entitled on the same ground to a right to freely enter state A 
and reside there for a limited period of time (for example, 1 month). That 
would allow me to visit and spend time with my mother, preserving my 
 family ties intact and allowing me to discharge whatever ordinary duties I 
have towards family members. But what if my mother becomes frail or ill, 
6 In the same vein, Iseult Honohan proposes in her contribution to this debate 
that minors born in another states other than that of their parents should also be 
entitled to their parents’ citizenship but only until they reach adulthood; from 
then on, they can lose this citizenship if they do not continue residing in the 
country of parental citizenship. This would be another way of limiting ius 
sanguinis entitlements.
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and I become her main caregiver and thus need to spend more than one 
month in state A? If the circumstances require it, I should be able to petition 
for my right to remain to be extended, and that petition should be automati-
cally granted so long as authorities are satisfied that the requisite circum-
stances really do prevail. The period for which one can enjoy such rights, 
and the categories of rights one enjoys, might be extendable in this way. 
Alternatively, of course, I could bring my mother to reside with me in state 
B on a (elderly) dependent visa.
Under my proposal, there would thus be a limit to what one is entitled to 
under ius sanguinis alone. We should not think of the distribution of citizen-
ship rights as an all-or-nothing affair. Among the many component rights 
currently associated with citizenship, different rights can and should be dis-
tributed separately according to different criteria. By the same token, many 
different criteria can serve as a legitimate ground for the distribution of any 
one of those constituent rights.
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Learning from Naturalisation Debates:  
The Right to an Appropriate Citizenship  
at Birth
Katja Swider and Caia Vlieks
Citizenship has a political and a legal dimension. In his opening contribu-
tion, Costica Dumbrava only marginally addresses the legal dimension of 
citizenship, acknowledging its importance, but suggesting that it is replace-
able with alternative arrangements, such as a universal status for children. 
Maybe he is right in his priorities; maybe citizenship status should primarily 
be reserved for the purpose of fostering a political community. But in reality 
much legal baggage is attached to citizenship, and one cannot simply shake 
it off, even if this appears normatively attractive. In a way, the whole human 
rights movement can be seen as an effort to separate access to legal rights 
from possessing a status of political membership, and this attempt has not 
reached its goal (yet). As Jannis Panagiotidis points out, ‘most so-called 
human rights are in fact citizens’ rights’. Citizenship is still the ‘right to have 
rights’. Avoidance of statelessness is therefore not just a legal whim; it is a 
human rights failsafe mechanism.
In our contribution we start from the assumption that leaving anyone, 
including (and especially) children, without a citizenship for any significant 
period of time is not an option due to the essential legal rights that are attached 
to the status of national citizenship. The question therefore is not whether 
children should acquire a citizenship at birth, but which citizenship they 
should acquire at birth. Should it be the citizenship of their parents? And if not, 
what alternatives to birthright citizenship arrangements are adequate?
While we consider attribution of citizenship at birth to be necessary, we 
also maintain that it is inherently unfair, regardless of what mechanisms of 
attribution are relied upon. There is nothing fair about attaching the fate of a 
child to one state, when states differ so tremendously in their ability (and 
willingness) to provide access to basic rights, such as education, healthcare, 
physical safety and pursuit of happiness for their minor citizens. Rainer 
Bauböck shifts attention from this unfairness by suggesting that ‘we have to 
address the causes of global inequality directly’ instead of criticising the 
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contingencies of birthright citizenship. However, we should not forget that 
this discussion takes place largely among the privileged ‘winners’ of the 
‘birthright lottery’.1 There is no doubt that global inequalities need to be 
addressed, but is it morally justifiable to suggest to the ‘losers’ of the birth-
right lottery to wait for global equality?
If fairness in birthright citizenship cannot be achieved and leaving chil-
dren without any citizenship is unacceptable, what is the normative ideal 
that we could strive towards in attributing citizenship at birth? As Lois 
Harder correctly argues here, rules about birthright attribution of citizenship 
are as politically charged as rules about acquiring and losing a nationality 
during adulthood, even though the former are not as much part of the public 
debate. According to Harder, ‘[t]he magical power of birthright citizenship 
is that it makes it possible for us to know and rehearse [politically charged] 
rules while simultaneously making birthright seem straightforward, static 
and apolitical’. Can we reverse this logic, and perhaps also learn from the 
extensively politicised discourse on migrants’ rights to naturalisation in 
order to improve birthright citizenship rules?
In particular, we suggest applying the concept of appropriate citizenship 
to strengthen the normative foundation of birthright citizenship attribution. 
This notion is based on the ideas of Ernst Hirsch Ballin, who advocates ‘a 
citizenship that is appropriate to everyone’s life situation, where he or she is 
at home – which can change during the course of a person’s life: a natural 
right to be recognized as a citizen, born free’.2 He believes that this type of 
citizenship and citizens’ rights can overcome the existing gap between ‘the 
universality of human rights’ and ‘the changing political and social settings 
of people’s lives’.3 Drawing on that, we feel that appropriate citizenship, even 
when acquired at birth, could do the same. Appropriate citizenship is of 
course a highly subjective concept, the interpretation of which would be 
dependent on numerous cultural and specific national legal factors. Ensuring 
that birthright citizenship is appropriate would imply a case-by-case evalua-
tion of the individual situation of each new-born, a process which in most 
cases would be as simple as the registration of birth, but in some cases would 
require a complex investigation to be conducted in a very brief period of time.
1 Shachar, A. (2009), The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
2 Hirsch Ballin, E. (2014), Citizens’ Rights and the Right to Be a Citizen. 
Nijhoff: Brill, 145.
3 Ibid. 144.
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While perhaps logistically counter-intuitive, introducing the normative 
standard of appropriateness into the attribution of citizenship at birth is not 
more complex than trying to solve ad hoc ‘hard cases’ of citizenship within 
the traditional logic of ius sanguinis versus ius soli. This complexity of some 
birthright citizenship cases has been extensively discussed in the contribu-
tions by Dumbrava and Scott Titshaw. Requiring that birthright citizenship 
is appropriate emphasises the importance of (meaningful) ties4 of a person 
(including a child) to a country, and thus incorporates the idea of ius nexi 
discussed by David Owen. With the criterion of appropriateness we accept 
that birthright citizenship is a political issue, not a contingent biological fact 
of life, and therefore should be based in a reasoned decision-making process 
and subjected to normative criticism.
The requirement that citizenship acquired at birth needs to be appropriate is 
far from being precise. However, we believe that a certain amount of flexibility 
is necessary in order to ensure that attribution of citizenship at birth has a nor-
mative foundation in each individual case. The exact modes of implementation 
of the criterion of appropriateness would need to be developed within the indi-
vidual legal systems, but important factors to be considered include the ones 
that have been discussed elaborately in this Forum discussion:
• the nationalities of the persons that are expected to care for the child (bio-
logical, social or functional parents or otherwise, thus including and rein-
forcing the ius filiationis proposal put forward by Bauböck);
• the country where the child is born;
• the country where the child is expected to build his or her future, receive 
education and effectuate his or her rights as a citizen;
• the necessity of ensuring that at least one nationality is acquired and that 
the best interests of the child are safeguarded (in line with the almost 
universally ratified Convention on the Rights of the Child).5
It is not always easy to determine all the relevant criteria for establishing 
appropriateness of citizenship with a high degree of certainty. Kerry Abrams, 
for example, identifies some possible obstacles when discussing Bauböck’s 
ius filiationis proposal, namely that courts sometimes cannot determine who 
will ultimately be the parent that is truly (legally) responsible for the child. 
However, since the proposal of appropriate nationality is based on multiple 
relevant factors rather than a single one, the risks associated with the inability 
4 Or ‘genuine connection(s)’, see also Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) 
ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4; General List, No 18.
5 See Articles 3(1) and 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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to assess some of the factors are ameliorated by the availability of other fac-
tors that can compensate for uncertainties.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that Hirsch Ballin’s ideas and the 
concept of appropriate nationality that we have introduced are compatible 
with having multiple nationalities, as well as changing one’s nationality 
over the course of one’s life. It is appropriate to enable children, as well as 
adults, to acquire a new nationality to reflect the changes in their personal 
circumstances. When attributing an appropriate nationality at birth to a 
child, states therefore do not need to embark on the impossible task of pre-
dicting the future.
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Don’t Put the Baby in the Dirty Bathwater! 
A Rejoinder
Costica Dumbrava
This has been a fascinating debate that succeeded in unravelling some of the 
major issues about the past, present and future of ius sanguinis citizenship. I 
was delighted to see that many of the contributors shared my concerns about 
the failings of the current system of transmission of citizenship from parent 
to child. I learned a great deal from reading the various reactions to my 
deliberately provocative propositions. With these concluding remarks, I use 
the privilege of the last word to engage with several key points emerging 
from the debate and to clarify and, as much as possible, elaborate my posi-
tion. However, I am hopeful that this debate does not finish here and I look 
forward to continuing through other ventures.
 How ethnic is ius sanguinis and why does it matter?
I think we are in agreement that ius sanguinis is not inherently ethnic and 
that it can take on ethnic connotations depending on particular historical and 
policy contexts. The apple of discord is whether the gravity of such occur-
rences recommends the abolishment of ius sanguinis. I concede that empiri-
cal evidence is not conclusive for dismissing the principle of ius sanguinis. 
However, I caution that we should not underestimate the dangers of ethnon-
ationalist instrumental uses of ius sanguinis.
Panagiotidis explains clearly the difference between legal descent 
(descent from a citizen) and ethnic descent (descent from a non-citizen of a 
particular ethnicity) and shows that the objection about the ethnic character 
of ius sanguinis is founded on a big conceptual confusion. While I agree that 
ius sanguinis is conceptually distinct from ethnic or racial descent, I would 
hesitate to say that the two have ‘nothing to do’ with one another. 
Unfortunately, it is not only distracted scholars that make this confusion. 
The ambiguity between legal and ethnic descent is often present in legal 
practices and political discourses about birthright citizenship. In my initial 
contribution I mentioned co-ethnic citizenship because these policies fre-
quently rely on the ambivalence between legal and ethnic descent. For 
example, legal criteria of descent from citizens (or from former citizens or 
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from former citizens of a former part of a country, etc.) are often used as a 
smoke screen for selecting future citizens according to (perceived) ethnic 
descent. It matters less that these policies rarely achieve the goal of ethnic 
selectivity as long as the very statement of the commitment to include co- 
ethnics is likely to bring significant political and ideological gains. As 
Decimo and Harder argue, despite being a technical and legalistic principle, 
ius sanguinis carries significant ideological connotations, among which the 
myth of commonality of blood or ethnic descent is often prevalent.
I also doubt that the ethnonationalist uses of ius sanguinis are only a mat-
ter of the past and I am not convinced that they are unlikely to be ‘used like 
that in the future’ (Panagiotidis). What else if not the fear of ethno-national 
extinction drove Latvia and Estonia in 1990 to reinstate their pre-war citi-
zenship laws and to apply ius sanguinis retrospectively back to pre-1940 
citizens? It is besides the point that not all newly recognised citizens were 
ethnic Latvians or Estonians (as not all of the pre-war citizens were). The 
political-nationalist gains obtained from the perception that the overwhelm-
ing majority of them were co-ethnics and from the symbolic reinstatement 
of the original national citizenry were significant. The same can be said 
about the Romanian policy to restore citizenship to all those who lost 
Romanian citizenship independently of their will. In this case, ius sanguinis 
has been used to trace descendants of citizens several generations back in 
view of recovering the ‘national stock’ lost with the territorial changes dur-
ing WWII.
It is true, as Bauböck and Collins rightly point out, that both ius sangui-
nis and ius soli (and combinations thereof) can have either emancipatory or 
exclusionary implications, depending on the context. Since empirical facts 
do not translate well into normative arguments (Tanasoca), I think that wres-
tling over empirical evidence about the positive or negative effects of ius 
sanguinis is not going to help us settle the normative questions about the 
justification of the principle of ius sanguinis. If we have strong moral rea-
sons for maintaining ius sanguinis, we should endorse it regardless of how 
wrong it is applied in practice and how often this happens. Of course, we 
should adjust the ways in which to implement a morally justified principle 
to match changing empirical circumstances. Yet, the prior question is 





Many contributors to this debate grant that ius sanguinis is a morally justi-
fied principle and propose ways to reform the ways in which we implement 
it. Bauböck, Ersbøll and Abrams argue that the ethno-nationalist disposition 
of ius sanguinis can be counterbalanced through adopting supplementary ius 
soli and residence-based naturalisation. Bauböck, Titshaw, Abrams and De 
Groot discuss possibilities of rethinking legal parentage in order to accom-
modate complex cases of citizenship determination in the context of ART 
birth.
There is a broad consensus that ius sanguinis should be reformed, albeit 
disagreements prevail as to how and by whom. Bauböck’s proposals of ius 
filiationis, which reinterprets legal parenthood as a combination of genetic 
and social parenthood, is cheered by some but welcomed with scepticism by 
others. Titshaw and Collins, for example, worry that ius filiationis will not 
eliminate the uncertainty related to the determination of legal parentage and 
that it may also encourage abuse. Another contention is about the adminis-
trative level at which decisions about ius sanguinis should be taken. Writing 
in the context of the US federal system, Titshaw argues that fixing the family 
law will solve many problems related to legal parentage and therefore to ius 
sanguinis citizenship. Yet, Collins fears that leaving citizenship determina-
tion to those applying the family law will unwarrantedly expose citizenship 
to parochial concerns (e.g. immigration control). I think this is an important 
point, which we should consider beyond the level of administrative decision- 
making. I argue that the recognition of legal parentage and the determination 
of citizenship should not only be implemented through two separate proce-
dures, but also regarded as two normative processes driven by distinct prin-
ciples. While I appreciate the practical importance of the proposals for 
reforming ius sanguinis, I am not convinced that the strategy of fixing legal 
parentage addresses the prior and more fundamental question about the 
moral justification of ius sanguinis as a principle of admission to 
citizenship.
It is surprising to me that in a debate about ius sanguinis citizenship so 
little is being said about citizenship. Most contributors seem to take for 
granted the normative link between parentage and citizenship and to give 
priority to instrumental arguments over normative ones. Let me explain this 
point by discussing three key arguments in support of ius sanguinis: (1) ius 
sanguinis protects children against statelessness; (2) ius sanguinis enables 
and protects family life; and (3) ius sanguinis expresses the social identity of 
the child.
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 Preventing statelessness
There is a wide consensus in the debate that children need (at least one) citi-
zenship from birth and that ius sanguinis provides the ‘most simple and 
secure’ means (Ersbøll) to prevent statelessness. This view is accepted even 
by those who argue that birthright citizenship is ultimately an unfair arrange-
ment (Swider and Vlieks). It is true that in today’ world the possession of the 
legal status of citizenship (aka nationality) predetermines access to a set of 
important rights and privileges, in the absence of which a person’s life is 
significantly constrained. It is also true that, despite a number of complica-
tions caused by changing family patterns and the spread of assisted repro-
ductive technologies, ius sanguinis still provides a relatively simple solution 
to tackle statelessness at birth. However, one can think of other ways to 
prevent statelessness that are equally convenient, as well as better justified 
normatively.
The problem of statelessness could be arguably solved by a system of 
generalised unconditional ius soli or by a citizenship lottery in which new- 
borns are assigned randomly the citizenship of a state. These alternatives 
remove the uncertainties associated with the determination of legal parent-
hood for the purpose of ius sanguinis. However, convenience alone does not 
count for normative justification. Against the citizenship lottery suggestion, 
defenders of ius sanguinis would probably insist that new-borns should 
receive the citizenship of ‘their’ parents. Notice that this is not an argument 
about convenience anymore but one about the importance of a shared citi-
zenship between parents and children. But nothing in the argument about 
avoiding statelessness requires shared citizenship between parents and their 
children. To avoid statelessness at birth (in the absence of ius soli), it is suf-
ficient that a child receives one citizenship from either of the parents. This 
means that in international families only one parent needs to transmit citi-
zenship to the child and, if a parent has multiple citizenships, he or she needs 
to transfer only one these citizenships to the child. The argument about 
avoiding statelessness does not offer any guidance as to which citizenship 
should be shared between parents and children and why.
Alternative solutions based on ius soli elements may offer better norma-
tive justifications. I argued elsewhere that states have a collective duty to 
grant access to a fundamental status of legal protection (nationality) to those 
born and living in their jurisdiction due to states’ joint participation in an 
international system that leaves individuals no real possibility of opting out, 
i.e. to establish a new citizenship or to remain stateless. My point here is not 
that the parent-child relationship has no normative implications for 
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 citizenship; it is merely that the argument about avoiding statelessness is 
unable to bring such normative concerns to the surface.
 Protecting family life
The second major argument in defence of ius sanguinis is that the (automatic 
and immediate) transmission of citizenship from parent to child enables and 
protects family life. In the absence of a shared citizenship between parents 
and children, it is feared, family life would be severely disrupted as family 
members risk being separated from one another by borders and immigration 
restrictions. I do not contest that family life deserves special protection and 
that the legal recognition of parent-child relationship provides ‘critical pro-
tection for their [children’s] wellbeing’ (Abrams). However, I am not con-
vinced that the automatic and immediate transfer of citizenship from parent 
to child is a major normative prerequisite of family life.
It appears to me that the overwhelming majority of contributors sub-
scribe to an indirect and instrumental defence of ius sanguinis. The biggest 
concern is about securing joint migration rights for family members, which 
are instrumental for family life. De Groot mentions two other important citi-
zenship privileges, i.e. diplomatic and consular protection and political par-
ticipation, but surrenders quickly to the concern about migration rights. The 
prevailing argument in these interventions is not so much a defence of ius 
sanguinis citizenship but a defence of ius migrationis sanguine – the right to 
migrate in virtue of a blood relationship. The downside of linking too tightly 
ius sanguinis to family migration rights is that the argument only holds as 
long as migration rights are strictly determined by citizenship status and as 
long as there are no other ways to secure migration rights for family mem-
bers apart from ius sanguinis. Hence in a world of (more) open borders, 
where children would not be separated from their parents or siblings by 
migration restrictions, ius sanguinis citizenship loses its importance. 
However, a system of generalised family migration policies, such as the one 
suggested by Tanasoca, could provide the ‘permanence and stability’ 
(Titshaw) required for achieving meaningful family life in the absence of ius 
sanguinis citizenship.
Expressingsocialidentity
Another intriguing argument in defence of ius sanguinis rests on the idea 
that (birthright) citizenship is an important part of a child’s social identity. 
According to the judgement of the European Court of Human Right in the 
case Genovese v Malta, the failure to acquire a particular citizenship at birth 
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is likely to affect negatively the identity of the child. I distinguish two ver-
sions of this argument: a softer/instrumental version, according to which the 
ius sanguinis principle ‘makes citizenship a part of citizens’ personal identi-
ties that they are like to accept’ (Bauböck); and a harder/essentialist version, 
for which the ius sanguinis principle recognises and confirms the (inherited) 
identity of the child.
The essentialist version of the argument about a child’s social identity 
can be easily dismissed by pointing at the fact that citizenship is a contingent 
social and legal convention rather than a mechanism that confirms prior 
genetic, ethnic or cultural identities. Recall that in the Genovese case the 
Court used this argument in connection with the principle of non- 
discrimination. The failure to acquire citizenship via ius sanguinis by a child 
born out of wedlock will affect negatively his or her social identity because 
children born in wedlock do not face similar restrictions of ius sanguinis as 
children born out of wedlock. The situation can be remedied not only by 
removing the discriminatory treatment in the application of ius sanguinis 
but also by abolishing ius sanguinis altogether. The instrumental version of 
the identity argument is more interesting, not least because it supports our 
intuition that (birthright) citizens are likely to feel attached to their country 
of birth. However, this is valid for both ius sanguinis and ius soli, so the 
instrumental argument cannot show why we should preserve ius sanguinis 
or why we should chose one form of birthright citizenship over another.
Long-lasting institutions usually shape people’s attitudes and generate 
attachments and identities. They acquire the kind of ‘quasi-naturalness’ that 
Bauböck ascribes to birthright citizenship. However, the test of time and 
familiarity is not a valid moral test because bad institutions can also acquire 
that kind of ‘magical power’ (Harder). We ought to question the moral foun-
dations of deeply rooted institutions such as birthright citizenship especially 
because they are so popular and because they shape our identity.
Opportunitiesforintergenerationalmembership
There are several arguments in the debate that deal more seriously with nor-
mative aspects of ius sanguinis citizenship. I agree with Owen that the prin-
ciple of ius nexi or genuine connection is the best we have for determining 
access to citizenship and that this general principle can be served by differ-
ent policy arrangements, including some form of qualified ius sanguinis. I 
assume that the principle of ‘appropriate citizenship’ defended by Swider 
and Vlieks goes along the same path. My concern with their proposal is that 
allowing for ‘a case-by-case evaluation of the individual situation of each 
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newborn’ (Swider and Vlieks) might not serve well the commitment to avoid 
statelessness, which seems essential to the principle of appropriate 
citizenship.
Honohan endorses the principle of genuine connection and defends a 
limited version of ius sanguinis by arguing for imposing restrictions to the 
intergenerational transmission of citizenship. She endorses ius sanguinis but 
proposes that citizenship be withdrawn from (adult) citizens who fail to 
develop a genuine link with the country. I am sympathetic to this proposal 
but I am not fully convinced about its underpinning justification. Honohan’s 
main objection to ius sanguinis, which is shared by Decimo and Harder, is 
that the unconditional acquisition of citizenship by children from their par-
ents can amount to an unfair privilege. Although I acknowledge the implica-
tions of citizenship policies in today’s world characterised by sharp economic 
inequalities, I think that the concern with economic privilege should be dis-
connected from the concern about admission to citizenship. I agree with 
Bauböck that there are more appropriate means to fight global inequality 
and injustice than redistributing citizenship (e.g. economic redistribution, 
fairer migration policies).
Honohan rightly argues that citizenship ‘provides membership of a polit-
ical community’ but she does not explain why children should be admitted 
in the political community of their parents rather than in another (e.g. the 
best political community). My answer is that both parents and children have 
an interest in the continued participation to a particular intergenerational 
political project. This interest can be served through providing opportunities 
for intergenerational membership in the form of provisional ius sanguinis. 
The citizenship acquired provisionally at birth should be withdrawn upon 
majority from those (provisional) citizens who do not have a genuine link 
with the country. However, if a person fails to prove a genuine link with at 
least one country, his or her provisional citizenship should still be extended 
but only in the form of formal legal membership, i.e. without political rights.
Notice that the argument for intergenerational provisional citizenship 
stands even after we solve the problems related to the recognition of parent-
hood and to migration restriction for family members. Bauböck points at 
this when talking about the ‘signalling effects of birthright citizenship’ but 
his argument slides into an instrumental and collectivist defence of birth-
right citizenship. My argument for intergenerational citizenship puts empha-
sis on the individual interests in continued political membership. Incidentally, 
this solution is also likely to have positive implications for the political com-
munity as a whole, e.g. by fostering ‘a sense of responsibility towards the 
common good and future generations’ (Bauböck). I am sympathetic to 
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Harder’s idea of political membership as a ‘lively on-going process of nego-
tiation in which everyone has a stake’. However, I disagree that admission 
to political membership should be entirely up to negotiation, as I maintain 
that there are certain concerns that demand inclusion regardless of people’s 
preferences and abilities. I also no not think that political membership should 
be ‘limited by our mortality’ (Harder). While I reject continuation based on 
genetic, ethnic and racial traits or simply convenience, I argue that there 
should be opportunities for intergenerational political continuity, which can 
be provided through provisional ius sanguinis.
It is beyond dispute that any attempt to dislodge a deeply rooted and 
widespread institution such as ius sanguinis is bound to pose serious practi-
cal challenges. However, if one has compelling moral reasons for disman-
tling such an institution, one ought to work towards this end. Babies are born 
into a physical world and from actual bodies but they are not naturally born 
into families and citizenship. The latter are social conventions that demand 
our acceptance when they are justified and our courage to change and replace 
them when they are not. To my critics who worried that abolishing ius san-
guinis amounts to throwing out the baby with the dirty bathwater I reply that 
we should not put the baby in the dirty bathwater in the first place.
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Part III: The Return of Banishment
Abstract
There is a growing trend in Europe and North America of using denationali-
sation of citizens as a counter-terrorism strategy. The deprivation of citizen-
ship status, alongside passport revocation, and denial of re-admission to 
citizens returning from abroad, manifest the securitisation of citizenship. 
Britain leads in citizenship deprivation, but in 2014 Canada passed new 
citizenship-stripping legislation and France’s Conseil Constitutionnel 
recently upheld denaturalisation of dual citizens convicted of terrorism-
related offences. In the wake of the on-going crisis in Iraq and Syria, assorted 
legislators in Austria, Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States have 
expressed interest in enacting (or reviving) similar legislation. The contribu-
tors to the Forum Debate consider the normative justification for citizenship 
deprivation from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. There is relatively 
little disagreement among commentators about the limited instrumental 
value of citizenship revocation in enhancing national security, and more 
diversity in viewpoint about its significance for citizenship itself. The con-
tributors discuss the characterisation of citizenship as right versus privilege, 
the relevance of statelessness and dual nationality, the relative merits of citi-
zenship versus human rights as normative framework, and the expansive-
ness of banishment itself as a concept.
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The Return of Banishment: Do the New 
Denationalisation Policies Weaken  
Citizenship?
Audrey Macklin
After decades in exile, banishment is back. Britain resuscitated the practice 
as part of its counter-terrorism strategy in the wake of the 9/11 and 7/11 ter-
rorist attacks in New York, Washington and London. Canada followed suit 
with the 2014 Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act.1 As we enter the 
third decade of the 21st century, assorted legislators in Austria, Australia, 
Netherlands, and the United States expressed interest in enacting, reviving, 
or extending citizenship stripping laws.2
From antiquity to the late 20th century, denationalisation was a tool used 
by states to rid themselves of political dissidents, convicted criminals and 
ethnic, religious or racial minorities. The latest target of denationalisation is 
the convicted terrorist, or the suspected terrorist, or the potential terrorist, or 
maybe the associate of a terrorist. He is virtually always Muslim and male.
Citizenship-stripping is sometimes defended in the name of strength-
ening citizenship, but it does precisely the opposite. The defining feature 
of contemporary legal citizenship is that it is secure. Making legal citi-
zenship contingent on performance demotes citizenship to another cate-
gory of permanent residence. Citizenship revocation thus weakens 
citizenship itself. It is an illegitimate form of punishment and it serves no 
practical purpose.
1 The Canadian legislation was subject to constitutional challenge following 
completion of this article. It was repealed by a new government in 2017 before 
the legality of hte legislation was determined and beforeany revocations went 
into effect.
2 For a more elaborate comparative analysis of recent legislative developments 
in the United Kingdom, Canada and the US, see Macklin, A. (2014), 
‘Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of 
the Alien’, Queens Law Journal 40 (1): 1–54.
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Denationalisation refers to involuntary loss of citizenship.3 
Denaturalisation is a subset of denationalisation, and applies selectively to 
those not born into citizenship via ius soli or ius sanguinis. The most com-
mon basis for denaturalisation is fraud or misrepresentation in the acquisi-
tion of citizenship. The operative premise is that had the material facts been 
known at the relevant time, the state would not have conferred citizenship in 
the first place. Denaturalisation for fraud simply annuls the erroneously con-
ferred citizenship and restores the status quo ante.4
My remarks focus exclusively on denationalisation for allegedly disloyal 
conduct by a citizen, while a citizen. In its present incarnation, citizenship 
revocation is best understood as a technique for extending the functionality 
of immigration law in counter-terrorism. Since 2001, states have turned to 
deportation to resolve threats to national security by displacing the embod-
ied threat to the country of nationality. But deporting one’s own citizens is 
exile, and exile extinguishes a singular right of citizenship, namely the right 
to enter and to remain. Citizenship revocation circumvents that problem by 
introducing the two-step exile: first, strip citizenship; second, deport the 
newly minted alien.
The British Nationality Act authorises the Secretary of State for Home 
Affairs (Home Secretary) to deprive a person of British citizenship where 
she ‘is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.’ That hap-
pens to be the same low and vague standard for depriving a person of per-
manent resident status (indefinite leave to remain), which provides one 
illustration of the downgrading of citizenship. In Canada, the executive 
power to revoke citizenship depends on a criminal conviction for a listed 
3 Before the widespread acceptance of dual citizenship, acquisition of a second 
citizenship or marriage to a foreign man commonly triggered denaturalisation. 
In a world where states tolerated only one legal bond between individual and 
state at a time, acquisition of a second nationality denoted a transfer of 
membership from one state to another.
4 The United States law combines renunciation of citizenship and denationalisa-
tion for birthright citizens into a category labelled expatriation. The US 
Constitution guarantees the citizenship of ius soli citizens as a constitutional 
right. The doctrine of expatriation operated on the legal fiction that certain acts 
by a citizen denoted an intention to renounce citizenship. In a series of 
judgments culminating in 1967 in Afroyim v. Rusk, the US Supreme Court 
progressively restricted the government’s ability to deem conduct short of 
explicit renunciation as conclusive proof of an intention to expatriate, and the 




offence and a minimum sentence of either five years or life imprisonment. 
The offences include treason, spying, any terrorism offence defined under 
the Criminal Code and a variety of offences applicable to members of the 
military. In the case of terrorism offences, the conviction may be by a for-
eign court for an offence committed outside Canada, if it would also con-
stitute a terrorism offence under Canadian law.5 The UK law authorises 
citizenship stripping of naturalised citizens (but not birthright citizens) 
even if it renders them stateless. The Canadian law prohibits the creation of 
statelessness but puts the onus on the individual to satisfy the Minister that 
statelessness would ensue from revocation. The UK declines to publicly 
disclose the exact number, identities or circumstances of those deprived of 
UK citizenship, but investigative journalists estimate that at least 53 Britons 
have lost citizenship since 2002, over half on national security grounds. In 
2013, the Home Secretary deprived 20 UK nationals of citizenship, more 
than all other years since 2002 combined.6
Citizenship revocation raises an array of practical, legal and normative 
questions: Does it advance a valid objective? Does it comply with domestic, 
constitutional and/or transnational law? Is it normatively defensible? The 
answers turn, in part, on one’s underlying conception of citizenship as legal 
status. Defenders of citizenship revocation liturgically intone that ‘citizen-
ship is a privilege, not a right’. The rhetoric of citizenship-as-privilege trades 
on a popular and laudable sentiment that is sometimes expressed as follows: 
‘I feel privileged to be a citizen of Canada, or the UK, or Italy, etc., and I 
consider it my duty to demonstrate my commitment through actively par-
ticipating in civic life, or joining the armed forces, and standing up for my 
country as a good and loyal citizen should do.’ But a privilege in law is 
something different: A privilege emanates from the patron (here a govern-
ment minister) and can be rescinded from an undeserving beneficiary (here 
the citizen) at the former’s discretion.
In two US Supreme Court cases in the 1950s, Chief Justice Warren rejected 
the classification of citizenship as privilege, proclaiming that ‘citizenship is not 
a licence that expires on misbehaviour’. Instead, he invoked Hannah Arendt’s 
5 The law also permits revocation of a citizen who ‘served as a member of an 
armed force of a country or as a member of an organised armed group and that 
country or group was engaged in an armed conflict with Canada.’ This is not a 
criminal offence, though it is almost identical to the existing offence of 
treason, except that it includes non-state armed groups, whereas the offence of 
treason only includes armed forces of a state.
6 Ibid.
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famous depiction of citizenship as ‘no less than the right to have rights.’7 
Framing citizenship as a right vests citizenship in the  rights- bearer. Depicting 
it as a meta-right dramatically increases the justificatory burden for any cur-
tailment, because it places all rights in the balance.
Yet the force of Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’ aphorism may seem atten-
uated, at least with respect to liberal democratic states of the twenty first 
century. After all, permanent residents enjoy almost all the same rights as 
citizens, and even foreigners without status can, in principle, claim a long 
menu of basic human rights under international law and many domestic 
legal orders. But this rejoinder overlooks one crucial fact. The exercise of 
virtually all rights depends on territorial presence within the state,8 and only 
citizens have an unqualified right to enter and remain on state territory. So 
once stripped of the right to enter and remain in the state, enforcement means 
that one is effectively deprived of all the other rights that depend (de jure or 
de facto) on territorial presence. This fact has not been lost on the present 
UK government: With two exceptions, all her targets were abroad when the 
Home Secretary chose to exercise her discretion to strip them of citizenship. 
This meant they were absent and unable to respond when the notice of inten-
tion to deprive was delivered, and therefore barred from entry qua alien in 
order to appeal the decision.
Another strand of citizenship discourse describes citizenship as a contract 
in which the citizen pledges allegiance to the sovereign in exchange for the 
sovereign’s protection. Acts of disloyalty amount to fundamental breach of 
contract, and so citizenship revocation simply actualises in law the citizen’s 
voluntary severance of the relationship. This was, more or less, the logic of 
constructive expatriation under US law9. But neither the rhetoric of contract 
nor privilege can mask the flagrantly punitive rationale for the citizenship 
7 The unattributed quote comes from Arendt, H. (1951), The Origins of 
Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt & Brace, at 294. It was picked up by US 
Supreme Court Justice Warren in Perez v. Brownell, 356 US 54 (1958) at 64 
and again in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) at 102. See discussion in Weil, 
P. (2013), The Sovereign Citizen. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press.
8 Expatriate voting is one exception. Many people suppose that diplomatic or 
consular assistance is also a right available outside the territory of the state, 
except that states tend to deny that they owe a legal duty to extend assistance 
to their citizens abroad. See, e.g. R (Abbasi) v Foreign Secretary [2002] 
EWCA Civ 1598.
9 The US model of expatriation implicitly relied on this metaphor to characterise 
a series of acts, from desertion, to voting in a foreign election, as acts signify-
ing an intention to renounce citizenship.
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revocation regimes currently in play in the UK and Canada: baldly stated, 
some citizens are very bad citizens, and therefore do not deserve to be citizens. 
The move from ‘bad citizen’ to ‘not citizen’ is explicit in the Canadian law, 
where conviction for a criminal offence is a condition precedent to revocation 
and eventual deportation. Citizenship revocation in the UK arguably turns on 
prevention of future risk rather than punishment for past wrong, but state-
ments by UK politicians like ‘We think that deprivation is a way of expressing 
extreme displeasure at the way in which someone has behaved’, reveal that 
the difference is more apparent than real.10
Banishment as criminal penalty has a long pedigree, and dates to a time 
before the rise of penal systems that enabled states to segregate, punish, 
rehabilitate and reintegrate wrongdoers within the state. In other words, 
modern states have criminal justice systems and an infrastructure that obvi-
ates the utility of banishment. These systems can, and are, deployed in 
response to the range of conduct encompassed under the rubric of terrorism. 
Banishment is both superfluous and anachronistic.
One might counter that offences threatening national security are quali-
tatively distinct from other offences. For these putative ‘crimes against citi-
zenship’, incarceration is insufficient and withdrawal of citizenship is 
uniquely appropriate as supplement or substitute. It bears noting, however, 
that none of the Canadian offences precipitating loss of citizenship on 
grounds of national security – including treason – apply exclusively to citi-
zens. Moreover, the idea that ‘national security’ misconduct is an affront to 
the state and so warrants a distinctive punishment fails to take proper account 
of the fact that all crime is regarded as an affront to the state’s maintenance 
of public order (the ‘King’s Peace’ in common law systems) and its monop-
oly on the legitimate use of violence. It is this public dimension of criminal 
law that differentiates it from private law, and confers on the state the author-
ity to investigate, prosecute and punish wrongdoers, in addition to and apart 
from any private remedy that an individual victim might seek in tort, con-
tract or property.
10 See See United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, HC Standing Committee E, 
30 April 2002, col 54 (Angela Eagle), quoted in Thwaites, R. (2014), ‘The 
Security of Citizenship?: Finnis in the Context of the United Kingdom’s 
Citizenship Stripping Provisions’, in F. Jenkins, M. Nolan & K. Rubenstein 
(eds.), Allegiance and Identity in a Globalised World, 243–266. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, at note 94.
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The purported symmetry between ‘crimes against citizenship’ and dena-
tionalisation echoes the defence of the sovereign’s other technique for perma-
nent elimination of wrongdoers, namely the death penalty. Banishment fits 
the crime of disloyalty the way capital punishment fits the crime of murder. 
When tethered to expulsion, citizenship revocation effects a kind of ‘political 
death’. A citizen stripped of nationality and banished from the territory is, for 
all intents and purposes, dead to the state. Once outside the territory, the state 
has neither legal claim nor legal duty in respect of the former citizen, and is 
relieved of any obligation to object if another state tortures, renders or kills 
one of its nationals.11 Indeed, denationalisation is not only a political ana-
logue to death, it may also be a prelude to it.12 At least two former UK citizens 
were executed by US drone strikes after the Home Secretary deprived them 
of citizenship, and another was rendered to the United States for trial on ter-
rorism charges.
As with the death penalty, denationalisation extinguishes the prospect of 
rehabilitation or reintegration. The paradigmatic subject of citizenship revo-
cation – the terrorist – is excluded from the ambit of human dignity that 
underwrites contemporary penal philosophy and affirms capacity for auton-
omy, rational self-reflection and reform. He is, in that sense, not fully human 
and thus incapable of rehabilitation. Banishment operates as pure and per-
manent retribution. There is no re-entry into the political community, no life 
after political death. Even creative and sophisticated attempts to classify and 
isolate those crimes that merit denationalisation from those that do not still 
founder on the instability of the distinction and the legitimacy of pure 
retribution.13
11 Since the United States’ lethal drone strike on US citizen Anwar al Awlaki (and 
his son), the United States’ position is that it may lawfully execute its own 
citizens without trial when they are abroad. This, of course, obviates the 
necessity to strip citizenship prior to execution. See ‘US cited controversial 
law in decision to kill American citizen by drone’, The Guardian, 23 June 
2014, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/us-justifi-
cation-drone-killing-american-citizen-awlaki. See also Spiro, P. (2014), 
‘Expatriating Terrorists’, Fordham Law Review 82 (5): 2169–2187.
12 This was the case with the Nazi extermination of German Jewry, as Hannah 
Arendt recounted. First, the Nazi government stripped Jews of German 
nationality and then, when no country would take them in, proceeded to 
murder them.
13 For a recent example, see Lavi, S. (2011), ‘Citizenship Revocation as 
Punishment: On the Modern Duties of Citizens and Their Criminal Breach’, 
The University of Toronto Law Journal 61 (4): 783–810, at 806.
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One might object that that this parallel neglects the statelessness con-
straint. To the extent that a prerequisite of denationalisation is actual or 
potential possession of another citizenship, the individual has another 
 political life to live somewhere else. This is also an answer to the complaint 
that stripping citizenship from dual nationals but not mono-nationals vio-
lates the principle of equality of citizenship.14 The dual national is not simi-
larly situated to the mono-national precisely because the former has another 
citizenship and the latter does not, so differential treatment does not consti-
tute invidious discrimination. (Of course, the counter-intuitive consequence 
of this reasoning is that dual citizenship becomes a liability. Multiple citi-
zenship becomes less than the sum of its parts: the mono-citizen is secure 
from revocation, while the dual or multiple citizen is not).
The cogency of this argument depends on how one characterises the 
impact of citizenship revocation. From an external, statist perspective, the 
function of nationality is to catalogue the world’s population and to file each 
person under at least one state. Nationality provides states with a return 
address they can stick on non-citizens for purposes of deportation, and is 
one reason why statelessness is an inconvenient anomaly for states. And just 
as all sovereign states are formally equal under international law, so too are 
all citizenships. Within this framework, citizenship becomes fungible. 
Statelessness is the problem, and nationality the solution. So, it may not 
actually matter what nationality a person possesses – Canadian or Somali, 
Brazilian or North Korean – as long as he or she possesses at least one. All 
nationalities are equal for purposes of averting statelessness.15 This formal 
equality of nationality may partly explain international law’s diffidence, or 
at least ambiguity, on whether citizenship deprivation that does not induce 
statelessness may nevertheless be arbitrary and contrary to international 
law.16 In any event, as long as an individual retains a nationality somewhere, 
denationalisation poses no human rights problem.
From an internal, individual perspective, however, citizenship is not fun-
gible.17 The revocation of citizenship severs a unique relationship between 
14 It does not, of course, answer the charge of discrimination against naturalised 
mono-citizens under UK law. They are exposed to the risk of statelessness 
whereas birthright citizens are not.
15 One could even imagine how a creative government wedded to this view might 
venture that protecting mono-citizens from statelessness is really an affirmative 
action initiative under s. 15(2) of the Charter.
16 See Spiro, P. (2011), ‘A New International Law of Citizenship’, Am J. Int’l 
Law 105 (4): 694-746, at 711–12.
17 Thwaites makes a similar argument, supra note 9, at 263.
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the individual and a specific state. It is unique in two respects: First, the 
formal equality of nationality suppresses the substantive inequality of citi-
zenship. The bundle of social, political, economic, cultural and legal 
 opportunities and entitlements to which citizenship provides access varies 
radically between countries. Canadian or Brazilian citizenship is dramati-
cally and indisputably heftier than that of present-day North Korea or 
Somalia.
Secondly, the subjective experience of that legal bond, what the 
International Court of Justice in Nottebohm v. Guatemala calls ‘the social 
fact of attachment’18 is as infinitely diverse as the people who make up the 
citizenry. It may range from the ‘nominal citizen’ whose social attachment is 
highly attenuated, to the individual whose existence is, and has always been, 
wholly and exclusively embedded in the country of residence. Citizenships 
are not substantively equal in comparison to one another and the nature of the 
individual citizen-state relationship is not invariant. But my point is not to 
propose a metric capable of measuring the quantitative, qualitative, experien-
tial, emotional, personal, familial, cultural, social, financial, linguistic and 
political impacts of exile on any individual, in order that some state official 
could determine precisely when citizenship revocation inflicts an appropriate 
versus excessive degree of punishment. Citizenship as legal status obviates 
both the need and the legitimacy of an on-going or comparative evaluation 
by state authorities of how much or how well a citizen performs as a citizen.19 
The very act of subjecting a subsisting citizenship to this kind of normative 
scrutiny subverts the security that distinguishes legal citizenship from other 
statuses that define the relationship between state and individual.
The history of banishment generates only cautionary tales about the 
inevitably arbitrary and prejudicial abuse of a discretionary power to iden-
tify the ‘bad’ citizen for purposes of relegating him or her to the non-status 
of non-citizen. The violence of rupturing the link between citizens and state 
is not negated by possession of citizenship status in another polity, if one 
conceives of the relationship (whatever its intensity, depth, etc.) between a 
state and a citizen as singular and unique. On this view, citizenship revoca-
18 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ICJ 4 (1955) at 23.
19 This does not preclude an argument that the depth and duration of a resident 
non-citizen’s relationship to a state could and should generate an entitlement to 
remain and to be put on a path to citizenship. See, e.g. Carens, J. (2013), The 
Ethics of Immigration. Oxford: OUP.
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tion inflicts an intrinsically grave harm that is separate from (though exacer-
bated by) the harm of statelessness.20
I leave to one side an account of the myriad procedural and substantive 
deficiencies of the UK and Canadian denationalisation regimes that make 
them ripe for legal challenge. Nor do I dwell here on the dubious practical 
value of denationalisation in preventing terrorism or protecting national secu-
rity. Suffice to say that if the aim of citizenship revocation is deterrence, there 
is no evidence that stripping citizenship will deter a potential terrorist any 
more or better than the prospect of a criminal conviction and lengthy impris-
onment or, for that matter, the risk of blowing oneself up, getting killed or 
executed, or being detained indefinitely, rendered, or tortured. To the extent 
that exile supposedly makes a country more secure by removing dangerous 
people, the justification knows no limits: it is not obvious why Canadians or 
Britons would not also be made safer by exiling all citizens who commit vio-
lent offences. From the other side, expelling convicted or alleged terrorists is 
an oddly parochial response that transfers rather than reduces risk. Depending 
on the destination country, deportation may actually make it easier for the 
individual to engage in activities that pose a threat to global security.21
And, finally, the sheer absurdity of banishment as a response to the terror-
ist qua global outlaw is best illustrated by speculating on what would happen 
if all states behaved like the UK and Canada: Imagine a dual UK-Canada 
citizen who is convicted of a terrorism offence in the UK. Since terrorism is 
a global menace, Canada can treat a terrorism conviction in the UK as proof 
of being a bad Canadian citizen. Both Canada and the UK can lawfully dena-
tionalise him. But both states are also somewhat constrained in law not to 
create statelessness, and both want and need to find another state to admit the 
expelled person. And the only country that has a legal obligation to do is a 
state of nationality. So, now it becomes a race between Canada and the UK 
to see which country can strip citizenship first. To the loser goes the citizen.
Modern exile, as imagined under UK and Canadian law, is erected upon 
unsustainable and incoherent propositions about the nature of legal citizen-
ship. If citizenship is irrevocable only where withdrawal causes stateless-
ness, then citizenship is a right for mono-citizens but a privilege for dual or 
20 For a similar argument, see Rayner Thwaites, supra note 9.
21 Macklin, A. (2001), ‘Borderline Security’, in R. Daniels et al. (eds.), The 
Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, 383-405. 
Toronto: U of T Press; ‘Still Stuck at the Border’, in C. Forcese & F. Crépeau 
(eds.), Terrorism, Law and Democracy: 10 Years After 9/11, 261–306. 
Montreal: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice.
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multiple citizens. Legal citizenship can be contingent on normative criteria 
for one state if and only if it is not similarly contingent for another state. 
State A can deprive a national of citizenship and banish him because he is a 
bad citizen. But State A can do so lawfully if and only if State B is com-
pelled to admit the individual simply because he is a citizen of State B, 
irrespective of whether he is a good or bad citizen of State B. One state’s 
authority to deem the bad citizen a non-citizen presupposes another state 
lacking that same authority.
To contend that punitive denationalisation in the twenty-first century is 
an illegitimate and futile exercise of sovereign power does not refute or 
deny that social solidarity, belonging and allegiance have a place in concep-
tions of citizenship and deserve to be promoted. It is rather that these goals 
will not and cannot be advanced by citizenship revocation. Nor will citizen-
ship revocation make any state, or the global community, more secure. 
Citizenship revocation only enhances the discretionary and arbitrary power 
of the executive, at the expense of all citizens, and of citizenship itself. 
Banishment deserves to be banished again. Permanently.
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Terrorist Expatriation: All Show,  
No Bite, No Future
Peter J. Spiro
I agree with the bottom line of Audrey Macklin’s excellent kick-off for the 
Forum. New expatriation measures adopted by the United Kingdom and 
Canada are ill-advised and possibly unlawful. The UK and Canada moves 
make for a kind of trendlet, and other states (even human rights-pure 
Norway) are considering similar measures as the ‘foreign fighter’ phenom-
enon captures global attention. Denationalisation of terror suspects clearly 
merits the attention of scholars and activists; after decades of disuse, states 
are now stepping back into the practice of forced expatriation. Macklin sets 
the scene with a primer on recent developments and a powerful critique of 
the UK and Canadian measures.
But I would get to the destination along another path. I see denationalisa-
tion as anachronistic and toothless in the face of diminished conceptions of 
citizenship as an institution and changed locations of allegiance. The expa-
triation measures are empty gestures, a kind of counter-terror bravado to 
make up for the deficiency of more important material responses. Government 
officials must be seen to be doing something, and so they may (for appear-
ances sake) throw expatriation into the counter-terror toolbox. But expatria-
tion won’t advance the counter-terror agenda in any real way. Given the lack 
of policy advantage, I expect that the human rights critique will suffice to 
suppress the broad use of denationalisation in this context.
In theory, expatriation could help shore up the boundaries of membership 
and national solidarity. Terrorist expatriation might be consistent with the 
historical practice of terminating nationality upon formal transfer of alle-
giance. This was once the near-universal practice; original nationality was 
lost automatically upon naturalisation in another state. Military and govern-
ment service in another country would also typically result in expatriation, 
even when the other state was a friendly one. This practice helped police the 
boundaries of community. One could be a member of one or another polity, 
but not both. States that continue to prohibit dual citizenship still operate on 
this principle. A Japanese citizen who naturalises as an American, for exam-
ple, automatically forfeits her Japanese nationality.
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One might situate security-related expatriation in this tradition. To the 
extent that fighting for the Islamic State represents a shift of loyalty incom-
patible with loyalty to the United Kingdom, expatriation merely reflects 
social conditions on the ground. Membership in the United Kingdom would 
be exclusive of membership in forces associated with the Islamic State. 
Expatriation clarifies the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a way that clarifies social soli-
darities and the special obligations that come with co-nationality. (Ayelet 
Shachar makes a similar argument with respect to ‘hollow’ citizens acquir-
ing citizenship on the attenuated basis of descent.)
But this logic doesn’t map out onto denationalisation in the current secu-
rity context. There is no citizenship in the Islamic State (ISIL not being a 
state, the label notwithstanding). One cannot naturalise or be born into ISIL; 
there is no formal evidence of loyalty or membership. Expatriation doesn’t 
work without the symmetry. To the extent that only dual nationals are sub-
ject to security-related expatriation, the criterion no longer makes any sense: 
the other citizenship is random, unrelated to the motivation for expatriation. 
(As Macklin points out, it could lead to a strange dynamic in which states 
allied against groups such as ISIL could race to expatriate foreign fighters in 
an effort to offshore putative threats.) The condition then arbitrarily dis-
criminates against individuals on the basis of their dual-citizen status.
That takes care of the only normatively tenable rationale for the expatria-
tion measures. The punitive basis is more easily dispatched. Punitive uses of 
expatriation have long been condemned. As early as 1958, the U.S. Supreme 
Court was able to observe that ‘[t]he civilized nations of the world are in 
virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for 
crime.’ The Canadian measure marks a return to the practice of exile. As 
Macklin argues, non-application to cases in which statelessness would result 
does not save it from this rap. A person may well feel a deep social attach-
ment to one country while holding alternative nationalities (which them-
selves may be nominal). The denationalisation of a Canadian citizen 
long-resident in Canada will feel like banishment even as he holds another 
nationality, especially to the extent the latter is attenuated.
Finally, the protective rationale for terrorist expatriation makes little 
sense as a practical matter. The ‘foreign fighter’ problem is largely framed 
as a problem of return. Citizens radicalised by their experience in Iraq and 
Syria with brutal ISIL forces will return to their home countries in the West 
to undertake terror attacks. It’s a potent narrative of weaponised citizens. 
Without citizenship, these individuals would have no right of re-entry, thus 
defusing their utility as ISIL operatives.
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Or so our politicians would have it. In practice, denationalisation adds 
little counter-terror value. You can’t take away someone’s citizenship for 
being associated with ISIL before you know that he’s associated with 
ISIL. But once the security apparatus is aware of the connection, it will have 
other, standard counter-terror tools to protect against the threat. There will 
be the possibility of criminal prosecution in many states on material support 
charges, with incarceration on conviction. (Canada’s punitive scheme can 
hardly sustain even the pretence of a protective rationale.) Short of prosecu-
tion, watch lists and well-practiced surveillance techniques should prevent 
returning foreign fighters from undertaking terror attacks. Passport revoca-
tion and travel bans will help prevent citizens from becoming foreign fight-
ers in the first place.
So terrorist expatriation advances counter-terror efforts not at all. It sup-
plies yet another example of security-related theatre, a feel-good move that 
will be popular with some voters. (The features are shared with some 
Western responses to the vastly exaggerated Ebola threat, where politicians 
must be seen to respond dramatically even if dramatic moves make no sense 
in policy terms.) Terrorist expatriation is unlikely to have staying power 
against a powerful human rights critique. The UK and Canadian measures 
may well fall to legal challenges, domestic or international. Even if they are 
sustained in court, they are unlikely to be put to broad use. Few other states 
will follow suit (it is interesting that terrorist expatriation has almost no 
political traction in the United States, its aggressive counter-terror posturing 
notwithstanding). The failure will evidence an emerging norm against invol-
untary expatriation. If states can’t make expatriation stick here, they won’t 
be able to make it stick anywhere.
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Should Those Who Attack the Nation Have 
an Absolute Right to Remain Its Citizens?
Peter H. Schuck
Audrey Macklin’s call for the banishment of banishment is eloquent and 
persuasive on many points. She is surely right that particular denationalisa-
tion regimes may suffer from a variety of fatal defects. The standards for 
revocation may be too vague to constrain official discretion or to provide 
adequate notice to the citizen concerning what conduct will risk revocation. 
Most important, the grounds for revocation must be limited to only the most 
extreme, unmitigated attacks on the nation’s security, attacks that are consis-
tent only with a desire to bring the nation to ruin. This conduct must be 
scrupulously-defined and highly specific conduct; mere malignant thoughts 
will not suffice. Revocation cannot be permitted to lead to statelessness and 
thus a loss of the ‘meta-right’ (as Macklin puts it) to have rights, especially 
the right to the territorial presence that in turn confers a broad panoply of 
liberal rights. The procedures for revocation must be robust in all respects, 
including of course the right to be actually or virtually present rather than 
having to contest the government’s action ex post and from exile. The gov-
ernment’s burden and standard of proof must be exceedingly demanding, 
perhaps even the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for criminal 
convictions.
But even these extraordinarily demanding and rare preconditions are 
irrelevant to Macklin; she is utterly categorical in her rejection of the very 
notion of denationalisation. She would preclude denationalisation even if 
these (and other) strict conditions were met; indeed, no protections for the 
individual citizen – or for the threatened nation – would suffice. Here is 
where we disagree. I see no reason in logic or justice why a state should be 
powerless to protect itself and its people from imminent, existential threats 
(suitably defined) from an individual who has launched a dangerous attack 
(suitably defined and rigorously proved) on itself and its people, whose 
interestsm both international law and domestic politics obligates it to pro-
mote. And I see no reason in logic or justice why that state cannot defend 
itself and its people against such an attack by, among other things, severing 
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the attacker’s connection to a state with which he is manifestly at war, 
thereby making it much more difficult for him to succeed in that war. Should 
the individual’s interest in maintaining that connection, which (by my defi-
nition, embedded in the preconditions listed above) can only be tactical and 
cynical, utterly and categorically outweigh the nation’s interest in protecting 
those for whom it bears a sacred trust? This question, I submit, answers 
itself – and the answer is grounded not merely in a utilitarian balancing but 
in a deontological principle: the nation’s fundamental duty to protect its 
people.
I also have some reservations about a few of Macklin’s other, less funda-
mental arguments. First, she claims that denationalisation weakens citizen-
ship by eliminating its security and thus rendering it a form of mere legal 
residence. I don’t understand her logic. Am I less secure in my citizenship if 
I know that the state may execute me or imprison me for life if I murder a 
fellow citizen? I suppose that I am less secure, but that insecurity is war-
ranted and I can easily avoid it. Moreover, there is a sense in which dena-
tionalising one who has demonstrably satisfied the exceedingly demanding 
conditions for revocation that I have specified does, contrary to Macklin’s 
claim, strengthen citizenship by reaffirming the conditions on which it is 
based.
Second, she categorically condemns revocation in part because it cate-
gorically denies the individual the opportunity to rehabilitate himself. We 
should and ordinarily do protect a wrongdoer’s opportunity to rehabilitate 
himself, but there are many situations in which we don’t. An employer who 
catches an employee embezzling from the company may fire him without 
giving him an opportunity to rehabilitate himself there; if he wishes to reha-
bilitate himself, he will have to do so elsewhere, on his own time. When we 
sentence a murderer to life imprisonment without parole, we are denying 
him the right to regain his freedom through rehabilitation.
Third, it is true that denationalising a dual citizen would still leave him 
with a state while denationalising a mono citizen would not. But so long as 
we do not allow revocations that would render one stateless, this particular 
inequality between categories of citizens is hardly one that should trouble 
us – any more than we should be troubled that a dual citizen has an addi-
tional passport and can vote in an additional polity.
Finally, Macklin states that there is no evidence that denationalisation 
will deter a would-be terrorist if other, more conventional counter-terrorism 
measures fail to do so. I agree, but so what? Deterrence may be an important 
reason to punish wrongdoers but it is by no means the only reason to do so. 
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If we are justified in punishing them, that justification is not nullified by a 
claim that the punishment will not deter others. And if more conventional 
measures are indeed effective in eliminating threats, they should of course 
be our first and perhaps final resort. In such situations, denationalisation 
may well be a superfluous, unnecessary remedy. But this is a question of 
policy and prudence, not of moral principle.
Macklin is certainly right to worry about the possible abuses of denation-
alisation. The history of political banishment is hardly reassuring on this 
point. But a liberal constitutional regime can control such abuses by scrupu-
lously controlling the state’s exercise of this power through a variety of 
familiar institutions and practices. These include a careful definition and 
exacting limitation of the grounds for revocation; demanding procedural 
and evidentiary requirements before such a power can be exercised; a right 
to legal counsel; and an independent judiciary accustomed to challenging 
state power in the name of protecting individual rights. We have entrusted 
our precious liberties to the faithful working through of these institutions 
and practices. Some of these liberties are even more precious than our right 
to retain our citizenship when we have knowingly acted in horrendous ways 
that make it justifiable, under the safeguards I have described, for the state 
to declare that status forfeited.
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Terrorists Repudiate Their Own Citizenship
Christian Joppke
The recent trend to strip international terrorists of their citizenship raises 
general questions about the changing nature of terror and of citizenship. Let 
us start with ‘terror’. In the era of Marxist-inspired violence against the 
state (or rather ‘capitalism’, of which the state was suspected to be merely 
a servant), terror was a purely domestic affair, committed by the flower 
children of the elite, particularly its most educated and morally minded. No 
one would have fathomed stripping an Ulrike Meinhof or Andreas Baader, 
leaders of the 1970s’ German Red Army Faction (RAF), of their German 
citizenship. The current ‘return of banishment’ is a response to an alto-
gether different type of terror, one that transcends borders and is committed 
by people who explicitly posit themselves outside the political community 
of the nation-state—allegiance to the community of believers (ummah) 
cancels out the secular community of citizens, it is even deliberately mobil-
ised against the latter. Only notice the cynical ritual of the Islamic State`s 
henchmen to have a fellow-national do the mediatised head-chopping. By 
the same token, RAF limited its murderous acts to high-ranking repre-
sentatives of the ‘system’ (of which ordinary citizens were seen as merely 
victims who thus stood to be recruited as fellow-fighters). Al Qaeda and its 
Islamic State sequel seek death for ordinary citizens, whose humanity is 
denied through being demoted to ‘unbelievers’. Paul Kahn took the ubiqui-
tous threat of terror to be today’s ultimate moment of citizenship, the 
‘moment of conscription’.1
Indeed, Islamic terror is meant to be ‘war’, while RAF aspired to ‘revolu-
tion’ – two very different things, with obvious implications for citizenship in 
the former but not the latter. That terror against citizens should lead to recon-
sidering the citizen status of its culprits, who proved the ties to their state of 
citizenship to be at best ‘tactical and cynical’, as Peter Schuck writes in his 
contribution, seems logical. One is therefore astounded about the measured 
response by Western states, which have mostly respected the  international 
norm of avoiding statelessness (only lately, in response to the unspeakable 
1 Kahn, P. (2011), Political Theology. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
p. 138.
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atrocities committed by the fighters of the Islamic State, have there been 
cracks in this commitment, most notably in Britain). But academics cry out 
that ‘banishment weakens citizenship’, as Audrey Macklin does. They draw 
an idyllic and reality-resistant picture of ‘singular and unique’ ties between 
terrorists and the citizenship they despise; ‘intrinsically grave harm’ is said 
to be inflicted here, separate even from ‘the harm of statelessness’. Evidently, 
more sympathy is invested on the culprits than on their victims.
Make no mistake. One should hold no illusion about populist, spin- 
doctored politicians, from Britain to America, Norway to Italy, who hide 
their chronic incapacity to lead in our contemporary ‘audience democracies’ 
behind the sable-rattling ‘security’ and ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric that the peo-
ple wish to hear.2 Macklin has a point when she finds that under the guise of 
‘security’ only ‘the discretionary and arbitrary power of the executive’ is 
increased. Particularly the recent experience in Britain under Tory Home 
Minister Theresa May, with a rather capricious practice of citizenship strip-
ping for the loosely defined reason of being ‘conducive to the public good’, 
with sometimes lethal and conspiratorially concocted consequences for the 
targeted individuals, lends itself to this interpretation. And Peter Spiro is on 
target that conducting the fight against terrorism on the citizenship front is 
‘empty gestures’ and not likely to have much effect – though his proposal of 
‘passport revocation and travel bans’ in lieu of denationalisation reads eerily 
off the mark after the recent tragedy of a would-be jihadist, who had been 
grounded by the Canadian government exactly in these terms, turning his 
rage about the passport denial against an innocent guardsman in Ottawa.
The practical question of effectiveness is secondary to the principled 
question whether citizenship for proven (naturally not just suspected or 
potential) terrorists who conduct war (in the literal sense) against Western 
states and their citizens should be unassailable. At heart, the issue is one of 
‘loyalty and allegiance’, as the Canadian Immigration Minister, Chris 
Alexander, defended the 2014 Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act in 
parliament. This act, representative of similar bills currently being consid-
ered in a number of European states, Australia, and the United States, allows 
the stripping of citizenship in the cases of treason, spying, taking up arms 
against the Canadian Forces, and terrorism, even if the latter is committed 
outside Canada and sentenced by foreign courts, should the action in 
 question constitute a terrorism offence also under Canadian law. The 
expanded geographic scope for terrorism, which stirred controversy, was 
2 Manin, B. (1997), The Principles of Representative Government. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, Chapter 6.
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clearly dictated by heightened security concerns. But it also recognises the 
global nature of the new terror and its affront to the secular state and citizen-
ship at large, wherever it may occur; one might read it as a comity of nations 
response to a global challenge. In any case, it is not just bizarre but self- 
destructive to measure the ‘strength’ of citizenship in terrorists’ unencum-
bered possibility to make tactical use of it in their war against the godless 
state and its unbelieving median citizen.
For calibrating banishment, next to taking into account the changing 
nature of terror, one also needs to recognise the changing nature of citizen-
ship in a globalising world. Whoever has reflected for a second on the colos-
sal injustice inflicted on the vast majority of mankind by being born into the 
‘wrong’ kind of state that cannot guarantee its ‘citizens’ physical safety and 
the elementary means of survival3, must be irritated to see citizenship 
depicted as something that an individual should never be able to lose, how-
ever randomly it had been assigned to her in the first place, and however 
much a particular individual has done to undermine or even destroy this 
very citizenship (and the state that guarantees it). Audrey Macklin sees the 
danger of banishment in ‘making legal citizenship contingent on perfor-
mance’. ‘Performance’ strikes me as a rather vague and anodyne term for 
the behaviour in question. It is one thing to make citizenship acquisition 
contingent on virtuous behaviour, which could never be exacted on born 
citizens (as Britain entertained for a while in its ‘probationary’ or ‘earned’ 
citizenship scheme that was never implemented); it is quite another to make 
a declared war against the secular state and its citizens a ground for renun-
ciation. As much as one should eschew virtuous citizenship from a liberal 
perspective, one should welcome, even require the withdrawing of citizen-
ship from someone to whom it is at best a tactical weapon.
It may warm the heart to elevate citizenship to a ‘right to have rights’, 
enunciated by US Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren in a different 
time and context (voting in foreign elections4 and desertion during World 
II5, in both cases without any third-party harm inflicted and at best a vague 
and constructed violation of allegiance). The gospel of citizenship stripping 
as ‘cruel punishment’, pronounced in Trop v. Dulles (1958), needs 
 reconsideration in the age of global terror. And the accompanying formula 
of citizenship as a ‘right to have rights’ obscures that persons without states 
3 See Shachar, A. (2009), The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global 
Inequality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
4 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 54 (1958).
5 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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or citizenship are no longer the ‘scum of the earth’ they may have been in 
the late 1940s, when Hannah Arendt wrote the Origins of Totalitarianism. 
But most importantly, the formula ‘rights to have rights’ dodges the fact that, 
indeed, citizenship in a globalising world is increasingly ‘privilege’ and 
‘contract’. It is a privilege if one considers the mentioned exclusion from a 
lucrative OECD-state citizenship of most of mankind (that has to make do 
with less than US$ 2 per day). And it is a contract by definition for the ever 
growing number of immigrants who are not born with it but seek it out for 
their own benefit. In the post-feudal world, most states allow the possibility 
to renounce one`s citizenship—this was the point of departure of ‘demo-
cratic’ America from ‘monarchical’ Britain. But then it is not outlandish (or 
illiberal) to concede the converse capacity to states to rid themselves even of 
born citizens who have despised or patently abused their citizenship through 
their actions (and why stop at the threshold of statelessness?).
Macklin claims that banishment is ‘both superfluous and anachronistic’ 
because states now have ‘criminal justice systems’ at their disposal to 
‘rehabilitate and reintegrate wrongdoers within the state’. This claim is 
misleading and paternalistic. International terrorists are not criminals but 
warriors—they don’t want to be ‘reintegrated’. The liberal state should 
acknowledge their claim, eye to eye, by taking away from them what they 
have factually renounced and even wish to destroy. Canadian minister Chris 
Alexander is right: ‘They (terrorists) will have, in effect, withdrawn their 
allegiance to Canada by their very actions.’ Peter Spiro lawyerly ups the 
ante by arguing that there could not be a ‘shift of loyalty’ on the part of 
Islamic terrorists because ‘there is no citizenship in the Islamic State’. Does 
he want to wait until they have acquired a seat in the United Nations?
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It’s Not About Their Citizenship,  
it’s About Ours
Vesco Paskalev
The very passion and fury pouring from Christian Joppke’s contribution 
should prompt both the lawyer and the political philosopher that he is wrong. 
I too am outraged by what ISIS fighters are doing, but it is well known that 
the function of constitutional rights, and of the constitutions themselves, is 
precisely to assure that the legislator is not driven by the passion of the day. 
One decade after 9/11 we know that the actions taken both by the President 
and the Congress of the US, based on the rationale that it is a new world that 
we have woken up into, were not all reasonable, to put it mildly. So may be 
today’s rush to strip terrorist suspects of their citizenship. When watching 
the daily news on TV, one is easily tempted to think that we are living in 
extraordinarily dangerous times, which warrant a return to what the US 
Supreme Court considered to be ‘cruel punishment’ half a century ago. Yet 
as a matter of statistics, and despite our contrary impressions, violence of all 
kinds in the world is actually declining.1 On the other hand, the capacity of 
law enforcement agencies for surveillance and control, especially in the 
OECD countries, has increased dramatically, so the return to practices which 
have long been abandoned is difficult to justify. This is not to say that that 
citizenship is a sacred cow and any return to abandoned practices is excluded 
by some historic laws of human progress. Nothing can be further from the 
truth. But it does follow that the proponents of banishment must provide a 
more subtle justification than we have seen so far.
Joppke has a point when distinguishing the old school revolutionaries 
from the contemporary jihadists, who conceive of themselves as members 
of the global ummah, and not of any state. (Do we know that for sure? ISIS 
aims to create an Islamic state after all). He also has a point that waging war 
against a country is a good reason to strip the warrior of the citizenship of 
that country. I can accept even stretching this argument to apply to all those 
who take up arms against any allies of that country, or even to those who 
1 Pinker, S. (2011), The Better Angels of our Nature. New York: Viking.
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have taken arms against the international system of states. This would bring 
me already quite close to the position of the ‘deprivationists’.
What I find difficult to accept is the unquestioned assumption that this 
gesture would serve any of the goals Joppke, and the politicians favouring 
banishment, may have. If the jihadists were as cosmopolitan as he takes 
them to be, deprivation would not have any meaning, neither for the actual 
fighters, nor for any like-minded followers. It might be the case that taking 
their passport will have the practical effect of preventing them from travel-
ling to Syria or back, but as a person who is genuinely outraged by their 
deeds, I would rather see them locked up in prison rather than left at large in 
a legal limbo (in the Middle East out of all places!). For Joppke the practical 
side is only of secondary concern, but I am afraid his theoretical argument is 
self-defeating.
Now, if we accept that the jihadists just do not care if they are deprived 
of their western citizenships, let us consider whether this would still matter 
for anyone else. On the one hand, there are the ‘normal’ citizens of the same 
country who may wish to see the extremists publicly excommunicated. This 
is a legitimate concern. However, it is in no way different from the desire of 
many law-abiding citizens to see murderers and rapists sent to the electric 
chair. So the usual objections to the latter punishments apply here too. More 
importantly, while there is some commensurability between a murder and a 
death sentence, the very gravity of the offences of the jihadists make citizen-
ship deprivation superfluous. Ironically, not the cruelty of citizenship depri-
vation, but its softness make it appear quite inappropriate for the case of 
terrorists. If we take into account also the practical difficulties arising in the 
prosecution of a foreigner, on balance it might be better to keep him as a citi-
zen. On the other hand, the possibility or impossibility of revocation defines 
and redefines the meaning of the concept of citizenship itself – of our citi-
zenship, not of theirs. That is why many academics, whose professional duty 
is to care for precisely such nuance, are so uneasy about the recent trend. I 
would be glad if this concern remains confined to the ivory towers of the 
academia, but I suspect that the conditionality of citizenship is more than a 
theoretical concern for those citizens who are not white, Anglo-Saxon and 
Christian and have only recently arrived from the wrong side of the OECD 
border.
One may argue, as Peter Schuck does, for deprivation administered under 
narrowly circumscribed conditions. Indeed, due process can alleviate some 
of the anxieties the conditionality of citizenship would create, but he does 
not provide much of a justification for this conditionality in the first place. 
He also relies on the intuitive, yet questionable assumption that citizenship 
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deprivation serves to protect the state and its people. But all grounds for 
deprivation he suggests already constitute a serious crime, and if the 
 perpetrator must be convicted to be denationalised as he suggests, then 
again, what difference would it make if those imprisoned for a very long 
time remain citizens or not? If deprivation were administered properly – for 
grave crimes and with due process, it becomes redundant.
Beyond these conceptual concerns, and paying due consideration to the 
all too present terrorist threats, I want the Islamic State bombed out of exis-
tence, and I want all jihadists punished for what they do. But as a citizen I 
also want my tax money spent on police to put the bad apples in jail, not on 
border patrols to keep them out.
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You Can’t Lose What You Haven’t Got: 
Citizenship Acquisition and Loss in Africa
Bronwen Manby
The heading for this discussion makes a person focused on sub-Saharan 
Africa scratch her head somewhat. Which ‘new’ denationalisation policies 
are we talking about? In Africa, we have continued to see the same old dena-
tionalisation policies that have been in place since the 1960s. The context of 
national security has changed in some countries, especially the threat of 21st 
century terrorism methods in places such as Kenya or Nigeria, but the meth-
ods used by the governments in response have not changed.
 The legal provisions
If we start from a survey of the laws, most African countries allow for depri-
vation of nationality acquired by naturalisation, some of them on quite 
vague and arbitrary grounds. The former British colonies borrow language 
from the British precedents and provide for deprivation on the grounds of 
‘disloyalty’ or the ‘public good’; while the francophone countries talk about 
behaviour ‘incompatible with the status of a national’ or ‘prejudicial to the 
interests of the country’. However, more than half of Africa’s 54 states for-
bid deprivation of nationality from a national from birth (of origin, in the 
This text was written in November 2014 and reflects events current at that time. 
Some important later developments are not reflected, including, most importantly, 
the readmission of Morocco to the African Union in January 2017 and the decision 
of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the Anudo case against 
Tanzania issued in March 2018.
The original version of this chapter was revised. A correction to this chapter is 
available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92719-0_62
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civil law terminology), whether or not the person would become stateless.1 
And although a large number of the remaining countries have a provision 
framed along the lines provided in the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness for a person who works for a foreign state in defiance of an 
express prohibition to lose their nationality,2 only a small handful provide 
for deprivation of a birthright citizen in case of a crime against the state – 
Egypt, Eritrea and Mali.3
None of the sub-Saharan countries come close to the extremes of Egypt, 
where citizenship can be deprived from anyone (whether a citizen from birth 
or by naturalisation) if, among other things, ‘at any time he has been qualified 
as Zionist’.4
On the positive side, the South African and Ethiopian constitutions pro-
vide blanket prohibitions on deprivation of nationality, whether from birth 
or naturalised (though South Africa then goes on to violate this prohibition 
in its legislation).5 Several constitutions and laws create serious due process 
hurdles for governments seeking to revoke citizenship. In Kenya for exam-
ple, the 2010 constitution requires a naturalised citizen (citizenship by birth 
cannot be revoked) to have been actually convicted of a serious crime, 
including treason;6 less specifically, Burundi, Malawi, and Rwanda have 
1 Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Comoros, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. In the case of Botswana, Ethiopia, Libya, Tanzania and Zambia, 
dual nationality is not permitted, and voluntary acquisition of another national-
ity results in automatic loss. Lists from Manby, B. (2010), Citizenship Laws in 
Africa: A Comparative Study. Open Society Foundations, 2nd edition; updated 
information for a forthcoming 3rd edition. On the number of states in Africa: 
Morocco is not a member of the African Union, while the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic is: if both are counted, there are 55 states.
2 Angola, Cameroon, CAR, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Sao Tomé & Príncipe, South Sudan, Sudan, Togo and 
Tunisia.
3 Egypt Law No. 26 of 1975 Concerning Egyptian Nationality, Article 16(7); 
Eritrea Nationality Proclamation 1992 Article 8; Mali Nationality Code 1962, 
Article 43 (amended 1995).
4 Law No. 26 of 1975 Concerning Egyptian Nationality, Article 16(7), transla-
tion from UNHCR website, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4e218.html. 
Libya had similar rules until they were changed in 2010.
5 South Africa Constitution 1996, Article 20; Ethiopia Constitution 1993, Article 
33.
6 Kenya Constitution, 2010, Section 17.
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constitutional provisions forbidding arbitrary deprivation of nationality.7 
Meanwhile, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia and Rwanda all provide that depriva-
tion can only be done by a court, on the government’s application;8 and a 
majority, though not all, others provide for judicial review of administrative 
decisions to deprive.9 A few countries provide for protection against 
 statelessness in deprivation cases: just Lesotho, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe 
(since 2013) provide in principle for protection from statelessness in all 
cases where nationality is revoked by act of the government; and Namibia, 
Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa provide partial protection, allowing 
statelessness to result in some circumstances.10
On the negative side, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe — notably, all with a British legal inheri-
tance — explicitly state in their legislation that the decision of the minister 
on any matter under the nationality law cannot be reviewed in court.11 These 
are all countries which do not allow for deprivation of birthright citizenship 
(though some provide for loss in case of acquisition of another nationality); 
but it’s questionable what the protection against statelessness in deprivation 
7 Burundi Constitution 2005, Article 34; Malawi Constitution 1994 (as amended 
to 1998), Article 47 ; Rwanda Constitution 2003, Article 7.
8 Gambia Constitution 1996, article 13; Ghana Constitution 1992 Article 9, 
Citizenship Act 2000, Article 18; Liberia Aliens and Nationality Law 1973, 
Articles 21.53; Rwanda Nationality Law No.30 of 2008, Article 20.
9 Most of the civil law countries provide quite detailed procedures for national-
ity litigation through the courts; the Commonwealth countries tend to have 
weaker protections, and do not have the same tradition of providing procedures 
in the substantive law itself, but South Africa for example, provides for all 
decisions of the minister to be reviewable by the courts, as do Gambia and 
Kenya.
10 Lesotho Constitution 1993, as amended to 2001, Article 42 (however, this 
provision is not respected in the Citizenship Order 1971 Article 23); Mauritius 
Citizenship Act 1968, as amended to 1995, Article 11(3)(b); Namibia 
Constitution 1990, as amended to 2010, Article 9(4); Rwanda Nationality Law 
2003, Article 19; Senegal Nationality Code 1961 as amended 2013, Article 21; 
South African Citizenship Act 1996, as amended 2013, Article 8; Zimbabwe 
Constitution 2013, Article 39(3) (but this is not respected in the Citizenship 
Act, 1984, as amended to 2003, Article 11(3), which provides in principle 
prohibition of rendering a person stateless, but allows the minister to override 
if it is in the ‘public good’ to do so).
11 Botswana Citizenship Act 1998, Article 22; Lesotho Citizenship Order 1971, 
Article 26; Malawi Citizenship Act 1966, Article 29; Mauritius Citizenship Act 
1968 Article 17; Seychelles Citizenship Act 1994, Article 14; Tanzania 
Citizenship Act 1995 23; Zambia Citizenship Act Article 9; Zimbabwe 
Citizenship Act 1984 Article 16.
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cases provided by Mauritius means, if the decision of the minister cannot be 
challenged. In Swaziland, where a certificate of nationality ‘shall’ be issued 
by the minister to a person who is qualified to be a citizen, it is also provided 
that the minister ‘may revoke’ a certificate and no grounds are specified.12 
Namibia allows deprivation of nationality on the grounds that a person was 
already deprived in another country, increasing the likelihood of rendering 
them stateless.13
In 2013, the Seychelles inserted a new article to its citizenship law 
expanding the grounds for deprivation of citizenship if the minister ‘is 
 satisfied’ that the person has been involved in terrorism, piracy, drug offences, 
treason, and other offences, or has acted with disloyalty.14 In 2010, the South 
African Citizenship Act was amended to provide for automatic loss of citi-
zenship by a naturalised citizen ‘if he or she engages, under the flag of another 
country, in a war that the Republic does not support’, leaving lawyers won-
dering how you would know whether or not the Republic ‘supported’ a par-
ticular war (and would it matter which side the person was on?).15
 The practice
But this review of deprivation provisions has a slightly unreal feel. These 
procedures are hardly used, so far as one can tell. Only South Africa pub-
lishes any statistics – or at least it used to do so – revealing that at least 17 
people have been deprived of citizenship since 2001-02 (despite the consti-
tutional ban on deprivation), though no details are given. Countries such as 
Kenya and Nigeria, both facing well-publicised and serious security threats 
from the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are not known to 
have deprived any individual of citizenship through the formal procedures 
of the law on deprivation.16
12 Swaziland Citizenship and Immigration Act 1992, Article 20.
13 Namibia Citizenship Act 1990, Article 9(3)(e).
14 Section 11A of the Citizenship Act, No. 18 of 1994, inserted by Act 11 of 
2013.
15 South African Citizenship Act 1996, as amended 2013, Article 6(3). This 
amendment came into force on 1 January 2013. The 1996 Constitution 
provides in Article 20 that ‘No citizen may be deprived of citizenship.’ It is 
possible that the phrasing of the revised Article 6(3) is designed to avoid this 
prohibition by providing for automatic loss. See further Submission on the 
South African Citizenship Amendment Bill, B 17 – 2010, Citizenship Rights in 
Africa Initiative, 6 August 2010.
16 Email correspondence, November 2014, with Chidi Odinkalu of the Nigeria 
National Human Rights Commission and Adam Hussein Adam of the Open 
Society Initiative for East Africa, both following these issues closely.
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The legal provisions on deprivation of citizenship are, in fact, more or 
less irrelevant in countries where (a) as described above, citizens from birth 
cannot be deprived of citizenship under law except in the rather rare circum-
stance of working for another state despite a formal request not to do so; (b) 
naturalisation is very difficult to obtain; and (c) the government has easily 
accessible other means of achieving the same result in relation to (people 
who believed they were) birthright citizens, obviating any need to amend 
the law on withdrawal of nationality.
As regards (b), statistics on naturalisation are hard to come by, but it seems 
that only a handful of people a year may be naturalised in most countries – 
even in Nigeria, with more than 150 million people, only around a hundred 
people acquire nationality by naturalisation or marriage annually – and those 
who are naturalised are mostly non-Africans operating in the formal economy, 
with all the panoply of lawyers and documents to support their claim.17 So few 
people are involved, and the procedures for obtaining naturalisation are so 
highly discretionary, that it seems unlikely that anyone who has the slightest 
possibility of becoming a threat to the security of the state could pass that bar-
rier – and therefore be at risk of subsequent deprivation. It’s not impossible of 
course; but very unlikely. South Africa has had much more accessible natu-
ralisation procedures, rendering it perhaps more vulnerable in this regard; but 
the numbers have dropped dramatically in recent years, without explanation.
Therefore, (c) comes into play. The methods traditionally used in Africa 
to ‘denationalise’ a person are simply to deny that he or she ever had nation-
ality to start off with; to argue that the nationality documentation previously 
held was issued in error, or to fail to issue or renew a document providing 
proof of nationality (not even requiring an allegation of fraud). The key 
amendments to nationality laws in Africa have not been to increase govern-
ment powers to deprive, but to restrict access to nationality based on birth 
and residence and to exploit any ambiguity in the rules applied on succes-
sion of states at independence.18 These are the methods used against some 
high profile individuals: Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Alassane Ouattara 
of Côte d’Ivoire most famously; but also John Modise of Botswana, who 
found himself no longer considered a national by birth when he set up a 
political party in order to run for president. These cases reached the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, but there are many others liti-
gated only at national level involving politicians, journalists or activists.
17 Manby, B. (2015), Nationality, Migration and Statelessness in West Africa. 
Dakar: UNHCR and IOM.
18 Manby, B. (2014), ‘Trends in citizenship law and politics in Africa since the 
colonial era’, in E. F. Isin & P. Nyers (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Global 
Citizenship Studies, 172–185. Oxon; New York: Routledge.
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UNHCR’s clear guidance is that a retrospective finding that a person was 
not a national and was issued nationality documents in error is just as subject 
to rules on arbitrariness as any procedure under formal provisions on depri-
vation.19 However, under national law, why bother with deprivation 
 proceedings if you can manage matters so much more easily by other meth-
ods? And this applies especially when whole categories of people are seen 
as problematic, or potentially so.
It is, in fact, not the individual difficult cases that raise the greatest con-
cerns in the African context, but the tendency to attribute collective respon-
sibility to whole groups of citizens when a country is faced with a (real or 
perceived) security threat – or simply an organised opposition with support 
from a particular ethnic group. Faced with the challenges of ‘nation- building’ 
in states created by colonial fiat, the question of who belongs is not necessar-
ily an obvious one to answer. African states have a history of mass expulsions 
based on ethnic grounds – there is even a style of bag known in Nigeria as a 
‘Ghana Must Go’ bag, dating to one such episode in the 1980s when (actual 
or alleged) Ghanaians had to pack up and leave – and it remains the case that 
the usual approach is to assert that someone is a non-national, and then expel 
them.20 The prevalence of such practices led to the inclusion of a specific 
provision banning mass expulsions, not found among similar treaties, in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.21 Even where those who 
have been expelled fail to find recognition in their alleged country of origin, 
they may be unable to reclaim their status in the former country of residence: 
among those persons of Eritrean origin who were expelled by Ethiopia to 
Eritrea during the 1998 war between the two countries, a number subse-
quently became refugees from the highly repressive Eritrean regime. Even in 
their case, when some applied for reacquisition of Ethiopian nationality, they 
were reportedly told that they were security risks, so could not get papers.22
In Kenya, discriminatory measures in relation to documentation and 
identity have been sharply stepped up against Kenyan Somalis and coastal 
Muslims, tarred with the brush of the Westgate Mall siege and other out-
19 Expert Meeting - Interpreting the 1961 Statelessness Convention and Avoiding 
Statelessness resulting from Loss and Deprivation of Nationality (‘Tunis 
Conclusions’), UNHCR, March 2014, especially paragraph 9.
20 See Manby, B. (2009), Struggles for Citizenship in Africa. London: Zed Books, 
Chapter 4.
21 Article 12(5) of the African Charter.
22 ‘Ethiopians in Limbo: from statelessness to being a refugee in one’s own 





rages. In addition to a general round up and detention of suspected youth, 
the issuance of national ID cards has been suspended in the three counties 
that are located in the former North Eastern Province bordering Somalia 
(Garissa, Wajir and Mandera Counties, created by the 2010 Constitution), 
meaning that those without IDs cannot travel out of that zone, and effec-
tively lose the reality of citizenship rights – without the need for the govern-
ment to undertake any bothersome legal proceedings.23 In Nigeria, the 
peculiar features of the country’s federal system have led to the possibility 
of ‘denationalisation’ from a particular part of the country, even though such 
measures haven’t been taken at national level. In the context of the threat 
from Boko Haram, governors of states in the south-east of the country in 
2014 stepped up long-standing discrimination based on the idea of ‘indige-
neity’ to adopt controversial measures to register and possibly deport ‘non- 
indigenes’, leading to an emergency meeting of the National Council of 
State in July 2014 to condemn these practices (but no action beyond estab-
lishing a committee to make recommendations).24 Ghana’s consul-general 
in Nigeria indeed recently blamed the Boko Haram insurgency on ‘stateless 
people’ excluded from the benefits of citizenship, and urged efforts to 
strengthen documentation across the sub-region.25
There are the beginnings of recognition that stronger guarantees around 
the right to a nationality may be part of the solution to some of the security 
challenges in the continent. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights is working with the AU Commission in Addis Ababa to draft a proto-
col to the African Charter on the right to a nationality.26 The African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child recently 
adopted a General Comment on the rights of children to a name, birth regis-
tration and a nationality.27 In parallel, there is a major push to improve docu-
23 Email communication, Adam Hussein Adam, OSIEA, November 2014.
24 ‘Council of State moves to stop citizens’ registration, deportation’, The Citizen, 
1 August 2014, available at https://thecitizenng.com/council-of-state-moves-to-
%E2%80%8Estop-citizens-registration-deportation/. On the history of discrim-
ination in relation to nationality in Kenya, see Manby, B. (2009), above n. 20, 
Chapter 6; on Nigeria and ‘indigeneity’, see Chapter 5.
25 ‘Envoy Blames Insecurity in Nigeria, Others on Stateless People’, Premium 
Times, 29 April 2014, available at https://www.premiumtimesng.com/
news/159587-envoy-blames-insecurity-nigeria-others-stateless-people.html
26 See ACHPR Resolution 234 on the Right to Nationality, 53rd Ordinary 
Session, 9-23 April 2013, Banjul, The Gambia; Resolution 277 on the drafting 
of a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Right to Nationality in Africa, 55th Ordinary Session, 28 April to 12 May 
2014, Luanda, Angola.
27 Available at the Committee of Experts website: http://acerwc.org/the-commit-
tees-work/general-comments/
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mentation through the initiation or strengthening of  requirements to hold a 
national identity card, for civil registration in general, and for the use of 
biometric data in these documents. But this push on information technology 
carries significant risks that governments will seek only to police the bound-
aries of their systems, excluding anyone of ‘doubtful’ nationality, while fail-
ing to reform legal provisions and administrative practices that restrict access 
to nationality for those who constitute no security threat at all. To date, the 
international agencies responsible on these issues — especially UNHCR, 
UNICEF and IOM — are also failing to join up the dots with a coherent 
approach on nationality and documentation in their interventions with 
national governments. Given the very real security threats they face, it 
remains an open question whether governments such as Nigeria’s and 
Kenya’s will commit to more secure rights to citizenship, rather than only 
more secure documentation.
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Revocation of Citizenship of Terrorists:  
A Matter of Political Expediency
Kay Hailbronner
Let’s be clear: We are not in a dispute about the use of denationalisation 
policies to get rid of unwanted citizens who do not comply with a code of 
conduct how to behave as a ‘good’ or ‘loyal’ citizen. Nor are we talking 
about deprivation or revocation of citizenship on account of race, political 
opinion, religion, descent etc. There are clear rules of public international 
law prohibiting discriminatory citizenship policies and none of the policies 
discussed here call these into question. What we are discussing is the differ-
ent and by no means absolutely novel issue of revoking the citizenship of 
persons who have given up or are irrefutably considered as having renounced 
that basic attachment which distinguishes citizenship from a residence per-
mit. A recent report of de Groot and Vink for the European Commission1 
lists voluntary military service and non-military public service in nine, and 
eight EU countries respectively as a ground for revocation of citizenship, 
subject of course to some restrictions (prevention of statelessness) and 
exceptions.
In around half of the 28 countries included in the study, seriously preju-
dicial behaviour is considered as a ground for revocation of citizenship. The 
European Convention on Nationality of 6 November 1997 provides for 
revocation of citizenship for conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital inter-
ests of the State party (Art.7 para 1 lit.d). Very similar provisions on revoca-
tion are laid down in Art. 8 para 3 of the Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness of 1961.
What is new is the inclusion of a specific type of seriously prejudicial 
behaviour which is considered as endangering the safety of the population 
of a state and its security into this catalogue. The actors are not totalitarian 
or authoritarian regimes but democratic states with well-established 
1 de Groot, G.-R. & M. P. Vink (2015), A Comparative Analysis of Regulations 




 institutions to protect human rights and to ensure the rule of law. Not that the 
democratic character of the states in question would dispense us from closely 
watching the transfer and exercise of powers to the executive branch, par-
ticularly in such a rights-sensitive area as denationalisation policies. 
Safeguards against arbitrary actions and abuse of power, conditions and pro-
cedures must be predominant on the watch list, as Peter Schuck rightly 
emphasizes. But why should revocation of citizenship of terrorists result 
inevitably in arbitrary and abusive exercise of power, as Audrey Macklin 
assumes?
What makes international terrorism so distinctive is not only its criminal 
and administrative relevance, but also its relevance for discontinuance of 
that special relationship established by citizenship. In order to answer this 
question it is not sufficient to conjure up emphatically the uniqueness of the 
ties between a citizen and a state. It is true that citizenship establishes a spe-
cial relationship based upon security and stability. Security and stability on 
the side of the individual citizen require that denationalisation remains a rare 
exception. Citizenship implies rights, whether it is designated as a privilege, 
as a right to have rights or as a contract. For that reason deprivation of citi-
zenship requires an overriding public interest and is subject to 
proportionality.
Ordinary crimes, even of a serious nature, have not been considered as 
sufficient under Art. 7 of the European Convention to destroy the bond of 
citizenship. Yet, fundamental and persistent alienation from the nation as a 
political community has – in spite of divergent interpretations and applica-
tions – frequently been considered as a justification for revocation of citi-
zenship. Democratic states in the defence of their constitutional order and 
protection of the safety of their population and the security of the state are 
not restricted to a regime of criminal and administrative sanctions if their 
own nationals turn against them.
Legal comparison shows that there is no uniformity. States, according to 
their particular political conditions, and history that is sometimes reflected 
in constitutional provisions, have largely prohibited involuntary revocation 
of citizenship. Germany is one example, though it provides for loss of citi-
zenship for voluntary service in foreign military services or in case of vol-
untary acquisition of a foreign citizenship. Other states, like Britain, have 
applied the concept to high treason, espionage, etc. International treaties, 
like the European Convention on Nationality of 1997 or the Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness provide further barriers. States may not pro-
vide for the loss of nationality if the person concerned would become state-
less (except in case of fraud). One could discuss what this means if a state’s 
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national joins a group or organisation, such as the ‘Islamic State’, which is 
dominating a state-like territory and exercises state-like authority.
Discussion of the international and constitutional law prerequisites of 
revocation of citizenship is not the concern of Audrey Macklin. She argues 
primarily with illegitimacy. As a lawyer I have some difficulty with this 
term. If it is not illegal, what are the criteria for illegitimacy or immorality? 
Her personal idea of how democratic states should behave? That of course 
may be an acceptable political reasoning, provided I learn more about its 
ideological premises which I may share or not. I do understand Peter Spiro’s 
objection about the revocation of citizenship as a ‘security theatre’ although 
I feel not confident on the basis of the facts to judge whether it is true that 
revocation of citizenship for international terrorists is impractical and irrel-
evant. The arguments of illegitimacy, in my view are hardly convincing. 
Assuming that revocation of citizenship is a (prohibited) form of punish-
ment simply ignores the legal nature of revocation of citizenship. It is not 
destined to sanction acts of international terrorism, in addition to a potential 
criminal or administrative sanction. By untying the bond of citizenship, the 
former citizen can no longer rely upon his/her citizenship for unlimited 
entry and residence and free international travel. The further argument that 
there is no chance of rehabilitation is based on the same misunderstanding 
of revocation of citizenship as a special form of punishment. Citizenship of 
such persons is revoked because they have given up their attachment to a 
community by attacking the very fundament of that community, not by 
merely violating its internal rules of public order. To talk in this context of 
an inalienable right of rehabilitation, distorts the purpose of citizenship 
revocation.
The hard questions arise with the formulation of a precise and judicially 
reviewable provision authorising the executive to revoke citizenship. 
International terrorism as such is a term open to divergent interpretations. 
We do, however, have quite some experience, based upon the jurisprudence 
of national and international courts and Security Council Resolutions, in 
defining international terrorism. In order to be effective, a provision must 
include such actions as joining extremist organisations for training in order 
to use such training for participation in terrorist activities, as well as a mem-
bership in an organisation destined to fight against the state whose citizen-
ship the person concerned possesses.
A further question is whether the introduction of a new provision on 
revocation of citizenship serves a useful purpose. Utility cannot be denied 
by reference to criminal law. It goes without saying that acts of international 
terrorism should be punished and that administrative action should, where 
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possible, be taken to limit the use of passports for international travel for the 
purpose of preparing or assisting international terrorism – the technical and 
cynical use of citizenship rights, as Peter Schuck has phrased it. Criminal 
and administrative sanctions are always attached to specific activities. They 
do not cover the aspect of using citizenship in a general and in principle 
unforeseeable manner for acts destined to endanger the security of the state 
of which the perpetrators are citizens.
The cosmopolitan nature of this type of terrorism, as Christian Joppke 
has aptly described it, is misunderstood by Vesco Paskalev when he argues 
that the jihadists do not care about their citizenship. They might indeed not 
care about their attachment to the state whose citizenship they posses but 
they do care about the possibilities that a Canadian, US, British or German 
passport conveys with visa-free international travel, free entry and residence 
in their ‘home’ country and diplomatic protection if something does not go 
quite as smoothly as expected.
Revocation of citizenship means a substantial interference with individ-
ual rights. It can only be justified if tightly defined material conditions in 
accordance with the constitutional law of each country and its international 
commitments are fulfilled. Risk assessment and proof of an affiliation, assis-
tance or membership in an international terrorist organisation will be essen-
tial elements in this procedure. Whether there is a practical value in 
revocation of citizenship for citizens engaged in international terrorism in 
addition to criminal and administrative sanctions is within the framework of 
law a matter of political expediency which may well lead to different results 
in different countries.
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Whose Bad Guys Are Terrorists?
Rainer Bauböck
Peter Schuck, Christian Joppke and Kay Hailbronner have provided strong 
arguments why liberal democracies should have the power to strip terrorist 
suspects of their citizenship. As good lawyers, Schuck and Hailbronner add 
that such power must be exercised with restraint and hedged in by the rule 
of law.
Everybody in this debate agrees that terrorists ought to be punished. 
Most would also agree that liberal states need exceptional powers in order to 
prevent terrorism and that this justifies some constraints on freedom of 
speech and association, for example by making incitement to terrorist vio-
lence or joining a terrorist organisation punishable crimes.
Terrorists commit particularly evil crimes. Yet denationalisation does not 
look like punishment for these crimes. First, it is normally based on execu-
tive order rather than court judgment. Second, it does not meet the standard 
purposes for criminal punishment. It cannot be justified as retribution, since 
it is not proportionate to the monstrosity of the crime. It does not promote 
rehabilitation, since the effect is to remove the criminal from the jurisdic-
tion. And it is not effective in deterring or preventing terrorist crimes, since – 
as Vesco Paskalev has argued – global jihadists hardly care about losing 
citizenship status in a Western democracy that they detest.
Hailbronner points out that terrorists care about losing their right to 
travel, but restricting their freedom to move can also be achieved by other 
means, e.g. by invalidating their passports without denationalising them. 
Banishing jihadists to exactly those states where they want to go anyway to 
commit their atrocities can hardly count as an effective strategy against 
global terrorism. As a political scientist I suspect that governments have 
other motives apart from policy effectiveness when they seek denationalisa-
tion powers. They do not only want to do something against terrorism, they 
also want to be seen by voters as doing something. Stripping terrorist sus-
pects of their citizenship is a strongly visible policy and for that reason pos-
sibly also a strongly symbolic one, as suggested by Peter Spiro.
202
This is not yet a conclusive refutation, since on some views it is exactly 
the symbolic nature of the sanction that justifies the denationalisation of ter-
rorists. This argument starts from the assertion that liberal democracies are 
value-based political communities. Their basic values include freedom of 
conscience and religious practice, of speech and association and democratic 
self-government. Since these states are liberal, they cannot force their citi-
zens to share their basic values. These are instead enshrined in their consti-
tutions and their political institutions are designed to protect these values. 
Terrorists do not merely reject liberal values, they act to destroy the very 
institutions that protect these values. So why should liberal states not take 
away citizenship from those who attack the very foundations of liberal citi-
zenship? Wouldn’t this serve to defend these states’ core values?
The answer is that the norms guiding the acquisition and loss of citizen-
ship status have little to do with either the promotion or the defence of lib-
eral values. In all states, including liberal ones, citizenship is acquired 
automatically at birth and normally retained over a whole life. Native citi-
zens are never asked to show their commitment to liberal values as a condi-
tion for retaining their citizenship, nor are they stripped of their status when 
they commit crimes. Serious criminals are locked up in prison and thereby 
stripped of many citizenship rights, most importantly that of free movement. 
In some countries they also lose – and in my view much more question-
ably – voting rights. But they do not lose their citizenship status. Citizenship 
in our world has an extremely sticky quality. It does not have an expiry date, 
it can be passed on to subsequent generations and it can be carried abroad 
and increasingly also exercised from outside the state territory.
Yet many liberal states have introduced citizenship tests or naturalisation 
oaths in which immigrants are asked to affirm their commitment to the pol-
ity and its constitution.1 Doesn’t this show that acquisition of citizenship 
status and therefore also its loss may depend on a commitment to liberal 
values? No, it doesn’t. Leaving aside the tricky question whether such com-
mitments can be tested by filling in a questionnaire or taking an oath, natu-
ralisation integrates newcomers into a political community that is based on 
birthright membership and equal citizenship. No matter how they have been 
selected and how they have acquired their citizenship, all citizens have equal 
1 See: Bauböck, R. & Joppke, C. (eds.) (2010), ‘How Liberal are Citizenship 
Tests?’, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies-EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory Working Paper N. 2010/41. Florence: European University 
Institute, available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/13956.
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membership status and those who have got it through naturalisation can 
retain it in the same way as if they had got it by birth.
This statement needs two minor qualifications. First, if citizenship has 
been acquired unlawfully, for example through concealing a criminal record, 
then it may be withdrawn. This reasoning cannot be applied to citizens who 
assert their commitment to a liberal constitution in a citizenship test or loy-
alty oath that they subsequently violate. Because liberal states cannot force 
ordinary citizens to support their core values, they also cannot claim that 
citizenship status has been acquired unlawfully if a naturalisation applicant 
was not sincere when swearing loyalty or was sincere and subsequently 
changed his views.
Second, the norm of equal treatment of native and naturalised citizens is 
not accepted by all liberal states – as we all know, the American President 
must be a native citizen. It is, however, enshrined in Art. 5 of the 1997 
European Convention on Nationality and it is not difficult to see why unequal 
treatment of citizens based on their circumstances of birth is discriminatory 
and undermines the core value of equality. Faced with terrorism that is now 
no longer just imported but also home-grown, Western governments may 
anyhow be reluctant to limit the application of their denationalisation pow-
ers to naturalised immigrants.
There are two closely connected reasons why citizenship status is sticky 
and why it should not be taken away even for acts that attack the foundations 
of the polity. The first reason has to do with the function of nationality in the 
international state system. Citizenship is a mechanism for assigning respon-
sibility for individuals to states. In its 1955 Nottebohm judgment the 
International Court of Justice asserted that citizenship should be based on a 
genuine connection in order to prevent states from abusively bestowing 
their citizenship on individuals residing abroad who want to escape a legal 
duty towards their host country. The same genuine link argument has been 
invoked by the European Parliament and Commission against Malta in 
January 2014 as an objection against the sale of EU citizenship to wealthy 
foreigners without a residence requirement.2 If states can abuse their powers 
to confer citizenship by naturalising foreigners who lack a genuine 
2 See the press release of EU Justice Commissioner Vivian Reding ‘Citizenship 
must not be for sale’ (15 January 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_SPEECH-14-18_fr.htm, the ‘European Parliament resolution of 
16 January 2014 on EU Citizenship for Sale’, available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-
0038+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN and Part I of this volume.
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 connection, they can also do so by denationalising their citizens in order to 
shift responsibility for them to another state. This is exactly what happens 
when Western countries deprive terrorist suspects of their citizenship. As 
Audrey Macklin has already explained, the effects can be particularly per-
verse for dual citizens. Since deprivation does not make them stateless, each 
of the two states involved has an incentive to act first so that the other state 
becomes responsible.
International law can thus not provide a full answer to our question. We 
must also consider what depriving terrorist suspects does to the citizenship 
bond as an internal relation between an individual and a state. Joppke points 
out that Germany did not expatriate the left wing terrorists of the Red Army 
Faction. They wanted to transform the German state whereas the global 
jihadists de facto renounce their membership by affiliating themselves with 
an Islamic pseudo-state. But the RAF was certainly as effective in shaking 
the foundations of a liberal Rechtsstaat by triggering illiberal responses as 
was Al Qaeda when it fell the twin towers in New York – and much more so 
than IS, which primarily wants to scare Western powers out of Iraq and 
Syria. In any case, the question here is not whether Ulrike Meinhof and 
Andreas Baader had a moral claim to German citizenship that jihadist terror-
ist suspects do not have. The question is whether Western democracies can 
shed responsibility for their home-grown citizen terrorists and shoulder it 
upon other states. This is what the new denationalisation policies are about.
Imagine for a moment that after 1945 Germany or Austria had posthu-
mously denationalised Adolf Hitler. Would this symbolic act have strength-
ened their post-war liberal orders by demonstrating their abhorrence of 
Hitler’s destruction of their liberal constitutions and his genocidal elimina-
tion of Jews and Roma from the political community? The answer is clearly 
no, because Hitler’s denationalisation would have entailed a denial of 
responsibility for his crimes and their consequences and would thus have 
achieved the very opposite of the intended defence of liberal values. 
Moreover, if either Germany or Austria had taken such a decision, it would 
have signalled that they merely wanted to pass on the buck to the other state. 
Recognising that Hitler was ‘our bad guy’ was therefore crucial for building 
a liberal democratic consensus in both countries and good relations with 
other states that were the victims of Nazi aggression.
Why should this be different today with the jihadist terrorists? Joppke’s 
answer involves an attempt to distinguish domestic from global terrorists. 
This may be often difficult, since Hitler turned out to be a global terrorist 
too. But the crucial point is that citizenship is by its very nature a domestic 
relation between an individual and a state. By cutting the bond, states deny 
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their responsibility, including that towards the rest of the world upon whom 
they inflict the terrorist threat.
If denationalisation were a necessary and effective tool to prevent terror-
ism, it might be justifiable on such utilitarian grounds. But as a symbolic 
defence of the liberal values that terrorists attack it is entirely 
unconvincing.
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Human Rights for All Is Better than  
Citizenship Rights for Some
Daniel Kanstroom
This is an exceptionally rich and challenging discussion in which I am hon-
oured to participate, though space limitations will inspire brevity. Audrey 
Macklin’s essay reaches two major conclusions with which I heartily agree:
 1. Citizenship-stripping weakens the concept of citizenship;
	2.	 It	is	of	highly-questionable	efficacy	and	legitimacy	as	punishment;1
Despite my deep agreement with Macklin about the dangers of denationali-
sation trends in the UK, Canada, and elsewhere, I am not convinced that she 
has chosen the best way to counter them. In brief, I fear that Macklin may 
have missed some of the forest for the trees.
My view of the forest is this: Denationalisation should be situated against 
a broader backdrop in which pervasive rights deprivations against nonciti-
zens – and even such extraterritorial rights deprivations against citizens as 
drone strikes – are central components. Macklin points us in this direction 
when she distinguishes the aspirational safe harbour of citizenship from a 
functional methodology:
But my point is not to propose a metric capable of measuring the quantitative, 
qualitative,	experiential,	emotional,	personal,	familial,	cultural,	social,	finan-
cial, linguistic and political impacts of exile on any individual, in order that 
some	 state	 official	 could	 determine	 precisely	 when	 citizenship	 revocation	
inflicts	an	appropriate	versus	excessive	degree	of	punishment.
I fully support Macklin’s desire to enhance ‘the security that distinguishes 
legal citizenship.’ I worry, though, about what certain approaches to such 
security	might	mean	for	‘other	statuses	that	define	the	relationship	between	
state and individual.’ The challenge is to protect citizenship rights without 
relegating those ‘other statuses’ unduly tenuous and marginal.




Put simply, I suggest that the best way to do this is less (formally) citi-
zenship–centred and more (functionally) rights-centred. By ‘rights-centred,’ 
I mean, essentially, a critical examination of state practices (including the 
government’s	intentions	and	justifications,	and	the	practices’	mechanisms,	
and effects) measured against the norms of a fully-developed human rights 
protection system.2	More	specifically,	the	important	legal	and	policy	ques-
tions raised by Macklin may be best answered by viewing denationalisation 
along a continuum of state practices that use citizenship status and territorial 
formalism to achieve policy goals with weakened (and in some cases no) 
rule of law encumbrances. This is one of the great human rights legal chal-
lenges of our times. It must be engaged fully – in all of its manifestations – 
in order to be properly understood and effectively engaged.
Macklin rightly notes that, ‘…citizenship revocation is best understood 
as a technique for extending the functionality of immigration law in counter- 
terrorism.’ Moreover, ‘[s]ince 2001, states have turned to deportation to 
resolve threats to national security by displacing the embodied threat to the 
country	of	nationality.’	However,	the	deep	significance	of	these	insights	may	
be lost by too formalistic and narrow an examination of the particular prac-
tice of denationalisation. A basic reason for this is the powerful attraction – 
symbolic and practical – of citizenship as a safe harbour. That, in and of 
itself, is unobjectionable. But it risks denigration of the rights claims of 
noncitizens. Let me emphasize that I do not think that Macklin intends this 
at all. Still, her method may take us there.
Here	is	an	example.	Macklin	writes,	‘Banishment	fits	the	crime	of	disloy-
alty	the	way	capital	punishment	fits	the	crime	of	murder.’	This	works	for	me	
passably well as analogy (though, of course, the ‘crime’ of disloyalty is a 
much more complex proposition than murder). But the analogy prompts a 
question: How does banishment (of citizens) differ from what I have termed 
‘post-entry social control deportation,’ which in the U.S. has resulted in life-
time exclusion of many thousands of long-term legal residents from their 
families and communities due to minor criminal offenses?3 Does their lack 
of citizenship status render the death penalty analogy less apt? In another 
passage, Macklin correctly worries about ‘arbitrary and prejudicial abuse of 
a discretionary power.’ What do we make of the fact that such abuses are 
2 See e.g., A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
UKHL 56, available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/56.html
3 See e.g., Kanstroom, D. (2007), Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American 
History. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Kanstroom, D. (2012), 




rare against citizens and troublingly common against noncitizens? Macklin 
is	thus	right,	but	perhaps	insufficiently	expansive	when	she	asserts	that	the	
particular practice of denationalisation ‘is exile.’ Is denationalisation cate-
gorically different from expulsion and removal of long-term legal residents 
because, as Macklin argues, it ‘extinguishes a singular right of citizenship, 
namely the right to enter and to remain’? This seems formalistic and perhaps 
a bit circular. A fuller exploration might consider the actual effects of depor-
tation and denationalisation on people of various statuses, various levels of 
assimilation, and various fears of harm. This would help explain why the 
‘right’ to enter and remain is so crucial to protect against disproportionate or 
arbitrary state action against all people.
My main concern is about the potential implications of Macklin’s meth-
odology.	The	formalistic	reification	of	citizenship	may	justify	the	relegation	
of noncitizens to a nether world of inferior balancing tests.4 This is espe-
cially	the	case	if	that	reification	is	connected	to	an	implicitly	exclusive	set	of	
rights claims to enter and remain. Noncitizens have such rights, too, at least 
under	certain	circumstances.	Insufficient	attention	to	such	rights	–	though	
they are concededly still works–in-progress – is especially dangerous where 
the rights claims at issue include the right to life, to proportional punish-
ment, to family unity, against arbitrary detention, and to procedural 
fairness.
Let us also consider the etiology and evolution of denationalisation. 
Harsh expulsion and exclusion practices against noncitizens can provide a 
conceptual matrix that facilitates similar practices against citizens. As 
Thomas Jefferson – writing to oppose the Federalists’ Alien Friends Act, 
Alien Enemies Act, and Sedition Act – warned in 1798: ‘The friendless alien 
has	indeed	been	selected	as	the	safest	subject	of	a	first	experiment,	but	the	
citizen will soon follow...’5 The best response to this concern, however, is 
not a regime of exclusive protections only for citizens. Rather, we should 
strengthen reasonable (procedural and substantive) human rights protec-
tions for all people, regardless of status or location. I expect that Macklin 
would	not	 strongly	disagree	with	 this.	 Still,	 insufficient	 attention	 to	 such	
experiments against noncitizens have had metastatic tendencies in the past.
4 I suppose that the opposite might also be true in certain circumstances. Rights 
gains won by citizens could form models that protect long term residents, 
albeit in depreciated form. But this pathway works best if citizenship is viewed 
on a continuum.
5 The Kentucky Resolution, Documents of American History 181 (Henry Steele 
Commager ed., 6th ed. 1958).
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Denationalisation should not be viewed as an anomalous practice that 
requires a unique normative critique grounded on a strong, formalistic con-
ception of citizenship as the (supposed) Arendtian ‘right to have rights.’ 
Rather, it should be viewed as the apotheosis of an evolving array of exclu-
sion and removal practices, as well as the episodic search by governments 
for what some termed Guantánamo Bay: ‘a legal black hole.’6 A more capa-
cious analysis would thus not only critique the British, ‘conducive to the 
public good’ standard as relegating citizens to the status of permanent resi-
dents. It would equally question the standard’s legitimacy and propriety for 
the latter group.7 (Indeed, its attempted application to citizens might be 
ironically salutary, as political opposition will be more readily mobilised if 
it is practiced widely.)
Easy denationalisation deserves normative and practical critique, to be 
sure. As Rainer Bauböck properly highlights, citizenship is (and should be) 
‘sticky’	 and	 thus	 denationalisation	must	 be	 justified	 as	 punishment.	This	
practice	is	ill	advised,	problematic,	and	especially	difficult	to	justify	in	lib-
eral democracies for the reasons he highlights. However, critique should be 
primarily grounded in a broader set of human rights norms that apply when-
ever a state seeks to use its power disproportionately or arbitrarily against 
anyone anywhere. This is especially important for those who are strongly 
assimilated, who would be rendered juridically or functionally stateless or 
who would face severe harm, persecution, or torture.
In a similar vein, I would not recapitulate the rather formalistic and ulti-
mately sterile debate between a ‘right’ and a ‘privilege,’ nor rely too readily 
on Justice Earl Warren’s implicit references to Hannah Arendt. When Warren 
asserted that citizenship is ‘the right to have rights,’ he was tactically using 
this phrase to justify a particular position in a dissent in a 1958 case.8 The 
case involved a U.S. citizen (by birth) who had lived most of his life in Texas 
6 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (concluding: ‘We have assumed 
… that Hamdan is a dangerous individual whose beliefs, if acted upon, would 
cause great harm and even death to innocent civilians, and who would act upon 
those beliefs if given the opportunity. … But in undertaking to try Hamdan and 
subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the 
Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.’) See also, Steyn, J. (2004), 
‘Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’, The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 53 (1): 1–15.
7 By which I mean conformity to the best understanding of the ‘rule of law’ in 
all its aspects, including procedural and substantive protections of basic rights.
8 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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and had voted there in 1946.9 The court narrowly upheld the denationalisa-
tion (also called ‘expatriation’). Justice Warren wrote a somewhat rambling 
dissent built around the (unattributed) reference to Arendt.10 He concluded 
with	 two	 apparently	 contradictory	 propositions.	 The	 first	 was	 seemingly	
absolute, if a bit puzzling: ‘The Government is without power to take citi-
zenship away from a native-born or lawfully naturalized American.’11 The 
second conclusion focused on the intention of the citizen: ‘The citizen may 
elect to renounce his citizenship, and under some circumstances he may be 
found to have abandoned his status by voluntarily performing acts that com-
promise his undivided allegiance to his country.’ Thus, even Justice Warren 
accepted that certain conduct could justify expatriation, so long as the con-
duct was voluntary.12	But	this	fits	poorly	with	the	absolutist	reading	of	the	
‘right to have rights.’ Who would voluntarily relinquish the right to have all 
rights?
Later U.S. cases elaborated on the criterion of voluntariness, ultimately 
elevating it to the dominant principle.13 However, as Justice Harlan once 
noted, the historical evidence limiting government power to voluntary 
9 The 1940 law at issue had been passed largely in response (ironically for our 
purposes) to voting by American citizens in a 1935 plebiscite relating to 
Hitler’s annexation of the Saar region. As one member of congress put it. The 
legislation would ‘relieve this country of the responsibility of those who reside 
in foreign lands and only claim citizenship when it serves their purposes.’ Id. at 
55 (in opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
10 (joined by Justices Douglas and Black)
11 Puzzling because the latter practice (denaturalisation) was well accepted in a 
wide variety of situations, such as where naturalisation had been illegally 
procured. The term, ‘lawfully,’ thus meant that one could not be denaturalised 
absent	a	finding	that	the	naturalisation	(viewed	retrospectively,	had	been	in	
some way unlawful).
12 Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (in which Justice Warren, writing for a 
plurality, found denationalisation of a military deserter to be invalid for similar 
reasons, and also invalid as cruel and unusual punishment, because it resulted 
in ‘the total destruction of an individual’s status in organized society.’)
13 See e.g., Aforyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (‘First we reject the idea…
that…Congress has any general power, express or implied, to take away an 
American citizen’s citizenship without his assent.’); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 
U.S. 252 (1980) (‘[T]rier of fact must in the end conclude that the citizen not 
only voluntarily committed the expatriating act prescribed in the statute, but 
also intended to relinquish his citizenship.’ Proof may be by a ‘preponderance 
of the evidence’ standard.) See also, Pub.L.99–653 (1986) (adopting this 
approach).
Human Rights for All Is Better than Citizenship Rights for Some
212
 expatriation was questionable, to say the least.14 Harlan highlighted a more 
functional, less formalistic defence of citizenship: ‘Once obtained, citizen-
ship is of course protected from arbitrary withdrawal by the constraints 
placed around Congress’ powers by the Constitution….’ This model seems 
to dovetail with Peter Schuck’s proposal in this debate.15 It has the powerful 
virtue of situating denationalisation within the rubric of well-accepted pro-
tections of the rule of law.
Finally, one should also note something obvious but worth highlighting: 
Hannah Arendt’s position was not that citizenship should be the ‘right to 
have rights.’ Rather, as she expressly put it: ‘The Rights of Man, supposedly 
inalienable, proved to be unenforceable…whenever people appeared who 
were no longer citizens of any sovereign state.’16 Her concerns were practi-
cal: Such people lacked any real protection. When she explored the subject 
substantively her argument was much more nuanced: ‘…recent attempts to 
frame a new bill of human rights, which seem to have demonstrated that no 
one	 seems	 able	 to	 define	 with	 any	 assurance	 what	 these	 general	 human	
rights, as distinguished from the rights of citizen, really are.’17 But Arendt 
published The Origins of Totalitarianism in 1951. It hardly needs to be said 
that	–	despite	its	evident	challenges	and	deficiencies	–	the	corpus	of	human	
14 Senator Howard, who had sponsored the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, had conceded that citizenship could be ‘forfeited’ due to ‘the 
commission of some crime.’
15 It should also be noted that US law has long provide for such denationalisation 
for a wide variety of actions, including: ‘committing any act of treason against, 
or attempting by force to overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States, 
violating or conspiring to violate any of the provisions of section 2383 of title 
18, United States Code, or willfully performing any act in violation of section 
2385 of title 18, United States Code, or violating section 2384 of said title by 
engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the 
Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, if and when he 
is convicted thereof by a court martial or by a court of competent jurisdiction.’ 
Immigration and Nationality Act Sec. 349. [8 U.S.C. 1481].
The operative standard, as noted, is the following:
‘A person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturali-
sation, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the following 
acts with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality- …’ Kay 
Hailbronner correctly highlights the prevalence of such standards elsewhere 
though	I	am	less	optimistic	than	he	about	the	ability	of	states	to	define	terrorism	
with	sufficient	precision	to	justify	denationalisation.
16 Arendt, H. (1966), The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace 
& World, Inc., 293.
17	 Indeed,	Arendt	herself	defined	the	‘right	to	have	rights’	not	as	formal	citizen-
ship status as such, but as the right ‘to live in a framework where one is judged 
by one’s actions and opinions…’ She distinguished this from the related ‘right 
to belong to some kind of organized community.’ (Ibid: 296–7)
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rights	 protections	 is	 today	more	 specific,	 more	 robust,	 and	more	 widely	
enforced than was the case during the times she considered.
Arendt also poignantly described the ‘calamity of the rightless’ as ‘that 
they no longer belong to any community whatsoever.’ The main reason this 
was a calamity was that ‘no law exists for them.’18 The best way to avoid 
such calamities is not only to strengthen citizenship protections. That may 
well have the perverse consequences of, on the one hand, rendering citizen-
ship ever harder to achieve, and on the other, relegating noncitizens to an 
increasingly rightless realm. We must do the harder, more basic work of 
defining	and	instantiating	meaningful	human	rights	protections	for	all	peo-
ple,	regardless	of	status,	or	location.	Focusing	too	specifically	on	the	prob-
lem of deprivation of citizenship must not blind us ‘to the numerous small 
and not so small evils with which the road to hell is paved.’19
18 Ibid: 295.
19 Arendt, H. (1994), Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, 
and Totalitarianism. New York: Schocken Books, 271.
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Denationalisation, Assassination, Territory:  
Some (U.S.-Prompted) Reflections
Linda Bosniak
Unlike the several liberal states Macklin cites which have already, or will 
soon, deploy citizenship revocation as an anti-terrorism mechanism, the 
United States is unlikely to implement similar policies. The U.S. Constitution 
has been interpreted to prohibit unilateral citizenship-stripping as a tool of 
governance. Instead, denationalisation via expatriation in the U.S. requires 
the individual to specifically consent to relinquish the status, and such con-
sent cannot be inferred from acts alone – even from acts which some (includ-
ing some commentators in this symposium) would like to characterise as 
intrinsically antithetical to citizenship identity. The vigorous safeguarding 
of individual citizenship in US law is borne of the nation’s history of race- 
based slavery and its aftermath. Today, courts quite stringently interpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship status for ‘all persons 
born or naturalised in the U.S.’ I realise the matter of slavery will seem 
remote from the concerns of contemporary transnational debates over 
citizenship- stripping in Europe and Canada (although it might be worth 
wondering, another day, if ‘slavery’ could ever serve – along with ‘political 
death’ – as a fruitful analytic metaphor here. Think, for example, of the 
recent mass denationalisation of Dominican-born Haitians in the Dominican 
Republic1). Nevertheless, we know that national citizenship law and policy 
look inward as well as outward. In the U.S., the legacy of slavery forms a 
part of a deep conversational grammar about citizenship in a way that will 
almost certainly stay the hand of congressional advocates of the ‘Enemy 
Expatriation Act’ and similar proposed measures.
That the US is not about to join Britain and Canada and other states in a 
politics of forcible expatriation, however, by no means implies that the US 
does not wish to ‘permanently eliminate’ suspected or confirmed terrorists, 
nor that it is unable to do so. Indeed, we have recently seen deployment by 
1 ‘Stateless in the Dominican Republic: Residents stripped of citizenship’, 




the U.S. of what Macklin calls ‘the sovereign’s other technique for perma-
nent elimination’ of such persons: namely: state-inflicted death. The 2013 
assassination of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen was a widely noted 
recent example of this policy (with the apparently accidental assassination 
Anwar’s 16-year-old U.S. citizen son, Abdulrahman, a notorious follow-
 up.) For some commentators, state acts of this kind may appear more ‘pro-
portional’ to the claimed offenses than expatriation is. Personally, I would 
not endorse any policy of assassination, much less when visited upon its 
target without application of due process. But my comments don’t concern 
the policy’s defensibility. Instead, I raise the al-Awlaki case to frame a few 
brief observations about the relationship between citizenship-stripping, tar-
geted assassination and territoriality in the United States and beyond.
First, as Macklin points out, states strip citizenship not merely in order to 
territorially banish the affected going forward but sometimes perhaps, as a 
‘prelude to assassination,’ whether by themselves or others. In particular, 
Macklin cites the cases of Britons who were denationalised and subse-
quently killed by US drone strike in Somalia.2 Denationalisation here can be 
understood to have strategically relieved Britain of the imperative of pro-
tecting its own nationals from harm, including assassination, by another 
state party. In this scenario, denationalisation is not merely a form of politi-
cal death; as Macklin argues, it may facilitate bodily death as well.
Nevertheless, we have also seen that since United States law makes it 
‘easier to kill than expatriate,’ in Peter Spiro’s succinct phrasing,3 the U.S. 
government does not await denationalisation to assassinate its own citizens. 
We could, indeed, view assassination of al Awlaki senior as the nation’s only 
route to denationalise him, with assassination serving as the actual mecha-
nism for stripping his citizenship.
On the other hand, al Awlaki’s assassination precipitated a fascinating 
debate in the United States about territoriality and citizenship which perhaps 
bears on our transnational conversation here. In the wake of the killing, a 
segment of the US political class erupted in concerted anxiety about whether 
2 See ‘British terror suspects quietly stripped of citizenship… then killed by 
drones,’ The Independent, 28 February 2013, available at http://www.indepen-
dent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/british-terror-suspects-quietly-stripped-of-citizen-
ship-then-killed-by-drones-8513858.html and ‘Britain Increasingly Invokes 
Power to Disown Its Citizens’, The New York Times, 9 April 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/world/europe/britains-power-to-disown-
its-citizens-raises-questions.html?_r=3




the government actually claimed authority not only to assassinate US citi-
zens abroad but to do the same ‘on US soil.’ Senator Rand Paul led a filibus-
ter against the confirmation of proposed CIA Director John Brennan, 
promising to ‘speak as long as it takes until the alarm is sounded from coast 
to coast that our Constitution is important, that your rights to trial by jury are 
precious, [and] that no American should be killed by a drone on American 
soil without first being charged with a crime, [and] found…guilty by a 
court.’ Much media fan-flaming followed, and eventually, Attorney General 
Eric Holder conceded that targeting any U.S. citizen for assassination within 
national territory – in the absence of imminent threat – is unacceptable. 4
What was striking in this episode was the normative distinction taken up 
in popular discourse between in-country and out-of-country citizen assassi-
nation. The implied claim was that death of a citizen by its own government 
was somehow uniquely intolerable when accomplished inside national ter-
ritorial bounds. For that moment, at least, the American political imaginary 
seemed to coalesce more around fear of tyrannical government than of the 
foreign terrorist within.
Of course, if government were in fact bound by this normative logic – 
i.e., that territorially present citizens are uniquely out of bounds for targeted 
killing – then the target would need to be denationalised and/or territorially 
expelled first and only executed thereafter. Yet since the US state is con-
strained in denationalising citizens, and since, like all states, it is precluded 
from expelling citizens, it would seem to have to await such person’s travel 
outside the country in order to strike. This seems odd, yet it notably parallels 
the form denationalisation practices take in many countries – where, accord-
ing to Macklin, governments tend to strip citizenship from those citizens 
who are already located abroad. In both settings, we see not only that 
territorially- present citizens are regarded as possessing more fundamental 
protections against government power than those territorially absent, but 
that governments make opportunistic use of citizen absence to act against 
them. Among other things, this amounts to a kind of penalty on citizen 
mobility, and seems to rest on an arbitrary locational distinction. This, at 
least, is what the US Supreme Court itself concluded in 1957 in a related 
context when it wrote that a citizen’s constitutional rights may not ‘be 
stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.’5
4 For more extensive discussion and citations, see Bosniak, L. (2013), ‘Soil and 
Citizenship’, Fordham L. Rev. 82 (5): 2069–2075.
5 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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Of course, territoriality’s relationship with citizenship sometimes reaches 
back well beyond any possible denationalisation and assassination to the 
moment of the citizen’s birth. For some, the Awlaki affair itself evoked long-
standing debates about assignment of citizenship based on territorial pres-
ence at birth, with Awlaki an exemplar of the ‘nominal citizen’ whose 
extraterritoriality for most of his post-natal life rendered his social attach-
ment to the nation ‘highly attenuated’ (to use Macklin’s phrase). Yet in this 
setting as well, the United States will remain robustly-citizenship protective. 
The country’s inclusive birthright citizenship rules are another stanchion of 
its post-slavery, post-Civil War, constitutionalism. Consequently, and much 
as some ‘anti-birthers’ wish it were otherwise, citizenship cannot be easily 
eliminated on the front end here, except by way more stringent immigration 
and border control policies to prevent, ex ante, potential parents’ territorial 
presence. Broadly drawn and often selectively-applied grounds of inadmis-
sibility and deportability based on ‘terrorist activity’ arguably go some of 
the distance in accomplishing that end.6
In short, citizenship status, especially for those in national territory, still 
remains more secure in the U.S. than it is in some other national settings. 
Our government works to counter the alleged ‘bad guys’ (Bauböck’s short-
hand) by different means.
6 E.g., Legomsky, S. H. (2005), ‘The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of 
Noncitizens: National Security and International Human Rights’, Boston 
College Third World Law Journal 25 (1): 161-196.
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Beware States Piercing Holes into Citizenship
Matthew J. Gibney
I find a great deal to agree with in Audrey Macklin’s trenchant and wide- 
ranging argument against denationalisation power’s recent revival in 
Western countries. Yet I also understand where her critics are, somewhat 
abrasively, coming from. It is of course possible to imagine carefully fash-
ioned cases where denationalisation seems a morally appropriate response 
as long as a range of guarantees are met (for example, when an individual 
represents a clear threat to the state, where there are no doubts about his guilt 
or intentions, and where he could be stripped of citizenship without being 
made stateless.) However, while this realisation might help us identify the 
terms on which the denationalisation of a particular individual is permissi-
ble, it tells us little about the broader consequences of piercing the norm of 
unconditional citizenship for punitive reasons.1 I think that once we are real-
istic about the political dangers of conceding to the state powers to withdraw 
citizenship, we’re brought back to a position compatible with Audrey 
Macklin’s ban on denationalisation.
Before explaining why I think an absolute bar might be justified let make 
a couple of comments on the previous discussion. The first of these is on 
what one might call the statelessness constraint. All of the critics of Audrey 
Macklin’s position start (with the possible exception of Christian Joppke) by 
accepting that individuals, even those who commit terrorist acts, should not 
be made stateless. This constraint against statelessness is not simply a matter 
of international or domestic law; it is also a normative constraint that stems 
from basic liberal commitments. The problem with statelessness is that it 
leaves individuals subject to state power without citizenship’s basic protec-
tions against that power, including security of residence, political rights, and 
potentially a host of other entitlements. If we accept this normative rationale 
for guarding against statelessness, as I think we should, we will also want to 
1 My focus in this short piece is exclusively on the punitive withdrawal of 
citizenship. There are, of course, other reasons why states have sought to 
‘pierce’ citizenship, for example, to address fraudulent acquisition of citizen-
ship or to prevent dual nationality.
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ensure that those denationalised are not made de facto stateless, that is, 
forced to rely on a state that is unable and unwilling to protect them or oth-
erwise to deliver the fundamental rights citizenship (or nationality) is sup-
posed to guarantee.2
Yet taking this additional constraint seriously is going to be very conse-
quential. The secondary citizenships of the individuals Western states most 
want to strip of citizenship tend to be those of countries with dubious human 
rights records and histories of civil war and conflict (Somalia, Iraq, Eritrea, 
Sudan, to name a few).3 If de facto statelessness is a bar, most of the prime 
targets are going to be out of denationalisation’s reach. Of course, de facto 
statelessness does not establish a case for an absolute rejection of the state’s 
power to denationalise. But it does show why the power’s scope may be 
very narrow indeed, at least for liberals.
Second, I find myself attracted to the position of Rainer Bauböck that 
one reason denationalisation is unacceptable is because it involves states 
‘passing the buck’ of their own responsibilities on to other states, a point that 
adds a different dimension to Audrey Macklin’s claim that citizenship is, in 
important respects, not fungible. This view that banishment is unfair to other 
states is a very old one. None other than Voltaire argued against the practice 
of banishment on the grounds that it involves throwing into our neighbour’s 
field the stones that incommode us in our own.
Powerful as it is, however, the consideration that there’s something 
wrong with denationalising ‘home grown’ terrorists, wouldn’t mean that 
denationalisation was always inappropriate. States might still claim the 
moral right to denationalise individuals who had held citizenship only for a 
short period of time or had spent most of their lives living in the other 
2 Cf. Barry, C. & L. Ferracioli (2013), ‘Withdrawing Citizenship’, paper 
delivered at the Australian National University, Canberra, 16 July 2013. I 
accept that specifying exactly what is included in the concept of ‘de facto 
statelessness’ is not necessarily clear, as is the relationship between de facto 
statelessness and simple human rights abuses. A good starting point for further 
consideration of this issue is Sawyer, C. & B. K. Blitz (eds.) (2011), 
Statelessness in the European Union: displaced, undocumented, unwanted. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3 Note, for example, the second nationalities of the denationalised individuals 





 country in which they held citizenship. Germany certainly should not have 
posthumously denationalised Hitler. But Hitler was the leader of the German 
state and celebrated in this role by a significant proportion of the German 
people during the 1930s and 1940s. Putting aside the question of what 
should be done posthumously, some citizens have a much more tenuous, 
even a merely nominal, relationship to the state. Not all are even grown at 
home.
These considerations help to clarify some of the constraints necessary for 
a liberal denationalisation power. Even from the short discussion here, we 
can identify plenty of others. Peter Schuck suggests that an individual’s 
threat to the state needs to be ‘rigorously proven’ and Kay Hailbronner 
argues that citizenship deprivation must be ‘subject to proportionality’. It’s 
clear that satisfying all of these different requirements will make the con-
struction of denationalisation law consistent with liberal principles a 
Herculean task. However, where I part company with the denationalisers is 
not so much over whether it’s possible to identify a liberal starting point for 
the practice.4 Rather, my concern is over the illiberal direction denationali-
sation seems likely to take once it returns to the political repertoire. Here my 
position has been greatly influenced by the recent experience of the UK.5
When denationalisation was first revived after over thirty years of desue-
tude by the Blair government in 2002, the power was tightly constrained: the 
definition incorporated was taken from the European Convention on 
Nationality, only dual nationals were targeted, and an automatic judicial 
appeal was to follow any decision by the Home Secretary. The government 
promised to use the power rarely. This modest beginning for denationalisa-
tion did not last. After the London bombings in July 2005, a new act passed 
by the Blair government in 2006 lowered the standard required for denation-
alisation. While previously the Home Secretary had to be satisfied that an 
individual had engaged in actions that threatened the ‘vital interests of the 
UK’ state, now he or she had only to be satisfied that taking away someone’s 
citizenship was ‘conducive to the public good’. The standard for continuing 
4 I discuss the normative complexities of denationalisation in Gibney, M. J. 
(2013), ‘Should citizenship be conditional? The ethics of denationalization’, 
The Journal of Politics 75 (3): 646–658.
5 I give a fuller account of the history of UK denaturalisation power in Gibney, 
M. J. (2013), ‘“A Very Transcendental Power”: Denaturalisation and the 
Liberalisation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom’, Political Studies 61 (3): 
637–655.
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to hold British citizenship had now become the same as the one used to 
judge whether a non-citizen should be deported. Even after this radical 
change, it was possible to convince oneself that the government would use 
the power sparingly. Only a handful of people lost their citizenship under the 
Labour government’s watch.
But with the coming of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition 
government things have gone seriously awry. In the Cameron government’s 
first year of office in 2010-11, no fewer than six people were stripped of 
their citizenship. This was more people than the Blair and Brown govern-
ments had denaturalised in the previous nine years (in the immediate after-
math of the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005). The 
enthusiastic use of deprivation power has continued apace in the years since, 
though almost always in secret. By May 2014, it was evident that Cameron’s 
government had some 23 people stripped of citizenship on ‘not conducive’ 
grounds in the last three years. Almost all of these individuals were stripped 
of citizenship while outside the UK, undermining real access to appeal pro-
cedures. In January 2014 the government presented a bill to parliament 
requesting the power to strip citizenship from naturalised citizens even if 
they would be made stateless. The amendment passed, albeit, in a modified 
form. Under current law in the UK a naturalised citizen can be made state-
less if the Home Secretary deems there are reasonable grounds for believing 
they have access to another citizenship.
Now it might be said – and Christian Joppke would probably be the one 
to say it – that the UK is an outlier. The unravelling of constraints on dena-
tionalisation evident in Britain is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere because 
other Western countries are less insouciant about protecting rights. But note 
that the circumstances that have geed along transformation in UK law are 
generally applicable: terrorist events (the 2005 Tube bombing) and a change 
of government (the coming of the Conservatives to power). Moreover, I’m 
not confident that other countries are as legally protected against creep of 
denationalisation power as they might seem. Australia has fewer rights 
based protections even than the UK; Canada has some alarming inclusions 
in its recent denationalisation legislation, including the state’s ability to rely 
on a conviction for terrorist offences in another country; and, as I write, a 
large number of prominent US politicians (buoyed by public opinion polls) 
have effectively endorsed torture as a practice for dealing with terrorists past 
and future.
I thus find myself agreeing with Audrey Macklin’s embrace of uncondi-
tional citizenship, albeit because I fear where we will end up if we try to 
pierce even a small – liberal size – hole into citizenship to punish terrorists. 
M. J. Gibney
223
Liberalism is not simply a set of principles, it’s also a political stance – one 
that encourages a healthy scepticism of state attempts to encroach upon 
established rights and protections. In these fraught times, it is wise to adopt 
the stance as well as to protect the principles.
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Macklin’s kick-off focused ‘exclusively on denationalisation for allegedly 
disloyal conduct by a citizen, while a citizen’. Most contributions to this 
debate weighed the predicament of the former citizen against state interests. 
In my contribution, I offer a typology of cases in which revocation could be 
sought according to some of the contributors. I contend that disowning of 
citizens by their states is incoherent, tenuous, or disingenuous.
The first type of case involves acts which, according to Hailbronner, 
undermine the constitutional order by seriously threatening public safety 
and state security. Hailbronner contends that individuals performing such 
acts ‘have given up their attachment to a community by attacking the very 
fundament of that community, not by merely violating its internal rules of 
public order’. However, this line-drawing exercise seems to be quite diffi-
cult: every crime may cause insecurity, threaten public order, and prevent 
democratic societies from functioning properly; citizens (and decision- 
makers, including those entrusted with citizenship revocation) will diverge, 
based on their ideological biases, as to whether particular crimes cross 
Hailbronner’s threshold. For instance, did the perpetrators of the Brighton 
hotel bombing on 12 October 1984 cross the threshold in light of the poten-
tial ramifications of Thatcher’s assassination for the stability of the United 
Kingdom? If so, would a person financing such an attack qualify, too?
Nevertheless, perhaps a ‘core’ case can be identified, such as a criminal 
conviction for treason. One of the constituent elements of such acts is often 
that they are committed by citizens qua citizens. For instance, Lord Haw- 
Haw (William Joyce) could be convicted of espionage for Germany in the 
Second World War because he possessed British nationality; he unsuccess-
fully argued that he did not owe loyalty to the Crown.1 If the basis for Joyce’s 
conviction was that his crimes against the state were committed as a British 
national, then disowning Joyce ex post facto seems incoherent: the state 
1 ‘Lord Haw-Haw – The Nazi broadcaster who threatened Britain’, Lord 
Haw-Haw Collection, BBC Archive, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/archive/
hawhaw/
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must reject the claim that treasonous acts amount to renunciation of citizen-
ship, because that would disable the state from prosecuting the perpetrator 
for treason (for an analogous argument concerning the legitimacy of disen-
franchisement of convicted adult citizens, see my article2).
The second type of case involves crimes (including crimes defined as 
‘terrorism’ under international treaties or domestic law) committed by a citi-
zen of state A against individuals or institutions in state B. The fact that the 
person who has committed such crimes holds the citizenship of state A 
seems incidental. Consider the attack on the Jewish museum of Belgium in 
Brussels on 24 May 2014, which is likely to have been carried out by a 
French national affiliated with ISIL3. ISIL has been designated as a terrorist 
organisation by the EU, of which France is a member, as well as by the 
UN. Were France to revoke the citizenship of this member of an internation-
ally designated terrorist organisation, it would be severing legal relations 
with a citizen even though the citizen’s actions were not directed specifically 
towards the French state, its institutions, or its population. This seems rather 
tenuous.
Joppke argued that ‘international terrorists are not criminals but war-
riors’. But the state exercises its sovereign powers vis-à-vis ‘international 
terrorists’ qua citizens. The fact that such persons commit acts that are of an 
international character does not make it more plausible for their state of 
nationality to legally disown them as a result. Hailbronner argues that ‘[w]
hat makes international terrorism so distinctive is … also its relevance for 
discontinuance of that special relationship established by citizenship.’ I am 
not quite sure why engagement in international terrorism (such as the ISIL- 
sponsored attack on the Jewish museum) necessarily or even plausibly indi-
cate that a citizenship bond has been severed by the terrorist. This seems to 
conflate the fact that their state of nationality perceives (and rightly so) the 
terrorist’s act as heinous with a direct effect on that state.
The third type of case concerns acts which are committed by a citizen in 
the name of the Ancien Régime. Following political transformation, the 
state wishes to disassociate itself from such past acts by dissociating itself 
2 Ziegler, R. (2011), ‘Legal Outlier, Again? U.S. Felon Suffrage: Comparative 
and International Human Rights Perspectives’, Boston University International 
Law Journal 29 (2); Oxford Student Legal Studies Paper No. 01/2011. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1689665
3 ‘French suspect in Brussels Jewish museum attack spent year in Syria’, The 




from the perpetrators. As Bauböck rightly notes, Hitler’s posthumous dena-
tionalisation by either Germany or Austria would have been considered ‘a 
denial of responsibility for his crimes and their consequences’. In addition 
to the revocation’s outward-looking dimension (towards the international 
community), it has an inward-looking dimension too. When Augusto 
Pinochet stood trial in in 2004, he was charged with crimes committed by 
him as head of the military junta which ruled Chile after the 1973 coup. He 
died in 2006 before the conclusion of his trial. Let’s imagine that Pinochet 
had another (nominal) citizenship, and that his conviction would have 
resulted in his denationalisation. This would have seemed, rightly, as an 
attempt to undermine the fact that these acts were committed in the name of 
the Chilean state.
Paskalev asserted that, ironically, the ‘softness of citizenship revocation 
makes it appear quite inappropriate for the case of terrorists’. However, even 
if (some) terrorists may be blasé about losing their citizenship, we ought to 
be concerned about states’ eagerness to wash their hands of them.
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Our Epoch’s Little Banishments
Saskia Sassen
I arrive late to this discussion, to these excellent pieces that cover much 
ground... not much left to cover. For the sake of debate and commentary, 
rather than scholarly analysis, let me throw into the discussion what is no 
more than a little wrench.
Denationalisation is an ambiguous concept. This discussion has given it 
one sharp meaning: being stripped of one’s nationality and thrown out of 
one’s country. In my own work I have used it to capture more ambiguous 
meanings, thereby giving it the status of a variable that can be applied to a 
range of domains, not only citizenship.1
Thus, I see denationalisation at work when, beginning in the 1980s, 
global firms pushed for and got most national governments to institute 
deregulations and privatisations so as to maximise their access into any 
national economy.2 It meant that states had to denationalise key elements of 
the legal framing (i.e. protections) they had long offered their own firms, 
markets, investors. One might say that in doing so, these states instituted a 
partial ‘banishment’ of their own national firms from a legal framing that 
granted these national firms exclusive privileges/rights. This is a form of 
banishment that does not entail a physical departure from a country’s terri-
tory. It only entails a loss of particular exclusive rights and protections. We 
can conceive of it as a kind of micro-banishment.
Similarly, I would argue that such internal micro-banishments are also 
present in the decisions of many national states, beginning in the 1980s and 
onwards, to eliminate a few rights here and there that their citizens may long 
have had. Examples for the U.S. are, among several others, Clinton’s 1996 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act which took 
away the rights of citizens to bring legal action against the INS in lower 
1 See chapters 4, 5, and 6 in Sassen, S. (2008), Territory, Authority, Rights: From 
Medieval to Global Assemblages, 2nd ed. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.
2 Sassen, S (2017), ‘Predatory Formations Dressed in Wall Street Suits and 
Algorithmic Math’, Science, Technology & Society 22 (1): 1–15.
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courts; or when credit card companies obtained the right to pursue payment 
even if a household had declared bankruptcy – a right so abusive it eventu-
ally got cancelled. We might argue that in these cases, citizens experienced 
a partial banishment from specific rights (even as some new rights were also 
attained, notably gay marriage). The better language to describe these losses 
may be what Audrey Macklin refers to elsewhere as civil death.3
Current examples for the gains of rights for global firms and the loss of 
protections for national firms and workers can be found in some of the 
clauses of both the Transpacific and the Transatlantic Trade Partnerships.
Long before we get to the dramatic figure of the terrorist, where the 
debate about banishment turns clearly pro or contra, I see a range of micro- 
banishments that take place deep inside national territory. If I wanted to give 
this image an extreme character, I would say that in today’s interaction prone 
world (see, for instance, the earlier behind closed-doors negotiations 
between Iran and the U.S., or, for a period, between the U.S. and the Taliban) 
there is no more terra nullius for banishment.
If I were to use the term ‘banishment,’ I would want to use its conceptual 
power to get at the multiple little banishments that happen inside our coun-
tries and that often entail a move into systemic invisibility – the loss of 
rights as an event that produces its own partial, or specialised, erasure. I 
refer to these micro-banishments as expulsions, a term I intend as radically 
different from the more common term ‘exclusion,’ which refers to a condi-
tion internal to a system, such as discrimination.4 I conceive of such expul-
sions as a systemic capability, clearly a use of the term capability that 
diverges from the common use which marks it as a positive. Thus micro- 
banishments can be seen as a profoundly negative systemic capability that is 
far more widespread than our current categories of analysis allow us to see.5
To conclude I would like to return to Audrey Macklin’s argument.
I agree with Audrey Macklin’s proposition that citizens should not be ban-
ished even when they engage in terrorist attacks on their own country. I share 
3 Macklin, A. (2014), ‘Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and 
the Production of the Alien’, Queen’s Law Journal 40 (1): 1–54, at 8.
4 Sassen, S. (2014), Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global 
Economy. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
5 This also raises the possibility of an obverse condition: that the tissue con-
structed via the recurrence of micro-banishments inside a nation-state could, 
with time, become the tissue for a claim to transnational citizenship. Could it 
be that as citizens experience the limits of national citizenship, transversal 
notions of membership become more plausible? I am thinking here of substan-
tive conditions for transnational citizenship, not just ideational ones.
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her concern with the importance of protecting a robust form of citizenship. 
But I do so partly also from a transversal and dystopian perspective that may 
have little to do with the rationale put forth by Macklin. Let me clarify. It is not 
only terrorists that are destructive and attack the innocent; it is also predatory 
actors of all sorts – corporate firms that exploit workers worldwide, financial 
speculators, abusive prison systems. Further I agree with Macklin that a coun-
try should develop the needed internal instruments to deal with terrorists rather 
than banish them. But again, I would take this beyond terrorists who are citi-
zens, and include the types of predatory actors I refer to above.
Beyond all of this, I am above all concerned with the larger history in the 
making that I refer to earlier in this short text. This larger history is shaping 
an epochal condition that takes me away from prioritising banishment as 
loss of citizenship and of the right to live in one’s country as discussed in 
this Forum.
Briefly put, I would argue that the conceptual locus of the category ban-
ishment in today’s world is not banishment in the historical sense of the 
term, but a new kind of banishment. It is one predicated on the formation of 
geographies of privilege and disadvantage that cut across the divides of our 
modernity – East-West, North-South. The formation of such geographies 
includes a partial disassembling of the modern national territorial project, 
one aspiring (and dependent on) national unity, whether actual or idealised. 
This then also means that there is a weakening of the explanatory power of 
the nation-based encasements of membership (for citizens, for firms, for 
political systems) that have marked our modernity. The micro-banishments 
I refer to are part of emergent (and proliferating!) geographies of disadvan-
tage (for citizens, firms, districts) internal to a country.
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Deprivation of Citizenship: Is There  
an Issue of EU Law?
Jo Shaw
The purpose of this short intervention in the debate on The Return of 
Banishment initiated by Audrey Macklin, where the pros and cons of vari-
ous forms of deprivation policies pursued by, or sought by, liberal states 
have been fully debated, is to add an element of EU law. Specifically, in the 
light of the judgments of the European Court of Justice in Rottmann1 and 
Ruiz Zambrano2, how – if at all – are Member States’ laws and procedures 
on involuntary loss of citizenship affected by EU law, given that the primary 
competence to determine the rules on the acquisition and loss of citizenship 
remains with Member States? At the time of the hearing, well informed 
observers3 who followed the UK Supreme Court hearing in the case of B2 
(Pham) v SSHD4 concerned with the UK’s rather extensive deprivation 
powers and the issue of statelessness indicated that they thought it likely that 
the Supreme Court would make a reference to the Court of Justice. It seemed 
that the judges would ask the CJEU if it really meant what it said when it 
decided the case of Rottmann. B2 (Pham), like the earlier cases of G1 (dis-
cussed below) and as well as the case of 5, a former Iraqi citizen who has 
1 C-135/08, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-135/08
2 C-34/09, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.
jsf?language=en&num=C-34/09
3 Cox, S. (2014), ‘Rottmann Rules UK? Can British citizenship be taken away 
without regard to EU law?’, EU Law Analysis, available at http://eulawanaly-
sis.blogspot.com.es/2014/11/rottmann-rules-uk-can-british.html; Woodrow, P. 
(2014), ‘Statelessness, deprivation of nationality, and EU Citizenship…what is 
B2 in the Supreme Court really all about?’, freemovement, available at https://
www.freemovement.org.uk/statelessness-deprivation-of-nationality-and-eu-
citizenshipwhat-is-b2-in-the-supreme-court-really-all-about/. In the event, no 
reference was made [comment added in June 2018 to text prepared in 2014].
4 Pham (Appellant) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) 
[2015] UKSC 19, available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2013-
0150.html
5 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Al -Jedda [2013] UKSC 62 (9 
October 2013), available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2013/62.html
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twice been stripped of his UK citizenship as well as spending time in mili-
tary detention in Iraq6, all concern naturalised citizens who are suspected of 
some form of terrorist involvement, but against none of whom criminal pro-
ceedings have been brought in the UK.
We are likely, therefore, to be in a phase of further legal development – 
initially in iteration between the UK courts and the Court of Justice, but with 
implications for all of the Member States as quite a number of states have 
started to look closely at using expatriation measures in order to combat 
radicalisation and terrorist threats, even if many judge this approach to be 
ill-advised and inappropriate.
I will explain briefly what the issues are. The Rottmann case was the 
subject of an earlier Forum Debate7 on the EUDO Citizenship website. 
Rottmann was a case of loss of citizenship conferred by naturalisation, after 
it came to light that the naturalisation had been obtained by fraud. In this 
case, Rottmann, an Austrian citizen, had failed to reveal that he had been the 
subject of unconcluded criminal proceedings in Austria when seeking natu-
ralisation in Germany. Rottmann raised issues of EU law in his appeal 
against the deprivation decision before the German administrative courts, 
which led to a reference to the Court of Justice. He pointed out that having 
obtained German citizenship he lost Austrian citizenship, by operation of 
law. Thus, if he were deprived of German citizenship he would be stateless, 
and – furthermore – he would have lost his EU citizenship. One issue that 
had been raised – and which caught the attention of Advocate General 
Maduro in his Opinion – was whether this was a ‘wholly internal situation’ – 
i.e. a German court reviewing a decision of a German public authority 
regarding a German citizen. In that sense, it could be said, EU citizenship 
was not engaged at all. In response, the Court repeated its standard formula-
tion when dealing with matters which fall outside the competence of the EU 
and its legislature. It reminded us that EU cannot adopt measures with regard 
to national citizenship, but none the less while national competence remains 
intact, it must be exercised ‘with due regard’ to the requirements of EU law 
in situations covered by EU law. Specifically, in this case, said the Court:
6 ‘Al-Jedda, “statelessness” and the meaning of words’, Freemovement, 25 
October 2013, available at https://www.freemovement.org.uk/
al-jedda-statelessness-and-the-meaning-of-words/
7 Shaw, J. (2011), ‘Has the European Court of Justice Challenged Member State 
Sovereignty in Nationality Law?’, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory Working Paper No. 2011/62, 




It is clear that the situation of a citizen of the Union who, like the applicant in 
the main proceedings, is faced with a decision withdrawing his naturalisation, 
adopted by the authorities of one Member State, and placing him, after he has 
lost the nationality of another Member State that he originally possessed, in a 
position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by Article 17 EC 
[i.e. Union citizenship] and the rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of its 
nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European Union law (para. 
42 of the judgment).
The Court went on to recognise that states may have legitimate reasons to 
withdraw citizenship, but it is worth noting that the Court of Justice does 
not, in this paragraph, focus on statelessness, but rather on the loss of the 
rights specific to EU law. In other words, this can be seen as an EU-specific 
reason for requiring the testing of any decision to withdraw citizenship 
against – as the Court went on to hold – a standard of proportionality. Factors 
to be borne in mind in assessing the proportionality of the withdrawal deci-
sion included the gravity of the original offence or deception, lapse of time, 
the impact on the subject of the decision and their family, the possibility of 
recovering the original citizenship lost at the time of naturalisation, and the 
availability of other less severe measures than withdrawal.
While some have suggested that the essence of Rottmann lay in the way 
that the claimant is strung across between the national citizenship laws of 
two EU Member States, one at least of which claims exclusivity and thus 
operates an automatic rule of withdrawal in the event that a citizen acquires 
the citizenship of another state, the point about loss of the benefits of EU 
citizenship as a freestanding principle of EU law without regard to prior 
movement from one Member State to another was given a further boost in 
the case of Ruiz Zambrano. In that case, the EU citizens threatened with los-
ing their rights of citizenship were the children of the claimant, who were 
born in Belgium and who had acquired Belgian, and thus EU, citizenship at 
birth. Meanwhile, through a combination of circumstances their Colombian 
citizen father had not regularised his situation in Belgium (or had perhaps 
been prevented from doing so by a series of delays perpetrated by the 
Belgian authorities in relation to his case). Because the refusal of a residence 
permit for Ruiz Zambrano and his wife would, in effect, have meant that the 
EU citizen children would have been obliged to leave, with their parents, the 
territory of the EU and thus would not have been able to avail themselves of 
their rights as EU citizens (notably the right of free movement which they 
had not yet exercised, but which they might exercise in the future), the Court 
concluded that a Member State could not refuse to grant either a residence 
permit or indeed a work permit. The test that the Court articulated was 
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whether the measure taken in relation to a third country national upon whom 
the EU citizen children were dependent was whether it would make them 
unable to exercise ‘the substance of their rights’ as citizens of the EU.
Neither Rottmann nor – in particular – Ruiz Zambrano have been met 
with unalloyed enthusiasm at the national level. It goes beyond the scope of 
this short comment to discuss how and why Member States and indeed their 
courts might react to challenging judgments of the Court of Justice that 
appear to extend the scope of EU law and, in particular, the scope of EU citi-
zenship.8 That said, there is no evidence to suggest that, thus far, Rottmann 
has had a significant or disruptive effect on national citizenship laws.9
The UK is one of the few states where Rottmann has thus far been dis-
cussed in national cases, but – until the case of B2 (Pham) which is before 
the Supreme Court – the limit of consideration had been a rather dismissive 
swipe at the Court of Justice taken by Lord Justice Laws in the Court of 
Appeal in the case of G1 v SSHD10. Laws LJ sceptically asked ‘[u]pon what 
principled basis, therefore, should the grant or withdrawal of State citizen-
ship be qualified by an obligation to “have due regard” to the law of the 
European Union?’ (para. 38), given that the grant and withdrawal of citizen-
ship remains a matter of Member State competence.
The Supreme Court refused to give leave to appeal to the applicant in G1, 
but perhaps it was only a matter of time, given the salience of deprivation of 
citizenship in the UK at the present time, before it had to grasp the nettle of 
considering not only the meaning of statelessness in the context of the then 
applicable UK law (this having moved on somewhat since that time, as 
Gibney’s contribution to the Forum highlights) but also the possible appli-
cability of EU law as a restraint upon executive freedom, and as a standard 
8 Blauberger, M. (2012), ‘With Luxembourg in mind ... the remaking of national 
policies in the face of ECJ jurisprudence’, Journal of European Public Policy 
19 (1): 109–126; Blauberger, M. (2014), ‘National Responses to European 
Court Jurisprudence’, West European Politics 37 (3): 457–474; Schmidt, S. 
(2014), ‘Judicial Europeanisation: The Case of Zambrano in Ireland’, West 
European Politics 37 (4): 769–785.
9 See Shuibhne, N. N. & J. Shaw (2014), ‘General Report General Report: 
Union Citizenship: Development, Impact and Challenges’, in U. Neergaard, 
C. Jacqueson & N. Holst-Christensen (eds.), Union Citizenship: Development, 
Impact and Challenges. The XXVI FIDE Congress in Copenhagen, Congress 
Publications Vol. 2, Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing. at p. 154–155.




which UK courts, in exercising their review function, would need to uphold. 
Hence the appellant in B2 has been given leave to appeal, with perhaps a 
reference to the Court of Justice still to come.
As the discussion by Simon Cox11, a lawyer working with the Open 
Society Institute which intervened in this case12, has made clear, it seems 
quite likely that if the applicability of EU law as a frame of reference against 
which UK deprivation legislation needs to be judged is duly established by 
the Court of Justice and accepted by the Supreme Court, then the propor-
tionality standards which need to be applied by UK courts exercising their 
review function may differ from those otherwise applicable within UK pub-
lic law. The key issue seems likely to surround the putative autonomy of EU 
citizenship: is there a freestanding EU law related concern with citizenship 
stripping, namely the loss of EU citizenship rights, which goes beyond the 
issue of statelessness? Rottmann seemed to suggest there was, but this is the 
issue on which the Supreme Court may probe the CJEU further. It should be 
noted that there may also be higher standards of disclosure of otherwise 
secret evidence, following the judgment of the Court of Justice in the ZZ 
case13, if the applicability of EU law is accepted.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the OSI interest in the case is not 
directly with the Rottmann point, but concerns the definition of stateless-
ness, which, they argue also has an EU element and should have a common 
EU level definition to which Member States are obliged to adhere. This call 
stems from the fear that in its earlier judgment in B2 (Pham) the Court of 
Appeal14 created significant difficulties when it resolved that B2 was not to 
be judged as de jure stateless, once deprived of UK citizenship, because 
although the Vietnamese government indicated they did not recognise him 
as a citizen, it was clear that this was unlawful under Vietnamese law.
The UK courts, said the Court of Appeal, were bound by the rule of law. 
Therefore, they could not recognise an unlawful act of the Vietnamese gov-
ernment. This seems to be peculiarly Kafka-esque reasoning and the OSI, 
given its investment in the campaign against statelessness on-going under 
11 Cited above n. 3.
12 Case No. UKSC 2013/0150, available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/sites/default/files/b2-v-home-secretary-case-intervener-20 141105_0.pdf
13 C-300/11, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-300/11
14 B2 v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 616 (24 
May 2013), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/616.
html
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the leadership of the UNHCR, would be concerned if this reasoning were to 
take hold in the UK, which is bound to have further cases coming before the 
courts, given the remarkable rate15 at which the state is now expatriating its 
citizens on grounds that this is conducive to the public good.
15 ‘Government release number of deprived of British citizenship since 2013’, 
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 19 December 2014, available at 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2014-12-19/
government-release-number-deprived-of-british-citizenship-since-2013
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On Producing the Alien Within: A Reply
Audrey Macklin
Shortly after the last contributor posted a comment on this Forum, reports of 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks erupted in the media. The assailants were two 
French brothers (Cherif and Siad Kouachi) who claimed affiliation to Al 
Qaeda in Yemen. Hours later, an associate (Amiday Coulibaly) killed a 
police officer, then rampaged through a kosher Hyper Cacher supermarket 
and murdered four hostages. All three men were slain two days later in con-
frontations with French police and security. That same day, the notorious 
‘Finsbury Mosque cleric’, British national Abu Hamza, was sentenced to 
life in prison by a US court for terrorism related crimes. Most recently, the 
French Conseil Constitutionnel upheld a law permitting denaturalisation of 
dual-national French citizens convicted of terrorist offences.1 One cannot 
but wonder whether the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks cast a long 
shadow over the Conseil Constitutionnel’s deliberations, even though all 
three men were French by birth and therefore outside the purview of the 
denaturalisation law.
The horrific deeds of the French perpetrators struck at the heart of liberal 
democratic values: freedom of expression and religious tolerance. States 
understandably seek new and better tools to prevent future atrocities; the 
impulse toward retribution at such moments seems hard to resist. Do these 
attacks make the case for citizenship revocation? I remain sceptical that citi-
zenship revocation advances the objective of protecting liberal democracies, 
or that pursuit of unalloyed retribution is an objective worthy of liberal 
democracies.
Defenders of citizenship stripping offer a mix of instrumental and non- 
instrumental justifications, but Kay Hailbronner, Christian Joppke and Peter 
Schuck lean toward the latter more than the former. Despite its rejection by 
1 The law permits denaturalisation of dual nationals who commit terrorism 
offences within fifteen years of naturalisation (‘Moroccan-born man jailed on 




the US Supreme Court over fifty years ago, both Hailbronner and Joppke 
revert to the legal fiction of constructive renunciation and insist that certain 
conduct communicates an irrefutable intention of terrorists to renounce their 
own citizenship. Schuck revises the fiction by acknowledging that perpetra-
tors may not actually wish to renounce citizenship, but then discounts an 
intention to maintain citizenship for ‘tactical and cynical’ purposes. But 
however attractive the fiction of constructive renunciation, it does not 
become truer with repetition, or with the passage of time, or by writing new 
characters into the narrative. Citizenship revocation for misconduct while a 
citizen is not chosen by the citizen; it is inflicted by the state.
Joppke explains that Germany would have been wrong to regard mem-
bers of the RAF as menacing enough to warrant denationalisation, and I 
suspect he would also condemn the United States denaturalisation of 
Communist citizens in the twentieth century as hysterical overreaction. But 
he remains confident that one can transcend historic patterns of panic- 
induced political myopia and he thus arrives at the conclusion that Islamic 
terrorists are uniquely suitable for citizenship revocation. Peter Schuck con-
tends that citizenship revocation, when employed judiciously against terror-
ists, strengthens the value of citizenship itself. Kay Hailbronner adds that 
my arguments do not address the illegality of citizenship revocation under 
international or constitutional law, but rather proceed from unarticulated 
notions of legitimacy and morality. Space does not permit a proper reply to 
the last criticism. Readers are invited to read my published article on citizen-
ship revocation in the Queen’s Law Journal, which addresses citizenship 
revocation for misconduct under international and constitutional law.2
Consider citizenship revocation in relation to the goal of bringing perpe-
trators to justice. As I mentioned in my kick-off text, fear of citizenship 
revocation is unlikely to deter those bent on martyrdom, and the deaths of 
the Kaouchi brothers and Coulibaly seem to demonstrate that. As for Abu 
Hamza, it is worth noting that the UK did attempt to strip him of citizenship. 
It was thwarted because deprivation would have rendered the Egyptian-born 
cleric stateless. But the fact that Abu Hamza remained in the UK as a UK 
citizen made him available for extradition to face charges in the United 
States, where he was tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for 
terrorism offences after an open and fair trial. Had he been stripped of UK 
2 Macklin, A. (2014), ‘Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and 
the Production of the Alien’, Queen’s Law Journal 40 (1): 1–54.
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citizenship and expelled to Egypt, he would never have faced justice in a US 
court, or anywhere for that matter.3 I take the view that prosecution, trial and 
conviction are preferable responses to past acts. As for pre-empting incipi-
ent risks, various states have begun revoking passports of citizens allegedly 
bound for IS camps in Syria and Iraq. Restricting exit in this manner is only 
available in relation to citizens. Stripping citizenship permits states to shed 
their duty and responsibility toward nationals; it also deprives them of the 
authority to subject them to criminal prosecution and to thereby make a 
tangible contribution to bringing terrorists to justice under the rule of law.
Schuck, along with Hailbronner and Joppke, concede that existing prac-
tices of citizenship revocation breach basic norms of fairness. They regard 
these flaws as contingent defects that are severable from the abstract ques-
tion of whether citizenship revocation for misconduct can be justified. I find 
the attempt to segregate theory from practice unconvincing in this context, 
and Matthew Gibney’s intervention highlights the way in which attempts by 
the judiciary to hold the state to requirements of legality simply breed more 
tactics of state evasion. A chronic failure of a state practice to comply with 
fundamental norms of legality across time and space invites the inference 
that there is something about what the state is endeavouring to do that 
ineluctably and incorrigibly perverts the process of how it does it.4 A fair 
process leading to banishment, like a fair process culminating in the death 
penalty, can only ever operate as a mirage that legitimates on-going prac-
tices that will – inevitably and necessarily – fail to meet basic norms associ-
ated with the rule of law.
This leaves a defence of citizenship revocation that does not depend on 
practicality or utility, but instead rests on the insistence that revocation is 
just and fitting punishment of those who abuse the privilege of citizenship. I 
argue that when citizenship becomes revocable for misconduct, citizenship 
3 Egypt does not extradite its nationals, and the Egyptian criminal justice system 
does not inspire confidence in its capacity to administer justice.
4 This point draws on the insight of legal theorist Lon Fuller. He admitted that 
his principles of legality were formal in the sense that they did not stipulate 
any substantive moral content to law. But he also maintained that legal systems 
that were intent enacting morally repugnant laws would be hard pressed to 
reconcile achievement of those objectives with compliance with principles of 
legality. I extend Fuller’s intuition to suggest that a chronic pattern of non-
compliance with principles of legality in relation to a particular law supports 
an intuition that the law is normatively defective in substance.
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as legal status is demoted from right to privilege. This is a specifically legal 
argument about the juridical fragility of a privilege compared to a right. 
Joppke’s comment that citizenship in western states is a privilege because 
citizenship delivers so little to citizens of most non-western states is a non- 
sequitur. I may feel privileged to be a Canadian citizen and to benefit from 
the rights, entitlements and security of Canadian citizenship, but that does 
not make citizenship as such a privilege. And it would be peculiar indeed if 
only liberal democratic states that guarantee robust citizenship were entitled 
to revoke citizenship qua privilege, while poor and dysfunctional states that 
deliver only a meagre citizenship, were not so entitled. Schuck maintains 
that citizenship revocation, properly wielded, does not weaken citizenship, 
but can actually ‘strengthen citizenship by reaffirming the conditions on 
which it is based.’ I am not sure exactly what this means but his subsequent 
invocation of capital punishment does alert one to the rhetorical symmetry 
of his claim with similar assertions by death-penalty advocates: If one is 
convinced that the value of life is strengthened when the state executes a 
murderer, perhaps one will also be persuaded that citizenship is strength-
ened when the state denationalises a terrorist. The corollary also applies: If 
one is not attracted by the first proposition, perhaps one should resist being 
seduced by the second.
Jo Shaw’s insightful intervention about the implications of denationali-
sation for EU citizenship brings to the discussion the important issue of 
proportionality, a matter Hailbronner also addresses briefly. Stepping back 
from the specificities of EU citizenship, a proportionality inquiry into citi-
zenship deprivation directs us to the question of whether the state can 
achieve its objectives through less rights-infringing means than the impugned 
law. If one takes seriously the injunction against statelessness, the answer 
must surely be yes. However one frames the goals and purposes of citizen-
ship deprivation, it remains true that states can and do deploy other means to 
address, contain and denounce threats to national security from mono- 
nationals.5 They must do so because denationalisation is not a legal option, 
5 States can and do use the criminal law to prosecute people for terrorist related 
offences committed at home and abroad. Expanded police powers of investiga-
tion and surveillance enable detection. Passport confiscation that prevents 
travel to conflict zones restrains a right of citizenship (exit), and some states 
prosecute citizens who participation in combat abroad when the return. Some 
states also restrict the right of citizens abroad to re-enter in the name of 
national security. I consider this less defensible as a matter of law, both in 




yet no state will be heard to say that it is disabled from protecting the nation 
adequately because it cannot denationalise mono-citizens.
Schuck proclaims that a state is ‘powerless to protect itself and its people 
from imminent, existential threats’, if denied access to denationalisation as 
a weapon. Not only does this ignore the resources currently available to 
states, it dramatically overestimates what citizenship revocation would add 
to the arsenal. Unless a state could mount evidence showing that dual citi-
zens pose a qualitatively different and graver threat to national security than 
mono-nationals, I doubt that citizenship revocation for some citizens (but 
not others) could survive a rigorous proportionality analysis. And by advanc-
ing revocation as a response to 'imminent, existential' threats, he defeats his 
own claim that the process of citizenship revocation can, in principle, abide 
by standards of procedural fairness. Fair processes take time, so whatever 
threat revocation purports to eliminate, it cannot be imminent. And is it 
really a good idea to dump an ‘imminent, existential threat’ on another state 
and its people anyway?
Rainer Bauböck correctly and helpfully reminds us that what is at issue 
is citizenship as legal status. Legal citizenship, as an institution that regu-
lates membership within and between states, performs certain specific func-
tions that have formal implications. Among liberal states, equality of status 
and security of that status are two defining features of legal citizenship. The 
former speaks to citizenship’s internal dimension by ensuring that all citi-
zens within a state are recognised and treated as equal to one another. The 
latter speaks to citizenship’s external dimension. In functional terms, nation-
ality not only protects individuals from what Michael Walzer calls the ‘infi-
nite precarity’ of statelessness, it also serves an international system of 
sovereign states in ensuring that at least one mailing address is affixed to 
every individual for purposes of state responsibility and deportation.
Apart from Joppke, all contributors accept statelessness as a constraint 
on citizenship stripping. In the world as we know it, where all habitable 
space is already assigned to some state, the claim that a citizen, by virtue of 
his or her conduct, does not belong to this state must, therefore, entail the 
claim that the person does belong to that state.6 This exposes two related 
problems for conduct-based revocation. The first is that the people whom 
6 One could, I suppose, imagine a world where states re-appropriate stateless-
ness in order to resurrect the figure of the global legal outcast (hostis humani, 
or perhaps homo sacer). Stripped of law’s protection, this global outlaw could 
be killed or punished with impunity. I will set this aside this possibility, and I 
am unsure if this is what Joppke has in mind.
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Joppke depicts as appropriate targets of denationalisation are not merely 
enemies of a particular state or government. On his view, they ‘explicitly 
posit themselves outside the political community of the nation-state’. In 
other words, they repudiate citizenship as such or, if one prefers, pose as 
‘citizens’ of a non-state entity that every other state in the world rightly 
regards as deeply threatening and inimical to their security. One expects that 
they will be as ‘tactical and cynical’ in their connection to one citizenship as 
to another. The Canadian citizenship revocation law validates this model of 
the global terrorist by making conviction for a terrorist-related offence in 
another country grounds for revoking Canadian citizenship. If another state 
regards a Canadian citizen as a terrorist, that is reason enough for Canada to 
conclude that his citizenship connection to Canada is inauthentic and 
warrants severance.
Joppke’s own characterization of the terrorist’s relationship to citizen-
ship makes his argument about denationalisation self-defeating. If terrorists 
disavow citizenship as such, and are indeed hostis humani generi (enemies 
of all humanity), the same facts that would allow Joppke to pronounce that 
the Kouachis (for example) did not really belong to France must also yield 
the conclusion that they did not belong to any other state either. As a practi-
cal matter, if one state declares that formal possession of legal status is nor-
matively insufficient to attach the terrorist to that state, it can hardly press 
the claim that legal status is sufficient to attach him to another state.
Joppke mocks Peter Spiro for making the sensible observation that nei-
ther al Qaeda nor Islamic State are states, which means that they are not 
deportation destinations. Hailbronner abets Joppke by musing about whether 
IS’ military control over patches of land in the midst of violent conflict could 
be ratcheted up into something approximating statehood. If this is meant to 
hint at a viable legal option for where to dispose of otherwise stateless citi-
zens, one might as well explore the equally plausible (from a legal perspec-
tive) option of launching them into space to orbit the globe aboard some 
inter-galactic Flying Dutchmen.7 Alternatively, perhaps we are meant to 
7 It seems more likely that the UK will simply continue the practice of depriving 
citizens of their UK citizenship while abroad, now accompanied with a 
statement that the Home Secretary believes that target can obtain citizenship 
elsewhere. Even if the person does not, in fact, have access to another citizen-
ship, the individual’s physical location outside the UK and inside another state 
(to which they may have no legal relationship) will impose insuperable hurdles 
on challenging the decision or compelling the UK to repatriate him.
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shrug off as a convenient fact that powerful states can opportunistically 
denationalise their citizens while they are abroad in conflict zones. Even if 
they are rendered stateless, they become some other [failing] state’s 
problem.
Bauböck’s contribution directs one to another dimension of belonging, 
which reveals the second problem with Joppke’s approach. Citizenship 
stripping’s revival traces back to the anxiety about so-called ‘home-grown’ 
terrorists who, unlike the iconic foreign menace, actually possess citizen-
ship by birth. Revoking citizenship enables the state to recast them as the 
alien within, in order to then cast them out. Denationalisation serves the 
narrative of terrorism as always and essentially foreign to the body politic 
by literally transforming the citizen-terrorist into the foreign outcast. But the 
very term ‘home-grown’ refutes the premise. The Kaouchi brothers were 
French citizens. They were orphaned as children and raised as wards of the 
French state. It is difficult to see them other than as products of French soci-
ety. The ideology that seized them originated elsewhere, but their receptivity 
to it also directs one’s attention inward. Indeed, any viable anti-terrorism 
strategy must attend carefully and critically to the local conditions that pro-
duce a descent into disaffection, hatred and violence – whether of the 
Islamist, neo-Nazi or any other variety. The French assailants may have 
been alienated from France, but there is no state to which they belonged 
more.8
Ultimately, arguments about citizenship revocation turn on underlying 
conceptions of what citizenship is for, and expectations about what citizen-
ship as legal status can achieve. Citizenship signifies membership, but 
beyond that general descriptor, citizenship inhabits multiple registers across 
many disciplines which are not reducible to or fully commensurate with one 
another. Citizenship as legal status is powerful because it carries the force of 
law, but also limited in what it can achieve for precisely the same reason. It 
is enabled and constrained because it is citizenship law and because it is citi-
zenship law.
8 One might object that the sample set is too limited: After all, there are dual 
citizens (especially those who naturalised as adults) who might reasonably be 
understood as more connected to their country of origin. A short answer is that 
even if true, it would be a clear conflict of interest to let one state of citizenship 
make that determination. A fuller answer, which lies beyond the scope of this 
intervention, would explain why this type of calculus is inimical to the security 
that distinguishes citizenship from other statuses.
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States can and do use law to promote and endorse commitment, patrio-
tism and active citizenship. They do it through public education, programmes 
for social inclusion, support and assistance, sponsorship of the arts and rec-
reation, and other policies that build solidarity and encourage ‘good citizen-
ship’. These various spheres of public activity are enabled through legal 
frameworks, and so law plays an important role here. Citizenship law’s chief 
constructive contribution lies in imposing (reasonable) requirements for 
naturalisation, such as residence and language acquisition, that genuinely 
facilitate integration and commitment to the national community.
The state must also be concerned about ‘bad citizenship’ and it falls to 
the criminal justice and national security regimes to address the most egre-
gious conduct that endangers or harms the national community. To conclude 
that contemporary citizenship law is ill-suited to advancing punitive goals 
does not deny that some people are very bad citizens, or that law plays a 
crucial role in addressing that fact. It simply opposes the recruitment of citi-
zenship law to punish bad citizens by demoting them to non-citizens.9 A 
man who attacks his mother may be a terrible son who deserves to be pros-
ecuted for his crime, but it is not the job of family law to disclaim him as the 
son of his mother. Citizenship law is not criminal law. Nor is it national 
security law. Nor should it be rigged to operate as a trap door that shunts citi-
zens to immigration law.
Accounting for citizenship status’ specific legal character also guides us 
toward what law can (and cannot) achieve. A number of plausible accounts 
of citizenship’s normative foundation circulate in political theory. They typ-
ically involve some idea of commitment or allegiance, whether to the state, 
the constitution, or democratic self-government. I do not here express a 
preference among them, but rather observe that they tend to focus on the 
internal relationship between state and citizen, and the grounds upon which 
the relationship may be properly said to have ruptured. They do not attend 
to the external dimension of legal citizenship, namely the role of nationality 
in stabilising the international filing system for humanity, and they do not 
9 The various legal strategies currently in use to detect, deter, prevent and 
respond to terrorism can and do fail, sometimes tragically and spectacularly. Is 
this because states have not arrogated to themselves sufficient coercive powers, 




furnish a satisfactory normative explanation for why the ‘bad citizen’ should 
be assigned to another state.
Citizenship law cannot subject to legal regulation the myriad values, 
practices and aspirations ascribed to citizenship-as-belonging. This is unsur-
prising: Citizenship status enfranchises citizens above the age of majority, 
but there is no legal compulsion to vote (except in Australia, Belgium, Brazil 
and a few other states) and citizenship law does not purport to penalise those 
who never exercise their right or duty of active citizenship. Nor does citizen-
ship law purport to regulate access to most types of civil and social citizen-
ship (in Marshallian terms), and I suspect most commentators agree that that 
is a good thing.
Nevertheless, defenders of revocation insist that citizenship law can and 
should regulate ‘loyalty and allegiance’ of citizens. The criminal law can 
punish people for intentionally committing wrongful acts, including treason, 
murder, and all other forms of horrific violence that concern us here. Some 
assailants may openly express contempt for their country of citizenship, 
while others (like the Ottawa shooter Joppke cites) display a messy history 
of mental illness, drug addiction and petty criminality preceding recent con-
version to Islam. The putative value added by citizenship revocation is pre-
cisely that it makes lack of allegiance and loyalty the central element in 
defining crimes against citizenship. But to paraphrase Aldous Huxley, loy-
alty and allegiance are like happiness. They are by-products of other activi-
ties. Fostering love of country is a valid aspiration of states and worth 
cultivating. But it cannot be manufactured by the carrot of a citizenship oath 
(as Joppke has elsewhere10 acknowledged), nor will it be conjured by the 
stick of revocation. Law is not adept at producing sentiment on command.
Space constraints have led me to focus on those submissions that directly 
challenge my own position, and I have not responded to the cogent, pro-
vocative and creative insights offered by so many contributors. My own 
thinking has been deepened and challenged by them, for which I express 
gratitude and appreciation. I admit that I took as my remit citizenship revo-
cation only in the literal, legal sense. I also acknowledge the criticism that 
10 Bauböck, R. & Joppke, C. (2010), ‘How liberal are citizenship tests?’, Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory 
Working Paper No. 2010/41, Florence: European University Institute, available 
at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/13956
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confining my focus to citizenship revocation does not pay due regard to the 
compelling claim, for example, that deportation of non-citizens may also 
constitute banishment in some circumstances, with attendant human rights 
implications. I hope that nothing I have said here gives the appearance of 
foreclosing or prejudging broader or different conceptions of banishment. 
There is always more to be said, and much to be done.
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Abstract
New digital technologies are rapidly changing the global economy and have 
connected billions of people in deterritoralised social networks. Will they 
also create new opportunities for global citizenship and alternatives to state-
based political communities? In his kick-off essay, Liav Orgad takes an opti-
mistic view. Blockchain technology permits giving every human being a 
unique legal persona and allows individuals to associate in ‘cloud communi-
ties’ that may take on several functions of territorial states. 14 commentators 
discuss this vision. Sceptics assume that states or business corporations have 
always found ways to capture and use new technologies for their purposes. 
They emphasise that the political functions of states, including their task to 
protect human rights, require territorial monopolies of legitimate coercion 
that cannot be provided by cloud communities. Others point out that indi-
viduals would sort themselves out into cloud communities that are internally 
homogenous which risks to deepen political cleavages within territorial 
societies. Finally, some authors are concerned that digital political commu-
nities will enhance global social inequalities through excluding from access 
those who are already worse off in the birthright lottery of territorial citizen-
ship. Optimists see instead the great potential of blockchain technology to 
overcome exclusion and marginalisation based on statelessness or sheer 
lack of civil registries; they regard it as a tool for enhancing individual free-
dom, since people are self-sovereign in controlling their personal data; and 
they emphasise the possibilities for emancipatory movements to mobilise 
for global justice across territorial borders or to create their own internally 
democratic political utopias. In the boldest vision, the deficits of cloud com-
munities as voluntary political associations with limited scope of power 
could be overcome in a global cryptodemocracy that lets all individuals par-
ticipate on a one-person-one-vote basis in global political decisions.
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Cloud Communities: The Dawn  
of Global Citizenship?
Liav Orgad
 The idea of global citizenship
About 70 years ago, an American peace activist named Garry Davis created 
a registered concept of ‘world citizenship.’ A naïve enterprise at its infancy, 
this concept looks more realistic today for three reasons. The first reason is 
global interconnectedness. The internet has profoundly changed the notion 
of public space. About 50 per cent of the world population uses the internet 
and global internet use is consistently growing – from 16 per cent in 2005 to 
48 per cent in 2017. 71 per cent of the world’s youth population (15-24) uses 
the internet, 94 per cent in the developed world.1 2.3 billion people use 
smartphones, almost one-third of the global population. Facebook and 
WeChat in China have an estimated 3 billion users together. Internet tech-
nologies and cloud computing enable people to establish digital IDs, which 
could eventually become recognised as an international legal personality, be 
connected with one another, disentangled from physical borders, and act at 
a distance.
The second reason is identity. Ever since Aristotle, membership in a 
political community denotes an identity of some kind. Shared identity is a 
cornerstone of citizenship – it creates a sense of community and a commit-
ment toward a common good.2 While the idea of global citizenship goes 
back to ancient Greece – the Greek philosopher Diogenes is credited to be 
the first to define himself as ‘a citizen of the world’3 – it is only in recent 
1 International Telecommunications Union (2017), ITU Facts and Figures. 
Geneva: International Telecommunications Union, available at https://www.itu.
int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2017.pdf
2 Joppke, C. (2010), Citizenship and Immigration. Cambridge: Polity Press.
3 Nussbaum, C. M. (1994), ‘Patriotism and cosmopolitanism’, The Boston 
Review.
The research is supported by the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant 
(# 716350). I thank Ehud Shapiro and Primavera De Filippi for inspiring discus-
sions on the concept of self-sovereign digital identity.
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years that a transformation of consciousness from local to global identities 
has been identified. Recent polls reveal that people are increasingly identify-
ing themselves as global, rather than national, citizens. For example, a 2016 
BBC World Poll shows that 56 per cent of the respondents consider them-
selves, first and foremost, as ‘global citizens,’ rather than national citizens.4 
A 2016 World Economic Forum Survey indicates that the vast majority of 
young people identify themselves first as ‘human’ (40.8 per cent) and ‘citi-
zens of the world’ (18.6 per cent), while national identity only comes third 
(13 per cent).5 National identity remains central, but, particularly in emerg-
ing economies, a perception of global social identity is on the rise.6 For the 
first time in history, a large percentage of the world’s population places 
global identity above any national or local identities; there is a growing 
sense of a global community that transcends national borders.
The third reason is responsibility, a central component of a republican 
conception of citizenship. In a republican view, members of a political com-
munity share public responsibilities to promote a common good and con-
front common challenges. Today, more than ever, human beings face 
common global challenges and human activities have a cumulative effect on 
the global scale.7 Although there are no global individual responsibilities, at 
least not in the legal sense, private individuals are increasingly showing 
global responsibility in different policy areas (food consumption, global 
warming, animal rights) by taking actions (e.g., buying organic food, recy-
cling, becoming a vegetarian) based on free choice and without state coer-
cion. Some of the global challenges have become urgent and cannot be 
adequately addressed on the national level. By showing global responsibil-
ity, even if limited and with a weak sense of agency, individuals are 
 participating in activities whose scope and target audience go beyond 
4 GlobeScan (2016), Global Citizenship a Growing Sentiment Among Citizens of 
Emerging Economies: Global Poll. Available at https://www.globescan.com/
news-and-analysis/press-releases/press-releases-2016/383-global-citizenship-
a-growing-sentiment-among-citizens-of-emerging-economies-global-poll.html
5 World Economic Forum (2017), Global Shapers Annual Survey 2017. 
Available at http://www.shaperssurvey2017.org/static/data/WEF_GSC_
Annual_Survey_2017.pdf; World Economic Forum (2016) Global Shapers 
Annual Survey 2016. Available at http://www.shaperssurvey2017.org/static/
data/GSC_AS16_Report.pdf
6 Buchan, N., M. B. Brewer, G. Grimalda, R. K. Wilson, E. Fatas & M. Foddy 
(2011), ‘Global social identity and global cooperation’, Psychological Science 
22 (6): 821-828.
7 Dower, N. (2003), ‘Does Global Citizenship Require Modern Technology?’ 
Ideas Valores 52 (123): 25-42.
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national boundaries. The changing public opinion thus goes hand in hand 
with changes in individual actions motivated by a sense of global political 
responsibilities.
 Status: international legal persona
Under the current structure of international law, individuals exist as legal 
persons only through a status conferred to them by a state. Individuals are 
citizens or residents of some state; an international legal status of a ‘human 
being’ is non-existent.8 True, international law speaks in universal terms of 
international human rights law, even natural rights, but it makes them 
largely dependent on citizenship and territorial sovereignty, as if a person 
only legally exists through a state – a feudalist approach.9 This state of 
affairs raises three issues. First, human rights: an estimate of 1.1 billion 
people, 15 per cent of the world population, lacks an official identification.10 
Without a national identification, one cannot have access to basic services 
and participate in modern life; one lacks, as coined by Hannah Arendt, the 
‘right to have rights’. For refugees and displaced persons, having no national 
identity can lead to detention and deportation. But even people with a 
national ID may wish to have a universal ID that allows them to choose an 
identity free of state limitations (think of national restrictions on gender 
identity, sexual orientation, and names). The legal source for an interna-
tional legal personality can be found in Article 6 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, according to which ‘Everyone has the right to recognition 
everywhere as a person before the law’ (also Article 16, ICCPR).11
The second issue is lack of self-governance. Existing citizenship regimes 
are based on Westphalian sovereignty under which citizens govern their life 
8 It has a few exceptions: individual criminal responsibility and some civil 
liabilities in international law.
9 Benhabib, S. (2005), ‘Borders, Boundaries, and Citizenship’, Political Science 
and Politics 38 (4): 673-677.
10 Desai, V., M. Witt, K. Chandra & J. Marskell (2017), ‘Counting the uncounted: 
1.1 billion people without IDs’, The World Bank. Available at http://blogs.
worldbank.org/ic4d/counting-uncounted-11-billion-people-without-ids
11 United Nations (1948), Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Available at 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/; Also: United 
Nations (1966), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 1966, avail-
able at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-
999-i-14668-english.pdf
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indirectly – through the state.12 This means that the status of citizenship 
perpetuates the monopoly of the state to control the exercise of individual 
rights. On the national level, the exercise of rights is connected with the 
status of citizenship (though less today than in the past);13 on the transna-
tional level, following the development of a standard travel document, the 
passport, the exercise of freedom of movement outside the state has become 
connected with citizenship (perhaps more so today than in the 18th and 19th 
centuries).14 It also means that the participation of individuals in interna-
tional law-making, even in decisions that directly affect them, is only 
realised through state representatives and depends a great deal on who is 
included in the boundaries of the demos. Minorities that have minimal polit-
ical influence or no citizenship rights remain unheard in international 
decision- making, and so are people who are ineligible to vote in national 
elections due to electoral law restrictions and citizens in authoritarian 
regimes.15 The actual influence of individuals in the creation of international 
law is infinitesimally small.
The third issue is unequal representation. Since the 17th century, the 
Westphalian concept of sovereignty has been based upon two fundamental 
ideas that have marched together – nation-states and territories – accompa-
nied by a third idea, equality: the notion that sovereign states are equal.16 
The Peace of Westphalia ended the medieval hierarchical system of power 
among rulers – though not among humans – and replaced it with a system of 
territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality of states (this idea is recog-
nised today in Article 2(1) to the UN Charter).17 Unlike sovereign states, 
individuals do not have an equal voice in international affairs. International 
law is organised on a ‘one-state, one-vote’ basis – a system that creates dis-
parities in individual voting power. Citizens of San Marino (33,000 people) 
12 Peters, A. (2016), Beyond human rights: the legal status of the individual in 
international law. New York: Cambridge University Press (Huston J. tran.).
13 Spiro, P. (2008), Beyond Citizenship: American Identity After Globalization. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
14 Dehm, S. (2018), ‘The Passport’, in Hohmann J. & D. Joyce (eds.), The 
Objects of International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
15 Shaw, J. (2017), ‘Citizenship and the Franchise’, in Shachar A., R. Bauböck, 
I. Bloemraad & M. Vink (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship, 290-313. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16 Walker, N. (2017), ‘The Place of Territory in Citizenship’ in A. Shachar, 
R. Bauböck, I. Bloemraad & M. Vink (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Citizenship, 553-575. Oxford: Oxford University Press.




have the same voting power in the UN as citizens of India (1.2 billion). The 
disparity in individual voting power in governance of global issues (e.g., 
global warming and the environment) undermines the equal value of citi-
zenship under international law.
 Digital identity: blockchain technology
The UN Sustainable Development Goals recognise the importance of legal 
identity for all. Article 16.9 aims to ‘provide legal identity for all, including 
birth registration’ by 2030. Through the ID4D program, the World Bank 
assists in the promotion of the UN goal by financially assisting states to 
provide recognised IDs.18
The internet already offers the infrastructure for the realisation of digital 
IDs, yet new technologies, e.g. blockchain, are likely to bring further 
improvements necessary to turn the idea into reality. The internet is a system 
of interconnected computer networks, which allows for exchange and trans-
fer of data. All present major internet applications are structured in a client- 
server application, where the participants access it via an app or a web 
browser (client) and the company providing the application runs the compu-
tations and data on their own computers (server). This structure gives these 
companies (and governments) total control over the service they provide and 
all the data produced by its users. Blockchain technology offers the first 
internet applications that works differently; it is designed as a peer-to-peer 
system that is not controlled by a central entity and in which data exchange 
is not stored in a single physical location. On the blockchain, shared data are 
hosted by all the computers in the network simultaneously and are publicly 
accessible to all. Blockchain technology is a game changer; it can provide 
people with self-sovereign identity – they are the ones who create and regis-
ter their identity and they are the only ones who control what to do with it 
and with whom to share what. In such a decentralised system, one’s identity 
is not owned by a central server (Facebook, LinkedIn, a state ministry), but 
by the person herself; she can decide which data to share and for what pur-
pose. Hence, blockchain technologies can help achieving the UN goal of 
granting an ID to everyone, not just to those who can obtain it from a state, 
in a decentralised way that is not necessarily controlled by the UN or by 
states.
18 Above n.11.
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Several organisations are currently working on the creation of the tech-
nological infrastructure required for a trustworthy global digital ID.19 The 
achievement of this goal involves some challenges: who will register people 
for a global ID? What will be the relation between a global ID and a national 
ID – will the global ID rely on national registries or be independent? When 
will a global ID be created – at birth, or at later age when the person can 
exercise control? Which details will be included – only a birth certificate, or 
also physical characteristics and biometric data? Will there be a standard 
form? Will the possession of a global ID be a right, or also a duty? How to 
create digital IDs for people in places where the required technology does 
not exist or in authoritarian regimes that restrict their subjects’ access to 
information technology? How to create an ID that is immune to identity 
theft and fake identities? These are important questions, but the very idea of 
a global digital identity for everyone, giving all people a legal status as a 
‘human being,’ is no longer a far-fetched possibility.
A global ID is not a status of citizenship – nor does it create, in and of 
itself, an international legal status, although it is a prerequisite for it. Yet, in 
my view, this is not supposed to be its main purpose. An international legal 
persona should not be seen as a replacement of national citizenships but 
rather as a status and identity complementary to national citizenships (it is 
thus not identical to cosmopolitan visions of global citizenship)20. It is a 
legal concept that will provide everyone with a global unique ID of a ‘human 
being.’ This status will be the default lifelong identity and membership for 
every person, which cannot be waived or withdrawn, and on top of it indi-
viduals will have other forms of membership, such as national 
citizenship.21
19 E.g., ID2020; uPort; Accenture Unique Identity Service Platform; 
BITNATION; Democracy Earth Foundation, Jolocom, Evernym, Decentralized 
Identity Foundation.
20 See discussions in: Shachar, A. (2009), The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and 
Global Inequality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 45-48.
21 My focus is on a formal legal institution – status – and the political delibera-
tion that can follow it. Other issues that may be associated with an interna-
tional legal status – e.g., rights (think of global basic income), duties (think of 




 Political participation: ‘Cloud Communities’
Imagine that every person has a trustworthy unique international legal per-
sona; what are we going to do with it? The range of applications is enor-
mous. The question is not only which functions are technologically possible, 
but which ones are normatively desirable, i.e., which values should be 
achieved by using technology?
In international law, a ‘state’ possesses four qualities: a permanent popu-
lation, a defined territory, government, and a capacity to enter into relations 
with other states (Article 1, Montevideo Convention, 1933)22. International 
law does not recognise the concept of a ‘virtual state,’ yet existing virtual 
communities, such as Bitnation (https://bitnation.co/) – a decentralised bor-
derless virtual nation that functions as a government service platform – chal-
lenge the definition of a ‘state,’ and raise the question of why some of the 
institutional functions of the state, for which it was first established, cannot 
be effectively served also by a virtual political community?23 Can we inter-
pret a ‘defined territory’ to include cyberspace, or instead talk of ‘state-like’ 
non-territorial polities?
The concept of an international legal persona will enable individuals to 
establish ‘Cloud Communities’ of different kinds. Conceptually, cloud com-
munities have traditional characteristics of political communities, but not 
necessarily a physical territory. The communal bond can be global in 
nature – such as a shared concern about climate change, ageing, veganism 
and animal rights (i.e., a universal community, open to everyone) – or ascrip-
tive, such as a Jewish / Bahá'í faith / Diasporic Cloud Nations, a form of 
‘transnational nationalism’ (i.e., a selective community, open only to certain 
members). It can be thematic or geographic – region, country, state, city, 
village – based on a shared interest or territorial identity, even if not corre-
sponding to existing borders or legally recognised communities. Membership 
is based on consent; a person can be a member of several communities or 
none. The goal varies, but my focus is political communities. Cloud com-
munities are not social networks, but political communities whose aim is 
political decision-making and in which individuals take part in a process of 
governance and the creation of law. The legal source for it can be Article 
22 Convention signed at Montevideo December 26, 1933. Available at http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp
23 Tarkowski Tempelhof, S., E. Teissonniere, J. Fennell Tempelhof & D. Edwards 
(2017), Bitnation, Pangea Jurisdiction and Pangea Arbitration Token (PAT): 
The Internet of Sovereignty. Planet Earth: Bitnation.
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25(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
according to which ‘every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity … 
to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives.’ Such a community may function in four areas: law (consti-
tution, membership acquisition, registry), governance (political institutions, 
diplomacy, international agreements, taxes), welfare services (education, 
healthcare, social security), and economy (trade, corporate activities, fees). 
It can provide an ID registry, a dispute resolution system, collaborative 
decision- making, a virtual bank, and a voting system. In a sense, religions 
are a form of ‘cloud communities’: virtual and borderless, but not voluntary 
and decentralised.
Procedurally, cloud communities can be established in two ways. A top- 
down community can be set up by an international organisation, such as UN 
organs, as an advisory body to an existing UN organ (WHO, FAO, 
UNESCO), or in policy areas of global importance (the 17 UN Sustainable 
Development Goals is a good start). A bottom-up community can be set up 
by any number of international legal personas on a topic of common inter-
est; as time passes by and the community reaches a certain numerical thresh-
old, it can apply for a ‘Consultative Status’ at the UN (Article 71, UN 
Charter24). As in other mechanisms of advisory decision-making (e.g., advi-
sory referendum), the outcome may become politically, even if not legally, 
binding.
Cloud communities are not a replacement for the state, but they offer 
global citizens sharing a common goal, interest, or identity new ways of 
interacting and collaborating with each other; they are ‘state-like’ entities.
 The future of citizenship: dynamic and multilayered?
In today’s world, one is a participating member in multiple political com-
munities, each of which has different functions and comes with a different 
set of rights and duties. Citizenship is multilayered.25 It is, for example, 
national and supranational, as demonstrated by European Union citizenship 
24 Available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/
25 Bauböck, R. (2017), ‘Political Membership and Democratic Boundaries’, in 
Shachar, A., R. Bauböck, I. Bloemraad & M. Vink (eds.), 60-82. The Oxford 
Handbook of Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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or – quite differently – an African Union passport.26 It can be territorial and 
digital, as demonstrated by e-Estonia (https://e-estonia.com/), the first digi-
tal residency program in the world. In the blockchain-based digital society 
of e-Estonia, everyone can acquire e-residency in Estonia in order to access 
its digital governmental services; e-residents can establish a business in 
Estonia, register a company, participate in an e-school, open a bank account, 
and have an Estonian digital ID (e-residents are not entitled to physical resi-
dency in Estonia unless they fulfil the regular visa requirements – thus, they 
are e-residents without physical residency rights.) In July 2017, there were 
more e-residents than newborns in Estonia27 and the country is planning is 
to reach 10 million e-residents by 2025, which will make its virtual popula-
tion almost ten times larger than its territorial population (1.3 million in 
2017).
Existing attempts to create ‘cloud communities’ – such as Bitnation and 
e-Estonia – already offer non-territorial forms of political membership, 
remodel the way people think about sovereignty, and challenge the defini-
tion of the state as we know it – as a legal entity that must have a physical 
territory and a centralised governance.28 Citizenship, à la Bitnation and 
e-Estonia, resembles a business model where states are service providers 
and ‘citizens’ are billed for the service – from education to healthcare to 
infrastructure. In this model, there is no lifetime membership but fixed 
membership contracts, which can be renewed or become permanent.
If we had to design a new international legal system, given today’s politi-
cal and technological conditions, would it be like the current system? The 
world is ready, more than ever before, for realising of one of the most 
morally- desirable notions in human history – global citizenship 
26 The implementation of the African Union Passport, which is set to 2020, will 
facilitate the notion of an international legal persona as it would provide a legal 
identification to million Africans who currently lack a registered ID.
27 Fraga, D. (2017), ‘The Birth of a Digital Nation in Estonia’, Next Nature 
Network, August 30, available at https://www.nextnature.net/2017/08/
estonia-more-e-residents-than-babies/
28 Certainly, e-Estonia and Bitnation represent opposite functions of cloud 
communities. While e-Estonia uses new technologies to expand the global 
reach of a nation-state, Bitnation seeks to disrupt the current system by 
offering an anarchic post-nation state world of voluntary virtual communities. I 
thank Rainer Bauböck for this point.
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(Weltbürgerschaft) without a world state, as envisioned by Immanuel Kant 
in 1795. Such a vision is an addition to, and an improvement of the existing 
citizenship regimes that evolved in a completely different era. Are we ready 
to embrace the global citizenship that new technologies offer to us?
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Citizenship in Cloud Cuckoo Land?
Rainer Bauböck
We are in the midst of a digital revolution that could transform societies 
worldwide as profoundly as the agrarian revolution of the Neolithic age 
and the industrial revolution of the 19th century did. No doubt, new tech-
nologies will also deeply affect the structure and boundaries of political 
communities and the meaning of citizenship. Liav Orgad tells a hopeful 
story about the benefits of blockchain technology. It can serve to create an 
international legal identity for every human being and new forms of non-
territorial political community in which citizenship is based entirely on 
consent. I share Orgad’s sense of excitement about the speed and depth of 
change that we are witnessing. But I am less optimistic about the future of 
citizenship.
 The progressive potential: providing global legal status 
and enabling global civil society
Orgad’s first suggestion is that digital technologies will make it possible to 
provide every human being with an international legal persona, a ‘default 
lifelong identity and membership for every person, which cannot be waived 
or withdrawn’ (original emphases). This would indeed be a major achieve-
ment. In less developed countries and autocratic regimes, millions of births 
are not registered. Unregistered persons are de facto stateless and cannot 
claim services or rights from governments that do not recognise them as 
nationals.1
Yet blockchain, the technology that he sees as most promising for this 
task, is not a tool to improve governments’ administrative capacities. It is a 
decentralised ledger that is not under the control of any government or cor-
poration. Individuals control themselves what their registered identity is 
(e.g. their chosen gender) and who gets access to their linked data (such as 
1 For Africa see Manby, B. (2016), Citizenship Law in Africa. A Comparative 




health or education records). This is why Orgad sees in blockchain 
 technology a potential ‘to provide people with self-sovereign identity’ (orig-
inal emphasis).
There is an obvious tension between these two goals: providing every 
human being with an unalterable and unique identity, on the one hand, and 
providing them with sovereign control over their identity related data, on the 
other hand. Births and deaths must be registered by someone else than the 
individuals concerned. Presumably adult individuals, too, are constrained in 
their choices because they must not opt out by deleting their international 
legal identity or subvert the global registry by assuming that of another per-
son. More importantly, governments will not be out of business. Even if the 
act of registration is certified in a decentralised ledger, governments must 
recognise it in order for individuals to enjoy legal statuses and rights that 
only states can grant.
Orgad seems to be aware of this tension when he writes that a global ID 
is not a status of world citizenship and that it would supplement rather than 
replace national citizenships assigned by governments. But he also wants to 
put it to uses that would undermine the international system of sovereign 
states as we know it. When Orgad suggests that all individuals could be 
represented equally in making international law, he must have some form of 
global federal democracy in mind, e.g. a ‘peoples’ assembly’ enjoying co- 
legislative powers with a body in which each state has one vote, as in the UN 
General Assembly.2
His main vision is, however, the emergence of alternative forms of politi-
cal community at the sub-global level: cloud communities or virtual nations 
that individuals can join based on shared concerns or ascriptive identities 
that transcend the territorial boundaries of states. Orgad envisages two ways 
how these communities can come about: bottom up or top down. People 
concerned about global social justice could form cloud communities pro-
moting this goal, whereas others may want to join a global ethnic or reli-
gious diaspora. The UN could initiate cloud communities that support its 
development or climate change goals, but also states or regions could set 
them up to empower their diasporas.
2 Proposals for a UN reform along these lines have been made since the 1990s. 
See Archibugi, D. (1993), ‘The Reform of the UN and Cosmopolitan 
Democracy: A Critical Review’, Journal of Peace Research 30 (3): 301-315.
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To me, these applications of cloud communities look like an expansion 
of civil society, of international organisations, or of traditional territorial 
polities into cyberspace, rather than like genuinely new forms of political 
community. If this is what they are, then cloud communities could provide 
great opportunities. They could mobilise individuals across the world for 
goals of global justice or climate protection. And they would provide new 
spaces for civil society in states that suppress individual liberty and oppress 
ethnic or religious minorities. I imagine that states and global corporations, 
even if they cannot control the underlying blockchain registries, will find 
ways to instrumentalise or hijack cloud communities for their own purposes, 
as they already do with the internet and social media. Autocrats have done 
so with new communication technologies ever since the invention of the 
printing press. Yet this is not my main worry. It would be wrong as well as 
futile to reject new technologies that enhance individual freedom because 
they can also be used to constrain it.
 The threat to democracy: should we be ruled by voluntary 
associations?
My main worry is that cloud communities may provide new global spaces 
for citizenship as civic participation while undermining its foundation as 
equal membership in territorial polities. This tension emerges from contrast-
ing mechanisms for determining membership in civil society and in political 
communities. Civil society is the realm of voluntary association in between 
the involuntary associations of families, firms and states.3 In contrast with a 
global ID, which would register another form of involuntary membership, 
that of belonging to the human species, cloud communities must be volun-
tary associations. Individuals sort themselves into such communities by 
applying for membership or opting out while communities enjoy collec-
tively powers to determine the conditions for admission. A vibrant sphere of 
voluntary associations is an essential element of democratic citizenship. 
And in an increasingly interconnected world it is indeed highly desirable to 
expand civil society so that individuals can act as global citizens in volun-
tary associations that pursue global agendas.
But they can do so only because and insofar as they have a secure ter-
ritorial citizenship that protects their fundamental rights and makes them 
3 See Bauböck, R. (1996), ‘Social and Cultural Integration in Civil Society’, in 
R. Bauböck, A. Heller & A. Zolberg (eds.), The Challenge of Diversity. 
Integration and Pluralism in Societies of Immigration, 67-132. Aldershot, UK: 
Avebury.
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equal members of a political community that most of them have not cho-
sen to belong to. The social contract metaphor that has informed liberal 
thinking about citizenship since Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau is mislead-
ing in this respect. Citizenship as a legal status of membership in a territo-
rial polity has never been based on consent. Citizenship in today’s states is 
generally acquired at birth – either through birth in the territory or descent 
from citizen parents. Immigrants may opt in through applying for naturali-
sation but – as the word itself signals – they join a birthright community. 
Emigrants may opt out through renouncing their nationality, but they can 
generally do so only if they have already resided abroad for some time and 
have acquired another citizenship. The non-voluntary nature and auto-
matic acquisition of citizenship are even stronger at local and regional 
levels. Local citizenship is, or should be, generally based on residence 
rather than birth. By taking up residence in another municipality I become 
a local citizen and acquire rights to be represented in local government. In 
an increasing number of democracies this principle of ius domicilii is also 
extended to foreign nationals who are granted voting rights in local elec-
tions.4 Finally, regional citizenship in federal states or supranational 
unions is automatically derived from nationality. I am a citizen of the 
province of Lower Austria and a citizen of the European Union because I 
am an Austrian national. Birthright, residence and derivation are three 
complementary ways how territorial polities determine who their citizens 
are.5 None of them is based on voluntary association.
But why should we not see cloud communities building on blockchain 
technology as finally realising the social contract ideal by enabling us to 
shed the coercive straightjacket of nonvoluntary citizenship and transform-
ing all political communities into voluntary associations? My response is 
that this would be fatal for democracy. Already Aristotle knew that, unlike 
families, democratic polities are association of diverse individual. These 
have only one thing in common: a shared destiny that links the freedom and 
well-being of each to the collective freedom and good of all. The territorial 
bases and automatic attribution mechanisms of citizenship create political 
community among individuals that differ profoundly in their interests, iden-
tities and ideas about the common good. Democracy is a set of institutions 
and procedures that provide solutions to collective action problems and 
4 Arrighi, J.-T. & R. Bauböck (2017), ‘A multilevel puzzle. Migrants’ voting 
rights in national and local elections’, European Journal of Political Research 
56 (3): 619–639.
5 See Bauböck, R. (2017), Democratic Inclusion. A Pluralistic Theory of 
Citizenship. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 57-87.
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legitimacy for coercive government exercised over a set of individuals who 
have been thrown together in a territory instead of having chosen each other 
in a voluntary association.
Voluntary associations in civil society and territorial democracies are 
thus based on categorically different membership principles. Cloud com-
munities could strengthen democratic citizenship if they contribute to 
expanding civil society to global scale. They would, however, undermine 
democracy if they took over the provision of public goods and functions 
of coercive government from territorial polities. Imagine what kind of 
cloud communities would be formed if these enjoyed powers similar to 
today’s states. Individuals would sort themselves out into like-minded sets 
just as they do in the echo chambers of today’s social media networks. The 
rich would form non-territorial polities that provide them with the best 
medical, educational and private security services worldwide without 
being taxed to finance adequate services also for the local poor. The dreams 
of nationalists of matching ethnocultural with political boundaries would 
finally come true if the latter are no longer territorial since, unlike terri-
tory, voluntary association is not a scarce resource. The boundaries of 
political communities would be constantly reshaped in efforts to get rid of 
minorities or lower classes who have become redundant in a digitalised 
economy.
This is in my views a dystopian rather than a utopian scenario. I do not 
think it is likely to happen any time soon, because states are powerful beasts 
that have been skilful in adapting to technological revolutions and using 
them for their purposes. I also think that most individuals are attached to 
territorial democracy and citizenship and will fight back politically against 
what they regard as excesses of globalisation. Unfortunately, they do so 
today often through voting for populist parties and politicians that promote 
an illiberal transformation of democracy. The task for liberal democrats is to 
strengthen the integration of territorial democracies by bridging the cleav-
age between mobile and globally oriented populations, on the one side, and 
immobile ones that experience a shrinking of their opportunities and life- 
worlds, on the other side.
But maybe this is a period of transition and the next generations of digital 
natives will be much more footloose than today’s sedentary majorities? A 
combination of a steep rise in global mobility with digital technologies 
empowering non-territorial political communities may make preserving ter-
ritorial democracy and citizenship a hopeless goal. Individuals’ primary 
political allegiances would then no longer be to a community of citizens 
rooted in a particular territory but to their self-selected cloud community. 
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It may happen, but democracy would then separate individuals living next 
to each other instead of uniting them as equal citizens in spite of their differ-
ences. This is not going to be Aristophanes’ happy cloud cuckoo land.
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In the last decades, modern democracies have been witnessing a low rate of 
political participation and civic engagement with existing governmental 
institutions. Low voter turnout, especially with younger generations, is rais-
ing significant concerns for many representative democracies, and trust in 
public institutions has dropped to a point that it has become difficult for 
people to engage in political activity.1
Civic participation is not dead, however, it is only shifting to a new space. 
With the advent of internet and digital technologies, citizens of the world are 
coalescing into increasingly globalized social movements,2 paving the way 
for new forms of political engagement.3 With the blockchain, these indi-
viduals could find new ways to spontaneously organize and coordinate 
themselves into transnational ‘cloud communities’, and – as Liav Orgad 
suggests (chapter “Cloud Communities: The Dawn of Global Citizenship?”) – 
even acquire their own self-sovereign identity that subsists independently of 
any nation-state. Those, I believe, are some of the most compelling develop-
ments of blockchain technology, which I have been following closely over 
the past few years.
But what makes blockchain technology a powerful tool for promoting 
disintermediation and decentralized coordination – i.e. a trustless technol-
1 According to Pew Research, in 2016, only 19 per cent of Americans said they 
trust their government, among the lowest levels in the past half-century. See 
http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-
their-government/. The same is true at the international level. A GCF survey 
found out that 85 per cent of the respondents in eight countries believe that the 
UN needs to be reformed to better deal with global risks and 71 per cent 
support the establishment of a new supranational organization. See https://api.
globalchallenges.org/static/files/ComRes.pdf
2 Cohen, R. & R. Shirin (eds.) (2004), Global social movements. London: A&C 
Black.
3 Della Porta, D., & S. G. Tarrow (eds.) (2005), Transnational protest and global 
activism. Lanham (MD): Rowman & Littlefield.
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ogy – also constitutes one of its greatest limitations, especially when it comes 
to political deliberation. While politics is about reaching a compromise 
between conflicting interests and values, blockchain technology operates via 
distributed consensus and an exit-based conflict resolution system. As under-
lined by Rainer Bauböck, relying on voluntary cloud communities as a 
means to govern society could significantly increase inequalities, leading to 
an overall loss of democratic representation and wealth redistribution.
In a sense, I agree with the diverging views of both Orgad and Bauböck. 
When brought to an extreme, blockchain technology could create – simulta-
neously – a utopian society characterized by greater individual freedom and 
autonomy, and a dystopian society driven by market-based incentives and 
self-dealing. But reality is neither black or white; it often has many different 
shades of grey. I see blockchain technology as neither the cure nor the curse 
of today’s political institutions. Rather, I see it as a tool that could enable us 
to experiment with new governance structures and alternative political sys-
tems – in a world where there is very little room left for experimentation.
 Multiple shades of activism
Digital activism is a not a recent phenomenon. Social movements increas-
ingly leverage the power of digital technologies to coordinate themselves 
and communicate to a broader audience – as illustrated by the role played by 
social media during the Arab uprisings in 2011.4 But the internet also enabled 
the emergence of new communities of kinship, with a variety of online plat-
forms (e.g Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp) gathering people around specific 
interests or values, regardless of their political views. Some of these com-
munities operate as tight social groups, providing members with a newfound 
sense of belonging and a collective identity.5 While they do not engage in 
what we usually regard as political activity, these online communities play a 
key role in shaping the way people organize and coordinate themselves, in 
ways that significantly differ from those of existing political institutions.6 
Apart from the legal regime these communities operate in, they are gov-
4 Howard, P. N., A Duffy, D. Freelon, M. M. Hussain, W. Mari & M. Maziad 
(2011), ‘Opening closed regimes: what was the role of social media during the 
Arab Spring?’, Project on Information Technology & Political Islam Working 
Paper 2011.1, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2595096
5 Wellman, B. & M. Gulia (1999), ‘Virtual communities as communities: Net 
surfers don’t ride alone’, in M. A. Smith & P. Kollock (eds.), Communities in 
cyberspace, 167-194. London; New York: Routledge.
6 Norris, P. (2002), ‘The bridging and bonding role of online communities’, 
Politics 7 (3): 3-13.
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erned by their own systems of rules and social norms – which members 
voluntary abide by.
In her book, ‘Social Movements and Their Technologies: Wiring Social 
Change’, Stefania Milan illustrates the different approaches of social move-
ments in materializing their ideas into the world.7 Insiders adopt a coopera-
tive attitude: they recognise existing institutions as a legitimate source of 
power and actively engage in their game, through advocacy and traditional 
decision-making procedures.8 Outsiders adopt a more confrontational atti-
tude: they reject the rules of these institutions and choose instead to exert 
pressure from the outside, through campaigns, protest or other form of polit-
ical resistance.9 Finally, what she refers to as beyonders are a wholly differ-
ent bunch. Beyonders simply refuse to engage with existing institutions: 
they do not want to fight them nor do they want to change them, they simply 
regard them as a leftover from a past era – which they are trying to render 
obsolete by building new systems.10 Thus, relatively to the other two groups, 
beyonders operate in a way that is more autonomous or independent; they 
do not play for or against the established political system, they just decide to 
ignore it or bypass it.
Is it fair to conclude that beyonders do not play a political role in society? 
Clearly not. By creating an alternative to existing institutions, they exert an 
indirect pressure forcing them to adjust themselves to maintain their posi-
tion. Perhaps more so than insiders and outsiders, who operate within a 
given political framework, beyonders are deeply concerned with social 
change. Their political action is the result of a constructive reaction to the 
current state of affairs. They are responding to their own needs using new 
schemes and methodologies, leveraging the power of communities to create 
new institutions that will help them fulfil their missions – through what 
essentially amounts to a new form of political organisation.
7 Milan, S. (2013), Social movements and their technologies: Wiring social 
change. London: Springer, 118-136.
8 Moe, T. M. (2005), ‘Power and political institutions’, Perspectives on Politics 
3 (2): 215-233.
9 Maloney, W. A., G. Jordan & A. M. McLaughlin (1994), ‘Interest groups and 
public policy: the insider/outsider model revisited’, Journal of Public Policy 
14 (1): 17-38.
10 Hintz, A. & S. Milan (2011), ‘User rights for the Internet age: Communications 
policy according to “Netizens”’, in R. Mansell & M. Raboy (eds.), The 
handbook of global media and communication policy, 230-241. Chichester, 
West Sussex; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
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 Beyond the blockchain
Today, in the shadow corners of the internet, a new group of beyonders is 
emerging, looking at blockchain technology as a means to replace many of 
our traditional institutions. While most of the attention was put, initially, on 
Bitcoin disrupting banks and other financial operators,11 as people under-
stood the full potential of blockchain technology, they saw it a means to 
implement new governance structures that could potentially replace some of 
our existing systems of governance.12
At the extreme end of this spectrum are those who envision the creation 
of new blockchain-based virtual nations, with a view to ultimately replace 
the nation-state. This is the case, for instance, of Bitnation: an initiative 
aimed at creating a new sovereign jurisdiction that operates only and exclu-
sively in cyberspace, independently of any geographical boundaries. 
Founded in 2014, Bitnation describes itself as a decentralized borderless 
voluntary nation that anyone can join or leave as they wish:13 a transnational 
community of global citizens that spontaneously coordinate themselves, 
with no recourse to coercion.
To early internet pioneers, this might sound familiar. Already in 1996, in 
the ‘Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’, John Perry Barlow 
described the digital world as an independent space that simply could not be 
regulated, because – he claimed – governments did not have the right nor the 
capacity to exert their sovereignty over it14 (even though history has eventu-
ally taught us otherwise).
11 De Filippi, P. (2014), ‘Bitcoin: a regulatory nightmare to a libertarian dream’, 
Internet Policy Review 3 (2): 43.
12 Davidson, S., P. De Filippi & J. Potts (2016), ‘Disrupting governance: The new 
institutional economics of distributed ledger technology’, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811995
13 According to the Bitnation website, Bitnation is a decentralized is fostering ‘a 
peer-to-peer voluntary governance system, rather than the current “top-down”, 
“one-size-fits-all” model, restrained by the current geographical apartheid, 
where your quality of life is defined by where you were arbitrarily born.’ See 
https://bitnation.co/join-the-team/
14 ‘Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I 
come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask 
you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no 
sovereignty where we gather.’ Barlow, J. P. (1996), Declaration of 




Barlow was essentially a beyonder – mocking the various governmental 
attempts at regulating the internet landscape, in ways that he considered to 
be ineffective in this new digital era. Similarly, Bitnation is mostly the result 
of a beyonders’ approach to governance, trying to create a new sovereign 
nation that ignores the rules and procedures of existing nation-states, 
regarded as obsolete in this new digital world. Because it operates on a 
transnational and decentralized peer-to-peer network (the Ethereum block-
chain), Bitnation is not under the control of any one government. Indeed, by 
relying on blockchain technology, Bitnation is creating a system that not 
only tries to escape from the hegemony of nation-states – because it has no 
single point of failure, or control – but also tries to compete with existing 
institutions and governmental systems – by providing self-sovereign identi-
ties, notarization services, property rights and company registration, dispute 
resolution systems, etc. which are usually associated with the functions of 
the public administration. The Ethereum blockchain is particularly useful in 
this context, because – as a public and transnational blockchain – it provides 
the necessary transparency, verifiability, incorruptibility and trust that one 
would expect from these governmental services.
‘Governance in the real world is so fucked. We have to start thinking 
about how to build it in the virtual world’ said Lawrence Lessig in an inter-
view15, after he resigned from the 2016 presidential campaign. While Lessig 
was referring to the creation of a massive multiplayer online game16 inviting 
players to experiment with different forms of governances, it might be worth 
investigating whether initiatives such as Bitnation, and other attempts at 
creating blockchain-based virtual nations (such as Cultu.re) or even 
blockchain- based virtual worlds (such as Decentraland) could actually pro-
vide a new space of experimentation, allowing people to experiment with 
new political systems that operate outside of any defined territory. Indeed, 
these initiatives – which rely on decentralised blockchain-based systems – 
are not located in any given jurisdiction: they subsist in a transnational 
space, which has yet to be colonised by new governance structures and 
experimental political regimes.
15 ‘“Governance in the Real World Is So Fucked:” Lawrence Lessig Is Working 
on an MMO’, Motherboard, 8 June 2017, available at https://motherboard.
vice.com/en_us/article/neweqm/lawrence-lessig-is-working-on-an-mmo- 
game-seed
16 ‘Think the government is doomed? See if you can build a better one in 
“Seed”’, Digital Trends, 8 March 2017, available at https://www.digitaltrends.
com/gaming/seed-mmo-interview-democracy-lawrence-lessig/
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 Blockchain-based virtual nations
Can these blockchain-based systems support the emergence of a new frame-
work for global citizenship (as suggested by Liav Orgad, amongst others17) 
where people pledge allegiance not to an existing government or nation- 
state, but to a global community that transcends national boundaries?18 Can 
they support a new understanding citizenship as collective identity, provid-
ing new opportunities for collective action and civic participation in a post- 
national world?19 As with many things today, the answer is not a simple one. 
The concept of blockchain-based virtual nations is interesting because it is 
highly controversial. It is, in fact, supported by different groups, for very 
different purposes.
On the one hand, the concept of a virtual nation is appealing to many 
libertarians, who see it as an opportunity to reduce the room for governmen-
tal intervention, by creating new ad-hoc governmental structures aimed at 
creating a society governed by (unregulated) market forces, and nothing 
else. This is the vision brought forward most prominently by Peter Thiel, 
who envisions the creation of a new sovereign nation on an offshore artificial 
island20, built 200 miles off the Californian coast. This vision is also shared 
by a number of crypto-libertarians,21 such as the team behind Bitnation, who 
believe that – since we have lost trust in our governments – we shall now 
17 The notion of ‘world citizen’ has been endorsed by a variety of scholars, 
activists and social movements. See, in particular, Ulrich Beck’s notion of 
‘cosmopolitanism’ and discussions on the ‘post-westphalian’ international 
system. See Beck, U. (2003), ‘Toward a new critical theory with a cosmopoli-
tan intent’, Constellations 10 (4): 453-468; Beck, U. & N. Sznaider (2006), 
‘Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda’, The 
British Journal of Sociology 57 (1): 1-23.
18 See also the work of Tölölyan, K. (1996), ‘Rethinking diaspora(s): Stateless 
power in the transnational moment’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational 
Studies 5 (1): 3-36; Grewal, I. (2005), Transnational America: feminisms, 
diasporas, neoliberalisms. Durham: Duke University Press; and Van Hear, N. 
(2005), New diasporas: The mass exodus, dispersal and regrouping of migrant 
communities. London: Routledge (on diasporas as transnational entities).
19 Sassen, S. (2002), ‘Towards post-national and denationalized citizenship’, in 
E. F. Isin & B. S. Turner (eds.), Handbook of citizenship studies, 277-292. 
London: Sage.
20 ‘Libertarians Seek a Home on the High Seas’, The New Republic, 29 May 
2017, available at https://newrepublic.com/article/142381/
libertarians-seek-home-high-seas




rely on blockchain technology to create trustless systems (i.e. systems where 
trust is no longer needed) with a view to support and facilitate a series of 
atomic peer-to-peer interactions in a seemingly stateless environment.22
On the other hand, there are people who see virtual nations as an opportu-
nity to overcome the lack of trust in governmental institutions, through the 
creation of new trusted communities with a global scope. These communities 
can experiment with new institutional structures that operate independently 
from, or as a complement to existing institutions. They can support the emer-
gence of grassroots initiatives intended to fill the gaps generated by the pro-
gressive shrinking of the welfare state – i.e. the provision of public services 
and shared infrastructure, the pursuit of the common good, and the protection 
of individual and collective rights.23 Blockchain technologies could provide 
new mechanisms of social or political coordination, allowing for transna-
tional communities and activist groups (such as human rights defenders, 
internet freedoms advocates and climate change campaigners) to gather 
around a newfound sense of identity and organise themselves as a collective.
The idea is not to replace nation-states with new or competing forms of 
sovereignty, but rather to provide new means for global communities to 
mobilise and experiment with new ways of engaging in civic life. If political 
participation no longer finds its place in the context of traditional govern-
mental structures, perhaps these virtual communities – or cloud communi-
ties, as Orgad calls them – might be able to bring civics back to life. Indeed, 
if citizenship refers not only to a legal status, but also to an individual’s 
political activity and collective identity,24 we might soon witness the 
 emergence of new global citizens, who regard these new virtual nations as 
polities and self-identify as their members.
This is the vision supported by initiatives like Democracy Earth and 
Aragon, two blockchain-based platforms providing tools for small and large 
organisations to operate in a globalised post nation-state world, through 
their own governance rules and dispute resolution systems. Without trying 
22 Atzori, M. (2015), ‘Blockchain technology and decentralized governance: Is 
the state still necessary?’, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2709713 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2709713
23 Feigenbaum, H., J. Henig & C. Hamnett (1998), Shrinking the state: The 
political underpinnings of privatization. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
24 Dalton, R. J. (2008), ‘Citizenship norms and the expansion of political 
participation’, Political Studies 56 (1): 76-98; Eisenstadt, S. N. & B. Giesen 
(1995), ‘The construction of collective identity’, European Journal of 
Sociology 36 (1): 72-102.
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to replace the role of the state as a political institution, these initiatives are 
exploring whether (and how) some of the functions undertaken by govern-
mental authorities – e.g. the issuance of identity cards, recordation of vital 
records and maintenance of public registries, etc. – could be transposed into 
a blockchain-based system.
People are ideally free to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether they 
want to rely on traditional institutions and governmental frameworks, or 
whether they would rather adopt these new experimental systems, whose 
values they might feel more attuned with. As a general rule, citizens cannot 
easily revoke their allegiance to a particular nation-state, because – as high-
lighted by Rainer Bauböck – the social contract described by Hobbes and 
Rousseau is not a negotiable contractual agreement entered into by consent 
(i.e. citizenship as a legal status is generally something that one does not 
chose and that, once acquired, cannot be easily gotten ridden of). Yet, to the 
extent possible, they could choose to acquire additional citizenships, becom-
ing members of multiple communities based on affinity and consent. Insofar 
as they provide valuable services to their citizens, these virtual communities 
(or virtual nations) may be competing with one another – and potentially 
with nation-states – so as to expand their user-base.
While this might sound speculative at best, we are already seeing glim-
mers of this new world. For several years, the republic of Estonia has been 
trying to create a ‘digital nation for global citizens,’25 as illustrated by its 
e-residency program, which provides a government-issued digital ID to all 
individuals requesting it. Inspired by the notion of government as a 
platform,26 e-Estonia is trying to become the hub for every governmental 
service, providing all of its electronic residents with a secure identification 
system, notarisation services, and even the ability to run a company or open 
a bank account, without ever putting foot into Estonia. With over 28,000 
e-residents from all over the world, today, the state of Estonia increasingly 
operates on a digital layer, enabling people to interact with its governmental 
platform independently of their country of citizenship or residency.27
25 ‘E-Residency is a new digital nation for global citizens, powered by the 
Republic of Estonia.’ See https://e-resident.gov.ee/
26 O’Reilly, T. (2011), ‘Government as a Platform’, Innovations 6 (1): 13-40.
27 According to Taavi Kotka, Chief Innovation Officer of Estonia since 2013: 
‘Countries are like enterprises. They want to increase the wealth of their own 
people.’ Heller, N. (2017), ‘Estonia, the Digital Republic’, The New Yorker, 18 





Competition between nation-states, trying to collect new members by pro-
viding more efficient or reliable governments services, has already begun. If 
Estonia can collect e-residents on a global scale – in spite of its national 
boundaries – what would prevent virtual nations from doing the same, with-
out a physical territory? Are we actually moving towards a world in which 
multiple nations are competing to attract more citizens, in the same way as 
companies are today competing to attract more customers?28
Of course, things get murky when we move from purely administrative 
tasks – like identity, property and company recordation – to more political 
tasks, involving policy and decision-making. If people could choose to 
become citizens only of the communities with whom they agree, they would 
essentially engage in a generalised version of nation-shopping, constantly 
trying to find the jurisdictions that seem the most advantageous for them. 
When brought to an extreme, this would ultimately mean the end of politics.
Politics is all about compromises, in order to accommodate different 
viewpoints without entering into a conflict. An opt-in or exit-based political 
system essentially eliminates the notion of politics, because it removes the 
need for compromise. People with different values or opinions would no 
longer need to argue and deliberate in order to reach consensus, because if 
they’re in disagreement, they can simply leave.
As Bauböck recognises, there are significant challenges in letting people 
choose which nation they want to pledge allegiance to. The state as a sover-
eign entity – Hobbes’ Leviathan – is not only responsible for preserving the 
public order, it is also in charge of promoting the general interests, produc-
ing common goods and creating a collective sense of redistribution and 
 justice. All these functions could disappear as we move towards a more 
market-based approach to citizenship.
I am, however, more pessimistic than Bauböck when it comes to the way 
nation-states will adapt to these technological changes. Given the progres-
sive disengagement of citizens in local politics, and the growing distrust in 
existing institutions – whose legitimacy is increasingly put into question – it 
might not be surprising to see a new wave of nationalism emerging all over 
the world, with nation-states drawing on nationalist and anti-immigration 
28 According to its website: ‘Bitnation is creating a new world where thousands 
or millions of nations actually compete for customers by providing better 
services, instead of using force. It’s a world where everyone can choose.’ See 
http://bitnation.co
Citizenship in the Era of Blockchain-Based Virtual Nations
276
narratives to reinforce their hegemony over the territory, essentially redefin-
ing on-going relationships between citizens and non-citizens.29
At the same time, due to the increasing trends towards globalisation, 
large internet corporations, like Google or Facebook, are progressively tak-
ing on some of the functions that were once specific to the nation-state: from 
the task of supporting the discourses in the public sphere to their role as 
identity providers.30 With several billions of users on their platforms, these 
corporations are slowly turning into de facto corporate nations, with their 
own system of rules that they unilaterally define and impose on their ‘citi-
zens’. Traditional nation-states might, therefore, soon have to compete not 
only with virtual nations, but also with these new transnational corporate 
nations – similar to Neal Stephenson’s franchulates as science-fiction fans 
will certainly point out.31
 New opportunities for experimentation
It is in this convoluted (and daunting) context that I see the rise of blockchain- 
based virtual nations as a positive omen. Perhaps the reference to virtual 
nations is not the most accurate one, because the term has a strong political 
connotation and somewhat gives the impression that these communities are 
assuming the role of traditional nation-states. While some of these commu-
nities do intend to replace the figure of the nation-state (e.g. Bitnation), oth-
ers are simply trying to experiment with new and allegedly apolitical 
governance systems,32 which nevertheless play a crucial political function.
Because they rely on voluntary association, virtual communities might 
well remove the need for compromise within a single community, yet they 
do not eliminate the need for compromise between multiple communities. 
Hence, politics are not gone, they are simply moving into a different layer. 
By aggregating people with similar values and opinions, these virtual com-
munities could in fact strengthen the voice of certain minorities – usually 
stifled by the majority’s opinion – and create a more lively debate and politi-
cal discourse at the outside (rather than on the inside) of these communities. 
As such, they could end up participating in conventional politics, along with 
other real-world interests groups.
29 Mitchell, K. (1997), ‘Transnational discourse: bringing geography back in’, 
Antipode 29 (2): 101-114.
30 Habermas, J. (1991), The structural transformation of the public sphere: An 
inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
31 Stephenson, N. (1992), Snow crash. New York: Bantam-Random.
32 Atzori, M. (2015), ‘Blockchain technology and decentralized governance: Is 




To conclude, let me take the stance of a beyonder for a moment. As a 
member of Creative Commons,33 I have always been fascinated by its solu-
tion. Instead of trying to reform copyright law from the inside or fight it 
from the outside, Creative Commons introduced an alternative legal regime 
for creative works that coexists with the existing regulatory framework (in 
fact, it is based on it) for authors to experiment with new business models 
that do not rely on the exclusivity and artificial scarcity of copyright law.
Today, with the advent of blockchain technologies, a new wave of inno-
vation is underway in the realm of governance. This innovation is one that 
will benefit everyone: the insiders, i.e. governmental authorities like Estonia, 
relying on blockchain technology to increase the transparency and account-
ability of public administrations; the outsiders, like Peter Thiel, trying to 
create new self-sovereign nations with the intention to escape from the laws 
and control of existing nation-states; and, of course, the beyonders, like 
Bitnation et al., eager to use the technology to support the coordination of 
transnational communities of voluntary association that operate indepen-
dently of traditional nation-states, but are capable of peacefully coexisting 
with them. It is the latter which I am the most excited about, and which I 
believe could contribute to developing new governance models that might 
help us build a real global democracy.
33 Creative Commons is an organisation devoted to expanding the range of 
artistic, academic, and other content available for people to share and build 
upon. See http://creativecommons.org
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Global Citizenship for the Stay-at-Homes
Francesca Strumia
Technological advances sometimes alter our experience of well-established 
notions. The night is as dark today as in the 18th century. However street-
lights have pierced its veil. The distance between Turin and Rome is the 
same today as it was in the first century AD. Yet what was once at least a 
week-long journey has become with high speed trains a commute of a few 
hours. Similarly, distributed ledgers technology, by making it technically 
possible for every individual to create and maintain a globally recognised 
digital identity, has the potential to materially alter the experience and the 
meaning of citizenship.1 Such technological advances, and their possible 
applications, make global political participation, moral commitment and 
rights claiming as envisioned by global citizenship theorists one touch closer 
to reality.2 Liav Orgad and Rainer Bauböck emphasize from different per-
spectives that new technologies are not meant to supplant citizenship as we 
know it; they rather add to it. The notion of an international legal persona – 
explains Orgad – is a complement to national citizenship. And cloud politi-
cal communities are – in Bauböck’s view – an extension of existing political 
communities. Hence, global citizenship comes to flank long-established 
notions of citizenship.
I agree with them on the complementary nature of global citizenship in 
respect to traditional one. And in this contribution I focus on the latter rather 
than on the former. I propose to consider how the prospect of technology- 
enabled global citizenship alters the concept, legal structure and scope of 
citizenship as we know it. The possibility of novel virtual frontiers chal-
lenges further traditional citizenship as a state-based, non-voluntary and 
1 For an overview of the technology and its applications, see: UK Government 
Office for Science (2018), Distributed Ledger Technology: beyond block chain. 
Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf
2 Archibugi, D. (2008), The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: towards 
Cosmopolitan Democracy. Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University 
Press; Falk, R. (1994), ‘The Making of Global Citizenship’, in B. van 
Steenbergen (ed.), The Condition of Citizenship, 127-140. London: Sage.
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bounded membership. A web of relations beyond the bilateral one between 
state and individual comes within the purview of the concept; consensual 
citizenship acquires a new role; and citizenship becomes increasingly 
unbounded from national borders.
 A network model of citizenship
Cloud communities can cause a conceptual shift as they strike at the heart of 
the role of states in shaping citizenship. As Bauböck observes, global citi-
zenship cannot push the state out of business. States remain responsible for 
providing a range of fundamental services and benefits. Yet the advent of 
distributed ledgers technology potentially breaks the state’s monopoly in 
attributing and authenticating citizens’ identities.3 This nuances in turn the 
state’s role as the main counterpart of the citizen. Citizenship no longer 
focuses on a binary relation between lord and vassal, sovereign and subject, 
state and individual. While that relation loses part of its feudalist character, 
to echo Orgad, citizenship comes to express a relation between different 
classes of ‘belongers’ to a legal and political community: the birthright 
members, the voluntary joiners, the reluctant leavers, the engaged passers-
 by, to mention just a few. Blockchain and other technologies will mean that 
their interactions are no longer exclusively mediated by the state and its 
rules. They would rather articulate through a web of virtual relations enabled 
by encrypted and self-governed digital identities.
A network model of citizenship pushes us to rethink, and possibly 
reframe, the legal structure and scope of citizenship as we know it. First, 
consent potentially gains a heftier role than it has traditionally played in the 
domain of citizenship. Second, cross-border citizenship receives a new lease 
of life.
 More room for consensual citizenship
Consensual citizenship is traditionally the exception rather than the rule. 
The vast majority of humans are attributed a citizenship through a birthright 
lottery.4 A tiny minority exercises consent to change citizenship through 
3 For an explanation in this sense, see Dumbrava, C. (2017), ‘Citizenship and 
Technology’, in A. Shachar, R. Bauböck, I. Bloemraad & M. Vink, Oxford 
Handbook of Citizenship, 767-778. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4 Shachar, A. (2009), The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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processes of naturalisation,5 or renounces a citizenship automatically 
received. And consent is still only exercised within the narrow tracks 
designed by states for attribution and removal of citizenship. But otherwise 
citizenship is the legacy of blood relations or territorial connections one has 
never chosen.
With technology enabling participation of virtual citizens in cloud com-
munities, the relative weight of consensual citizenship potentially changes. 
This is because participation in a cloud community could allow citizens to 
virtually vote with their feet.6 It would enable everyone to decide to spend 
their digital identity in a community other than the territorial one to which 
one is assigned at birth. With the opening up of opportunities for virtual exit 
from the cage of territorial citizenship, the negotiating balance in the rela-
tion between state and individual changes. The question ‘why am I a citizen 
of this nation state’ no longer finds an obvious answer and individual citi-
zens gain more clout against the states to which they automatically belong. 
On the one hand, this transformation may lead to rethink the opportunities 
for birthright members to confirm or withdraw their consent to member-
ship.7 On the other hand, it may result in states pushing their efforts to attract 
consenting passers-by into the ranks of their territorial citizenry, as they 
already do in part with investor citizenship programs.8
More room for consensual citizenship is not necessarily good news, as 
Bauböck observes. There are risks linked to consent. Bauböck sees the non- 
voluntary character of citizenship as a condition for preserving democracy: 
non-voluntary determination of citizenship is the only guarantee that politi-
cal communities, whether territorial or virtual, preserve a healthy level of 
diversity. A further risk is that consensual cloud communities are resorted to 
5 For instance, in the US out of a population of ca 300,000,000, only 19.8 
million are naturalised citizens. See Pew Research Center, Recent Trends in 
Naturalization 1995-2015, June 29 2017, available at http://www.pewhispanic.
org/2017/06/29/recent-trends-in-naturalization-1995-2015/ (consulted 19th 
January 2018).
6 For an argument about voting with one’s feet in federal states, see Tiebout, C. 
(1956), ‘A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures’, The Journal of Political 
Economy 64 (5): 416-424.
7 For the theory of voice and exit see Hirschman, A. O. (1970), Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States. Cambridge/
London: Harvard University Press.
8 See Shachar, A. & R. Bauböck (eds.) (2014), ‘Should Citizenship be for Sale’, 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory 
Working Paper 2011/62, Florence: European University Institute, available at 
cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29318/RSCAS_2014_01.pdf
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as a means to harden the link between citizenship and territory rather than to 
loosen it. Cloud communities may easily become a tool for amplifying 
 cultural traditions and national sentiments. They offer a platform for joining 
virtually different territorial pockets of supporters of closure and exclusion. 
From this perspective cloud communities risk to widen the gap between the 
mobile and globally oriented citizens on the one hand, and the immobile 
ones on the other hand, as Bauböck points out.9 Should this cleavage come 
to inform the competition among virtual nations that Primavera de Filippi 
envisions, global society could end up split between the virtual communities 
of those engaged across borders and the ones of those living in splendid 
isolation.
But technology-enabled global citizenship does not only nudge states 
gently towards consensual citizenship. It also enhances qualitatively the 
prospects of cross-border citizenship. Enhanced cross-border citizenship 
may hold the key to the bridge across the above referred gap between the 
mobiles and immobiles.
 A citizen’s stake beyond national borders
It goes without saying that digital identities and their applications multiply 
the opportunities for long-distance citizenship. They can help states to 
engage their diasporas through virtual communities. Or enable expats to 
receive benefits and services issued by their state of origin in a state of resi-
dence. In this sense, technology supports and complements the legal infra-
structure underpinning cross-border movement and transnational 
citizenship.10
Beyond this, cloud communities of digitally identified participants have 
the potential to alter the very nature of cross-border citizenship. They open 
up opportunities for extending the reach of citizenship beyond the national 
territory even without cross-border movement. Cloud communities indeed 
offer to individuals the option to raise their voice, or claim benefits and ser-
9 For an insightful analysis of the new gap between supporters and opponents of 
‘drawbridges up’, see ‘The New Political Divide’, The Economist, 30 July 
2016, available at https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21702750-fare-
well-left-versus-right-contest-matters-now-open-against-closed-new (consulted 
19 January 2018)
10 Infrastructure that has one of its more sophisticated expressions in the citizen-
ship of the European Union. See Strumia F. (2017), ‘Supranational 
Citizenship’, in A. Shachar, R. Bauböck, I. Bloemraad & M. Vink, Oxford 
Handbook of Citizenship, 669-693. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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vices, in territorial communities to which they do not physically belong. 
States can open their communities to new classes of e-citizens along the 
lines of Estonia’s e-residence program.11 And sedentary citizens could nego-
tiate virtual membership in states to which they will never travel.
In this sense, digital identities and cloud communities may create the 
right to have, and exercise, a stake in legal and political communities beyond 
the borders of one’s own nation.12 On a practical level, they enable states to 
recognise forms of ad hoc political citizenship and temporary virtual admis-
sion to accommodate the stakes of non-citizens. Relevant non-citizens could 
be given voice in selected deliberations of the territorial political commu-
nity, touching upon the interests of a larger cohort of virtual denizens. On a 
conceptual level, the right that technology enables, if adequately recognised 
and framed within the legal structure of national citizenship, could funda-
mentally alter the scope of traditional citizenship. It would no longer be just 
the right to have rights, and raise a voice, within a bounded national territory 
but the right to have rights and to participate wherever interests, careers, 
affective life, chance or just curiosity bring one’s stakes.
In a similar scenario, the counterpart of the citizen would no longer be 
just one state (or two in the case of dual nationals), but potentially the plural-
ity of states within whose territorial boundaries a person’s virtual interests 
unfold in the course of a lifetime. ‘Why should states even bother to open 
their virtual borders to such virtual denizens?’, one could wonder. In part, 
because a state’s citizens would reciprocally benefit from the same opportu-
nity in other states. Hence a state would accommodate virtual denizens to 
protect the interests of its own citizens. Further, states may have an eco-
nomic, or even political interest, in activating the stakes of some external 
e-citizens. Relevant citizens may contribute capital or economic initiative. 
Or they may support governmental policy choices.
 Global citizenship for the stay-at-homes
The citizen’s right to have a stake beyond national borders potentially 
bridges the cleavage between the globally mobile and the immobile. It 
belongs to, and appeals to the interests of, both classes of citizens. It can be 
exercised physically by the former group, and virtually by the latter through 
11 See Republic of Estonia e-residency program, available at https://e-resident.
gov.ee/
12 For the concept of stakeholder citizenship see Bauböck, R. (2017), Democratic 
Inclusion. Rainer Bauböck in Dialogue. Manchester, UK: Manchester 
University Press.
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the novel channels that technology opens up. It is this very right that holds 
the potential to respond to nationalist and protectionist stances variedly rep-
resented in the contemporary political spectrum of several western coun-
tries. To the extent that these stances are driven by fear and insecurity, the 
concrete conferral of a right to have a stake beyond one’s borders can teach 
the 21st century citizens an important lesson: that protection and security do 
not come from populist retrenchment into closure and exclusion. They rather 
come from the broadening of the umbrella under which citizenship claims 
can find accommodation.
As the night has become less dark and millenary cities have grown closer, 
also national citizenship can change to track not only the territorial boundar-
ies of nation states but also the virtual ones of human stakes and interests. 
Never mind the gap between the mobiles and the immobiles. New technol-
ogy brings about the gift of global citizenship for the stay-at-homes.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium 
or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes 
were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
F. Strumia
285© The Author(s) 2018 
R. Bauböck (ed.), Debating Transformations of National Citizenship, 
IMISCOE Research Series, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92719-0_50
A World Without Law; A World  
Without Politics
Robert Post
I have read with great interest the stimulating contributions of Liav Orgad, 
Rainer Bauböck, Primavera De Filippi, and Francesca Strumia. It is impor-
tant to ask how a universal internet will affect the nature of citizenship, the 
status of which has heretofore been dominated by territorially-defined nation 
states.
I confess, however, that I know nothing about blockchain technology. So 
I accept Orgad’s assertion that blockchain technology ‘can provide people 
with self-sovereign identity – they are the ones who create and register their 
identity and they are the only ones who control what to do with it and with 
whom to share what.’ I accept that nation states can off-load this identifica-
tion function to some technological mechanism.
But Orgad seems to believe that this mechanism creates the possibility of 
‘realizing one of the most morally-desirable notions in human history – 
global citizenship without a world state.’ This is because the mechanism 
potentially shatters a Westphalian system in which legal personality is con-
ferred by nation states.
Orgad writes that ‘the concept of an international legal persona will 
enable individuals to establish “Cloud Communities” of different kinds. 
Conceptually, cloud communities have traditional characteristics of political 
communities, but not necessarily a physical territory. The communal bond 
can be global in nature – such as a shared concern about climate change, 
ageing, veganism and animal rights (i.e., a universal community, open to 
everyone) – or ascriptive, such as a Jewish / Bahá’í faith / Diasporic Cloud 
Nations, a form of “transnational nationalism” (i.e., a selective community, 
open only to certain members). It can be thematic or geographic – region, 
country, state, city, village – based on a shared interest or territorial identity, 
even if not or legally recognised communities. Membership is based on con-
sent; a person can be a member of several communities or none.’
So described, cloud communities are, as Rainer Bauböck properly 
observes, ‘an expansion of civil society.’ It is a far jump from expanding 
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international civil society to creating global citizenship. A global citizen 
must be a member of a global political community. Orgad acknowledges 
this point. He states that his ‘focus is political communities. Cloud commu-
nities are not social networks, but political communities whose aim is politi-
cal decision-making and in which individuals take part in a process of 
governance and the creation of law.’
It is at precisely this point that I lose track of the argument. Orgad is cor-
rect to observe that the defining characteristic of political communities is the 
production of ‘governance and the creation of law.’ What I do not under-
stand is how cloud communities produce governance and law.
By imposing sanctions of expulsion, any given cloud community can 
govern itself; it can create its own law. But this is true for every group within 
civil society. Every church has its rules and its criteria for excommunication. 
The point about a political community, however, is that it imposes law upon 
those who, as Bauböck observes, are not voluntarily members. Political 
communities govern all those within their jurisdiction. That is precisely the 
difference between political communities and a private organization. It is 
why law ultimately must have recourse to force, even to violence (as Max 
Weber observes).
A world in which every community is voluntary is a world in which 
every norm is also voluntary. It is therefore a world without law. Because 
politics is the social form by which we create law, it is also a world without 
politics.
If I commit murder, the necessity of my punishment is not bounded by 
my consent. Cloud communities, which are defined by consent, are thus 
irrelevant. The question is who we will entrust with the fearsome power of 
involuntary punishment, which is not a purely textual, purely mediated con-
sequence. To the extent that punishment operates on the body of the guilty, 
it cannot be within the purview of cloud communities.
De Filippi shrewdly observes that the attraction of blockchain technolo-
gies is to create ‘trustless systems (i.e. system where trust is no longer 
needed).’ The hope that technology will remove the human element is an old 
one. We all long to leave behind the flesh and live only in the spirit. But this 
is merely a fantasy. There is always corruption, and for that reason we can 
never escape the need for politics, police, and law.
Suppose someone infiltrates the blockchain and manipulates it for nefari-
ous ends. To whom will we entrust the power of ensuring the integrity of the 
chain? And don’t think that it can never happen. It always happens. All tech-
R. Post
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nology is ultimately wielded by human hands that can become dirty. Who 
will have the power (to use an old-fashioned word) to cleanse the chain and 
restore the system? And how will that power be legitimised? How will we 
come to trust that power?
Politics is what we use in the face of such problems, when we must con-
front each other as distinct human beings and reach accommodation about 
essential matters in which we differ. Another way of seeing this point is this: 
If cloud communities create, as Strumia writes, ‘citizens’ who can ‘virtually 
vote with their feet,’ who will protect global citizens as they travel between 
cloud communities?
At their best, cloud communities can inspire all the virtues that de 
Tocqueville saw in civil associations. They can train us in the benefits of 
participation and sociality. But in the contributions of Strumia and Orgad, I 
sense also another value, that of free, autonomous, marketplace consumers. 
Orgad writes that e-Estonia ‘resembles a business model where states are 
service providers and “citizens” are billed for the service.’ Strumia imagines 
e-states that provide services to expats or ‘virtual denizens.’
Strumia and Orgad emphasise real and important developments. But it is 
a mistake to confuse these possibilities with the creation of political com-
munities. Strumia and Orgad are instead describing ordinary marketplace 
consumer transactions. If states can sell services more cheaperly than a pri-
vate entity, and if they can sell these services internationally, that may be all 
to the good.
But what does this have to do with law and governance? To answer this 
query, we need to ask questions like: Who can (involuntarily) tax virtual 
denizens? Who can determine the commercial law that will govern the mar-
ket transactions that a state conducts with virtual denizens? and so forth. 
Every market transaction presupposes a legal environment that is outside 
the transaction itself. Setting the requirements of that environment is a polit-
ical task.
It is quite true that traditional states can offload services that now we 
associate with governmentality. Perhaps states can offload the determination 
of identity status to a blockchain. As the EU has taught us, it is a mistake to 
confuse government sovereignty with the particular shape in which it is 
presently exercised. But insofar as we wish to deploy government sover-
eignty – insofar as we wish to exercise state functions backed by the force 
of law – it is a fearsome and unstable thing to do so without a corresponding 
political community, as the EU has also taught us.
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If the very definition of cloud communities is that they are voluntary 
and exist only at the whim and interest of members, I do not see how 
blockchain cloud communities promise the creation of global citizenship. 
They seem instead to signal the emergence of global civil society or at 
most a global market in government services. And, to the extent that cloud 
communities are involuntary, I must ask how their members are con-
scripted and governed. I must also ask how blockchains or any other tech-
nological device can offer hope that governance will be more just or more 
democratic than what presently exists in traditional territorially-bounded 
nation states.
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Virtual Politics, Real Guns: On Cloud  
Community, Violence, and Human Rights
Michael Blake
The creation of novel forms of information technology will put pressure on 
traditional forms of state sovereignty. The future, then, will be unlike the 
past. That much – to me, at least – seems beyond question. The more inter-
esting subject, though, is whether we will be able to predict – from where 
and when we now are, with the technologies and histories we now inhabit – 
what that future will look like. Liav Orgad, in his lead essay, offers us a 
compelling – and profoundly optimistic – vision of one possible future. In 
that future, our current world of sovereignty, in which human rights are 
nested in territorially limited sovereign states, is supplemented by a plural-
istic and polycentric network of voluntary communities, mediated by infor-
mation technology based upon self-sovereign forms of digital identity. The 
notion of global citizenship, in that world, might move from useful meta-
phor to lived reality; we could, at last, inhabit a world of our own choosing – 
a world in which, as Francesca Strumia adds, we might join new worlds 
while never leaving home.
It is my lot, in these debates, to provide reasons to worry. I want to high-
light and describe problems that stand in the way of moving from where we 
are now to where Orgad thinks we might soon be. I want to present these 
worries, not as permanent obstacles to the forms of life Orgad describes, but 
as problems we would have to solve before that world could be made real. 
The worries I describe stem from features of the state system that I think are 
poorly replicated in the world of cloud community and voluntary associa-
tion; territorial states right now provide us with goods that cannot be pro-
vided by even the best systems of informational technology. To denigrate 
the importance of territorial states, in favour of these voluntaristic forms of 
association, might make things worse, rather than better.
I follow the lead of Rainer Bauböck, who notes the ways in which diver-
sity of thought might be placed at risk in voluntary association, and Robert 
Post, who argues that the power of the state to punish cannot be replicated 
by a virtual and voluntary community. My own challenge is broader: the 
protection of human rights, I believe, can only be accomplished by means of 
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violence and force, in both policing and in punishment – and this violence is 
in our world reserved (as a matter of right, if not reality) for use by states. 
Orgad’s polycentric vision, in other words, must either acknowledge the 
continued relevance of the state system, and provide space for the preserva-
tion and maintenance of that system – or it must provide us with the resources 
to move beyond that system, by showing how violence might be rightly used 
by dispersed forms of intentional community. What I think cannot be done – 
or, at any rate, cannot be done easily – is to insist that informational technol-
ogy has fundamentally transformed political reality, in the world in which 
we live. It might do so, of course; but I do not think it has done so yet – and 
there is a great deal of work to do, for philosophers and politicians alike, 
before that transformed world is open to us.
To see this, we might begin by looking at the notion of a failed state. 
What does such a state look like? A failed state, in the first instance, involves 
the absence of a political community sufficient to provide the means of sur-
vival; food, shelter, water, and so on.1 But the state rarely actually provides 
these goods itself; we do not expect the government to actually deliver us 
food and water, unless circumstances (or that government) have become 
very dire. What the state provides, instead, is coercion – coercion directed, 
in the first instance, at those people who would steal our food or water; at 
people who would break contracts with us as regards our labour; and so on. 
A state fails when it fails to provide the coercive means needed to preserve 
these liberties – or, on a broader vision of failure, when it sometimes pro-
vides the means of survival, and sometimes refrains from doing so.2
This is, to be sure, a minimal account of what a state must do; but it is 
already instructive. We should note, to begin with, that the use of coercion 
by the state is not here an optional part of its toolkit; coercion – which is to 
say, violence – is required of any state that is doing the job of the state. The 
second thing to note is that a great deal of political philosophy amounts to 
understanding what particular forms of violence might be justified specifi-
cally to the people gathered together within the coercive grasp of the state.3 
Most of us, after all, regard the state as having a duty to do more than avoid 
failure; it has to be just in how it deploys these coercive powers that make it 
distinct. The state must, therefore, do justice to those people over whom it 
claims the power of rightful coercion. The final thing to note is that the state 
1 Rotberg, R. I. (ed.) (2003), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
2 Easterly, W. R. (2002), The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge: MIT Press.
3 Rawls, J. (1989), Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
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is supposed to be capable of offering, in any particular dispute about what 
justice demands, something very much like finality. Once the state has 
decided some matter of controversy, it is entitled to insist that its determina-
tion shall be non-optional for the political community over which it rules.4
Why, though, is any of this relevant to our discussion of blockchain and 
cloud community? It is relevant, I think, because of how our most important 
rights are linked to the state’s use of violence. Our human rights are concep-
tually linked to violence; Hannah Arendt’s often-cited ‘right to have rights’ 
demands the existence of an agency that will deploy force against those who 
would presume to deny or trespass on those rights.5 Our civil rights, too, are 
conceptually linked with violence; the reason I have the right to vote in the 
United States and not France, goes the argument, is that the law of the United 
States – and not France – gets to order me around, and to coerce me if I 
resist. This sort of coercion, though, is unavailable to even the most robust 
and well-developed forms of virtual association. We have, I think, very little 
sense of what it would be for them to have such coercive rights; and we have 
some good reason to worry that a world in which they had such rights might 
be a bad one indeed.
We can use these thoughts to develop some more specific worries about 
the examples used by Orgad in his essay. Take the notion of political partici-
pation in a virtual political community. Orgad suggests that such communi-
ties would form valuable spaces for political negotiation. I agree – so long 
as we are aware that such communities are political in only a secondary and 
derivative sense. The political community of the United States must engage 
in discourse whose aim is to determine what sorts of things the law of the 
United States shall do. This sort of political community is, I think, political 
in a primary sense; if the discourse were to stop, the justice of coercive law 
in the United States would necessarily cease. Other forms of political asso-
ciation, though, are political communities only in a secondary sense. If they 
were to cease their discussions, the world of discourse would likely be 
impoverished; but the justice of United States legal determinations, for 
example, would not be automatically placed into doubt. I think we might 
usefully call the United States’ citizenry, and Amnesty International, politi-
cal associations; certainly, they both seem associative, and they both seem 
political. But the two are distinct in how they relate to violence. The United 
States uses violence. Amnesty International offers criticism about how that 
violence is used. The latter sort of political community, in short, could not 
4 Hart, H. L. A. (1961), The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
5 Arendt, H. (1994 [1951]), The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt.
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even in principle replace the former. It might make the political delibera-
tions in the former more robust, and more likely to do justice. (Certainly, a 
world without Amnesty International would likely have worse states in it 
than our own world.) But the virtual political community cannot do the job 
of the state’s political community. The fact that we can use the phrasing of 
political community in both contexts should not obscure the vast differences 
between the two sorts of human association.
I would suggest that something similar might be felt about blockchain 
cryptography, which produces self-sovereign forms of identification. These 
forms of identification are sovereign, in that they are initiated with and con-
trollable by the individual; but the individual has no greater sovereignty, in 
the sense used in international law, after her digital ID than before it. What 
the digital ID would provide, after all, is information. Information, we say, 
is power; but so too is, well, power, in the ordinary sense in which states use 
military might to preserve their sovereignty. What is required for rights to be 
protected, following on our discussion above, is a set of powerful agents 
willing to deploy violence against those who would do violence against us. 
The digital ID might be used to frustrate some forms of malignant state 
action – and, of course, allow others. What it cannot do is provide the vio-
lence that is conceptually linked with our human rights. If one is not pos-
sessed of a state willing and able to use violence on one’s behalf prior to the 
digital ID, one is not provided with one once that ID is created.
I suspect similar things might be said of the Estonian experiment. People 
have long been able to engage in contracts with foreign companies, and 
foreign states, for particular ends; we engage in international trade, we 
accept particular patterns of dispute resolution, we agree to the terms limit-
ing our rights as foreign visitors, and so on. It is not clear what, in particular, 
changes with the creation of a computer system capable of centralising and 
administering our dealings with a foreign state. I am open to being con-
vinced otherwise, but my initial reaction is that registering as an e-Estonian 
no more makes me Estonian than changing planes at Heathrow makes me 
British. The Estonian state has obligations to its own citizens that it does 
not – or, at least, does not yet – have to me. So long as the e-Estonian system 
leaves that fact fundamentally unchanged, it is not clear to me that the vir-
tual association it creates is even a pale shadow of a genuine political 
community.
All this, I should repeat, is intended not to defeat Orgad’s vision, but to 
outline what I take to be significant worries about how we might make that 
vision real. Orgad does not want these voluntary forms of transnational 
institution to take the place of states, but insists upon their validity and 
M. Blake
293
power as ‘state-like entities.’ It is this latter point with which I take issue. If 
these institutions are to become genuinely state-like, they must have some 
part in doing what it is that states do; and we must understand how they 
could do that sort of thing, and how we could move from where we are to 
where we might be. If, in contrast, these institutions are merely places for 
debate and for the creation of solidarity, then we have had them for a very 
long time indeed; Amnesty International has been helped by the digital revo-
lution, but had a life prior to that revolution. It is not clear what these tools 
provide us with except for scale and ease. Either way, I suggest, we have 
some work to do. Orgad is, I believe, well-positioned to help with this work; 
as I noted at the beginning, his vision is profoundly hopeful, while my own 
is not, and I genuinely hope I can be proven wrong.
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A World Wide Web of Citizenship
Peter J. Spiro
Liav Orgad offers a characteristically insightful and provocative speculation 
on how novel technologies will facilitate global citizenship. Global inter-
connectedness is transforming individual identity composites to include 
transnational elements, and the migration of identity is, as Orgad argues, 
establishing more pervasive understandings of global responsibility. Along 
these three dimensions of interconnectedness, identity, and responsibility, 
we are assimilating an understanding of global citizenship. A recent world-
wide poll1 found that a majority of respondents consider themselves more 
global citizens than citizens of their own countries.
Orgad is also to be congratulated for identifying the citizenship-related 
possibilities of blockchain technologies, which might further enable that 
sense of global identity. Blockchain could deliver a formal identity detached 
from national citizenship and sovereign control. Indeed, a blockchain iden-
tity could plausibly displace the passport as the standard form of identifica-
tion in the same way that Bitcoin might plausibly displace national 
currencies. So long as it were insulated from the surveillance capacities of 
states and powerful non-state actors, a blockchain ID might enhance indi-
vidual autonomies on a global landscape.
I am less taken by the concept of cloud communities as such. The inter-
net facilitates the making of transnational and non-state communities, but 
for the most part these are communities that exist on the ground. Eliminating 
friction in long-distance global communication, the web enables connected-
ness among individuals who might otherwise maintain only thin or even 
non-existent ties. This is the case with almost all real-space identities that 
are not based on territorial location. The Web collapses location, allowing 
territorially dispersed communities to establish dense networks.
True, some communities exist only or primarily on the web. The com-
munity of video gamers, for example, is mostly an online identity,  constituting 
1 ‘Identity 2016: “Global citizenship” rising, poll suggests’, BBC News, 28 April 
2016, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-36139904
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(perhaps) a genuine cloud community. But even as our online selves become 
more prominent in our everyday lives, they are now and will be for the fore-
seeable future only a slice of our identity composites. (Remember Second 
Life?) There is also the interesting phenomenon of e-residence as innovated 
by Estonia. But that ‘residence’ doesn’t represent community, even in its 
virtual sense; really, the label is misplaced. No sense of solidarity is likely to 
flow from e-citizenship in that form any more than individuals with bank 
accounts in the Cayman Islands compose a community on that basis. It’s a 
market convenience and little more.
 The false dichotomies of political community
Of course, one way in which the web facilitates communities is as a vehicle 
for community self-governance and in turn, global self-governance. Almost 
all communities are political. In this respect, I would part ways with the 
dichotomization of political, state-based communities and civil society that 
appears in other contributions to this Forum (Rainer Bauböck’s and Robert 
Post’s in particular). At the very least, it is a continuum rather than a binary. 
The web will as a general matter enhance transparency. The web allows 
voices to be heard. No organisation, community, identity group, or move-
ment can be governed in an insulated, top-down fashion.
So the web (more so than cloud communities as such) is already enhanc-
ing self-governance. It will not solve the problem of unequal representation. 
As Orgad notes, the international system continues formally to work from 
the principle of sovereign, not individual, equality, so that the citizen of San 
Marino has much greater clout than the citizen of China, both countries hav-
ing one vote in international institutions but San Marino having many fewer 
citizens deciding how that vote will be cast. It’s an extreme departure from 
the one person, one vote benchmark of democratic governance. But sover-
eign equality masks vast power disparities that in many pairings will more 
than compensate for inequality at the level of the individual. The citizen of 
China may be one of almost one and a half billion, the citizen of San Marino, 
one of thirty thousand, but China’s global heft surely gives its citizens a 
more powerful voice (however measured) than those of its pipsqueak 
counterpart.
The web does help level the playing field against state power generally. 
In that sense the web may mitigate political inequality. Global governance is 
not the sole preserve of state representatives, as Orgad appears to have it; 
non-state communities are exercising increasing powers, formal or not, at 
the international level. The web supplies an important channel of global 
influence that does not institutionally favour state-based communities (it 
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may even disadvantage them, insofar as bureaucracy inhibits technological 
adaptation). That translates into greater global self-governance capacities, 
and a redistribution of power away from states. The citizen of San Marino 
who is an environmentalist, who has an LGBTQ identification, or for that 
matter is a Catholic has alternate vehicles of representation at the global 
level, and those vehicles are empowered by the revolution in global 
communications.
But inequalities will persist, even if they are redistributed. I agree with 
Bauböck that Orgad’s implication of a world federalism based on block-
chain equality present an improbable prospect. In this respect, the technol-
ogy does not answer standing objections to one-person, one-vote at the 
global level. Cloud communities, such as they exist, will themselves operate 
on the basis of internal formal equality in limited contexts only.
 Corroded Leviathan
The corrosion of state power, meanwhile, will accelerate. Francesca Strumia 
articulates a new question, ‘why am I a citizen of this nation-state?’ That 
question has new salience, most dramatically with the rise of investor and 
other forms of instrumental citizenship. But it also begs the question, ‘why 
should I care that I am a citizen of this (or that) nation-state?’ It is no doubt 
true that possessing a premium passport expands life opportunities.2 But 
within the universe of developed states, the question is not so obviously 
answered. There are inevitable spatial elements to our physical existence 
that are best governed through territorially delimited community, but those 
necessities need not be addressed at the level of the state. Many are better 
addressed at the subnational level, with respect to which ‘voting with your 
feet’ is practicable as a preference-sorting mechanism into ‘like-minded 
sets’, in Bauböck’s formulation.
This gives the lie to the other misplaced critique of cloud communities, 
that they are voluntary and monolithic where states are involuntary and 
diverse. Here again, a descriptive spectrum is more appropriate than an arti-
ficial binary. It is true of course that most individuals are born into the states 
of which they will remain members (at the same time that a growing number 
change nationality after birth). But many are effectively born into non-state 
communities as well. Religion supplies an obvious example. In some con-
texts, the exit costs – perhaps a better metric than voluntariness – of leaving 
2 The Henley & Partners – Kochenov Quality of Nationality Index, available at 
https://www.henleyglobal.com/quality-of-nationality/
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a religious community3 are higher than leaving a state-based one. Communities 
based on race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation are more or less involuntary. 
They can also be remarkably diverse, sometimes more so than state-based 
communities. The Catholic Church represents a more diverse constituency 
than does Austria, for example, and its internal dynamics surely implicate 
politics in any but the most formalistic definition of the term.
I understand the liberal nationalist tendency to lament the corrosion of 
state-based communities. There was a time (the latter half of the twentieth 
century) when the state impressively if imperfectly delivered on redistribu-
tionist solidarities. But wishing a return to that era is starting to look some-
what sentimental. States are powerful beasts, as Bauböck observes. They 
will linger in the way of other once-dominant legacy institutions (think the 
Holy Roman Empire). But they are clearly in crisis, and it seems unlikely 
that we will be able to re-right the ship to its formerly commendable course.
In the meantime, we should be setting our sights on making the new 
world a better one than it might otherwise be. They are many dystopian pos-
sibilities (some of them almost apocalyptic) if the state collapses and other 
locations of power replace it. Wishing the resurrection of the state will do us 
no good to the extent that the state can’t withstand material developments on 
the ground. A necessary first step will be to map the new institutional land-
scape, of which cloud communities will clearly be a part.
3 ‘Off the path of Orthodoxy’, The New Yorker, 31 July 2015, available at 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/off-the-path-of-orthodoxy
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Citizenship Forecast: Partly Cloudy  
with Chances of Algorithms
Costica Dumbrava
In his thought-provoking kick-off contribution, Liav Orgad enthusiastically 
embraces the idea of a global digital citizenship that could remedy some of 
the deficiencies of the present system of territorial national citizenships and, 
potentially, transform the meaning of democratic citizenship. Technologies 
such as blockchain could allow people to create virtual communities based 
on shared interests and sustained by instantaneous consent, beyond the reach 
of nosy governments and regardless of national borders. By widening access 
to rights, expanding political voice and creating more secure and diverse 
identities, digital citizenship could address current challenges related to the 
imperfect attribution of status and rights (statelessness, disenfranchisement), 
widespread political apathy among citizens and artificial divisions created 
by national borders. To paraphrase the text of a famous cartoon: ‘on the 
internet nobody knows you are a foreigner’.
Other contributors to this Forum have pointed out several important ten-
sions and dangers lurking in Orgad’s proposal. Rainer Bauböck worries that 
replacing political communities, which are based largely on ascribed but 
equal citizenship, with freely chosen cloud communities would be ‘fatal for 
democracy’. Purely consensual political communities cannot work because 
political associations need coercive systems capable to enforce laws. As ‘exit-
based conflict resolution systems’ (Primavera De Filippi), virtual communi-
ties are too volatile to ensure stable membership and commitment to rules. 
They are also ill equipped to do the policing and punishing required by politi-
cal organisation (Robert Post, Michael Blake). Orgad’s cloud communities 
could be seen instead as akin to civil society organisations. As novel forms of 
coagulating solidarity, interests and identities, they can be instrumental for 
checking, challenging or complementing governments, but they have neither 
the means, nor the legitimacy to replace democratic citizenship.
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I agree that technologies may offer surprising opportunities for improv-
ing and reimagining our social and political life (Francesca Strumia, Peter 
Spiro). Information and communication technologies already offer to some 
people better access to legal status (digital IDs), allowing them to participate 
more effectively in political deliberations and decision making (e-forums, 
e-voting), to mobilise against authoritarian regimes (twitter revolutions) and 
to transcend borders in order to engage with communities of origin (dias-
pora politics).1 Using powerful computers, myriads of sensors and sophisti-
cated algorithms, ‘smart cities’ can identify and address public issues and 
concerns, such as traffic congestions and security threats. However, I worry 
that we too often take technologies for granted and fail to discern between 
technological opportunity and mythology.
My contribution to this debate is to raise two general points about the 
risks involved by linking citizenship to technology, namely making citizen-
ship vulnerable to biases and failures that typically affect technology and 
increasing citizenship’s dependence on technology.
Technologies are not neutral. They are embedded in and tend to rein-
force certain values, norms and expectations to the detriment of others. For 
example, predictive algorithms used by police are more likely to identify 
black persons as suspects of crime2 and facial recognition software seems 
to recognise better white male faces.3 When they are not biased by design, 
smart technologies may quickly pick up biases from their surroundings. In 
2016, Microsoft created Tay, a chatbot that used machine learning to emu-
late a teenage user on Twitter. However, after a few hours of ‘learning’ on 
the social media platform Tay began posting Hitler-praising and other racist 
1 Dumbrava, C. (2017), ‘Citizenship and Technology’, in Shachar, A., 
R. Bauböck, I. Bloemraad & M. Vink (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Citizenship, 
767–788. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2 ‘Big data may be reinforcing racial bias in the criminal justice system’, The 




3 ‘Facial recognition software is biased towards white men, researcher finds’, 





and sexist remarks4, which forced Microsoft to shut it down with an apol-
ogy. Bitcoin, the most well-known blockchain technology, can also be 
regarded as deeply political, a product of particular ‘right-wing, liberation, 
anti- government politics.’5 Such ideological bias makes blockchain unsuit-
able for becoming the repository of democratic citizenship. If the platform 
itself is biased towards a particular conception of the good, how can we 
expect it to serve as an arena and mediator between different conceptions 
of the good?
Technologies often fall short of expectations and are usually hijacked, if 
not initiated, by authoritarian governments and powerful groups. For exam-
ple, India’s population biometric database, Aadhaar, which is intended to 
provide more than a billion people with digital identities and access to pub-
lic services, has been criticised for its rigidity and security problems, which 
affect particularly the poor.6 The Chinese government is currently toying 
with a Social Credit System7 designed to measure citizens’ trustworthiness 
that would further mould their behaviour to align it with the government’s 
priorities and ideology. Blockchain gurus and their followers claim that this 
technology is highly secure. However, this has not prevented a hacker to 
steal about 60 million USD - worth Ether (another major cryptocurrency) in 
the so-called DAO attack.8 Indicative of the ideological underpinning of the 
blockchain movement, and deeply troubling from many perspectives of 
social justice, is that some members of the cryptocurrency community sug-
4 ‘Microsoft’s disastrous Tay experiment shows the hidden dangers of AI’, 




5 Golumbia, D. (2015), ‘Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right-Wing Extremism’, 
in G. Lovink, N. Tkacz & P. de Vries (eds.), MoneyLab reader: An intervention 
in digital economy, 118–31. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures.
6 ‘In Rajasthan, there is “unrest at the ration shop” because of error-ridden 
Aadhaar’, Scroll.in, 14 April 2018, available at http://scroll.in/article/805909/
in-rajasthan-there-is-unrest-at-the-ration-shop-because-of-error-ridden-aadhaar
7 ‘Big data meets Big Brother as China moves to rate its citizens’, Wired, 21 
October 2017, available at http://www.wired.co.uk/article/
chinese-government-social-credit-score-privacy-invasion
8 Reijers, W., F. O’Brolcháin & P. Haynes (2016), ‘Governance in Blockchain 
Technologies & Social Contract Theories’, Ledger 1 (1): 134–151.
Citizenship Forecast: Partly Cloudy with Chances of Algorithms
302
gested that the attacker should keep the money as s/he did not break the rules 
but simply exploited a flaw in the system.
As other products of digital technologies, the blockchain exists in online 
clouds that depend on critical physical infrastructures. Online clouds are no 
less fragile than on-the-sky clouds. Online systems are emanations of a 
bunch of machines connected to various grids that require an awful lot of 
things, such as electricity, computers, data centres, internet servers, etc. 
Since this enabling infrastructure is vulnerable to hacking and shutdown, so 
is democratic citizenship if embedded in digital technologies. If digital iden-
tities could be compromised (as in the Indian case) and cryptocurrency sto-
len there is little assurance that digital citizenship solutions, such as universal 
IDs, e-voting systems and blockchain-based cloud communities, would not 
succumb to the same illness.
My second point is about the risk of making citizenship (too) dependent 
on technology. As we regularly worry about our children’s addiction to 
tablets, online gaming and other technologies that could affect their social 
development, we should also worry about our society’s dependence on 
technologies that might affect its capacity for self-government. It is not 
only about a technologically mediated withdrawal of citizens from the 
physical public space, á la Putnam,9 but also about the dangers of making 
democratic citizenship dependent on specific technological systems and 
artefacts.
Exercising citizenship has always involved some forms of technology, 
from voting pebbles in Ancient Greece to ballot boxes and electoral district-
ing algorithms10 in modern representative democracies. However, the high 
levels of sophistication and, ultimately, opaqueness of technologies such as 
blockchain must be a real concern should we decide to entrust these tech-
nologies with the role of embodying democratic self-government. We are 
asked to take for granted the promises of new digital technologies and are 
kindly invited to take our places in shiny new cloud communities. However, 
we rarely understand how these technologies work, who designs and over-
sees them and whether we would be able to dispense of them if we find them 
wanting.
9 Putnam, R. D. (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
10 ‘Of the Algorithms, by the Algorithms, for the Algorithms’, Slate, 13 January 




Some religions tell you that the true God is in the clouds; tech enthusiasts 
tell you that the true community is in the cloud. I recommend examining the 
sky carefully before you start packing.
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The Separation of Territory and State:  
a Digital French Revolution?
Yussef Al Tamimi
The contributions on cloud communities and citizenship in this blog raise 
both hopes and fears. The reality of an idea initially as outlandish as citizens 
of a digital cloud is materialising as we ponder and debate its practices. 
Political theory and the law must attempt to keep up with these rapidly 
changing circumstances. This comment raises some questions regarding 
three assumptions in this debate:
 1. Cloud states1 have no territory
 2. Cloud states cannot exert violence
 3. Cloud state membership is based on choice
To illustrate and perhaps formulate a response to these assumptions, it 
might benefit this futuristic debate to consult experiences from the past. As 
suggested by the other contributors, the current transformation of the state 
as a consequence of the ‘digital revolution’ is profound. Nothing less than a 
separation of the state from its traditional connectedness to territory is sug-
gested. The historic event that comes close to matching such a seismic shift 
in the structure of the state was the American and French Revolutions, which 
set in motion the institutional untying of state and church. A historical paral-
lel is quickly drawn: if these revolutions led to the separation of Church and 
State that resulted in secular states, will the digital revolution lead to the 
separation of Territory and State that results in cloud states?
1 I use the term ‘cloud state’ rather than ‘cloud community’, as the latter 
unnecessarily obscures the fact that, at least in this debate, the question is 
whether clouds can fulfill certain political functions traditionally belonging to 
the state, such as conferring citizenship. Assuming that these political func-
tions can indeed be performed by clouds, this leaves no reason to call a cloud 
anything else than a ‘state’, except to dissociate the cloud from the negative 
connotations of the state and calling it by the more cozy term community. 
However, in my opinion, one should not appropriate the political function of 
the traditional state and simultaneously obscure the responsibility – which 
states sometimes fail to exercise – that is inherent to that function.
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 Assumption 1: Cloud states have no territory
Robert Post, focusing on legislation in his blog post, argues: ‘A world in 
which every community is voluntary is a world in which every norm is also 
voluntary. It is therefore a world without law. Because politics is the social 
form by which we create law, it is also a world without politics.’
For Post, a cloud state, which does not impose legislation, is not a 
state at all. One can imagine that arguments sounding very similar were 
once raised by opponents of the separation of Church and State: ‘a secu-
lar, neutral state, which does not impose public morals, is not a state at 
all.’ I raise this parallel not to disagree with Post. Rather, it is to show 
that after centuries of debate on secularism we have come to understand 
that ‘neutrality’ of the state is an impossibility; a state always makes 
choices that impact a state’s public sphere. That is to say that the oppo-
nents of the separation of Church and State were wrong in the first place 
because the starting premise of their critique, that the secular state would 
be neutral, was incorrect.
The starting premise of the cloud state is that it is nonterritorial. Now that 
we have come to know that ‘neutrality’ does not really exist, the question 
arises if we have to conclude that ‘nonterritorial clouds’ do not really exist 
either. In other words, is the cloud itself not territory? I do not mean this in 
the strict physical sense that clouds have servers that are located in territorial 
states, which itself is a valid point; yet the development of serverless cloud 
computing in the future might undermine such an argument. To think of the 
cloud as somehow territory-less and border-less is incongruous if one appre-
ciates that territory itself is not a natural phenomenon but a man-made con-
struct the meaning of which is dynamic and can come to encompass 
non-physical spaces.
 Assumption 2: Cloud states cannot exert violence
Focusing on violence in his comment, Michael Blake states: ‘My own chal-
lenge is broader: the protection of human rights, I believe, can only be 
accomplished by means of violence and force, in both policing and in pun-
ishment – and this violence is in our world reserved (as a matter of right, if 
not reality) for use by states.’
Blake argues that cloud states cannot protect human rights. A comparison 
with anti-separationists in the French Revolution is again not far away: they 
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would claim that ‘secular states cannot protect God’s law’. To make his 
argument, Blake relies heavily on state force. But why could cloud states not 
impose their own forms of digital violence? Perhaps an obvious damage 
they could inflict is to one’s reputation. An example of this is the social 
credit system proposed by the Chinese government, which is a national rep-
utation system that assigns social credit to citizens. The flipside of such 
reputation systems that aim to promote ‘good citizenship’ behaviour is the 
potential social devaluation of ‘bad’ citizens, which can go as far as seri-
ously harming their wellbeing and possibilities in life. A punishment in 
terms of such social devaluation imposed by the cloud state is conceivably 
more painful and restricting to the individual than traditional methods of 
punishment, such as fines or jail.
As with territory, one could counter this claim by saying that what mat-
ters for statehood is physical, rather than non-physical, violence. In that 
case, the actual core of the matter is the physicality of the traditional state’s 
territory and violence compared to the non-physicality of the cloud state’s 
territory and violence. That raises a question that is yet to be addressed by 
proponents of cloud states: What is desirable about the non-physicality of 
territory and violence that makes cloud states and their citizenship superior 
to traditional states and their citizenship?
 Assumption 3: Cloud state membership is based on choice
Focusing on the idea of consent-based cloud communities, Rainer Bauböck 
writes: ‘My response is that this would be fatal for democracy. Already 
Aristotle knew that, unlike families, democratic polities are associations 
of diverse individuals. The territorial bases and automatic attribution 
mechanisms of citizenship create political community among individuals 
that differ profoundly in their interests, identities and ideas about the com-
mon good.’
In short, for Bauböck choice cannot be constitutive for political member-
ship (citizenship). Hence, the chosen membership of cloud states is not citi-
zenship. This is a difficult topic, and the parallel with the earlier (French) 
revolution escapes me. The reason for this is that in the secular revolution 
separating Church and State the ‘onus’ of choice fell on the Church and not 
the State: It was religion and the freedom to choose individually one’s 
 religion that was guaranteed by the secular state. By contrast, in the digital 
revolution separating Territory and State the opening up of choice is focused 
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on the newfound states among which individuals can choose. In fact, one 
might even be limited in exiting from a territory (think refugees, political 
activists) yet have the freedom to select from a range of cloud states one 
wants to join.
Yet, the notions of choice and voluntariness applied in this context 
leave many questions unanswered. It is still unclear in what way we under-
stand membership in a cloud state to be a ‘choice’. The Chinese social 
credit system mentioned earlier may become mandatory as of 2020. Such 
a turn towards explicitly mandatory membership will probably not always 
happen, but what idea of choice do we have in mind when saying that 
cloud membership is a ‘choice’? Is it rational choice theory, which has 
long been refuted in psychology? The conditions that move people to 
decide on their cyber membership, as well as their non-rational motiva-
tions, have to be taken into account for a more realistic conception of 
choice.
The question of chosen membership is closely related to issues concern-
ing identity. The idea that individuals are able to ‘create’ their own identi-
ties, which is implicit in Liav Orgad’s contribution, is mistaken. Iris Marion 
Young makes a helpful distinction between associations and social groups to 
tease out the distinct role of identity when membership is based on choice. 
Young argues that that the contract model of society applies to associations 
but not to social groups: ‘Individuals constitute associations; they come 
together as already formed persons and set them up, establishing rules, posi-
tions, and offices.’ (my emphasis).2 In contrast, social groups, in which our 
identities are implicated, involve a much more complex process: ‘Group 
affinity (…) has the character of (…) “thrownness”: one finds oneself as a 
member of a group, whose existence and relations one experiences as always 
already having been.’ This does not mean that one cannot change one’s 
group affinity, for example by changing one’s gender identity as trans- 
persons do. For Young, these cases illustrate thrownness precisely because 
such changes are ‘experienced as a transformation in one’s identity.’ This 
phenomenological approach to social groups shows that a deeper affinity is 
involved in the process of membership and that social groups, which impli-
cate our identity, cannot be explained solely by ‘choice’. Young and Bauböck 
therefore agree that citizenship and choice are irreconcilable, though they do 
so from different standpoints: for Bauböck the presence of choice in 
 communities leads to a democratic deficit, for Young it leads to a social defi-
2 Young, I. M. (1989), ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of 
Universal Citizenship’, Ethics 99: 250–274, at 260.
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cit, a lack of social affinity or belonging. To respond to this complex debate 
relating to membership, the nature of cloud membership requires further 
clarification as to its position on citizenship, identity and choice.
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A Brave New Dawn? Digital Cakes, Cloudy 
Governance and Citizenship á la Carte
Jelena Džankić
I have always been fascinated by the human capacity to imagine future 
worlds and describe what humanity would look like in the years or decades 
ahead. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Jules Verne wrote about 
electricity, submarines and flying balloons. A few decades later, Thea von 
Harbou and Fritz Lang gave birth to the world of Metropolis, which in many 
ways is a metaphor of contemporary societies. In the 1970s and 1980s, Isaac 
Asimov wrote about psychohistory, a discipline that combines statistics, 
psychology and history to predict how the behaviour of large groups would 
shape future events. Just as most of the things described by Verne, von 
Harbou and Lang, or Asimov seemed technologically and politically distant 
or unimaginable at their times, so do meaningful digital communities seem 
to be today.
Liav Orgad sees tremendous potential in digital technologies for recon-
structing the traditional notion of citizenship by shifting status, identity and 
the exercise of rights away from the state and closer to the individual. He 
believes that blockchain could enhance the current structure of international 
governance by strengthening human rights through the attribution of digital 
identities and by offering new models for political participation through 
cloud communities, which in turn would decrease the inequality engrained 
in, for instance, the principles of voting in the United Nations. In other 
words, with further development of blockchain technologies, states would 
no longer be the sole determinants of an individual’s legal status, or have the 
monopoly over the exercise of individual rights, or be the core community 
for identity ascription. In this sense, I am in agreement with Orgad, Primavera 
De Filippi and Francesca Strumia that we cannot but acknowledge that rap-
idly developing technologies are likely to ‘outsource’ many of the state’s 
functions to cyberspace. Even so, as has been pointed out by other contribu-
tors (Rainer Bauböck, Robert Post, Michael Blake and Peter Spiro), block-
chain technologies and cloud communities raise a number of concerns about 
governability and the exercise of self-sovereignty.
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 They want citizenship? Let them have digital identities 
instead!
In his kick-off contribution Orgad highlights that 1.1 billion people, or a 
sixth of  the global population  lack an official  identification. Such people, 
including many refugees, displaced persons, nomadic pastoralists or socially 
marginalised minorities like the Roma are consequently excluded from par-
ticipating in or accessing services of modern states. According to Orgad, 
blockchain technologies already provide the infrastructure for attributing 
such people global digital IDs, which would grant them recognition as 
‘human beings’. Blockchain-based digital IDs would enable individuals to 
create and register their own identity. This identity would be validated 
through multiple decentralised network nodes. It would also be permanent 
and immutable.
I agree with the general need to recognise every human being before the 
law. However, the attribution of a global digital ID scarcely resolves this 
problem  for  two  reasons. The first  one  is  recognition. Our  legal  status  is 
attributed by states recognising us as legal persons. The international system 
of mutual recognition among states allows us to be considered a legal per-
sona elsewhere precisely because the status that we have has been confirmed 
by a state. Hence, any global digital ID would still need to be recognised by 
states or an international organisation in order to have external validity. 
Initiatives, such as ID20201 speak about the need to tackle the problem of 
the  lack  of  ‘officially  recognised  identity’  through  digital  technology  but 
offer scarcely any practical pointers as to how these identities would be rec-
ognised and by whom. Furthermore,  if  such digital  identification were  to 
create a ‘status and identity complementary to national citizenships’, I am 
wondering what kind of status and rights it would yield for those whose 
predicament Orgad seeks to resolve. If a digital ID has no external recogni-
tion, it has little value for a person with no other proof of identity. They will 
still lack the status that a digital identity could complement but cannot sub-
stitute for. Isn’t the offer of digital identity for them a bit like Marie 
Antoinette’s cake for the hungry crowds in revolutionary Paris?





 Governance by blockchain: digital hierarchies or direct 
democracy?
Orgad’s second claim looks prima facie stronger. Recent experiments with 
blockchain-based virtual communities, such as Bitnation, indicate that 
blockchain technology has the potential to substitute or complement some 
elements of state governance. In theory, in a blockchain-based cloud com-
munity, members agree on a set of laws regulating their interaction, and 
these laws are then amended by consensus.
Pazaitis, De Filippi and Kostakis give the example of Backfeed (http://
backfeed.cc/) protocol as a conceptual model ‘for a new form of governance 
with an incentivisation system implemented on the blockchain.’2 This sys-
tem would be materialised through an organisational structure of decentral-
ised cooperation based on peer-to-peer evaluation and a reputation system 
as  grounds  for  allocating  communal  influence.  This  kind  of  cooperation 
would presume that a number of members come together to establish a digi-
tal community and reach a consensus on what values underpin that commu-
nity. Members of the community own certain initial amounts of ‘reputation’ 
tokens and they are incentivised to participate in communal decisions 
through a system that provides reputational gains to those who are best 
aligned with communal values. Those contributing voluntarily to ‘values’ 
receive a reward if 50 per cent of the tokens representing the community’s 
reputation have been invested in the evaluation of the voluntary contribu-
tion. The reward takes the form of reputation tokens, which are shared 
between the contributor and those who reached the consensus on the evalu-
ation. Whenever a person evaluates a new contribution, they also give away 
some of their existing reputation to it.
Let’s translate this into a thought experiment. Imagine there is a Backfeed- 
based community called Scientia, in which the core value were ‘knowl-
edge’. Scientia has been created by five members (A, B, C, D, and E), each 
of whom originally had 10 reputation tokens (i.e., the community has a total 
of 50 tokens). Member A comes up with a proposal to create an encyclopae-
dia of cloud communities and the proposal is put to communal vote. Votes 
can range from 1 to 5 (1 lowest contribution, 5 highest contribution). The 
proposal will go through if at least 25 reputation tokens have been invested 
in the evaluation.
2 Pazaitis, A., P. De Filippi & V. Kostakis (2017), ‘Blockchain and value systems 
in the sharing economy: The illustrative case of Backfeed’, Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 125: 105–115, at 111.
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Now, imagine a scenario where A invests 8 out of her initial 10 reputation 
tokens with a vote of 5; B invests 5 tokens with a vote of 5; C invests 3 
tokens with a vote of 3; D invests 5 tokens with a vote of 4; E invests 7 
tokens with a vote of 5. A total of 28 tokens have been invested, with three 
contributors voting 5, and hence the proposal is accepted. C and D will lose 
the 8 tokens they invested, and these will be distributed between A (4 
tokens), B (3 tokens), and E (1 token) in line with their initial reputation 
investment. The new count of reputation tokens would be 14 for A, 13 for B, 
7 for C, 5 for D, and 11 for E. In evaluating the subsequent proposal, A, B 
and E would have greater voting power, as they would hold three quarters of 
the community’s reputation tokens.
In my view, there are three problems with this kind of decision-making. 
First, the ‘overall evaluation of a specific contribution is based on the repu-
tation score’.3 This implies the use of a system of weighted voting, whereby 
individuals with higher reputation (i.e., with more tokens) have a greater say 
in communal decision-making. Paradoxically this would make the princi-
ples of deciding in such digital communities closer to those in ancient Rome, 
feudal Prussia, or French colonies where votes were weighted on grounds of 
‘wealth’ than to contemporary democracies based on the equality of votes. 
In other words, this kind of system would perpetuate inequality of member-
ship in a similar way as the Chinese social credit system described by 
Costica Dumbrava does. Second, even though the general idea of Backfeed- 
based governance is to incentivise participation through rewards, those with 
high rewards from previous rounds of evaluations may be less inclined to 
participate in new evaluations as that may result in their loss of reputation. 
Equally, ‘losers’ in the communal vote (such as the examples of C and D 
above) may face obstacles in putting forward or voting for any proposal due 
to limited resources at their disposal. Third, such a system could create 
incentives to bet with the winners rather than to invest into the values that 
one truly believes are in line with communal ones. This is antithetical to 
democracy and turns into a market where people pursue reputational gains 
instead of deliberating on what values they share. That is, a system in which 
reputation is gained and lost by ‘betting’ on the levels of contribution to 
communal value has the potential to create a stratified society in which deci-
sions are made by a small number of those willing to speculate on commu-
nal value.
An alternative to this would be to think how direct democracy could 
work in cloud communities. Presumably, protocols could be developed 
3 Above n. 1 at 110.
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that – unlike Backfeed – base decision-making on equal voting power for 
each digital identity and that offer a platform for deliberation rather than 
only for voting. Such communities would be similar to voluntary associa-
tions of individuals that adopt statutes providing for internally democratic 
governance: all members (independently of their duration of membership 
and place of residence) and members only can participate in decisions taken 
by the ‘demos’ of the association.
Now, let’s go back to the example of Scientia. Imagine that this time, 
Scientia were a voluntary decentralised blockchain-based community that 
operates on the basis of equal votes of its members A, B, C, D, and E. The 
community votes on A’s proposal for the encyclopaedia of cloud communi-
ties and the proposal passes due to positive votes of A, B, and E. Unlike in 
the previous example, since there are no reputational gains or losses, C and 
D will have the same voting power in the next ballot. Hence such a model 
would not disincentivise those who opposed the initiative. However, it 
would then not provide incentives for contributing in the future, as Backfeed 
is supposed to do. As Pazaitis, De Filippi and Kostakis rightly point out, this 
would lead to ‘to the gradual dissipation of the community members, who 
could no longer reflect themselves into the value system of the new entity.’4
So there is a dilemma of blockchain governance in cloud communities: 
will they be based on incentives that create hierarchies or on direct democ-
racy with scarce mechanisms for motivating participation?
 Citizenship as a business model?
In his kick-off contribution Orgad notes that the future of citizenship is 
dynamic and multi-layered. Yet so is the present, and so has been its past. 
The key question is whether we are ready to embrace a new approach to citi-
zenship, based on ‘smart contracts’ operating in cyberspace and regulating 
needs of individuals, just as a business model would do. For Spiro the recent 
trend towards a global market for passports exemplifies such an approach to 
citizenship: individuals with multiple passports have more choice where to 
settle, pay taxes, send their children to school, etc. Hence, in some respects, 
citizenship (albeit for a small number of people who can benefit from inves-
tor citizenship programmes) is already merely an access point to a market of 
goods and services that different providers (in this case states) offer.
As new technologies develop, digital markets will allow individuals to 
choose the services previously provided by the state from private  companies. 
4 Ibid.
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Indeed, some functions of the state have already been outsourced to compa-
nies operating in the digital world (e.g., online education instead of public 
schooling, car-sharing schemes instead of public transport, etc.). Perhaps 
the utopian vision of the ‘sharing economy’ is that public goods would be 
produced through horizontal and voluntary cooperation among consumers. 
Yet examples such as online degrees, Airbnb, Uber, and the likes prove the 
contrary. They follow the logic of the market and reveal the huge potential 
for corporate power based on network effects and ‘cartelisation’ of servic-
es.5 In considering the effects of citizenship as a business model, we also 
need to think about possible implications for some other core functions of 
the state, including adjudication and the provision of security.
And even if, in the spirit of the introductory paragraph, digital technolo-
gies bring along numerous benefits we have to recognise that their á la carte 
approach is hardly conducive to the creation of a community of shared val-
ues among members. That is, it is hardly conducive to citizenship.
5 Atzori, M. (2015), ‘Blockchain technology and decentralized governance: Is 
the state still necessary?’, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2709713 or https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2709713
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Old Divides, New Devices: Global  
Citizenship for Only Half of the World
Lea Ypi
There is no doubt that we live in an age of global communication. But who 
is able to communicate and how is access to the means that enable that com-
munication (computers, mobile phones, internet lines) distributed?
Consider again the facts of global interconnectedness with which Liav 
Orgad begins his piece. But consider them from a different perspective, not 
that of the wealthy Western academic who blogs about cloud communities. 
If half of the world population spends time online, it means that the other 
half does not. While 94 per cent of the youth population in the developed 
world has access to the internet, 70 per cent of youngsters in least developed 
countries do not. While almost one-third of the global population uses 
smartphones, the other two-thirds (the vast majority) does not. If global 
internet use in 2017 was at 48 per cent, 52 per cent of the world’s population 
was left out. In the least developed countries only 15 per cent of households 
have access to the internet from their homes and 85 per cent rely on schools, 
offices, libraries or other public connections to access the web. The propor-
tion of men using the internet is higher than the proportion of women, and 
the proportion of private internet access in developed countries is twice as 
high as in developing ones.1
All this suggests that the narrative of global interconnectedness on which 
the ideal of global citizenship rests is only half true and true only for half of 
the world. There is of course the claim that even for the half of the world that 
is connected, the technology might not work very well. There are the dangers 
of digital identities being stolen and of data centres, internet servers, and the 
rest of the infrastructure being vulnerable to hacking, as Dumbrava empha-
sises in his contribution. But my problem is even more basic. One of the most 
attractive features of global citizenship based on blockchain  technologies 




seems to be that it does not entail the right to exclude. But either proponents 
of that ideal start with the world as it is, or they do not. If they take the world 
as it is, they endorse an even more pernicious form of exclusion, the exclusion 
of those who have no access to the internet from the community of those that 
do, and they proceed to reify the separation between the two. If they start with 
the world as it ought to be, they owe us an argument on how we can get from 
here to there. How can we make sure that the half of the world that has no 
access to the internet can do so? How are we going to take care of the costs of 
IT provision? What will put an end to the inequalities that make it the case that 
for some people (like me) mobile phones are an extension of themselves and 
for some others only an aspiration? Who controls the production of the tools 
that lead to differentiated access of the means of connection?
It will be clear from my lines above that I approach the question of global 
citizenship presented in Orgad’s piece from a radical egalitarian perspective, 
concerned with inequalities of access to the material means of production, 
and the related power positions of those who control such access. In the 
contemporary world this means raising very basic questions, such as who 
owns Apple and Microsoft, and how we can make sure that everyone has a 
mobile phone that works as well in central London as it does in the remote 
areas of Albania (where it typically does not). Apple and Microsoft are the 
modern equivalents of cotton and spin factories. We have the same reasons 
to worry about who controls their ownership and who has access to the tech-
nologies that they enable as much now as we did in the past. But if we ignore 
the problem of asymmetrical access and proceed as if the internet was 
already within everybody’s reach, we run the risk of entrenching one of the 
most problematic divides of our time.
Given the perspective I have offered, I hesitate to show enthusiasm for 
Orgad’s proposal for reasons very different from those of Robert Post, 
Michael Blake or even Rainer Bauböck. My argument is not that cloud com-
munities based on voluntary membership do not offer the benefits of a col-
lective coercive system of rewards and punishments like the one offered by 
modern states. I do not think that states are necessarily either more just or 
more democratic than cloud communities, or that they ‘provide us with 
goods that cannot be provided by even the best systems of informational 
technology’ as Michael Blake suggests. If you are a representative of the 
half of the world that has nothing to do with the internet you are of course 
failed by IT providers, but you are also failed by your state. Indeed, you are 
failed by those providers precisely because you are failed by your state. It is 
because the state is captured by powerful groups who merely exploit you 
and who are uninterested in guaranteeing you access to those basic goods 
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that the state is supposed to guarantee (at least according to the liberal myth) 
that you are excluded within the state as much as outside.
When we assess the benefits and limitations of state citizenship versus a 
voluntary model of global citizenship, we have to make sure that we compare 
like with like. We have to make sure we don’t compare an ideal of the state 
with the reality of failing blockchain technologies, for example. We need to 
compare the reality of the state with the reality of cloud communities or the 
ideal of the state with the ideal of cloud communities. Speaking about ideals, 
like Orgad, I am attracted to a system of voluntary membership where citi-
zenship does not come coupled with the right to exclude, and like De Filippi 
I can see the advantages of ‘trustless systems (i.e. system where trust is no 
longer needed).’ Indeed, both of those things are compatible with the kind of 
utopian society Marx thought would come after capitalism had been super-
seded and when the need for a state (understood as a collective coercive 
system of punishment) would have withered away. But speaking about real-
ity, capitalism is alive and kicking: capitalist relations control the state and 
they will control cloud communities. Without remedying the asymmetries of 
access to the means of connection, and the exclusions they generate, the ideal 
of global citizenship will be as illusory as the ideal of a state that is effective 
in distributing social goods. But while in the case of the state, we have at least 
a history of political mobilisation and, if lucky, democratic learning processes 
and institutions on which to rely when seeking change (as Bauböck also 
points out in his piece), nothing of that sort is available in the cloud. So we 
should probably hold on to state citizenship for the conflictual period of tran-
sition and leave cloud communities to the future utopian society that may 
become accessible once interconnectedness is truly global. If it ever does.
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Escapist Technology in the Service  
of Neo-Feudalism
Dimitry Kochenov
This contribution agrees with Rainer Bauböck’s reaction to Liav Orgad’s 
opening statement. I am, too, ‘less optimistic about the future of citizen-
ship’. My reasons are different though. There are different ways to go about 
technological leaps: to turn technological breakthroughs into the tools of 
improving the long-established reality, or to revolutionize society based on 
technological advancements. Nikolai Fëdorov, to give an ambitious exam-
ple, aimed at conquering death and resurrecting all those previously living.1 
Liav Orgad’s text proposes technology-inspired change. I suggest, respect-
fully, that by not going far enough, what is proposed by Orgad could turn out 
to be dangerous and unwelcome for a large share of the world population 
outside of the richest countries. Echoing Lea Ypi’s contribution, I suggest 
that it will do more harm than good. The reason for this is that it puts tech-
nology to the service of the mythology of citizenship, instead of interrogat-
ing citizenship’s essence and functions and questioning its darker corners.
The core of the problem, to my mind, is the concept of citizenship as 
such, not the documentation of identity, which the blockchain proposal 
addresses. Virtual nations, as long as they replicate existing national struc-
tures that randomly ascribe strict identities and reinforce deep global 
inequalities, will make the world worse off, especially among its poorest 
half. Even if they miraculously end up playing a significant role, the citizen-
ship framing of the issues Orgad aims to address seems to be unhelpful and 
problematic, especially in the context of his rhetoric aspiring to reach out to 
‘global’ citizenship, whatever this could mean.
Citizenship is a racist and sexist status of randomised violent segregation 
of the world population into relatively closed groups of varying objective 
value from the point of view of individual rights.2 Some come with far- 
reaching rights – others with liabilities. Both are significant both in real life 
1 Fëdorov, N. F. (1906), Filosofija obshchego dela. Moscow: Vernyj.
2 Kochenov, D. (2019), Citizenship: An Alchemist’s Promise. Michigan: MIT 
Press (forthcoming).
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and in the cloud. If someone is assigned a humiliating set of liabilities in real 
life, say, a Central African Republic citizenship, instead of a noble and dem-
ocratic status boosting one’s rights, say the citizenship of France, cloud 
communities will not change that, unless the distinction between being 
assigned to CAR as opposed to France is thereby undermined, and based on 
Orgad’s suggestion it won’t be. The ‘real life’ problem thus derives from 
real life inequalities between citizenships as bundles of rights and liabilities. 
It is not only that citizenships by definition exclude. It is the difference 
between different citizenships that matters. As long as these two premises 
persist in shaping our day-to-day reality, a ‘global’ cloud community is a 
meaningless proposition for those who hold inferior citizenships, reinforc-
ing the gaps between CAR citizens and the French.
Citizenship’s core function throughout history, alongside sexism and a 
deep exclusion of women, has been to establish and police global race- and 
wealth-based hierarchies of opportunities and rights, while providing an 
impenetrable and punishing noble façade of equality and self-determination. 
In this, citizenship has been very effective: it took US women almost hun-
dred years to get the right to vote and the Dutch ones waited until 1986 to 
have a citizenship status independent of that of their husbands. Compared 
with women, all the colonial subjects fared significantly worse. While 
African Americans obviously have not been enjoying the same rights as 
‘Caucasian’ US citizens throughout the history of US citizenship, the same 
is true for the European and Asian empires as well. Emmanuelle Saada 
explains how arbitrary and uniquely based on skin-colour the ascription of 
Frenchness in the colonies of the Republic was.3 What decolonisation 
brought, however, was a racial segregation of the world under the banner of 
equal citizenship among equal states. All the former colonial subjects are 
now confined to the places around the world reserved uniquely for the losers 
of Ayelet Shachar’s infamous birthright lottery.4 The only difference com-
pared with seventy years ago is that there is no more French judge in the 
former colony, whom you can beg for a drastic status upgrade for your child, 
capitalising on her unexpected blue eyes – racism is outlawed, remember?
The world has thus both changed and remained the same. It changed, 
because since the Second World War the Western world has come to accept 
women as the bearers of citizenship status independent of their sexual 
3 Saada, E. (2012), Empire’s Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the 
French Colonies. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
4 Shachar, A. (2009), The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. 
Harvard: Harvard University Press.
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partners and even grants them political rights. Racial minorities within ‘first 
world’ states are also respected – both on paper and often in practice too. 
The façade of citizenship as a status of equals seems to have met – for the 
first time since its proclamation by Aristotle – its promise. Yet the world has 
also remained hugely unequal. Branko Milanovic teaches us that, although 
global income inequalities have recently declined when measured by coun-
try averages, country of residence is more important than class today.5 Even 
the ‘occupy Wall Street’ guys belong in fact to the world’s elites, they are 
only not able to realise the depth of misery of others. Indeed, those locked 
into the poorest former colonies do not inhabit the same narrative as 
Europeans and Americans. The main purpose of citizenship has been 
upgraded: from a neo-feudal mechanism of sexist and racist governance, it 
is turning into one of the core instruments of preservation and justification 
of global inequality, hiding its functionality behind the old façade of politi-
cal self-determination, which had been effective to brush away women and 
minorities before.
Citizenships are thus about preserving inequality worldwide. As long as 
segregating remains citizenships’ main function, cloud communities are 
powerless in their mission: identities are irrelevant as long as all the life 
chances or the lack thereof depend on a random legal status of ascription to 
authority distributed at birth. Worse still, humiliation and randomness are 
routinely sanctified: while upholding and perpetuating inequality, citizen-
ship supplies a powerful and ultimately pointless narrative justifying random 
privilege through the glorification of expediency in territorial governance.
The lack of any rights worldwide coming with some citizenships as 
opposed to a huge bundle of rights coming with others can be measured. By 
comparing GDP, HDI, travel freedom and settlement and work rights abroad 
it is easy to see why being born French – with a status welcoming you to the 
job market of 41 countries and all the other perks included – is infinitely 
better than being a Ukrainian or, God forbid, an Afghani. The Quality of 
Nationality Index, which I designed together with Chris Kälin shows this in 
the most graphic way (http://www.nationalityindex.com). For ordinary peo-
ple this is not all theory: the boats crossing the Mediterranean are full and 
they cross the sea in one direction only. My point is, they will be going the 
same way no matter what cloud communities are introduced, since the 
5 Milanovic, B. (2012), ‘Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: In History 
and Now’, Policy Research Working Paper No. 6259, The World Bank, 
available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/959251468176687085/
Global-income-inequality-by-the-numbers-in-history-and-now-an-overview
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 violence of global segregation that citizenship inflicts cannot be affected by 
the technology proclaiming an abstract ‘global citizenship’ to be a value and 
reaffirming it in the cloud.
Before discussing the potential benefits of a set of quasi-citizenships in 
the cloud it is crucial to be fully aware of the drastic differences between 
citizenships in ‘real life’ and fully internalise their ability to punish besides 
simply segregating at random. Pace Arendt’s ‘right to have tights’ citizen-
ship is a status associated with rights in a handful of countries only. In many 
others, it is a severe and undeserved liability and sometimes a mortal one. 
What blockchain offers to a Frenchmen will thus be radically different from 
what it offers to a Congolese (pick your Congo!). When refugees arrive in 
Europe or America, they often destroy, sometimes even eat, their passports. 
Have you tried to consider why? It is because many citizenships are so ter-
ribly poisonous and dangerous that you might be infinitely better off as a 
stateless person. This is because with a Central African Republic passport 
your child born in Brussels will be a Central African, not a Belgian, because 
you will need to wait for naturalisation longer and, ultimately, because CAR 
will have to accept you back once you are out of the Belgian asylum system. 
To be identifiable is always as bad a liability as the citizenship or the place 
of birth you will be identified with. It can ruin lives. This is where cloud 
communities come in as an impermissibly rosy dream. The proposal ignores 
the complexity of the world and fails to fully come to terms with its own 
dangers in the context of the current functions of citizenship behind the self- 
justificatory sacred façade put up uniquely for those who somehow happen 
to belong to the right country in order to let them sleep tight at night.
Citizenship’s inescapable evil does not stem from the fact that it is a ran-
domly assigned benefit, but from the reality that it is about branding as defi-
cient those who are randomly proclaimed not to belong while treating such 
exclusion as self-explanatory and just. This justice is ethically void, how-
ever, as long as we believe that it is humanity that counts morally and that 
obliges us to respect others’ desire to live a worthy life, as Joseph Carens has 
demonstrated.6 Should this indeed be our starting point, any serious work to 
perfect the current citizenship paradigm – either on the ground or in the 
cloud – is nothing else but work that opposes ethical imperatives we all 
share. The untenability of citizenship’s ethical narrative, no matter which 
way of telling it one chooses, is the elephant in the room, which ultimately 
explains the on-going demise of the citizenship of the ‘good old times’: a 
random supremacist status for armed white boys who belong and believe in 
6 Carens, J. (2013), The Ethics of Immigration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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the greatness of their land, whatever it might be, often at the expense of all 
their neighbours.
How do the cloud communities proposed by Orgad fit Joppke’s story of 
the ‘inevitable lightening of citizenship’?7 In the former imperial centres 
such luxury as new online associations emerging through the individual sov-
ereign governance of identity with the help of blockchain as Orgad describes 
it is only welcome – our world is open and ripe with opportunities – in the 
cloud and on the ground. About the rest of the world I am somewhat scepti-
cal: as Robert Post has already suggested in his contribution, life in the place 
where you are is something that is of crucial importance, more than your 
cloud identity, whatever that would come to mean. And as Michael Blake 
points out, violence in the physical world is equally crucial. Work and edu-
cation of your choosing, residence abroad, freedom of belief and expression, 
an ability to be with your loved ones, to go places – this is what a Saudi citi-
zenship, now grotesquely granted to a robot, will no doubt deny you, espe-
cially if you are a woman. Using technology for escapism is something that 
falls far short, it seems to me, of its potential. A cloud community will not 
even save you from beheading in Saudi Arabia for confessing atheism 
online, for instance, or, if you happen to be a Chinese national, spending 
three years in jail for calling Mr Xi a ‘steam bun’ in a private chat conversa-
tion in your cloud.
Once escapism has been discarded, it becomes necessary to consider 
what cloud communities could be good for. And in doing so it is our impera-
tive not to replicate the repugnant nature of citizenship as a justificatory 
label for random privilege and for explaining away global inequality. Here 
Estonia shows the way, as Poleshchuk has demonstrated.8
It is not the cloud identity, – I am gay in the cloud since otherwise the 
government will kill me – it is the functional added value of the virtual sta-
tuses and ‘residences’ that should come to the fore. What I am saying is that 
clubs, no matter whether offline or in the cloud, have nothing to do with citi-
zenships, since citizenships are involuntary and do not foster common inter-
ests or values. Consequently, calling any cloud identities ‘citizenship’ is a 
misconception. One needs to move on from citizenship when technology 
allows. What is possible today – and this is a great beginning Estonia 
7 Joppke, C. (2010), Citizenship and Immigration. London: Polity.
8 Poleshchuk, V. (2016). ‘“Making Estonia Bigger”: What E-Residency in 
E-Estonia Can Do for You, What It Can Do for Estonia’, Investment Migration 
Working Papers. Available at https://investmentmigration.org/download/
making-estonia-bigger-e-residency-e-estonia-can-can-estonia/
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started – is to use online residences as compensation mechanisms for the 
deficiencies of the statuses of citizenship, which the vast majority of the 
world’s population got by birth. You are born in Afghanistan? Fine, with an 
Estonian residency online you can at least open a proper bank account and 
have access to basic state services – notaries, company registers etc. This is 
a primary use of new digital technologies.
A second purpose – and this one should be based on a broad agreement 
between states – is to use attested individual identities to judge people by 
those, rather than their passports. Crucially, these cannot go hand in hand. 
The core added value would be to replace one with the other. We are a long 
way from here and the connection between the cloud and ‘real life’ is crucial 
here, but what one can envisage is a world where babies in Afghanistan or 
Pakistan are born without at least some of the drastic harmful effects of the 
original sin of nationality and that peoples’ worth at international borders is 
assessed via some factors other than the particular state that has been claim-
ing the possession of them from birth. This should be the future of techno-
logical thinking to bring true liberation from the neo-feudal essence of a 
poisonous status, which is ethically vacuous, its political expediency not-
withstanding. A technological revolution should not become a servant of the 
status quo, erecting yet higher walls between the haves and have-nots.
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Stefania Milan
As a digital sociologist, I have always found ‘classical’ political scientists 
and lawyers a tad too reluctant to embrace the idea that digital technology is 
a game changer in so many respects. In the debate spurred by Liav Orgad’s 
provocative thoughts on blockchain-enabled cloud communities, I am par-
ticularly fascinated by the tension between techno-utopianism on the one 
hand (above all, Orgad and Primavera De Filippi), and socio-legal realism 
on the other (e.g., Rainer Bauböck, Michael Blake, Lea Ypi, Jelena Dzankic, 
Dimitry Kochenov). I find myself somewhere in the middle. In what fol-
lows, I take a sociological perspective to explain why there is something 
profoundly interesting in the notion of cloud communities, why however 
little of it is really new, and why the obstacles ahead are bigger than we 
might like to think. The point of departure for my considerations is a number 
of experiences in the realm of transnational social movements and gover-
nance: what we can learn from existing experiments that might help us con-
textualize and rethink cloud communities?
 Three problems with Orgad’s argument
To start with, while I sympathise with Orgad’s provocative claims, I cannot 
but notice that what he deems new in cloud communities – namely the global 
dimension of political membership and its networked nature – is indeed 
rather old. Since the 1990s, transnational social movements for global jus-
tice have offered non-territorial forms of political membership – not unlike 
those described as cloud communities. Similar to cloud communities, these 
movements were the manifestation of political communities based on con-
sent, gathered around shared interests and only minimally rooted in physical 
territories corresponding to nation states.1 In the fall of 2011 I observed with 
earnest interest the emergence of yet another global wave of contention: the 
1 Tarrow, S. (2005), The New Transnational Activism. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
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so-called Occupy mobilisation. As a sociologist of the web, I set off in 
search for a good metaphor to capture the evolution of organised collective 
action in the age of social media, and the obvious candidate was… the cloud. 
In a series of articles2 and book chapters,3 I developed my theory of ‘cloud 
protesting’, intended to capture how the algorithmic environment of social 
media alters the dynamics of organized collective action. In light of my 
empirical work, I agree with Bauböck, who acknowledges that cloud com-
munities might have something to do with the ‘expansion of civil society, of 
international organizations, or of traditional territorial polities into cyber-
space.’ He also points out how, sadly, people can express their political 
views – and, I would add, engage in disruptive actions, as happens at some 
fringes of the movement for global justice – only because ‘a secure territo-
rial citizenship’ protects their exercise of fundamental rights, such as free-
dom of expression and association. Hence the questions a sociologist might 
ask: do we really need the blockchain to enable the emergence of cloud 
communities? If, as I argue, the existence of ‘international legal personas’ is 
not a pre-requisite for the establishment of cloud communities, what would 
the creation of ‘international legal personas’ add to the picture?4
Secondly, while I understand why a blockchain-enabled citizenship sys-
tem would make life easier for the many who do not have access to a regular 
passport, I am wary of its ‘institutionalisation’, on account of the probable 
discrepancies between the ideas (and the mechanisms) associated with a 
Westphalian state and those of politically active activists and radical tech-
nologists alike. On the one hand, citizens interested in ‘advanced’ forms of 
2 Milan, S. (2015), ‘From social movements to cloud protesting: the evolution of 
collective identity’, Information, Communication & Society 18 (8): 887–900; 
Milan, S. (2015), ‘When algorithms shape collective action: Social media and 
the dynamics of cloud protesting’, Social Media + Society 1 (2): 1–10.
3 Milan, S. (2015), ‘Mobilizing in Times of Social Media. From a Politics of 
Identity to a Politics of Visibility’, in L. Dencik & O. Leistert (eds.), Critical 
Perspectives on Social Media and Protest: Between Control and 
Emancipation, 53–71. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2880402; Milan, S. (2013), ‘WikiLeaks, Anonymous, 
and the exercise of individuality: protesting in the cloud’, in B. Brevini, 
A. Hintz & P. McCurdy (eds.), Beyond WikiLeaks: Implications for the Future 
of Communications, Journalism and Society, 191–208. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
4 I am aware that there is a fundamental drawback in social movements when 
compared to cloud communities: unlike the latter, the former are not rights 




political participation (e.g., governance and the making of law) might not 
necessarily be inclined to form a state-like entity. For example, many 
accounts of the so-called ‘movement for global justice’5 show how ‘official’ 
membership and affiliation is often not required, not expected and especially 
not considered desirable. Activism today is characterised by a dislike and 
distrust of the state, and a tendency to privilege flexible, multiple identities.6 
On the other hand, the ‘radical technologists’ behind the blockchain project 
are animated by values – an imaginaire7 – deeply distinct from that of the 
state.8 While the blockchain technology is enabled by a complex constella-
tion of diverse actors, it is legitimate to ask whether it is possible to bend a 
technology built with an ‘underlying philosophy of distributed consensus, 
open source, transparency and community’ with the goal to ‘be highly dis-
ruptive’9 … to serve similar purposes as those of states?
Thirdly, Orgad’s argument falls short of a clear description of what the 
‘cloud’ stands for in his notion of cloud communities. When thinking about 
‘clouds’, as a metaphor and a technical term, we cannot but think of cloud 
computing, a ‘key force in the changing international political economy’10 
of our times, which entails a process of centralisation of software and hard-
ware allowing users to reduce costs by sharing resources. The cloud 
5 Della Porta, D. & S. Tarrow (eds.) (2005), Transnational Protest and Global 
Activism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; Juris, J. S. (2012), ‘Reflections 
on #Occupy Everywhere: Social Media, Public Space, and Emerging Logics of 
Aggregation’, American Ethnologist 39 (2): 259–279; McDonald, K. (2006), 
Global Movements: Action and Culture. Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell.
6 Bennett, L. W. & A. Segerberg (2013), The Logic of Connective Action Digital 
Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press; Milan, S. (2013), ‘WikiLeaks, Anonymous, and 
the exercise of individuality: Protesting in the cloud’, in B. Brevini, A. Hintz & 
P. McCurdy (eds.), Beyond WikiLeaks: Implications for the Future of 
Communications, Journalism and Society, 191–208. Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
7 Flichy, P. (2007), The Internet imaginaire. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
8 Reijers, W. & M. Coeckelbergh (2018), ‘The Blockchain as a Narrative 
Technology: Investigating the Social Ontology and Normative Configurations 
of Cryptocurrencies’, Philosophy & Technology 31 (1): 103–130.
9 Walport, M. (2015), Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond blockchain. 
London: UK Government Office for Science. London: UK Government Office 
for Science, available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-
ledger-technology.pdf
10 Mosco, V. (2014), To the Cloud: Big Data in a Turbulent World. New York: 
Paradigm Publishers, 1.
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 metaphor, I argued elsewhere,11 is an apt one as it exposes a fundamental 
ambivalence of contemporary processes of ‘socio-legal decentralisation.’ 
While claiming distance from the values and dynamics of the neoliberal 
state, a project of building blockchain-enabled communities still relies on 
commercially-owned infrastructure to function.
Precisely to reflect on this ambiguity, my most recent text on cloud pro-
testing interrogates the materiality of the cloud.12 We have long lived in the 
illusion that the internet was a space free of geography. Yet, as IR scholar 
Ron Deibert argued, ‘physical geography is an essential component of 
cyberspace: Where technology is located is as important as what it is’ (origi-
nal italics).13 The Snowden revelations, to name just one, have brought to 
the forefront the role of the national state in – openly or covertly – setting 
the rules of user interactions online. What’s more, we no longer can blame 
the state alone, but the ‘surveillant assemblage’ of state and corporations.14 
To me, the big absent in this debate is the private sector and corporate capi-
tal. De Filippi briefly mentioned how the ‘new communities of kinship’ are 
anchored in ‘a variety of online platforms’. However, what Orgav’s and 
partially also Bauböck’s contributions underscore is the extent to which 
intermediation by private actors stands in the way of creating a real alterna-
tive to the state – or at least the fulfilment of certain dreams of autonomy, 
best represented today by the fascination for blockchain technology. 
Bauböck rightly notes that ‘state and corporations… will find ways to instru-
mentalise or hijack cloud communities for their own purposes.’ But there is 
more to that: the infrastructure we use to enable our interpersonal exchanges 
and, why not, the blockchain, are owned and controlled by private interests 
subjected to national laws. They are not merely neutral pipes, as Dumbrava 
reminds us.
11 Milan, S. (2015), ‘When Algorithms Shape Collective Action: Social Media 
and the Dynamics of Cloud Protesting’, Social Media + Society 1 (1): 1–10.
12 Stefania, M. (2018), ‘The Materiality of Clouds. Beyond a Platform-Specific 
Critique of Contemporary Activism’. In M. Mortensen, C. Neumayer & 
T. Poell (eds.), Social Media Materialities and Protest: Critical Reflections. 
London: Routledge.
13 Deibert, R (2015), ‘The Geopolitics of Cyberspace After Snowden’, Current 
History 114 (768): 9–15, at 10.
14 Murakami Wood, D. (2013) ‘What Is Global Surveillance?: Towards a 




 Self-governance in practice: A cautionary tale
To be sure, many experiments allow ‘individuals the option to raise their 
voice … in territorial communities to which they do not physically belong,’ 
as beautifully put by Francesca Strumia. Internet governance is a case in 
point. Since the early days of the internet, cyberlibertarian ideals, enshrined 
for instance in the ‘Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace’15 by late JP 
Barlow, have attributed little to no role to governments – both in deciding 
the rules for the ‘new’ space as well as the citizenship of its users (read: the 
right to participate in the space and in the decision-making about the rules 
governing it). In those early flamboyant narratives, cyberspace was to be a 
space where users – but really engineers above all – would translate into 
practice their wildest dreams in matter of self-governance, self- determination 
and, to some extent, fairness. While cyberlibertarian views have been appro-
priated by both conservative (anti-state) and progressive forces alike, some 
of their founding principles have spilled over to real governance mecha-
nisms – above all the governance of standards and protocols by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), and the management of the Domain Name 
System (DNS) by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN).16 Here I focus on the latter, where I have been active for about 
four years (2014–2017).
ICANN is organized in constituencies of stakeholders, including con-
tracted parties (the ‘middlemen’, that is to say registries and registrars that 
on a regional base allocate and manage on behalf of ICANN the names and 
numbers, and whose relationship with ICANN is regulated by contract), 
non-contracted parties (corporations doing business on the DNS, e.g. con-
tent or infrastructure providers) and non-commercial internet users (read: 
us). ICANN’s proceedings are fully recorded and accessible from its web-
site (https://www.icann.org/); its public meetings, thrice a year and rotating 
around the globe, are open to everyone who wants to walk in. Governments 
are represented in a sort of United Nations-style entity called the Government 
Advisory Committee. While corporate interests are well-represented by an 
array of professional lobbyists, the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group 
15 Barlow, J. P. (1996), Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace. Available at 
http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html
16 The system of unique identifiers of the DNS comprises the so-called ‘names’ 
standing in for domain names (e.g., www.eui.eu), and ‘numbers’, or Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses (e.g., the ‘machine version’ of the domain name that a 
router for example can understand). The DNS can be seen as a sort of ‘phone 
book’ of the internet.
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(NCSG), which stands in for civil society,17 is a mix and match of advocates 
of various extraction, expertise and nationality: internet governance aca-
demics, nongovernmental organisations promoting freedom of expression, 
and independent individuals who take an interest in the functioning of the 
logical layer of the internet.
The 2016 transition of the stewardship over the DNS from the US 
Congress to the ‘global multistakeholder community’ has achieved a dream 
unique in its kind, straight out of the cyberlibertarian vision of the early 
days: the technical oversight of the internet18 is in the hands of the people 
who make and use it, and the (advisory) role of the state is marginal. 
Accountability now rests solely within the community behind ICANN, 
which envisioned (and is still implementing) a complex system of checks 
and balances to allow the various stakeholder voices to be fairly represented. 
No other critical infrastructure is regulated by its own users. To build on 
Orgad’s reasoning, the community around ICANN is a cloud community, 
which operates by voluntary association and consensus,19 and is entitled to 
produce ‘governance and the creation of law’.20
But the system is far from perfect. Let’s look at how the so-called civil 
society is represented, focusing on one such entity, the NCSG. Firstly, given 
that everyone can participate, the variety of views represented is enormous, 
and often hinders the ability of the constituency to be effective in policy 
17 Technically, of the DNS, which is only a portion of what we call ‘the internet’, 
although the most widely used one.
18 Civil society representation in ICANN is more complex than what is described 
here. The NCSG is composed of two (litigious) constituencies, namely the 
Non-Commercial User Constituency (NCUC) and the Non-Profit Operational 
Concerns (NPOC). In addition, ‘nonorganizedd’ internet users can elect their 
representatives in the At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC), organized on a 
regional basis. The NCSG, however, is the only one who directly contributes to 
policy-making.
19 ICANN is both a nonprofit corporation registered under Californian law, and a 
community of volunteers who set the rules for the management of the logical 
layer of the internet by consensus. See also the ICANN Bylaws, available at 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en (last updated in 
August 2017).
20 This should at least in part address Post’s doubts about the ability of a political 
community to govern those outside of its jurisdiction. One might argue that 
internet users are, perhaps unwillingly or simply unconsciously, within the 
‘jurisdiction’ of ICANN. I do believe, however, that the case of ICANN is an 




negotiations. Yet, the size of the group is relatively small: at the time of writ-
ing, the Non-Commercial User Constituency (the bigger one among the two 
that form the NCSG) comprises ‘538 members from 161 countries, includ-
ing 118 noncommercial organizations and 420 individuals’21, making it the 
largest constituency within ICANN: this is nothing when compared to the 
global internet population it serves, confirming, as Dzankic argues, that 
‘direct democracy is not necessarily conducive to broad participation in 
decision-making’. Secondly, ICANN policy-making is highly technical and 
specialised; the learning curve is dramatically steep. Thirdly, to be effective, 
the amount of time a civil society representative should spend on ICANN is 
largely incompatible with regular daily jobs; civil society cannot compete 
with corporate lobbyists. Fourthly, with ICANN meetings rotating across 
the globe, one needs to be on the road for at least a month per year, with 
considerable personal and financial costs.22 In sum, while participation is in 
principle open to everyone, informed participation has much higher access 
barriers, which have to do with expertise, time, and financial resources.23
As a result, we observe a number of dangerous distortions of political 
representation. For example, when only the highly motivated participate, 
the views and ‘imaginaries’ represented are often at the opposite ends of the 
spectrum.24 Only the most involved really partake in decision-making, in a 
mechanism which is well known in sociology: the ‘tyranny of 
structurelessness’,25 which is typical of participatory, consensus-based 
organising. The extreme personalisation of politics that we observe within 
civil society at ICANN – a small group of long-term advocates with high 
personal stakes – yields also another similar mechanism, known as ‘the tyr-
anny of emotions’,26 by which the most invested, independently of the suit-
ability of their curricula vitae, end up assuming informal leadership 
21 ‘Our membership’, available at https://www.ncuc.org/about/membership/
22 ICANN allocates consistent but not sufficient resources to support civil society 
participation in its policymaking. These include travel bursaries and accommo-
dation costs and fellowship programs for induction of newcomers.
23 See for example: Milan, S. & A. Hintz (2013), ‘Networked Collective Action 
and the Institutionalized Policy Debate: Bringing Cyberactivism to the Policy 
Arena?’, Internet & Policy 5 (1): 7–26.
24 Milan, S. (2014), ‘The Fair of Competing Narratives: Civil Society(ies) after 
NETmundial’, IPO Blog, 10 September. Available at http://globalnetpolicy.org/
the-fair-of-competing-narratives-civil-societyies-after-netmundial/
25 Freeman, J. (1972), The Tyranny of Structurelessness. Available at http://www.
jofreeman.com/joreen/ tyranny.htm
26 Polletta, F. (2002), Freedom Is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American 
Social Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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roles – and, as the case of ICANN shows, even in presence of formal and 
carefully weighted governance structures. Decision-making is thus based on 
a sort of ‘microconsensus’ within small decision-making cliques.27 To make 
things worse, ICANN is increasingly making exceptions to its own, 
community- established rules, largely under the pressure of corporations as 
well as law enforcement: for example, the corporation has recently been 
accused of bypassing consensus policy-making through voluntary agree-
ments ad private contracting.28
 Why not (yet?): On new divides and bad players
In conclusion, while I value the possibilities the blockchain technology 
opens for experimentation as much as Primavera De Filippi, I do not believe 
it will really solve our problems in the short to middle-term. Rather, as it is 
always with technology because of its inherent political nature,29 new con-
flicts will emerge – and they will concern both its technical features and its 
governance.
Earlier contributors to this debate have raised important concerns which 
are worth listening to. Besides Bauböck’s concerns over the perils for 
democracy represented by a consensus-based, self-governed model, 
endorsed also by Blake, I want to echo Lea Ypi’s reminder of the enormous 
potential for exclusion embedded in technologies, as digital skills (but also 
income) are not equally distributed across the globe. For the time being, a 
citizenship model based on blockchain technology would be for the elites 
only, and would contribute to create new divides and to amplify existing 
ones. The first fundamental step towards the cloud communities envisioned 
by Orgad would thus see the state stepping in (once again) and being in 
27 Although a quantitative analysis of the stickiness of participation in relation to 
discursive change reveals a more nuanced picture (see, for example: Milan, S. 
& N. ten Oever (2017), ‘Coding and encoding rights in internet infrastructure’, 
Internet Policy Review 6 (1): 1–17). See: Gastil, J. (1993), Democracy in Small 
Groups. Participation, Decision Making & Communication. Philadelphia, PA 
and Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers.
28 ‘ICANN Drifting Toward Online Content Regulation, Says Law Professor’, 
Circle ID, 28 February 2017, available at http://www.circleid.com/
posts/20170228_icann_drifting_toward_online_content_regulation_says_law_
professor/
29 Bijker, W. E., T. P. Hughes & T. Pinch (eds.) (2012), The Social Construction 
of Technological Systems. New Direction in the Sociology and History of 
Technology. Cambridge, MA and London, England: MIT Press.
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charge of creating appropriate data and algorithmic literacy programmes 
whose scope is out of reach for corporations and the organised civil society 
alike.
There is more to that, however. The costs to our already fragile ecosys-
tem of the blockchain technology are on the rise along with its popularity. 
These infrastructures are energy-intensive: talking about the cryptocurrency 
Bitcoin, tech magazine Motherboard estimated that each transaction con-
sumes 215 Kilowatt-hour of electricity – the equivalent of the weekly con-
sumption of an American household.30 A world built on blockchain would 
have a vast environmental footprint.31 Once again, the state might play a role 
in imposing adequate regulation mindful of the environmental costs of such 
programs.
But I do not intend to glorify the role of the state. On the contrary, I 
believe we should also watch out for any attempts by the state to curb inno-
vation. The relatively brief history of digital technology, and even more that 
of the internet, is awash with examples of late but extremely damaging state 
interventions. As soon as a given technology performs roles or produces 
information that are of interest to the state (e.g., interpersonal communica-
tions), the state wants to jump in, and often does so in pretty clumsy ways. 
The recent surveillance scandals have abundantly shown how state powers 
firmly inhabit the internet32 – and, as the Cambridge Analytica case33 reminds 
us, so do corporate interests. Moreover, the two are, more often than not, 
dangerously aligned.
30 ‘One Bitcoin Transaction Now Uses as Much Energy as Your House in a 
Week’, Motherboard, 1 November 2017, available at https://motherboard.vice.
com/en_us/article/ywbbpm/
bitcoin-mining-electricity-consumption-ethereum-energy-climate-change
31 Also see: Mosco, V. (2014), To the Cloud: Big Data in a Turbulent World. 
New York: Paradigm Publishers.
32 Deibert, R. J. (2009), ‘The geopolitics of internet control: censorship, sover-
eignty, and cyberspace’, in A. Chadwick & P. N. Howard (eds.), The Routledge 
Handbook of Internet Politics, 323–336. London: Routledge; Deibert, R. J., 
J. G. Palfrey, R., Rohozinski & J. Zittrain (eds.) (2010), Access Controlled: 
The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press; Lyon, D. (2015), Surveillance After Snowden. Cambridge and Malden, 
MA: Polity Press.
33 ‘Cambridge Analytica case highlights Facebook’s data riches’, Financial 
Times, 19 March 2018, available at https://www.ft.com/content/
c1f326a4-2b24-11e8-9b4b-bc4b9f08f381
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I do not intend, with my cautionary tales, to hinder any imaginative effort 
to explore the possibilities offered by blockchain to rethink how we 
 understand and practice citizenship today. The case of Estonia shows that 
different models based on alternative infrastructure are possible, at least on 
the small scale and in presence of a committed state. As scholars we ought 
to explore those possibilities. Much work is needed, however, before we can 
proclaim the blockchain revolution.
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Cloud Agoras: When Blockchain Technology  
Meets Arendt’s Virtual Public Spaces
Dora Kostakopoulou
While developments in information technology have always sparked lively 
debates about democratic participation and citizenship, the advent of block-
chain technology promises to change the concept and nature of participatory 
citizenship by providing an inclusive, secure and transparent mechanism of 
data sharing among an unlimited number of members. Liav Orgad has writ-
ten a powerful contribution about the promise of blockchain technology. I 
fully share his thoughts and his optimism. Blockchain participants are able 
to interact, share information, collaborate and have access to an incredible 
amount of information organised in blocks without the intervention of a 
centralised authority and without any reliance on a centralised platform. 
More importantly, everyone’s copy of the distributed database will be kept 
updated and will be immutable; information can be added by any member of 
the global network, but cannot be deleted. Blockchain is thus a platform for 
worldwide information sharing, interaction and collaboration. As such, it 
has the potential to enhance political participation, trigger civic mobilisation 
and to provide the substratum for public action on a global scale.
Such a bottom up, participatory and size-neutral (the network could con-
sist of billions of people) digital network does not merely offer a glimpse of 
what might be possible in terms of global citizenship but, as Liav Orgad has 
explained, casts doubts on any arguments about the impossibility of global 
citizenship. This is because blockchain simply removes three of the main 
obstacles for its realisation; namely, the impermeability of state borders, the 
size of the demos, and certain costs associated with political participation. 
Participants just need to have internet access in order to join a network com-
prising millions of citizens from diverse regions and remote locations of the 
globe who could be mobilised in influencing public policies and taking part 
in public actions.
In what follows, I will thus sidestep questions about the feasibility of 
global citizenship in order to examine how the new technological revolution 
will lead to innovations in political life and will create Hannah Arendt’s 
public spaces of ‘virtual’ citizenship. By so doing, I take it for granted that 
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blockchain is a ‘game-changer’ and that it could have significant transfor-
mative effects on societies, politics and citizenship. I use the verb ‘could’ 
because I do not wish to embrace determinism or to imply the existence of a 
causal relation between technology and political processes. Blockchain has 
the potential to transform the way we think about public spaces, citizenship 
and political participation, but this potential can only be realised if technol-
ogy is put to uses which can enhance democratic political processes.
My critics might object here that we do not need technological advance-
ments in order to procure new conceptions of public space. Analyses 
informed by the thinking of philosophers, such as Henri Lefebvre, and geog-
raphers, such as Doreen Massey and Edward Soja, have highlighted that 
spaces are not given but are constructed in different ways by politics and 
discursive practices. Readers might recall Peter Maier’s anthology on the 
changing boundaries of the political in the late 1980s.1 In it, Maier mapped 
the blurring of the distinction between the state and civil society, while a few 
years later, Gilles Deleuze commented on the shifting of borders and the 
proliferation of political spaces within contemporary societies of control.2
While all this is true, blockchain promises to realise those ideas in 
unprecedented ways. It also holds the promise of generating huge publics 
beyond (and across) geographical borders and territorially defined commu-
nities and thus of opening up new citizenship spaces. Rainer Bauböck and 
Peter Spiro have noted this in their contributions. Citizenship relies on the 
existence of public spaces of communication, of exchange of ideas, argu-
ments and contested viewpoints and of joint decision-making. For a signifi-
cant period of time, the agoras of the direct democratic experimentation in 
ancient Athens became remnants of a distant past that had no chance to be 
replicated in the present and future. Now, virtual agoras ‘containing’ mil-
lions of active and activist individuals can be built onto blockchain.3 The 
mythical space of a distant past becomes connected with, and re-enacted 
within, the contemporary world of an embodied digital network that makes 
citizenship a network good.4
1 Maier, C. C. (ed.) (1987), The Changing Boundaries of the Political. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2 Deleuze, G. (1992), ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, MIT Press 
October 59: 3–7. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/778828.
3 Isin, E. & M. Saward (2013), Enacting European Citizenship. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
4 Kostakopoulou, D. (2008), The Future Governance of Citizenship. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 107–110.
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This is essentially the realisation of Hannah Arendt’s conception of ‘vir-
tual’ public spaces. Virtual ‘agoras’ built on blockchain will become shared 
common worlds of continuous flows of speech and action, that is, spaces 
where people would recognise one another as equals or at least equally enti-
tled to express their views, to ‘deal only with one’s peers’ and to decide on 
common actions at national, international and global levels.5 As Arendt had 
eloquently noted, the (public) space of speech and action ‘can find its proper 
location almost any time and anywhere’.6 By transcending topological as 
well as institutional accounts of the ‘public space’, blockchain technology 
not only lends credence to Arendt’s conception of public space, but it also 
promises to open up decentralised public spaces in which all participants 
can be contributors, deciders and holders of institutional memories. The par-
ticipants’ geographical location does not matter. In an unprecedented border- 
transcending move, new spaces of citizenship appear ‘almost any time and 
anywhere’ as Arendt had argued. What ties all the blockchain participants 
together in the virtual public space of citizenship is simply their ongoing 
concern and active engagement.7 These are, in reality, the characteristics 
that sustain all communities, be they virtual or not: members are visibly 
concerned about the common state of affairs and want their claims, needs, 
and aspirations to be heard.
This development can bring about a complete reconceptualisation of the 
nature of international society; non-statist ways of defining it will gain 
prominence. Hedley Bull’s envisaged transformation of international soci-
ety from a society of states to a society of peoples will be progressively 
realised.8 Cloud agoras will also prompt a rethinking of communitarian 
ways of defining communities and international society which see society 
and culture as interlocked. This is because they do not rely on some form of 
cultural homogeneity or conformity to a majority’s ideas and narratives; the 
rely, instead, on the coming together of strangers9 in order to share their 
concerns and information, express their interests, make demands on the 
political system and to articulate proposals for common action. All this is 
bound to give rise to interesting questions about ways of constructing politi-
cal order and legitimacy in international relations and politics.
5 Arendt, H. (1958), The Human Condition. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
6 Above n. 5, at 198.
7 Kostakopoulou, D. (1996), ‘Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in 
Europe’, Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (4): 337–358.
8 Bull, H. (1977), The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan.
9 Young, I. M. (1986), ‘The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference’, 
Social Theory and Practice 12 (1): 1–26, at 21–23.
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While cloud agoras have the potential of dislocating citizenship from its 
statist reference point and stimulating citizen involvement by delivering the 
affirmative requirements for an active citizenry, namely, information shar-
ing, the exchange of ideas and preferences, capability for action and the 
means of exerting influence and pressure, they will not be able to resolve the 
‘problem of equality of voice’. Claude Lefort, Nancy Fraser, Jürgen 
Habermas and others have commented on the inequalities that persist in 
democratic public spheres. Some voices will be louder and more influential 
than others and women will always struggle to find time to engage even 
virtually. Socio-economic disparities measured in terms of education, 
income and occupation will also allow certain participants to easily convert 
their possessed resources into political involvement. The cognitive and lin-
guistic skills for political articulations and activity are not uniformly distrib-
uted. Nor do they exist independently of individuals’ socio-economic setting 
and geographical location across the globe. Peter Spiro, Lea Yip and Stefania 
Milan correctly highlight this problem. Cloud agoras therefore will not be 
able to transcend the difficulties of ensuring full inclusion in the open public 
grid. They will certainly be more inclusionary that the existing publics, but 
they will still represent a stratified model of political community or public 
space(s). They will also have their own ‘spinners’, exploiters and manipula-
tors of public opinion. I recall Jean Mansbridge’s observations about the 
dark world of domination and manufactured invisibility of actors underpin-
ning deliberative democracy.10
Although it is true that participatory parity cannot be easily achieved 
even in cloud agoras, it is equally true that the common world of citizenship 
beyond borders, states and nations could be more activist. And this is good 
news for democracy in general. It would be relatively easy for millions of 
blockchain members to mobilise on specific issues and to demand change in 
law and policy regionally, nationally and globally. It would also be more 
difficult for decision-making elites to ignore the voices of so many people 
and to pretend that they do not count or that their claims do not matter. Civic 
awakenings and political mobilisations in cloud agoras are also likely to 
exert influence on other public spaces that are more conventional and delin-
eated across national and statist lines. For the boundaries of public spaces, 
virtual and non-virtual ones, will always be porous and issues will leak from 
one domain to another. The dawn of global citizenship will thus be a combi-
nation of the activation of an international or global society and of a more 
activist citizenship. Virtual global citizenship promises to be more virtual, in 
10 Mansbridge, J. (1995), ‘Does Participation Make Better Citizens?’, The Good 
Society 5 (2): 1–7.
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the republican sense; citizens will continually question aspects of public 
life, make public disclosures of wrongdoing, take an active part in public 
affairs and engage in regular, assertive action.
That this is good news for citizenship, democracy and politics in general 
cannot be denied. The virtual public space of blockchain communities will 
make citizens think, engage and act more virtually. In other words, the vir-
tual reality of cloud agoras will have an impact on institutions and the par-
ticipants themselves; it will yield pressures for more open, transparent and 
accountable institutions and will result in more virtuous, that is, actively 
engaged, citizens. Whether cloud agoras will prove to be decisive public 
spaces and strong promoters of democratic processes that make wealth, 
power and privilege accountable or merely subaltern counter publics will 
depend on the intentions and actions of their participants. In other words, the 
answer to the question whether the virtual public space of global citizenship 
will have a decisive influence on global, regional and national public policy- 
making is not theoretical or scholarly; it will be a contextual one.
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Global Cryptodemocracy Is Possible  
and Desirable
Ehud Shapiro
The fascinating discussion kicked-off by Liav Orgad addresses the interplay 
between the clouds and earth: How do cloud citizens and cloud communities 
relate to their earthly counterparts?
Arguments by Orgad, Primavera De Filippi, Francesca Strumia, Peter 
Spiro and Dora Kostakopoulou espouse the potential benefits of global citi-
zenship, ordained by the clouds, and cloud communities that such global 
citizens can form, inhabit and govern. Counterarguments by Rainer Bauböck, 
Robert Post, Michael Blake, Costica Dumbrava, Yussef Al Tamimi, Jelena 
Dzankic, Lea Ypi and Dimitry Kochenov suggest that what happens in the 
cloud stays in the cloud, and may not be helpful or relevant to, or at least 
cannot substitute for, earthly dominions, due to fundamental differences 
between the two. I will try to counter these counterarguments.
A key introductory point made by Bauböck is that Orgad ‘must have 
some form of global federal democracy in mind’, yet that ‘his main vision 
is, however, the emergence of alternative forms of political community at 
the sub-global level’. It is this main vision of Orgad that much of the weighty 
and thoughtful criticism is directed at.
To address it, I recall a strategy from mathematics: When faced with a 
difficult problem, namely a difficult theorem to prove, turn it into an even 
bigger problem: Define a more general and broader theorem, prove it, and 
then the original theorem easily follows as a corollary. This seemingly- 
paradoxical strategy works sometimes since a higher vantage point may 
offer a clearer view of the crux of the matter. I try to apply this strategy here: 
I will not address criticisms directed at sub-global political cloud communi-
ties directly. Instead, I will paint a vision of a global democracy, enabled by 
the internet and the emerging technologies of blockchain and cryptocurren-
cies, explain how subsidiary communities based on shared territory or com-
mon interests, as envisioned by Orgad, can emerge and operate within it, 
and respond to criticism from this broader and more encompassing 
perspective.
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From the outset, key criticisms that apply to subsidiary cloud communi-
ties do not apply to a global democracy, whether on or off the cloud (we note 
in parenthesis the respective critics): It has a clear territory (Bauböck, Post, 
Blake, Al Tamimi) – Planet Earth; it has diverse membership (Bauböck, 
Blake) – humanity at large; membership is involuntary (Bauböck, Post, Al 
Tamimi, Ypi) and by decree – just as earthly states conscript citizens by 
decree; it has room for political communities ‘that differ profoundly in their 
interests, identities and ideas about the common good’ (Bauböck, Al 
Tamimi); and, due to all the above, it is clearly political (Bauböck, Post, 
Blake, Al Tamimi). Key remaining criticisms not answered by generalising 
the vision to incorporate all of humanity are those related to the use of coer-
cion in community governance (Bauböck, Post, Blake, Dumbrava, Al 
Tamimi), lack of inclusivity (Ypi and Kochenov), and the risks of new tech-
nology (Dumbrava), which I will answer now in turn.
For our envisioned global democracy to be worthy of its name, it must 
uphold democratic values1, including sovereignty, equality, freedom of 
assembly, the subsidiarity principle, transparency, and the conservation of 
the natural and imprescriptible human rights: liberty, property, safety and 
resistance against oppression.2
A fundamental advantage of blockchain technology is that it is the only 
technology to date that can uphold sovereignty: The multitudes participating 
in the operation of the blockchain are its sovereign; no member, third party 
or outside entity has omnipotent ‘super user’ or ‘administrator’ capabilities 
over the system, and no-one can pull the plug on it: it will survive as long as 
there are interconnected participants who are able and willing to continue its 
operation.3 Hence, the answer to Stefania Milan’s question, ‘do we really 
need the blockchain to enable the emergence of cloud communities?’, is: 
Yes, if we want cloud communities to be sovereign and not subservient.
The situation is not as rosy with equality. Governance trepidations of the 
‘cloud communities’ of the leading cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum, 
which consist of their developers, miners and owners, resulted in  community 
1 Shapiro, E. (2017), ‘Foundations of e-Democracy’, Computers and Society. 
Available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.02873
2 Ibid.
3 I acknowledge Milan’s point that such interconnectedness (but not the comput-
ers being connected!) would most-probably be commercially-owned, and that 
it is essential that such interconnectedness be neutral and unhindered, even if 
owned and controlled by private or government interests. Given that, global 




breakups termed ‘hard forks’. Hence, second- and third-generation crypto-
currencies attempt to address their self-governance from first principles.4 
However, they offer only plutocratic solutions,5 espousing ‘one coin – one 
vote’ instead of the ‘one person – one vote’ principle necessary for equality. 
It may be ironic, given the thrust of our discussion, that the only approach 
available today to realise equality on the blockchain is to piggyback on iden-
tities issued by earthly governments. Besides defeating the purpose of free-
ing cloud communities from the grasp of their earthly counterparts, this 
approach cannot mix and match governments or identity- granting authori-
ties, lest people with multiple government-issued identities have multiple 
votes in the cloud; and it excludes people, such as refugees, who may be 
hard pressed to present a government-issued identity.
Realising truthful, unique and persistent global digital identities for all, a 
precondition for making an egalitarian blockchain, is a major open chal-
lenge.6 But, for the sake of the vision we wish to paint, please suspend dis-
belief and assume that: (i) a worthy method for granting global digital 
identities to all has been devised, allowing any individual to claim a global 
identity (which functions as the ‘attested individual identities’ Kochenov 
aspires for); call the rightful owners of such global identities global citizens; 
(ii) unhindered internet access has been globally recognised as a basic civil 
right and is provided, directly or via a proxy, to any individual wishing to 
become a global citizen. While disbelief regarding the first assumption could 
be discharged in a decade, the second one will take longer. However, stating 
the goal of universal access as a basic civil right, taking concrete steps to 
implement it effectively, and making interim amends to compensate for its 
temporary lack, are all essential for our vision to be legitimate (and to 
address the justified criticisms of exclusion by Ypi and Kochenov). With this 
in mind, let us explore the vision of bringing about a global democracy of 
global citizens.
4 Bitshares (2018), Technology. Available at https://bitshares.org/technology/; 
Tezos (2018), Governance. Available at https://www.tezos.com/governance
5 Buterin, V. (2018), ‘Governance, Part 2: Plutocracy Is Still Bad’, Vitalik 
Buterin’s Website, 28 March, available at https://vitalik.ca/general/2018/03/28/
plutocracy.html
6 Disclosure: My team at Weizmann aims to address this global challenge. Note 
that it will not be solved just by achieving broader coverage of local govern-
ment-issued IDs (‘Identification for Development’, available at http://www.
worldbank.org/en/programs/id4d).
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As much as disbelief is suspended, a method for granting global digital 
identities will never be perfect. Hence, the global democracy will have to 
grapple with fraud (fake, duplicate and stolen identities, Sybil attacks), 
extortion (the $5 wrench attack) and negligence (lost/forgotten password). 
Resolving such matters with due process would require a court. Such a court 
would need to rule according to a constitution. And the operation of the 
court (populated most likely by a combination of people and machines) will 
have to be financed. So we have hardly left the doorstep in our journey 
towards a global cloud democracy, and already discovered that in order to 
realise equality we need a global court, a global constitution, and a global 
currency.
That the global democracy needs a currency immediately suggests a 
cryptocurrency. But, how can we entrust the future of humanity to the hands 
of an environmentally-harmful7, plutocratic regime? The answer is of fun-
damental importance: Current cryptocurrencies were architected on the 
premise that participants are anonymous and trustless, and resorted to the 
deliberately wasteful (Milan) proof-of-work protocol to cope with trustless-
ness. If indeed we have a mechanism for granting truthful and unique global 
digital identities that is reasonably resilient to attacks (e.g. at most one third 
of the global identities are compromised at any time)8 then the global democ-
racy can deploy an egalitarian and planet-friendly cryptocurrency with a 
democratic governance regime; let’s call such a cryptocurrency a demo-
cratic cryptocurrency.
Let’s take stock: We have a democratic cryptocurrency governed by sov-
ereign global citizens that are subject to a global court that rules according 
to a global constitution and is financed by the democratic cryptocurrency. 
This may sound a bit circular, but that’s exactly how earthly states finance 
their operation. For example, the democratic cryptoeconomy can be fuelled 
by a universal basic income to all global citizens.9 Income, wealth and trans-
7 Present-day cryptocurrencies are unsustainable, even environmentally-harmful, 
since the proof-of-work protocols that underlie, for example, Bitcoin and 
Ethereum are unfathomably energy-wasteful on purpose: The ongoing opera-
tion of Bitcoin alone consumes as of today more energy than does the entire 
state of Israel, with its more than 8 million inhabitants (Bitcoin Energy 
Consumption Index, available at https://digiconomist.net/
bitcoin-energy-consumption)
8 Algorand (2018), Algorand Website. https://www.algorand.com/
9 Flynn, J. (2018), ‘The Cryptoeconomics of Funding a Universal Basic 




actions could be taxed, progressively if the global democracy decides so. 
Tax revenues would be disbursed to finance the operation of the global 
democracy, in particular the court and the underlying computational infra-
structure (‘mining’), as well as other purposes, according to a democratically- 
formed budget.10 To prevent speculative manipulation of the exchange rate 
of the democratic cryptocurrency, a global central bank may be established, 
with authority to purchase and sell foreign (crypto)currency to hinder such 
manipulations; the bank can similarly set an interest rate. The constitution 
will have to be updated as the global democracy develops, and subsidiary 
legislation will have to be adopted. So, in just a few short paragraphs we 
have come to realise that the global citizens of a global cloud democracy 
that has its own cryptocurrency and cryptoeconomy will have to recreate 
almost all the functions of earthly states; let’s call this resulting specific 
vision a global cryptodemocracy, to distinguish it from the more general 
and abstract idea of a global democracy. If successful, it would show that a 
technology built with an ‘underlying philosophy of distributed consensus, 
open source, transparency and community’ can be both ‘highly disruptive’ 
and ‘serve similar purposes as those of states’ (Milan); and it could achieve 
that without a reliance on the private sector and corporate capital that would 
necessitate paying undue attention to their interests and lobbying (Milan).
Additional key criticisms concern the ability of our global cryptodemoc-
racy to protect human rights (Bauböck, Blake, Kochenov), collect taxes 
(Bauböck, Post) and in general enforce the rule of the law, given that physi-
cal coercion is possible on earth but not in the clouds (Bauböck, Post, Blake, 
Dumbrava, Al Tamimi). To redress crimes against global identities, we pro-
pose that global identities be realised as programmable software agents, aka 
‘smart contracts’, programmed to obey certified court orders. Thus, coercion 
is achieved through design and programmability, without violence: If the 
court determines a global identity to be fake, then it can directly order it to 
terminate; if determined to be a duplicate, then it can be ordered to merge 
into another identity, and if stolen then to change its owner. Regarding 
Milan’s observation that ‘activism today is characterised by […] a tendency 
to privilege flexible, multiple identities’, we cannot hold the stick at both 
ends: aspire for egalitarian rule of law in a global democracy, and undermine 
it with flexible (and hence unaccountable) and multiple (and hence unfairly 
privileged) identities.
10 Shapiro, E. & N. Talmon (2017), ‘A Condorcet-Consistent Democratic 
Budgeting Algorithm’, Computer Science and Game Theory, available at 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.05839
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We propose to integrate the global citizen’s global identity with her dem-
ocratic cryptocurrency wallet into one entity, termed global persona. A 
global persona is the global citizen’s proxy in the cloud: it is entrusted with 
the global citizen’s identity information and crypto-assets, and it performs 
financial transactions and civic duties in the global cryptodemocracy on 
behalf of the global citizen it represents. Being unique and persistent makes 
a global persona accountable for the global citizen it represents. Hence, in 
addition to the court orders described above, a court may also issue fines 
against a global persona, payable immediately from her wallet, or deducted 
from her future (universal basic) income. As the global persona is pro-
grammed to obey court orders, no force is needed to collect such fines either. 
Income, wealth and transaction taxes can be similarly collected without the 
use of force, by programming global personas to obey the (democratically 
instituted) tax rules that are in effect. Of course, the court must be open to 
appeals on any decision and transaction.
A key remaining criticism relates to relying on and overseeing the tech-
nologies that will underlie our envisioned global cryptodemocracy (Post, 
Dumbrava). The criticism is valid, but is mostly equally valid of any tech-
nology on which humanity depends today, and there are many. Perhaps one 
key technological vulnerability is related to the democratic process itself, 
ensuring that elections and more generally voting on the blockchain at least 
stand up to earthly standards.11 Regarding overseeing blockchain technol-
ogy, blockchain governance is indeed an issue of active research and experi-
mentation, with the recognition that a change of underlying technology of a 
blockchain is as akin to, and as grave as, a change of constitution in a democ-
racy. The global cryptodemocracy would employ the constitutional approach 
to its core technology, allowing constitutional change by its sovereign global 
citizens via a democratic process. Such a process must dampen the imme-
diacy of internet communication, lest mob dynamics may rule, by employ-
ing hysteresis measures such as special majority requirements.12 Recovery 
mechanisms would also be established, and invoked, by democratic 
decision.
Let us now consider Orgad’s vision of multiple cloud communities with 
a shared concern or ascriptive, thematic or geographic memberships ‘whose 
11 European External Action Service (2018), Compendium of International 
Standards for Elections. Available at https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/
compendium-en-n-pdf.pdf




aim is political decision-making and in which individuals take part in a pro-
cess of governance and the creation of law.’
First, we note that all these communities can be subsidiary communities 
of the global cryptodemocracy, potentially with multiple levels of hierarchy 
(e.g. subsidiary animal rights or Bahá'í communities, with their own subsid-
iary communities based on country of residence); that the ability to form 
them is a manifestation of freedom of assembly in the clouds; and that allow-
ing them to conduct their affairs without outside intervention is in line with 
the subsidiarity principle.
Second, such communities, within the context of a functioning global 
cryptodemocracy, may have at least one clear political goal: To draft and 
promote, within the parent global cryptodemocracy, policy and legislation 
that pertain to the rights and goals of their (possibly minority) community 
members. Recall the second article of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen: ‘The goal of any political association is the conservation 
of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, 
property, safety and resistance against oppression’. To uphold these, the 
conduct of all subsidiary cloud communities must be transparent in order to 
ensure that no subsidiary community aims to harm the liberty, property or 
safety of other communities or global citizens.
Third, within these rich and multi-faceted cloud communities, a virtual 
punishment with a global scope against one’s global persona, e.g. temporary 
suspension or even just a public reprimand, applied to all subsidiary cloud 
communities, would be severe indeed. Hence, the higher the value of the 
subsidiary cloud communities to peoples’ lives, the mightier the coercive 
power of the global cryptodemocracy.
While we have implicitly assumed an egalitarian, democratic decision- 
making process at the core of global cryptodemocracy and in its subsidiary 
communities that will choose to adopt it, we have not specified this process. 
Such a mechanism faces many challenges, including ‘tyranny of structure-
lessness’, ‘tyranny of emotions’, decision-making by ‘microconsensus’ 
within small cliques (Milan) and many others. The question of how to best 
reach a democratic decision has been investigated sporadically for centuries 
(e.g. by Llull, Condorcet, Borda), and intensively for the last 70 years within 
Social Choice theory. Much theory was developed, much confusion was 
sowed, and confidence in democracy has eroded, mainly due to Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem and its follow-on work. I will just hint that adding a 
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taste for reality to social choice theory can undo much of this damage and 
restore trust in democratic decision making, on and off the cloud.13
I have aimed to show that a vision of a global cryptodemocracy, with a rich 
set of subsidiary cloud communities, is realisable and have tried to address 
many of the criticisms raised in this debate. But, even if a global cryptodemo-
cracy is realisable, and successfully addresses criticism, is it desirable? My 
personal answer is positive for two reasons: First, I believe that, since the days 
of Kant and even before,14 the proponents of a world government own the 
moral high ground, and the weakness of their position was practical: Until 
now, for a world government to materialise, local governments have to volun-
teer to cease some of their power; and giving up of power is not known to 
happen voluntarily. Fortunately, earthly democracies are sufficiently free so 
that the formation of a global cryptodemocracy does not require their consent. 
True, dictatorial regimes may prevent their citizens from participating, but 
this would, eventually, be at their own peril, as the interests of their people 
will not be represented as well. And true, the full power of a global cryptode-
mocracy will not be realised until proponents of global democracy become 
majorities in the majority of their respective earthly states. Yet, embryonic as 
it may be, the global cryptodemocracy vision presented here may very well be 
the only concrete proposal towards the ultimate realisation of a global demo-
cratic government based on currently available technologies.
And this relates to my second reason. I believe that for representative 
democracies to rebounce from their worldwide decline, they should undergo 
a major revision and adopt the practices of one of the oldest and most suc-
cessful democracies in the world, namely the Swiss federal direct democ-
racy. Given that those in power never give it up voluntarily, and that direct 
democracy disempowers representatives, such a major shift cannot happen 
without a major outside force in its favor. And new technology can offer 
such a force. In particular, political e-parties, formed as subsidiary cloud 
communities of the global cryptodemocracy, sharing the same technology 
and networking to share winning practices and methods, may be able to win 
earthly elections and change earthly democracies for the better. This in turn 
13 Shapiro, E. & N. Talmon (2018), ‘Incorporating Reality into Social Choice’, 
Computers and Society, available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.10117
14 Global Challenges Foundation (2018), Global governance models in history. 




may result in such earthly democracies officially supporting15 the global 
cryptodemocracy in its rise into a bona fide egalitarian democratic world 
government of all global citizens.
15 For example, a state may create government-attested global personas for all its 
citizens, place them in the escrow of the state notary, and assign them to 
citizens upon their presentation of a government-issued ID. This would 
immediately turn all state citizens into global citizens. A state citizen who 
already owns a global persona will have to merge it with the received govern-
ment-attested global persona, lest she would be guilty of owning duplicate 
global personas.
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The Future of Citizenship:  
Global and Digital – A Rejoinder
Liav Orgad
This has been an insightful discussion that touches upon some of the most 
fundamental concepts in political theory – communities, states, citizenship, 
and sovereignty. New technologies challenge the meaning and essence of these 
terms and blur the lines between physical and digital, local and global. The 
nature of the transformation is still a puzzle, but sooner rather than later the 
‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ will reach the institution of citizenship. The pos-
sible effects are promising but, as this GLOBALCIT debate shows, scary too.
My celebration of the potential of blockchain technologies to advance 
the idea of global citizenship lost in the GLOBALCIT digital agora, at least 
if we count ‘votes.’ There are four firm supporters (Primavera De Filippi, 
Francesca Strumia, Dora Kostakopoulou, Ehud Shapiro), five strong objec-
tors (Robert Post, Michael Blake, Peter Spiro, Lea Ypi, Dimitry Kochenov), 
and five people who are somewhere in between, acknowledging the poten-
tial yet expressing concerns (Rainer Bauböck, Costica Dumbrava, Yussef Al 
Tamimi, Jelena Dzankic, Stefania Milan). The objections are wide – theo-
retical and practical, empirical and normative, methodological and concep-
tual. The idea of blockchain-based global citizenship, which can lead to the 
development of cloud communities that seek to take part in international 
decision making, is seen as ‘techno-utopianism’ (Milan), ‘escapism’ 
(Kochenov), and ‘exclusion[ary]’ (Ypi), a risk to ‘territorial democracy’ 
(Bauböck) that may bring a ‘world without law’ (Post) and ‘legitimate coer-
cion’ that is so essential for the protection of human rights (Blake).
My kick-off had several premises. When discussing the need for an inter-
national legal persona for all human beings, I indicated three fundamental 
problems: human rights concerns (1.1 billion people do not have an official 
identification), lack of self-governance (individuals have no direct voice in 
The research is supported by the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant 
(# 716350).
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international law-making), and unequal representation (the principle of ‘one-
state, one-vote’ leads to disparities in individual voting power). I identified 
three developments – the rise of global interconnectedness, identity, and 
responsibility – that, taken together, can end up with the creation of an inter-
national legal persona and digital identity (as a form of ‘global citizenship’), 
thereby mitigating some of these problems. I also indicated one possible out-
come of global citizenship – the emergence of (top-down and bottom-up) 
decentralised ‘cloud communities’ in which global citizens, sharing a com-
mon bond, can be politically organised and collaborate with the purpose of 
influencing international decision making and, eventually, becoming part of it. 
The authors in this debate have not addressed the premises, yet challenged my 
observations (e.g., global interconnectedness) and my conclusion – the poten-
tial of global digital citizenship to do more good than harm. I cannot do justice 
to all the subtle replies, so let me first express my gratefulness to the partici-
pants – this has been enriching experience, although it has not changed my 
optimistic view – and briefly address below some issues that I see as central.
 Cloud computing
A large percentage of humanity is already engaged with some forms of cloud 
computing on a daily basis. Whenever you use Google Drive, Apple iCloud, 
and Dropbox, you spend time ‘in the cloud.’ Whenever you use audio and 
video streaming, online storage, and mobile services, you are ‘in the cloud.’ 
Government services, research data, medical records, and consumer services 
are available ‘in the cloud.’ Social networks too are ‘in the cloud.’ I have never 
physically met most of the authors who contributed to this debate, but I meet 
them on a daily basis on Facebook. The reason why we call these digital struc-
tures ‘cloud’ is not due to the lack of territory – the hardware is located some-
where – but because territory is largely irrelevant for the user and the service.
Cloud computing does not create, in and of itself, a ‘community’ (Post, 
Spiro), let alone a political community (Blake). Facebook is a social net-
work, not a political community. It is commercial and dictatorial – members 
have no common bond and cannot create law or engage in governance – and 
it does not guarantee a truthful unique identity. Yet, in recent years there 
have been attempts to create cloud-based ‘communities’ by using blockchain 
and other technologies. This started as private initiatives, such as Bitnation, 
but spread into government initiatives, as illustrated by Estonia’s e-resi-
dency. True, e-Estonia is far from creating a ‘community’; Estonia’s e-resi-
dents do not interact with one another or cooperate for political purposes. 
They are a group of clients more than a sovereign. It is also true that the 
notion of DBVNs (Decentralized Borderless Voluntary Nations), where any-
one can build a ‘community’ in a Pangea jurisdiction – an IKEA-style do-it-
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yourself nation – is unrealistic and undesirable. Still, the idea of a political 
community in which territory is largely irrelevant for certain political func-
tions is worth considering. Thus far, it has been regarded as radical because 
it was promoted by anarchists and like-minded people looking for disruptive 
technologies to replace the nation-state. But as technology becomes more 
developed, it is just a matter of time until the idea will crystallise.
 Political community
Even if the idea crystallises, can we really call cloud networks a ‘political 
community,’ or would they be like a ‘community of video gamers,’ to use 
Spiro’s analogy, or just an addition to global civil society (Bauböck, Post, 
Milan)? The essence of the community I envision is indeed political, having 
members who share a common bond (say, the protection of animal rights) 
and seek to become part of national (and mainly international) decision 
making. There are similarities between cloud communities and global civil 
society (Bauböck, Post, Milan) as they are both voluntary, political in nature, 
civil (in the sense of non-governmental), and usually non-profit. But there 
are some differences. The global civil society is not composed of sovereign 
political entities where decision making is based on a ‘one person, one vote’ 
principle; global civil society organisations are acting on behalf of a group, 
while decentralised cloud communities can form themselves democratic 
collectives acting on a global scale.
Do cloud communities merit being called ‘political communities’? It 
depends on the nature of such a community and how it will be developed. At 
least three components should come together: 1) members should have a 
self-perception as belonging to a collective entity, a shared consciousness of 
forming a political community; 2) members should have political relations 
and act with a collective responsibility; 3) members should be capable of act-
ing collectively with regard to some functions. Take immigrants, for exam-
ple. If all international migrants – more than 250 million people in 2017 – joined 
a virtual community, it would be the world’s fifth largest ‘country’ (after 
China, India, USA, and Indonesia). It could act as a self- governed collective 
at the international level, negotiating with states and UN agencies, collecting 
taxes, and promoting immigrant rights worldwide – all based not on repre-
sentatives or NGOs, but on direct decision-making by its members.
 Digital coercion
What about coercion – how can there be a political community without a 
recourse to force (Bauböck, Post, Blake, Dumbrava)? Normatively, the 
coercive force of law can be independent of the state or its territory; it 
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requires authority. Such authority exists also in a blockchain-based commu-
nity with one main difference – it is decentralised. If, for example, the 
‘migrant cloud community’ decides collectively to stop migration to a cer-
tain country that does not respect migrants’ rights or to buy products from 
certain retailers, and a migrant who is a member violates the rules, s/he can 
be sanctioned (through fines, suspension, limited access to rights/data, or 
termination of membership). As long as membership provides some bene-
fits, particularly the ability to influence and shape decisions that affect the 
member’s life, these sanctions are not minor or trivial.
Technologically, since membership is virtual, coercion is realised via 
software. As Shapiro notes, one’s virtual identity (or ‘global persona’) is 
programmed to obey the community’s decisions (‘coercion is achieved 
through design and programmability, without violence’). In fact, state laws 
represent ‘weak coercion’; there are papers that set rules (e.g., a prohibition 
of murder or crossing a red light) and one decides whether to follow the rules 
or violate them, in this case there are punishments and sanctions. Internet 
protocols are one step further. They are a form of ‘strong coercion’; internet 
codes (e.g., restrictions and blockings) are stronger than papers because the 
law of the software is more difficult to violate – it is not in the discretion of 
an individual but requires knowledge and effort. A digital society represents 
a form of ‘absolute coercion.’ Transaction monitoring (e.g., voting, tax, or 
registry) is governed by blockchain rules that one cannot violate.
Socially, ‘punishment’ in a digital society is of a different type. A person 
cannot be sent to jail, but her reputation can be discredited. In the digital era, 
reputation capital is a valuable asset and a factor for providing services and 
products (think of Airbnb, Uber, eBay). In other words, online reputation 
has a real-world value. As Al Tamimi observes, ‘A punishment in terms of 
such social devaluation imposed by the cloud state is conceivably more 
painful and restricting to the individual than traditional methods of punish-
ment, such as fines or jail.’
 Functional sovereignty
The territorial dimension of states has been seen central to citizenship (Bauböck, 
Post, Blake). Indeed, territory is considered the state’s most characteristic fea-
ture; states are, by definition (Article 1, Montevideo Convention, 19331), 
territorial units. Territory is considered necessary for assuming most of the nor-
mative functions of the state – for instance, as a source of security and identity, 
1 Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp
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and for managing natural resources. Against this background, the concept of a 
deterritorialised state – or cloud communities that would replace the state and 
fulfil all of its functions – is politically inconceivable. But this does not entail 
that none of the state’s essential functions can be reconceptualised. Cloud com-
munities are not a state-replacement, but an improvement – they seek to add a 
circle to the already dynamic and multi- layered rich dimensions of citizenship. 
They are not supposed to act in the physical world – and thus have no sover-
eignty on issues like murder (Post) – but to govern the transaction of values or 
data that exist in the digital world (voting, registries, certificates, etc.). However, 
as cloud communities become politically more important, what happens there 
will not remain confined to the cloud but influence real-world political 
decision-making.
The idea of ‘concentric circles’ of citizenship – to use Cicero metaphor – 
with each circle having a different normative function, is not foreign to the 
theory of sovereignty. There are three options: cloud communities can be 
seen as sub-sovereign entities, semi/quasi-sovereign entities, or functional 
sovereign entities. Let me focus on the third option – functional sovereignty. 
Under this approach, sovereignty is divided by functions, with each being 
governed by a different entity. Think of federal systems, a condominium of 
states, mandate/trusteeship, autonomy (e.g., Quebec or Puerto Rico), or 
municipalities (where certain functions are governed by local sovereignty). 
Divisible sovereignty can be exercised over territories – e.g. Andorra, which 
was a condominium before independence in 1993 and still had two heads of 
state (the French president and a Catalan bishop) – or peoples. Sovereignty 
can be divided between political entities, as in federations or in the European 
Union, or between political and nonpolitical entities – think of religion (in 
Israeli law, for example, religious law is sovereign in family issues). The idea 
of functional sovereignty, as coined by Willem Riphagen in 1975,2 enables 
entity A to have sovereignty over social welfare, entity B to be the sovereign 
on financial issues, and entity C to enjoy sovereignty over  security – all in the 
same territory. It also makes it possible for different political authorities to 
exercise functional sovereignty over different peoples in the same space. The 
switch is from a jurisdiction over territories to a jurisdiction over functions, 
peoples and services. As this is not a new concept, we can understand how it 
could be applied to blockchain-based cloud communities as well.
The normative functions of cloud communities remain an open question 
in the debate. My focus has been on global topics – global warming, the 
2 Riphagen, W. 1975. ‘Some Reflections on Functional Sovereignty’, 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 6: 121–165.
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environment, and other issues of global sustainability – but it is for the states 
to decide which functions to delegate to self-sovereign communities. 
Ultimately, states would set the boundaries and decide the sensitive areas in 
which sovereignty cannot/should not be divided or shared.
 Coda
We can construct theoretical models of digital citizenship but, as this debate 
has shown, there are plenty of uncertainties – political, technological, and 
psychological ones – before it can become actually operative. I agree with 
Milan that ‘much work is needed . . . before we can proclaim the blockchain 
revolution.’ In particular, I share the concern about global inequality gener-
ated by ideas of cloud communities due to lack of internet access (Dzankic, 
Ypi, Kochenov) – this gap, however, has tremendously (and rapidly) nar-
rowed and in 104 states more than 80 per cent of the youth population (aged 
15–24) are now online. The situation will further improve if a right to inter-
net access is universally recognised. And I cannot but share Bauböck’s wor-
ries about the tyranny of the majority in the cloud – addressing it is a matter 
of constitutional design of voting mechanisms (note, however, that there 
will be judicial review, decisions that require supermajority, and perhaps 
even veto rights in the digital world as well). Discussing these (and others) 
concerns will keep theorists and policy makers busy in the years to come. 
While the focus of this debate is on global citizenship and virtual communi-
ties, I see it as a broader invitation to reflect on the nexus between new 
technologies and the future of citizenship.
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of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the Anudo case 
against Tanzania issued in March 2018.”
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